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Two   central   ideas   characterise   the   dominant   discourse   surrounding   sovereign   debt  
and   sovereign   debt   crises:   the   portrayal   of   the   crisis   as   the   only   problem   and   the  
singling   out   of   the   debtor   state   as   the  main   culprit.   This   thesis   challenges   both   of  
these   ideas   and,   in   doing   so,   contributes   to   the   nascent   normative   literature   on  
finance  and   justice,  as  well  as  to  the  more  established  debates  on  global   justice  and  
structural  injustice.  
   First,   the   most   serious   problem   is   not   the   crisis   itself,   but   a   highly  
asymmetrical  and  unjust  Sovereign  Debt  and  Credit  Regime  (SD&CR),  which  rests  on  
and   further  entrenches  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage  along   lines  of  class  
and   citizenship.  Occupiers   of   positions   of   disadvantage   are   vulnerable   to   structural  
domination   and   exploitation   when   debt   is   accrued.   Three   heuristic   categories   are  
introduced   here   to   better   understand   how   the   injustices   characterising   the   SD&CR  
are   reproduced,   namely   the   ‘structural   processes   proper’,   the   ‘structural-­‐relational’,  
and  the  ‘structural-­‐systemic’  dimensions.    
   Second,  an  integrated  responsibility  model  is  defended,  which  challenges  the  
unilateral   attribution   of   responsibility   to   the   debtor   state   and   allows   for   more  
expansive   and   differentiated   responsibility   attribution.   According   to   this   model,  
creditors  can  be  held  responsible  on  three  grounds:  moral  responsibility,  benefit,  and  
role   responsibility.   Disadvantaged   debtor   governments,   in   turn,   are   responsible   to  
resist   their  domination  and  exploitation.  This   responsibility  may  give   rise   to   (a)   the  
duty   to   refuse   to   renounce   their   own   agency   by   endorsing   outcome   responsibility,  
and  (b)  to  the  duty  to  engage  in  acts  of  state  civil  disobedience.  Finally,  citizens  cease  
to   have   debt   servicing   obligations   if   the   state   budget   is   systematically   used   in   the  
interest   of   only   a   fraction   of   the   state’s   citizenry   and   whenever   the   acquisition   of  
further  debt  threatens  the  state’s  ability  to  act  in  the  public  interest.     
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INTRODUCTION    
The  Danger  of  the  Single  Story    
Stories   matter.   Many   stories   matter.   Stories   have   been   used   to  
dispossess  and  to  malign,  but  stories  can  also  be  used  to  empower  
and   to   humanize.   Stories   can   break   the   dignity   of   a   people,   but  
stories   can   also   repair   that   broken   dignity.   -­‐   Chimamanda   Ngozi  
Adichie  
  
In   a   powerful   TED   talk,   acclaimed   writer   Chimamanda   Ngozi   Adichie   warns   her  
audience  of  the  danger  of  the  single  story.  Growing  up  in  southern  Nigeria,  she  tells  
her   public   how   she   first   arrived   on   an   American   university   campus   and   was  
confronted,  day  in  and  day  out,  with  the  same  questions  about  the  place  –   ‘Africa’  –  
that   she   allegedly   came   from.  Was   it   true   that   famine  made  one’s   belly   swell?  And  
that  women  were  kicked  out  of  their  villages  when  raped?  American  campuses  at  the  
time   of   Adichie’s   arrival   were   awash   with   a   single   story   about   Africa   -­‐   a   story   of  
catastrophe.1    
Though  saddened  by  the  image  portrayed  of  a  continent  that  continues  to  be  
perceived  by  many  as  one  large  territorial  entity,  Adichie  is  quick  in  emphasising  that  
none  of  us   are   exempt   from  passively   endorsing   the   single   stories   that   surround  us  
daily.  Standing  amid  a  lively  and  colourful  vegetable  market  in  Mexico  City,  Adichie  
confesses  to  feeling  ashamed  of  herself  upon  realising  that  she  too,  had  bought  into  a  
single  story  of  Mexico  –  a  story  of  drug  wars  and  cartel  violence.  The  power  of  these  
single  stories,  then,  does  not  solely  reside  in  telling  a  particular  story  about  a  person  
or   a   phenomenon,   but   in  making   it   the   definitive   story,   the   one   that   counts.   It   is  
when  we  begin  to  question  the  unchallenged  authority  of  each   individual  story  that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Adichie,  2009.  
   8  
we   realise   that   there   is  never  one,  definitive   story  about  any  place  or  phenomenon,  
and  ‘we  regain  a  kind  of  paradise’.2    
My   objective   in   this   thesis   is   to   question   the   dominance   of   the   single   story  
most  commonly   told  about  sovereign  debt  and  sovereign  debt  crises.  On  one  hand,  
this   single   story   is   about   the   ‘repayment   norm’,3  which   concerns   the  moral   duty   of  
debtor   states   and   their   citizens   to   repay   debt   accrued   in   their   name,   because  
contracts  carry  normative  weight  and  ought   to  be  obeyed.  But   the  single  story  goes  
much   further   than  this.  When  a  country   is   faced  with  a  sovereign  debt  crisis  and   is  
unable  to  service  its  debts,  the  state  is  not  seen  as  just  facing  a  momentary  liquidity  
crisis,  but  rather  as  a  pariah   in  the   international  arena  –   it   is  not  solely   illiquid,  but  
also  immoral.4  The  discussions  regarding  Greece’s  debt  restructuring  in  the  midst  of  
the  sovereign  debt  crises  at  the  heart  of  the  EU  and  the  commentary  on  Argentina’s  
legal   battle   in  New   York   court   rooms   are   excellent   examples   of   this.   After   its   2001  
default,  Argentina  was  denounced  as  a  ‘parasite  state’  that,  despite  its  rich  resources,  
survives  at  the  cost  of  the  global  financial  economy,5  while  Greece  has  been  referred  
to  as  a  ‘black  sheep’,  a  ‘free  rider’  and  a  ‘profligate’  state.6    
This  highly  moralised  story  helps  to  render   invisible  the  obvious  distributive  
implications  of  sovereign  debt  crises.  The  question  of  who  is  to  bear  the  burdens  that  
arise   from   the   accumulation   of   unsustainable   debt,   both   in   the   private   and   in   the  
public  sector,  is  hardly  ever  thematised.  It  hides  behind  the  invocation  of  the  binding  
nature   of   debt   contracts,   obscuring   the   thorny   normative   questions   that   would  
challenge  a  unilateral   attribution  of  distributive  burdens   to   the  debtor   state  and   its  
citizenry.  While  these  distributive  aspects   include  questions  of  debt   forgiveness  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  Adichie,  2009.  
3  Lienau,  2014,  p.1;  Wollner,  2017,  p.1.  
4  Mason  and  Asher,  in  Lienau,  2014,  p.  18;  Antoniades,  2012;  Horas,  2015.  
5  Escudé,  2002,  p.453.  
6  Antoniades,  2012,  p.11.  Due  to  its  racists  undertones,  I  find  ‘black  sheep’  the  most  troubling  
expression.    
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debt  restructuring,  they  are  not  restricted  to  this,  for  attempts  to  solve  sovereign  debt  
crises  go  far  beyond  issues  of  credit  and  debt,  and  affect  all  aspects  involved  in  fiscal  
revenue  raising  and  expenditures.  Sovereign  debt  crises  are   thus  deeply   intertwined  
with   the   most   fundamental   political   choices   of   sovereign   states,   affecting   socio-­‐
economic  policies  for  present  and  future  generations  alike.      
In   this   thesis,   I   hope   to   offer   an   alternative   to   this   standard   story   normally  
told   about   sovereign   debt   and   credit.   In   doing   so,   I   do   not   limit   myself   to   solely  
questioning   the   obligation   of   citizens   to   repay   debt   accrued   in   their   name   –   an  
obligation   which   continues   to   be   nearly   unqualified   to   this   day   –   but   also   draw  
attention  to  the  unjust  structures  that  underlie  allegedly  free  and  equal   interactions  
between   sovereigns   and   their   creditors.   The   most   serious   problem,   as   I   intend   to  
show,   is   not   the   crisis   itself,   as   that   is   just   a   moment   of   obvious   rupture   that  
represents  only   the  tip  of   the   iceberg.  Nor   is   the  concern  an  exclusively  distributive  
one,   though   the   burdening   of   those   who   are   already   worse   off   with   the   costs   of  
sovereign  debt  crises  definitely  ought  to  worry  us.    
The  real  problem  resides  in  a  highly  asymmetrical  and  unjust  Sovereign  Debt  
and   Credit   Regime   (SD&CR).   The   SD&CR   can   be   defined   as   the   formal,   as   well   as  
informal,  institutions  that  regulate  the  extension  and  repayment  of  sovereign  debt.  I  
consciously   refer   to  both  credit  and  debt   in  order   to  emphasise   that   the  problem   is  
not  only  one  of  the  debtor  who  acquires  too  much  debt.  For  ‘credit  is  to  debt  as  virtue  
is  to  vice’7  –  it  is  an  identity  equation  and  there  cannot  be  one  without  the  other.  The  
term   'the   SD&CR   '   allows   me   to   problematise   both   sides   of   this   identity  
equation.  Embedded   in   a   highly-­‐financialised   economy,   the   SD&CR   rests   on   and  
further  entrenches  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage  along   lines  of  class  and  
statehood.  When  a  state  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  within  the  regime  accrues  debt,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Gregory,  2012,  p.381-­‐386.  
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individuals   qua   citizens   of   the   state   and   qua   members   of   what   I   call   the   wage-­‐
dependent  class  are  rendered  vulnerable  to  domination  and  exploitation.  It  is  thus  a  
mistake   to   assume   that   sovereign   states,   from   a   position   of   freedom   and   equality,  
decide   to   accrue  debt.  De-­‐bunking   this   implausible,   yet   still  widely-­‐endorsed  myth,  
moreover,  interrogates  the  responsibility  picture  commonly  associated  with  sovereign  
debt  crisis  and  the  responses  to  them.    
To   tell   this   alternative   story,   I   address   two   central   questions:   first,   what   is  
wrong   with   the   way   in   which   the   SD&CR   currently   operates,   and   second,   who   is  
responsible  for  these  injustices?  While  the  first  part  of  the  thesis  provides  a  structural  
analysis   that   answers   the   first   question,   the   second   part   addresses   the   question   of  
how  to  make  sense  of  the  responsibility  of  individual  agents  against  the  backdrop  of  a  
structural  diagnosis  of  the  regime’s  wrongs.  I  believe  that  answering  these  questions  
challenges  the  definitive  character  of  the  standard  story  of  sovereign  debt  and  credit  
and   thereby   contains   the   power   to   subvert   the   current   order,   opening   space   for  
contestation,   critique   and,   hopefully,   emancipation.   Stories,   as   Adichie   reminds   us,  
‘can  also  be  used  to  empower.’    
  
The  Limitations  of  the  Normative  Literature  on  Sovereign  Debt    
Within  political  theory,  most  existing  literature  concerning  sovereign  debt  and  credit  
is   concerned   with   the   question   of   debt   repayment.   What   conditions   need   to   be  
imposed   for   a   sovereign   debt   contract   to   be   binding?8   Are   there   circumstances   in  
which  a  binding  debt  contract  ought   to  be  overridden?9   It   is  argued   that   for  a  debt  
contract   to   be   binding,   the   contracting   parties   need   to   be   both   formally   and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8   Barry   and   Tomitova,   2006;   Wollner,   2017;   Dimitriu,   2017;   Dimitriu,   2015,   Dimitriu,   2011;  
Reddy,  2007;  Palley,  2003;  Gosseries,  2007;  Toussaint,  2016.  
9  Wollner,  2017.  
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substantively  free.  10  Whereas  formal  freedom  necessitates  that  neither  agent  A  nor  B    
have   the   right   to   unilaterally   dictate   the   terms   of   their   interaction,   substantive  
freedom   entails   the   additional   requirement   that   neither   party      be   able   to   exercise  
effective   and   unilateral   control   over   the   terms   of   the   interaction   by   virtue   of   its  
superior  power.  Enjoying  substantive  freedom  for  a  debtor  requires  having  a  range  of  
meaningful  conduct  options,  at  least  some  of  which  involve  refraining  from  engaging  
in   financial   transactions   of   the   type   that   they   are   entertaining.11   In   the   real   world  
practice   of   sovereign   borrowing   and   lending,   while   generally   formally   free,   many  
debtors  are  often  not  substantively  free  in  any  relevant  sense.12  Consequentially,  many  
of   the   debt   contracts   signed   by   states   in   the   real   world   are   non-­‐binding   when  
measured  against  the  yardstick  of  ideal  conditions  of  contracting.  
   I  find  these  accounts  very  persuasive,  but  I  do  not  consider  them  sufficient  to  
capture   the   injustices  occurring   in   the  SD&CR,  nor  do   I  believe   that   the  account  of  
agency  that  underlies  them  is  convincing.  First,  according  to  the  accounts  provided  in  
the  normative  literature  on  sovereign  debt,  an  injustice  can  occur  in  the  SD&CR  when  
citizens   are  made   to   service   a   debt   contract   that   is   either   non-­‐binding   in   the   first  
place  or  that  ought  to  be  overridden.13  The  injustice  thus  resides  in  the  enforcement  
of  the  ‘repayment  norm’  –  that  is,  the  norm  that  debt  ought  to  always  be  repaid,  at  all  
times  and  at  (nearly)  at  all  costs.   I  agree  that  the  unquestioning  enforcement  of  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10   In   addition   to   formal   and   substantive   freedom,   Barry   and   Tomitova   argue   that   the   other  
ideal   conditions   that   need   to   hold   for   debts   to   be   binding   are   rational   individualism,  
informational  adequacy,  and  a  stable  global  economic  environment  (2006,  p.56).  When  these  
conditions   are   met,   they   argue,   there   are   weighty   ethical   considerations   that   support   an  
agent’s  obligation  to  service  his  or  her  debt.    
11  Barry  and  Tomitova,  2006,  p.  56.  
12  Barry  and  Tomitova  also  argue  that  the  other  ideal  conditions  that  they  identify  do  not  apply  
to  sovereign  debt  contracts.  There  are   large   information  asymmetries  between  creditors  and  
debtors   (2006,   p.62)   and   the   global   economic   environment   in  which   sovereign   debtors   and  
creditors   interact   is   characterised   by   its   instability   and   volatility   (2006,   p.63-­‐64).   Most  
importantly,  however,   sovereign  debtors   are  not   rational   individuals,  but   complex   collective  
agents  made  up  of  many  present  and  future  individuals.  
13  For  a  distinction  between  non-­‐binding  debt  contracts  and  binding  debt  contracts  that  ought  
to  be  overridden  nonetheless,  see  Wollner  (2017).  
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repayment  norm  is  problematic  and  I  make  it  the  object  of  critique  in  two  chapters  of  
this   thesis   (chapters   6   and   8).   Yet   I   consider   the   uncritical   enforcement   of   the  
repayment   norm   a   manifestation   of   a   much   broader,   structural   set   of   injustices.   I  
deem  the  central   injustice  of  SD&CR  to   lie   in   the  asymmetrical  positions  that  make  
citizens   of   certain   states   and  members   of   certain   classes   vulnerable   to   domination  
and   exploitation   when   debt   is   accrued   in   their   name.   Since   they   are   vulnerable   to  
these  wrongs   by   virtue   of   the   position   they   occupy  within   an   asymmetrical   regime  
that   is   social   in   origin,   I   call   these   wrongs   ‘structural   domination’   and   ‘structural  
exploitation.’  Reducing   the  wrongs  of   the   regime   to   the   repayment  norm  alone   is,   I  
believe,  inaccurately  narrow.14    
   Second,   I   consider   the   conception   of   agency   that   these   accounts   predispose  
implausible.  To  think  about  agents  in  a  binary  way,  as  being  either  free  or  coerced,  is  
overly  simplistic  and  fails  to  grapple  with  the  nature  of  agency.  There  may  be  cases  in  
which  debtor  states  are  mere  transmitters  of  the  dictates  of  the  structure  and  are  thus  
entirely  powerless.  In  such  cases,  it  may  indeed  make  sense  to  argue  that  states  ought  
not   to   repay  a  debt   they  accrued,  based  on  a   total  absence  of   freedom.  But   in  most  
situations,  agents  –   in   this  case,   states  –  are  neither   fully  constrained  nor   fully   free.  
Thus,  the  presence  or  absence  of  freedom  as  the  relevant  criterion  for  the  attribution  
of  responsibility  (for  debt  servicing)  may  not  be  the  best  way  of  conceiving  of  agency.    
I   propose   to   conceive   of   agency   as   residing   in   the   choices   that   actors  make  
within  a  given  structure.  Agents  within  a  structure  act  by  choosing  among  a  range  of  
options  that  are  available  to  them  and  it  is  by  choosing  from  within  these  option  sets  
that  agents  shape  and  instantiate  the  structure.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  structures  are  
‘dual’:  structures  shape  agents  and  are,  at  the  same  time,  shaped  by  them.  As  I  argue  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14   I  do  not  claim  that  most  authors  who  have  written  about  sovereign  debt  and  credit  so   far  
explicitly  reduce  the  injustices  of  the  regime  to  those  pertaining  to  debt  repayment.  But  their  
focus  on  the  ideal  conditions  that  need  to  be  met  for  a  debt  contract  to  be  binding  suggests  so  
by  omission.    
   13  
in   chapter   7,  moreover,   conceiving   of   agency   as   constrained,   but   not   non-­‐existent,  
also   allows   us   to   conceive   of   the   responsibility   of   agents  who   can   rightly   be   called  
victims  of  structural  injustice.      
Connecting  this  to  the  first  point  concerning  the  injustices  of  the  regime,  the  
problem  does  not   tend   to  be   that   states  have  no  other  option  at   their  disposal,  but  
that  their  option  set   is  unjustly  constrained.  The  worry   is  not  that  states  cannot  act  
otherwise   –   it   is,   instead,   that   the   abilities   of   states   are   significantly   constrained   in  
ways  that  are  social  in  origin  and  in  ways  they  need  not  be.  This  impacts  the  ability  of  
individuals  qua  citizens  and  members  of  a  given  social  class  to  flourish  and  to  be  self-­‐
determined.  If  we  hold  the  conviction  that  agents  should  have  the  opportunity  –  and,  
indeed,   a   roughly   equal   opportunity–   of   flourishing   and   of   being   self-­‐determined,  
then  our  object  of  critique  should  be  the  existence  of  asymmetrical  structures  that  are  
normatively  troublesome  and  are  social  in  origin.  Put  differently,  the  reason  I  find  the  
normative   accounts   provided   to   date   to   be   insufficient   is   that,   they   fail   to   draw  
attention  to  how  an  asymmetrical  and  unjust  structure  constrains  agency,  providing  a  
purely  agential  solution  that  does  not  remedy  the  structural  injustices  characterising  
the  regime.    
   The  agential  critiques  to  the  status  quo  of  the  SD&CR  that  have  thus  far  been  
defended  in  the  literature  suffer  from  two  shortcomings:  they  erroneously  reduce  the  
injustice  of  the  SD&CR  to  the  uncritical  enforcement  of  the  repayment  norm  and  they  
think   about   agency   in   a   binary   way,   failing   to   acknowledge   that   agency   is   both  
constrained   and   enabled   by   the   existing   structures.   Conversely,   the   structural  
explanation  I  offer  suggests  that  the  injustice  of  the  SD&CR  resides  in  the  existence  of  
asymmetrical   positions   structured   along   class   and   statehood,   and   that   the   relevant  
question  is  not  whether  or  not  an  agent  is  free,  but  whether  or  not  the  options  that  
the   agent   has   at   his   or   her   disposal   are   unjustly   constrained.   Offering   such   a  
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structural   critique   to   the   SD&CR   also   allows   me   to   challenge,   in   a   more  
comprehensive  manner,  the  monolithic  responsibility  attribution  to  the  debtor  state  
that   characterises   the   well-­‐established   single   story   of   sovereign   debt.   While   the  
agential  critiques  to  the  regime  articulated  so  far  within  the  normative  literature  on  
sovereign  debt  only  enable  a  challenge  to  the  repayment  norm,  the  structural  critique  
I  offer  allows  me  to  contest   the  responsibility  picture   in  both  a  more  expansive  and  
nuanced  way.    
  
The  Main  Argument  in  Brief  
This  thesis  challenges  what  I  call  the  ‘agential  story’  of  sovereign  debt  and  credit.  The  
agential   story,   so   I  argue   in  chapter   1,   is  based  on  two  pillars,  namely:   the   idea   that  
the   ‘crisis   is   the   problem’   and   that   ‘the   debtor   is   responsible.’   Part   I   of   this   thesis  
critically   examines   the   first   pillar,   diagnosing  what   is  wrong  with   the  way   in  which  
the   SD&CR   operates   today.   Part   II,   in   turn,   questions   the   second   pillar.   It   is  
concerned   with   the   prescriptive   conclusions   that   can   be   drawn   from   the   analysis  
made   in  Part   I   regarding   responsibility   attribution.  While  Part   I   is  more   concerned  
with   the   injustices   of   structures,   Part   II   focuses   on   the   responsibility   of   individual  
agents.    
   In   challenge   to   ‘the   crisis   problem’,   I   argue   that   the  eruption  of   a   crisis  only  
represents  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  The  main  problem  does  not  reside  in  the  eruption  of  
sovereign   debt   crises   as   such,   but   in   two   other   aspects.   First,   sovereign   debt   is  
problematic  when  too  much  debt  is  accrued  (quantitative  aspects)  and  invested  in  a  
way  that  is  neither  equitable  nor  sustainable  (qualitative  aspect).  Crucially,  as  will  be  
argued   in   chapter   8,   the   question   is   not   only   one   about   ‘debt   sustainability’   as   a  
technical-­‐economic   threshold,   but   also   as   a   political   threshold.   When   the   state  
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accrues  too  much  debt,  it  becomes  unable  to  act  in  the  name  of  those  it  is  supposed  
to  represent.    
   To   be   sure,   I   do   not   endorse   the   idea   that   sovereign   debt   and   credit   are  
inherently  problematic,   though   I  do   review   this   line  of   argument.  According   to   the  
view  defended  here,  sovereign  debt  may  be  economically  productive  and  normatively  
defensible.   From   a   normative   perspective,   borrowing  might   be   justified   in   terms   of  
distributive  justice,  the  same  way  that  discounting  is  -­‐  if  the  future  is  to  be  richer  than  
the  present,  debt  is  a  way  of  transferring  money  from  the  rich  to  the  poor.  From  an  
economic   perspective,   debt   contracts   can   be   justified   since   they  mobilise   credit.   In  
contrast   to   equity   contracts,   in   which   the   returns   of   the   investor   depend   on   the  
success   of   the   enterprise   being   invested   in,   debt   contracts   promise   a   fixed   return.  
Without  this  promise,  there  would  be  an  insufficient  amount  of  available  credit.15  It  is  
difficult,   for   instance,   to   imagine   the  development   of   the  British   railway   system,   as  
well   as   the   industrial   expansion   that   it   fuelled,   without   debt   contracts.16   Similarly,  
developing   states   can   be   said   to   accrue   debt   in   the   present   to   make   the   large  
investments  needed  to  change  the  structure  of  their  economy  in  the  future,  to  climb  
up   the   value   chain   of   production   and   service   provision,   and   to   generate   greater  
economic  growth.    
The   problem,   instead,   seems   to   be   with   the   quantity   and   the   allocation   of  
debt.  Adair  Turner  makes   this  point  by   introducing   the   concept  of   ‘debt  pollution.’  
What   appears   to   be   socially   useful   in   each   individual   case   of   credit   extension  
generates,   in  the  aggregate,  excessive  debt  creation  –  or  debt  pollution  -­‐  which  may  
ultimately   result   in   crisis   and   in   the   state’s   loss   of   ability   to   act   in   its   citizenry’s  
name.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Turner,  2016,  p.6.    
16  Turner,  2016,  p.35.  
17  Turner,  2016,  p.119.  
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Second,   sovereign   debt   may   result   in   structural   exploitation   and   structural  
domination  when  accrued  by  a  state  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  within  the  regime.  
It   may   seem   puzzling   to   an   outside   observer   of   the   SD&CR   that   what   signifies   an  
opportunity   for   development   and   greater   self-­‐determination   for   some   may   be   the  
inverse   for   others,  whether   they   be   states   and   their   citizenry,   or,  more   specifically,  
parts  of  their  citizenry.  This  is  not  coincidental.  I  argue  that  much  of  what  determines  
whether  the  acquisition  of  sovereign  debt  represents  a  blessing  or  a  curse  depends  on  
the  position   that   a  given  agent  occupies  within   the  highly  asymmetrical   and  unjust  
SD&CR.  For  occupiers  of  positions  of  advantage   in   the  regime,  sovereign  debt  does,  
more   often   than   not,   result   in   all   of   the   positive   outcomes   that   classical   liberal  
economists   attribute   to   it.   Conversely,   for   individuals   of   a   state   that   occupies   a  
position   of   disadvantage  within   the   regime   and  members   of   what   I   call   the   ‘wage-­‐
dependent  class’,   the  acquisition  of  debt  makes   them  vulnerable   to  domination  and  
exploitation.   To   be   sure,   this   is   not   to   say   that   sovereign   debt   and   credit   is   a  
mechanism   for   exploitation   or   domination   per   se.   Rather,   it   can   become   such   a  
mechanism   if   debt   is   accrued   by   occupiers   of   a   disadvantaged   position   within   the  
regime,  by  virtue  of  them  occupying  that  very  position.    
In  challenge  to   ‘the  debtor  responsibility,’  I  contest  the  monolithic  attribution  
of  responsibility  to  the  debtor  state  –  both  its  government  and  its  citizenry  –  in  two  
ways.   First,   I   provide   my   own   challenge   to   the   repayment   norm,   offering   an  
alternative  critique  to   the  ones  offered  so   far  by  normative  scholars  concerned  with  
sovereign  debt.  I  do  so  in  Chapter  6  by  turning  the  tables  of  the  debate  and  starting  
with  the  question  of  what  moral  grounds  exist  to  burden  creditors  with  the  costs  that  
result   from   sovereign   debt   crises.   I   also   do   so   in   Chapter   8,   where   I   defend   two  
sufficient  conditions  that  justify  challenging  the  repayment  norm.    
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Second,   I   challenge   the   monolithic   responsibility   attribution   to   the   debtor  
state  by  redrawing  the  boundaries  of  that  for  which  responsibility  is  to  be  attributed.  
If  the  problem  does  not  only  reside  in  the  eruption  of  sovereign  debt  crises  as  such,  
but   in   the   existence  of   an  unjust   SD&CR,   then  we  do  not   only  need   to   re-­‐attribute  
responsibility   for   debt   repayment,   but   also   change   the   unjust   regime.   Attributing  
agential  responsibility  for  a  structurally  unjust  regime,  however,  is  tricky  business.  To  
do   so   successfully,   I   argue   that   we   need   to   distinguish   between   three   dimensions  
through   which   the   structural   injustices   within   the   SD&CR   are   reproduced,   namely  
what  I  call  ‘structural  processes  proper,’  the  ‘structural-­‐relational,’  and  the  ‘structural-­‐
systemic’   levels.   I   associate   these   three  heuristic   categories  with  normative  grounds  
on   which   agential   responsibility   can   be   attributed.   Doing   so   allows   us   to   both  
acknowledge   the   structural   nature   of   the   injustices   of   the   regime   and,   at   the   same  
time,   to   hold   on   to   the   powerful   intuition   that   not   all   contributions   to   structural  
injustice  are   comparable,   and   that   there  are  morally   relevant   reasons   to  distinguish  
among  them.  
Although   this   does   not   give   us   one   general   answer   regarding   who   is  
responsible   for   the   injustices   of   the   SD&CR   and  who   should   shoulder   the   burdens  
springing  from  sovereign  debt  crises,  it  does  provide  us  with  the  necessary  conceptual  
apparatus  to  think  through  the  responsibility  picture  for  the  individual  debt  histories  
of   different   countries.   In   this   thesis,   I   look   at   two   such   individual   debt   histories:  
Argentina  and  Greece.    
  
Theoretical  Contribution    
In  addition  to  the  political  motivation  that  animates  this  dissertation  project  and  the  
endeavour   to   contribute   to   the   specialised   normative   literature   on   sovereign   debt,  
   18  
this  thesis  also  contributes  to  two  wider  sets  of  literature  within  political  theory:  the  
global  justice  debate  and  structural  injustice.    
According  to  Forst,  any  critical  theory  of  global  justice  needs  to  start  with  “an  
analysis   of   given   social   relations,   that   is,   their   historical   genesis   and   their  
contemporary   character,   especially   the   inequalities   and   power   asymmetries   they  
contain”.18   The   idea   is   that,   in   order   to   come   to   an   insightful   analysis   about   global  
justice,   one   needs   to   take   a   closer,   more   critical   look   at   individual   domains   of  
injustice.19  This  dissertation  is  devoted  to  providing  an  analysis  of  one  particular  side  
or  domain  of  global  injustice,  namely  the  SD&CR.    
   Crucially,  however,  the  insights  gained  by  analysing  a  concrete  site  of  injustice  
are   not   limited   to   that   domain.   The   thought   is,   instead,   that   by   analysing   a   single  
domain   of   injustice,   one   can   make   more   general   contributions   to   the   theoretical  
debates  in  which  one  participates.  By  analysing  one  site  of  injustice  –  the  SD&CR  –  I  
offer  two  critiques  to  the  global  justice  debate  at  large.    
First,  I  consider  whether  the  debate’s  emphasis  on  questions  of  redistributive  
justice  -­‐  such  as  whether  domestic  egalitarian  principles  ought  to  be  extended  across  
borders      -­‐  comes  at   the  expense  of  a  more  extensive  and  rigorous  engagement  with  
the  equally,   if  not  more  important,  question  about  how  the  vastly  unequal  positions  
characterising  our  contemporary  world  actually  come  into  being.20    By  paying  special  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Forst,  2001,  p.168.  
19  As  Forst  writes,  “In  addition  to  a  global  context  of  trade,  there  is  now  also  a  global  context  of  
production   and   of   labour,   (…)   there   is   a   global   ecological   context   with   all   the   problems   of  
scarcity  of   resources,  pollution,   and   so  on;   there   is   a   global   context  of   institutions   from   the  
United  Nations  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund  as  well  as  non-­‐governmental  institutions  
(…);   there   is   a   global   context   of   legal   treaties   and   obligations,   of   technological  
interdependence   (…),   of   military   cooperation   as   well   as   conflicts,   of   migration   within   and  
across   continents;   and   there   is,   of   course,   an   ever-­‐growing   global   context   of   cultural  
production,   consumption   and   communication.   But   in   order   to   come   to   a   realistic   global  
perspective  when  thinking  about  transnational  justice,  one  must  take  a  closer,  critical  look  at  
these  phenomena.”  (2001,  p.165-­‐166).  
20  See  Wilde,  2011.
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attention  to  the  structural  process  through  which  the  injustices  of  the  SD&CR  came  
about,  I  hope  to  counter  this  tendency.  21    
I   am   also   critical   of   the   way   the   central   question   of   the   debate   is   usually  
pitched.  By  focusing  on  the  question  of  what  citizens  of  affluent  countries  owe  to  ‘the  
global  poor’  in  less  developed  regions  of  the  world,  global  justice  debates  do  not  only  
render  those  they  identify  as  victims  of   injustice  as  passive  subjects  to  whom  things  
happen,  but  also  largely  neglect  the  notion  of  class.  22  In  the  explanation  of  a  country’s  
debt   history   provided   in   this   thesis,   I   draw   special   attention   to   these   neglected  
aspects.  On  one  hand,  in  Chapter  7,  I  ask  the  question  of  what  the  responsibilities  are  
of  those  who  can  rightly  be  called  victims  of  injustice.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Chapter  
2,   I   explore   the   role   that   class   plays   in   redefining   the   traditional   boundaries   drawn  
within   the   global   justice   debate   between   the   appropriate   duty   bearers   and   right  
holders.    
   The  second  body  of  literature  to  which  this  dissertation  seeks  to  contribute  is  
the  literature  on  structures  and  structural  injustices.  In  this  dissertation,  I  develop  a  
new  integrated  model  to  think  about  individual  responsibility  for  structural  injustice.  
So   far,   the   most   thorough   discussion   of   responsibility   attribution   for   structural  
injustice  was   offered   by   Iris  Marion   Young   in   the   book   published   shortly   after   her  
death.23  She  introduces  an  alternative  way  of  thinking  about  responsibility,  where  it  is  
not  distributed  in  a  backward-­‐looking  manner,  like  the  ‘liability  model’  she  criticises,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Some  may  counter  that  certain  authors,  Thomas  Pogge  most  prominently  among  them,  have  
paid   attention   to   both   aspects   -­‐   class   and   the   structural   production   of   inequalities   -­‐   by  
acknowledging   the   contribution   of   the   political   and   economic   leadership   of   less   affluent  
countries  and  by  devoting  some  attention  to  the  causes  of  global  inequality.  Without  wanting  
to   negate   this,   I   believe   that   more   sustained   efforts   and   a   more   detailed   examination   is  
necessary.   Pogge,   for   instance,   has   been   criticised   for   the   absence   of   persuasive   empirical  
evidence  on  the  causal  contribution  of  affluent  countries  to  the  economic  deprivation  of  the  
global   poor   (Jaggar,   2010).  Moreover,   although   Pogge   does   acknowledge   the   importance   of  
class  in  stating  that  affluent  states  impose  an  unjust  global  economic  order  “in  the  interest  of  
their   business   and   financial   elites,”   it   is   not   these   elites   who   he   holds   responsible,   but   the  
citizenry  of  the  ‘affluent  states’  as  a  whole.    
22  Important  exceptions  are  Nussbaum  and  Sen.  For  a  discussion  of  this,  see  DeMartino,  2011.    
23  Young,  2011.  
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but   is   collectively   discharged   in   a   forward-­‐looking  manner.  While   Young   does   not  
intend  to  replace  the  liability  model,  she  does  take  her  ‘social  connection  model’  to  be  
the  most  appropriate   for  cases  of   structural   injustice.  To  this  day,   social  connection  
scholars   have   not   questioned   this   assumption.   In   this   thesis,   I   take   issue  with   this,  
arguing   that   in   the   same  way   in  which   the   liability  model   did   not   suffice   to  make  
sense   of   the   responsibility   picture   for   cases   of   structural   injustice,   the   social  
connection  model  does  not  capture  all   the   relevant  aspects  pertaining   to   individual  
responsibility   for   structural   injustice.   An   integrated   model   that   can   attribute   both  
individual,   backward-­‐looking   responsibility   and   shared,   forward-­‐looking  
responsibilities   is   required.   Demonstrating   how   such   an   expansive   and   nuanced  
responsibility   model   works   for   the   case   of   sovereign   debt   and   credit   is   a   central  
contribution  of  this  dissertation.    
Furthermore,  I  intend  to  contribute  to  the  structural  injustice  literature  by  re-­‐
focusing   the   debate   on   the   political   economic   critique   of   capitalism.   Despite   the  
important   contributions  made  by   recent  work  on   structural   injustice,   I   believe   that  
too  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  institutional  social  order  that  governs  many  
of   the   structural   processes   that   scholars   of   structural   injustice   denounce.   While  
debates  surrounding  structural  injustice  do  well  in  bringing  to  the  fore  the  underlying  
structures   that   are   normally   rendered   invisible   and   thus   remain   unchallenged,   the  
specific  form  that  capitalism  takes  historically  and  how  it  shapes  structural  processes  
is   not   often   emphasized.   This   disregard   for   capitalism   as   a   governing   institutional  
order  is  not,  however,  restricted  to  the  literature  on  structural  injustice.  As  Boltanski  
and  Chiapello   claimed  over   a  decade  ago,   after   the   cultural   and  democratic   turn   in  
social   critique   that   replaced   the  Marxian   focus,  most   of   the   literature   in   social   and  
political  theorising  became  disconnected  from  the  critique  of  the  political  economy  of  
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capitalism.24   Being   grounded   in   an   historical   period   of   significant   change   within  
domestic  and  the  global  political  economic  order  –  1971  (the  year  in  which  the  Bretton  
Woods  Regime  was  abolished  by  Nixon)  until  the  present  -­‐  this  dissertation  seeks  to  
return  to  the  analysis  of  one  of  the  political  economic  dimensions  of  capitalism  as  an  
institutional  social  order.    
  
Methodological  Contribution    
In   addition   to   providing   an   alternative   story   to   the   dominant   narrative   about  
sovereign   debt   and   credit,   and   contributing   to   the   distinct   theoretical   debates   on  
global   justice   and   structural   injustice,   I   also   intend   to   make   a   methodological  
contribution.  Contrary  to  the  most  common  practice  in  political  theory,  which  adopts  
a  ‘view  from  nowhere’,  my  analysis  is  rooted  in  a  concrete  historical  time  period  and  
relies  on  specific  cases  from  which  I  draw  my  theoretical  analysis.    
First,   the   answer   I   provide   to   the   two   main   questions   of   this   thesis   –   the  
question   regarding   the  wrongs   characterising   the   SD&CR   and   the   responsibility   for  
these  wrongs  –  is  rooted  in  a  specific  historical  time  period,  namely  the  period  from  
1971  to  the  present.  To  that  extent,  “I  don’t  claim  to  have  achieved  any  great  distance  
from   the   social  world   in  which   I   live”.25   Rather   than   leaving   the   cave,   climbing   the  
mountain  and  constructing  an  objective,  universal  standpoint,  “I  mean  to  stand  in  the  
cave,  in  the  city,  on  the  ground”.26  In  the  first  two  chapters  of  this  thesis,  I  situate  the  
domain   of   injustice   that   concerns   me,   the   SD&CR,   in   the   broader   historical  
developments  witnessed  in  the  global  political  economy  since  1971.    
   In  addition  to  rooting  this  analysis   in  a  particular  historical  period,   the  debt  
histories  of  two  sovereign  states  accompany  us  throughout  this  thesis.  These  are  what  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Azmanova,  2014.  
25  Walzer,  1983,  p.xiv.  
26  Walzer,  1983,  p.xiv.  
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the  Financial  Times  has  come  to  call  the  Argentine  ‘debt  saga’  (particularly  in  Chapter  
6   and   7)   and   the   Greek   sovereign   debt   crisis   that   shook   the   European   Union  
(particularly   in  Chapter  3).  While   the   international   significance  of  Argentina’s  crisis  
paled  in  comparison  to  the  Eurozone  crisis,  Argentina’s  default  was  the  largest  in  the  
world   at   the   time.  Moreover,   the   similarities   between   the  Argentine   and   the  Greek  
debt  crises  inspired  financial  journalists  and  academics  alike  to  compare  the  current  
Greek  crisis  with  the  2001  Argentine  crisis.27  Revisiting  the  Argentine  sovereign  debt  
crisis   and  debt   restructuring  process   from   today's   vantage  point   therefore   offers   an  
invaluable  opportunity  not  only  to  learn  from  the  Argentine  case  as  an  end  in  itself,  
but  also  to  challenge  the  monolithic  crisis  narrative  constructed  around  the  current  
crisis  at  the  heart  of  the  EU.28  
Methodologically,  my  case  choices  are  justified  as  extreme  case  studies.  Very  
few  normative  scholars  have  engaged  with  the  methodological  question  of  how  case  
studies  can  be  employed  to  develop  normative  theories.29  However,  from  qualitatively  
trained  scholars  we  learn  that  the  most  sensible  case  selection  technique  to  develop  
theory   inductively   is   the  extreme  case  method.30  An  extreme  case  can  be  defined  as  
one   “that   is   considered   to   be   prototypical   or   paradigmatic   of   some   phenomena   of  
interest”.31  Choosing  an  extreme  case  to  develop  theory  inductively  seems  reasonable  
because   in  such  cases,   the  object  under   investigation   is   “transparently  observable.”32  
The  Argentine  and  Greek  crises  and  debt   restructurings   represent   such  an   ‘extreme  
illustration.’  33  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Krugman,  2012;  Roubini,  2012;  Weisbrot  and  Montecino,  2012.  
28  Panizza,  2014.  
29  Fung,  2007;  Thacher,  2006.  
30  Eisenhardt,  1989.  
31  Gerring,  2007,  p.  101.  
32  Eisenhardt,  1989,  p.  537.  
33  Kacowicz,   2013,   p.   77;   see   also  Cooper   and  Momani,   2005;  Das   et   al.,   2012.  Note   too,   that  
political   philosophers   employ   a   similar   method   when   relying   on   hypothetical   or   even  
deliberately  unrealistic  cases  to  test  their   intuitions.  Despite   its  strengths,  using  the  extreme  
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Situating  my  analysis  in  a  concrete  time  period  and  thinking  through  thorny  
normative  questions  using  particular  cases,   I  attempt  to  bridge  two  divides   in  social  
and   political   theorising,   namely   the   divide   between   critical   theory   and   normative  
theorising  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  divide  between  normative  theorising  and  a  more  
robust  empirical  understanding  of  the  object  of  analysis  on  the  other.  If  the  ambition  
of   normative   philosophy   is,   as   it   is   often   said   to   be,   to   be   action   guiding,   it   is  
important   to  pay  a  greater   regard  to   the  empirical  circumstances   that   it   is   trying  to  
address.  Indeed,  as  I  intend  to  show  in  this  thesis,  even  to  attempt  to  disentangle  the  
normative   and   the   empirical   dimensions   fully   to   answer   the   applied   questions   that  
concern  us  here  is  futile,  because  the  empirical  and  normative  claims  are  inexorably  
intertwined.  The  normative   assessment  of   the  wrongs  of   the   regime  and   the   claims  
about   responsibility   rely   on   an   empirical   account   of   the   functioning   of   the   regime  
which  cannot  be  ignored.    
  
Chapter  Overview  
Part  I  of  this  thesis  is  concerned  with  providing  a  structural  diagnosis  of  the  wrongs  
of   the  SD&CR.  Chapter  I  serves  as  a  general   introduction  to  the  domain  of   injustice  
that  I  am  concerned  with.   It   introduces  what  I  refer  to  as  sovereign  debt  and  credit  
and   tracks   the  most   relevant   historical   changes   from   1971   until   the   present.   I   show  
how   financialisation  affected   the  option   sets  of   all   states   and  defend   the  need   for   a  
structural  explanation.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
case  method  raises  problems  of  generalisability.  The  worry   is   that   selecting  an  extreme  case  
may   lead   a   researcher   to   confuse   the   narrow,   idiosyncratic   features   of   an   extreme   case   for  
generalisable   facts.   The   researcher   must   thus   be   careful   not   to   overgeneralise   from   the  
findings.  My  aim  here,  however,   is   less   ambitious   than   that  of  qualitatively   trained   scholars  
who   aim   to   identify   causes   by   looking   at   individual   cases.   I  want   to   use   the  Argentine   and  
Greek   cases   to   illustrate   what   is   wrong   with   the   SD&CR   and   to   analyse   what   follows  
normatively  therefrom.  To  that  extent,  I  do  not  aim  to  develop  theory  from  within  a  case,  but  
rather  use  these  cases  as  an  illustration.  The  same  rationale  for  choosing  an  extreme  case  still  
applies,  however,   for   it   also  makes   sense   to   choose   a   case   in  which   the  object  of   analysis   is  
transparently  observable.  
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Chapter   2   characterises   the   empirical   and   normative   features   of   the   highly  
asymmetrical  structure  with  reference  to  which  a  country’s  debt  history  needs  to  be  
explained.  I  argue  that  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage  within  the  regime  are  
structured   along   two   key   axes:   statehood   and   class.   The   two   central   criteria   that  
determine   whether   a   state’s   position   within   the   regime   is   one   of   advantage   or  
disadvantage  relate  to  the  conditions  of  borrowing  and  to  the  vulnerability  to  crisis.  
Recognizing   that   the   regime   is   not   a   level   playing   field   but,   instead,   is   deeply  
asymmetrical,   is   a   central   step   in   challenging   the   unilateral   attribution   of  
responsibility   in   the   second   part   of   the   thesis.   In   addition   to   this   first   axis   of  
(dis)advantage,  the  regime  is  also  highly  asymmetrical  in  terms  of  class.  I  argue  that  
the  state’s  creditors  qua  members  of  an  international  financial  class  occupy  a  position  
of   advantage   and   that   citizens   of   both   debtor   and   creditor   states   qua   members   of  
what  I  call  the  ‘wage-­‐dependent  class’  occupy  a  position  of  disadvantage.  I  argue  that  
occupiers  of  a  position  of  disadvantage  within  the  regime  are  vulnerable  to  structural  
domination  and  exploitation  when  the  state  accrues  debt.    
Chapter  3  turns  to  the  question  of  injustice,  for  it  is  not  enough  to  point  at  an  
asymmetrical  background   structure   to   show   that   a   regime   is  unjust.  A   judgment  of  
injustice  differs   from  a  description  of  normatively   troublesome  asymmetries   in   that  
one  must  analyse  it  as  a  consequence  of  what  Pogge  calls  the  “imposition  of  a  skewed  
global  order  that  aggravates  international  inequalities  and  makes  it  exceedingly  hard  
for  the  weaker  and  poorer  societies  to  secure  a  proportional  share  of  global  economic  
growth.”34   I   argue   that   the   injustices   of   the   regime   are   not   only   reproduced   by  
powerful   agents   who   draw   on   social   norms   and   institutions   (what   I   call   the  
‘structural-­‐relational  dimensions’),  but  also  via  two  further  dimensions,  namely  what  
I   call   ‘structural   processes   proper’   and   the   ‘structural-­‐systemic’   dimension.   These  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  Pogge,  2002,  p.167.  
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three  dimensions  serve  as  heuristic  devices  to  distinguish  between  different  forms  by  
which   structural   domination   and   structural   exploitation   are   reproduced.  
Distinguishing   between   these   three   levels   is   essential   not   only   for   a   clearer  
understanding   of   how   structural   injustices   are   reproduced,   but   also   to   attribute  
responsibility,  something  which  becomes  crucial  in  the  second  part  of  the  thesis.    
Chapter   4   concludes   the   diagnosis   made   in   the   first   part   of   the   thesis   by  
presenting  the  SD&CR  as  a  liberal  imperial  order.  By  drawing  on  the  insights  made  by  
scholars   of   imperialism,   I   not   only   emphasise   the   continuity   between   coercive   and  
liberal   forms   of   domination,   but   also   answer   some   questions   that   remained   open  
from  the  analysis  in  Chapters  2  and  3.  First,  I  answer  the  question  of  how  the  two  axes  
of   (dis)advantage   –   class   and   statehood   –   interact.   I   argue   that   while   both   axes  
matter,   an   individual’s   class   is  more   important   in   defining   the   extent   of   his   or   her  
privilege   in   the   SD&CR   than   an   individual’s   citizenship.   I   make   this   argument   by  
introducing   the   language   of   a   ‘wage-­‐dependent   aristocracy’   and   a   ‘financial  
aristocracy.’  Second,  I  draw  attention  to  the  role  of  the  debtor  state  as  a  collaborator  
in  the  reproduction  of  structural  domination  and  exploitation,  and  raise  the  question  
of   the  appropriate  remedies   for   the  current  predicament.   If   the  state  plays  a  central  
role   in   instantiating  an  exploitative  and  dominating  order,  can  the  solution  to  these  
injustices  really  reside  in  the  reaffirmation  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation-­‐state?  By  
connecting   earlier   debates   among   scholars   of   imperialism   to   contemporary   debates  
regarding   the   fate   of   the   European   project,   I   flag   potential   dangers   and   discuss  
emancipatory  prospects.    
The  second  part  of  the  thesis  is  concerned  with  the  responsibility  of  individual  
agents   for   the   injustices   denounced   in   Part   I.   How   can   we   think   about   individual  
responsibility   against   the  backdrop  of   the   structural   diagnosis   of   the  wrongs   of   the  
regime?   In  Chapter  5,   I  defend   the  view  that  neither  an  exclusively   forward-­‐looking  
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model   of   responsibility,   which   focuses   on   altering   the   unjust   structures   and   that  
resists  the  distribution  of  responsibility,  nor  a  solely  backward-­‐looking  responsibility  
model,  which  is  primarily  concerned  with  righting  a  moral  balance,  suffices  to  make  
sense   of   the   full   responsibility   picture   in   cases   of   structural   injustice.   While   this  
argument   is  made   for   the  domain  of   injustice   that   concerns  us  here,   the   integrated  
model   of   responsibility   I   defend   is   applicable   to   a   wider   set   of   contexts   and   other  
cases  of  structural  injustice.    
Chapters  6-­‐8  are  concerned  with  applying  this  integrated  responsibility  model  
by   theorising   the   responsibility   of   individual   agents   or   groups,   such   as   the  
responsibility  of  creditors  (Chapter  6),  the  responsibility  of  governments  occupying  a  
position   of   disadvantage   within   the   regime   (Chapter   7)   and   the   responsibility   of   a  
debtor   state’s   citizenry   (Chapter  8).   In   contrast   to  Part   I  of   the   thesis,  were   I   could  
give  a  definitive  answer   to   the  question  of   the  wrongs  of   the  regime,   in   this   second  
part,  I  cannot  give  a  general  and  definitive  answer  to  the  responsibility  of  all  actors.  I  
can,   however,   provide  ways   of   thinking   about   the   individual   responsibility   of   these  
different   agents   and   groups.   How   exactly   the   responsibility   picture   looks   for   each  
sovereign  debt  history  is  something  that  will  need  to  be  individually  evaluated  via  a  
thorough  study  of  each  individual  case.    
In  Chapter  6  I  look  at  two  types  of  creditors:  private  creditors  qua  members  of  
the  financial  class  and  public  multilateral  institutions  (both  as  creditors  in  their  own  
right   and   as   intermediaries).   I   argue   that   private   creditors   qua   members   of   the  
financial   class   can   be   held   morally   responsible   when   the   structural-­‐relational  
dimension   is   at   play   and   responsible   on   the   basis   of   benefiting   from   the   injustices  
characteristic   of   the   SD&CR   when   the   other   two   dimensions   are   at   play.   Put  
differently,  I  argue  that  moral  responsibility  and  benefit  are  two  grounds  on  the  basis  
of   which   special   responsibilities   can   be   attributed   to   these   private   creditors.   These  
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special  responsibilities,  which  go  beyond  the  shared  responsibilities  that  they  have  by  
virtue  of   contributing   to   structural  processes  proper,   can  be  discharged   in  different  
ways,   ranging   from   changing   some   of   the   institutions   governing   the   regime   to  
cancelling  past  debt  obligations.  Public  multilateral  creditors  can  be  held  responsible  
by  virtue  of  being  complicit  in  the  wrongs  exerted  by  private  creditors  qua  members  
of  the  financial  class  and  on  the  basis  of  their  role  responsibility.    
Chapter  7   is  concerned  with  the  obligations  of  the  government  of  states   in  a  
disadvantaged  position  within  the  regime.  I  argue  that  a  government  in  this  position  
has   the   responsibility   to   resist   domination   and   exploitation.   Depending   on   the  
circumstances,  this  responsibility  may  give  rise  to  different  duties.  First,   it  gives  rise  
to   the  duty   to  not   renounce   its   own  agency,   (despite   its   structural   domination   and  
exploitation)  and  to  recognise  itself  as  an  outcome  responsible  agent.  Second,  it  may  
give   rise   to   the   duty   to   engage   in   acts   of   state   civil   disobedience   to   defend   the  
interests  of  its  citizens  qua  members  of  the  wage-­‐dependent  class.  Thus,  while  there  
is   latitude   with   regards   to   how   the   responsibility   to   resist   domination   and  
exploitation  is  discharged,  the  responsibility  does  need  to  be  discharged  somehow.    
Finally,  in  Chapter  8  I  turn  to  the  responsibility  of  citizens  to  service  debt  that  
past  and  present  governments  accrued  in  their  name.  First,  I  argue  that  citizens  cease  
to   have   debt   servicing   obligations   if   the   state   budget   as   a  whole   –   regardless   of   its  
source  –  is  systematically  used  in  the  interest  of  only  a  fraction  of  the  citizenry,  unless  
that  fraction  represents  the  most  disadvantaged  of  the  society.  Second,  I  defend  that  
whenever   the   acquisition   of   further   debt   threatens   the   state’s   ability   to   act   in   the  
public   interest,   this   offers   an   additional   normative   ground   to   challenge   the  
repayment  norm.  
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CHAPTER  1  
ON  THE  NEED  FOR  A  STRUCTURAL  EXPLANATION  OF  A  COUNTRY’S  
SOVEREIGN  DEBT  HISTORY  
Start   your   story   with   "Secondly,"   and   the   world   will   be   turned  
upside-­‐down.   Start   your   story  with   "Secondly,"   and   the   arrows   of  
the  Red  Indians  are  the  original  criminals  and  the  guns  of  the  white  
men  are  entirely  the  victims.  It   is  enough  to  start  with  "Secondly,"  
for   the  anger  of   the  black  man  against   the  white   to  be  barbarous.  
Start   with   "Secondly,"   and   Gandhi   becomes   responsible   for   the  
tragedies  of  the  British.35  
	  
Sovereign  debt  and  sovereign  debt  crisis  have  been  at  the  centre  of  public  attention  
for  the  last  decades.  Not  least,  the  eruption  of  a  sovereign  debt  crisis  at  the  heart  of  
the   European   Union   and   the   legal   dispute   between   Argentina   and   a   portion   of   its  
private   creditors   in   New   York   drew   attention   to   a   phenomenon   that   is   not   as  
uncommon  as  many  would  hope  it  to  be.36    
   With  increased  attention  to  sovereign  debt  and  debt  crises,  a  dominant  public  
discourse  emerged  that  portrayed  sovereign  debtors  with  unsustainable  debt  burdens  
as  the  pariahs  of  the  international  financial  system  and  as  the  outcasts  of  the  global  
political  economic  community.  A  country’s  sovereign  debt  levels  became  seen  as  “an  
objectified   measure   of   some   sort   of   underlying   moral   worth”37   and   sovereign   debt  
became  a  byword  for  being  irresponsible.  At  times,  the  government  of  the  hour  was  
singled   out   as   the   main   culprit,   suggesting   that   governments   spend   above   their  
means   and   fail   to   keep   their   fiscal   household   in   order.   The   discourse   surrounding  
Argentina’s  debt  debacle  in  the  last  fifteen  years  takes  this  form.38  In  other  cases,  the  
citizenry   is  considered  the  main  culprit.  The  discourse  surrounding  Greece   includes  
some  of   these  strokes   in   its  discursive  canvas:   “the  moral  discourse  on  Greek  public  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  Barghouti,  2005.  
36  Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  2009.  
37  Fourcade  et  al.,  2013,  p.22.  
38   Escudé,   2002,   p.453.   For   a   discourse   analysis   showing   that   international   newspapers  
portrayed  the  Argentine  government  as  the  unique  culprit  of  the  crisis,  see  Horas,  2015.    
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finances  focuses  on  ‘the  Greek  citizens’  and  their  presumed  duty  to  pay  off  debt  taken  
up  by  their  past  governments,  supposedly  to  enable  their  voters  to  enjoy  an  easy  life  
on  unearned  income.”39       
In  this  chapter,  I  intend  to  show  that  retelling  a  country’s  debt  history  in  this  
particular  way   is   analogous   to   starting   a   story  with   ‘secondly.’  As  Barghouti’s   prose  
captures,  stories  have  the  power  to  distort  and  alter.  The  standard  story  of  a  country’s  
debt  history  is  one  such  distorting  story  that  starts  with  a  ‘secondly.’  It  ignores  the  all-­‐
important   insight   that   states   act   against   a   particular   background   structure,   namely  
the  SD&CR,  which  is  embedded  in  a  highly-­‐financialised  economy.    
I   proceed   as   follows:   First,   I   reconstruct   the   dominant   agential   story   by  
arguing   that   it   rests  on   two  central  pillars,  which   I  call   ‘the  crisis  problem’  and   ‘the  
debtor   problem,’   respectively.   Second,   I   argue   that   offering   an   alternative   to   the  
standard  agential   story  about  a  country’s  debt  history  requires  drawing  attention  to  
the  relevant  background  structures.  I  describe  what  I  mean  by  ‘structures’  and  defend  
the  need  for  a  structural  explanation.  Finally,  I  argue  that  the  relevant  structure  in  the  
case  at  hand  is  the  SD&CR,  which  is  in  turn  shaped  by  processes  of  financialisation.    
  
The  Agential  Story    
Sovereign   states   have   rich   debt   histories   –   histories   of   acquisition   and   servicing   of  
debt,   of   default   and   restructuring;   histories   of   moderate   debt   levels   that   become  
unsustainable   and   of   exorbitantly   high   levels   of   debt   which   never   do;   histories   of  
crises,  and  –  by  no  means  less  central  -­‐  histories  of  responses  to  these  crises.  So  far,  
these   histories   have   been   explained   with   reference   to   one   particular   narrative:   an  
agential   story   about   a   sovereign   state  which,   in   a  position  of   freedom  and  equality,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39   Streeck,   2013,  p.18.  For   a  discourse  analysis  on  how   the  Greek   state  and   its   citizenry  were  
portrayed  as  a  ‘black  sheep’,  a  ‘free  rider’  and  a  ‘profligate  state,’  see  Antoniades,  2012.    
  
   31  
decides  to  accrue  debt.  If  a  crisis  erupts  and  the  state  is  no  longer  able  to  service  its  
debt,  then  this  default  is  the  debtor  country’s  responsibility.  Emphasis  is  laid  on  the  
bad  management   of   the   debtor   country,   on   expansionary  macroeconomic   policies,  
and  on  fiscal  deficits  leading  to  the  accumulation  of  unsustainable  levels  of  debt.40  It  
only  seems  right,  so  this  agential  story  continues,  to  insist  that  such  a  state  service  its  
debt,  for  contracts  carry  normative  force  and  ought  to  be  obeyed.  Failing  to  live  up  to  
this  contractual  obligation,  moreover,  becomes  a  sign  of   irresponsibility  on  the  part  
of   the   sovereign   and   provides   good   reasons   to   police,   via   various   degrees   of  
persuasion  and  intervention,  the  future  policy  choices  of  such  a  political  pariah.  
This  agential  story  is  composed  of  two  main  elements:   first,  the  reduction  of  
all   problems   pertaining   to   sovereign   debt   to   the   crisis   as   such.   Second,   the  
identification  of   the  sovereign  debtor  -­‐  both  of   its  government  and   its  citizenry   -­‐  as  
the   main   culprit   of   the   crisis.   Together,   these   elements   reinforce   and   justify   a  
particular   form   of   story   –   an   agential   story   that   puts   both   the   crisis   and   the   agent  
centre  stage.  The  problem  with  sovereign  debt  and  sovereign  debt  crises  is  reduced  to  
a  contingent  and  unusual  ‘black  swan’41  event  in  which  it  is  the  agent  who  causes  the  
crisis,  not  any  deeper,  underlying  structural  phenomena.    
In  this  section  I  reconstruct  both  pillars  by  drawing  attention  to  the  economic  
orthodoxy   on   which   they   are   based   and   showing   how   the   SD&CR   embodies   these  
ideas.  To  be  sure,  the  aim  of  this  section  is  not  to  specify  how  a  particular  economic  
orthodoxy   takes   root   in   the   domestic   or   international   policy   regime.   Rather,   by  
reconstructing  the  logic  that  underlies  the  agential  story,  I  start  contesting  the  norm  
that  informs  the  regime.  As  Harvey  states:  
[F]or   any   way   of   thought   to   become   dominant,   a   conceptual  
apparatus   has   to   be   advanced,   that   appeals   to   our   intuitions   and  
instincts,   to   our   values   and   our   desires,   as  well   as   to   possibilities  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  Palley,  2003,  Soederberg,  2005.  
41  Taleb,  2007,  p.  xvii.  
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inherent   in   the   social   world   we   inhabit.   If   successful,   this  
conceptual   apparatus   becomes   so   embedded   in   common   sense   as  
to  be  taken  for  granted  and  not  open  to  question.42      
Reconstructing  the  economic  orthodoxy  on  which  the  agential  story  is  based  is  thus  a  
way  of  challenging  the  dominant  conceptual  apparatus  and  a  first  step  to  contest  the  
policy  regime  that  it  shapes.    
The   first   pillar   on  which   the   agential   story   is   based   is  what   I   call   ‘the   crisis  
problem.’  According  to  this  view,  the  main  problem  is  the  crisis  itself,  not  any  deeper  
problems  in  the  highly-­‐financialised  global  economy  that  bring  the  crisis  about.43  This  
view  finds  backing  in  the  classical  liberal  position,  which  see  crises  as  events  triggered  
by  an  external  shock  in  an  otherwise  well-­‐functioning  market  economy.    
In  his  Principles  of  Political  Economy,  Mill  –  arguably  the  first  to  write  about  
crises   in   a   sustained   manner   -­‐   gives   a   good   introduction   to   what   still   broadly  
represents   the  canonical   liberal  position  today.44  According  to  Mill,  bubbles  prompt  
crises.  Bubbles  are  extreme  cases  of  asset  price  deviations  that  cannot  be  explained  by  
fundamentals.45   For   Mill,   bubbles   are   triggered   by   external   shocks   that   prompt  
speculation.46   The   underlying   thesis   is   “that   crises   are   born   of   events   completely  
external  to  and  separate  from  capitalism.  (...)  The  problem  originates  not  within  the  
system  but  outside  it.”47       
   This  ‘external  cause  idea’  remains  anchored  in  the  liberal  school  of  economics  
to  this  day.  The  key  proposition  is  that  markets  are  fundamentally  self-­‐regulating  and  
self-­‐adjusting,  and  that  they  get  the  prices  right,  be  it  of  normal  goods  or  of  financial  
assets.   The   idea   is   not   that   nothing   ever   changes   in   the   economy   or   that   no   crises  
erupt,  but  that  if  and  when  they  do,  they  are  triggered  by  an  external  event,  such  as  a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  Harvey,  2007,  p.5.  
43  I  say  more  about  what  I  mean  by  ‘financialisation’  in  the  third  section  of  this  chapter.    
44  Mill,  1848.  
45  Garber,  2000;  Claessens  and  Kose,  2013,  p.5.  
46  Mill,  1848,  p.319.  
47  Roubini  and  Mihm,  2011,  p.45.  
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war,   rising  oil  prices,   or   the   invention  of   the   internet.  Markets   can  be  disrupted  by  
external  events,  but  are  “fundamentally  resilient  and  could  not  collapse.”48  Crises  are  
presented  as  ‘black  swan  events’  that  are  highly  improbable  and  unpredictable.49  
Today,  studies  under  the  rubric  of   ‘behavioural  finance’  have  tried  to  explain  
the   creation   of   bubbles   by   looking   at   the   psychology   of   investors.50   Evocative   of  
Keynes’   argument   of   the   ‘animal   spirits’   of   capitalism,   according   to   which   market  
actors’  behaviour  is  driven  as  much  by  the  heart  as  by  the  mind,51  Robert  Shiller  –  the  
founding  father  of  behavioural  economics  –  argues  that  extreme  movements  in  asset  
prices  are  a  product  of  the  ‘irrational  exuberance’52  of  investors.  Resisting  the  Efficient  
Market   Hypothesis,   as   developed   by   Eugene   Fama   and   his   colleagues   at   the  
University  of  Chicago,  Shiller  rejects  the  idea  that  any  change  in  prices  must  reflect  a  
change   in   the   underlying   fundamentals,   arguing   instead   that   these  movements   are  
irrational   crowd   impulses.53   In   response   to   Shiller’s   irrational   exuberance   thesis,  
defenders   of   the   Efficient   Market   Hypothesis   developed   formal   models   to   try   to  
explain  asset  price  bubbles  by  showing  how  individual  rational  behavior  can  lead  to  
collective   mispricing,   which   then   leads   to   bubbles.   Blanchard   and   Watson,   for  
instance,  attempt  to  show  that  under  rational  expectations,   the  asset  price  does  not  
need  to  equal  its  fundamental  value,  leading  to  the  creation  of  ‘rational’  bubbles.54  
Although   scholars   working   under   the   school   of   thought   of   behavioural  
finance   depart   from   the   view   that   crises   originate   in   events   completely   external   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Roubini  and  Mihm,  2011,  p.45.  
49  Taleb,  2007,  p.  xvii.    
50  Claessens  and  Kose,  2013,  p.7.  
51  Keynes,  1936.  
52  Shiller,  2005.  
53   Shiller,   2005.   Other   scholars   emphasise   micro-­‐distortions   that   can   lead   to   mis-­‐pricing.  
Examples   are   virtuous   feedback   loops   (where   rising   asset   prices,   which   increase   net   worth  
positions,  allow  financial  intermediaries  to  leverage  up  and  buy  more  of  the  same  assets,  and  
can   contribute   to   the   evolution   of   bubbles)   and   contagions   (where   spillovers   occur   that   go  
beyond  what  fundamentals  would  suggest)  (Claessens  and  Kose,  2013,  p.7).    
54  Blanchard  and  Watson,  1979.  
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and  separate  from  the  normal  functioning  of  a  market  economy,  to  a  certain  extent,  
they   continue   to   uphold   the   view   that   crises   are   triggered   by   bubbles   produced   by  
deviations  from  an  otherwise  well-­‐functioning  market  economy.  The  main  problem,  
then,   is   the   crisis   itself,   not   any   deeper   problems   in   the   highly-­‐financialised   global  
economy   that   bring   the   crisis   about.55   To   anticipate   the   language   I   use   in   the  
proceeding  sections:   the  problem   is  not  one  of  background  structures,  but  with   the  
eruption  of  the  crisis  itself.    
The  second  pillar  on  which  the  agential  story  rests  is  the  idea  that  the  debtor  
state   is   the   main   culprit   of   the   crisis.   This   view   also   rests   on   a   particular  
understanding   of   how   the   economy   works.   According   to   the   efficient   market  
hypothesis,   financial  markets   shift   savings   from   locations  where   they   are   abundant  
and  cheap   to  places  where   they  are   scarce  and  expensive   relative   to   the   investment  
opportunities.   In   so  doing,   they   allocate  both   credit   and   information   efficiently.  Of  
course,   even   “mainstream   economics   recognises   that   the   world   of   perfect   capital  
markets   exists   only   in   the   classroom   and   that   informational   costs   and   uncertainty  
may  introduce  distortions  in  the  allocation  of  credit.”56  Importantly,  however,  liberal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55   This   classical   liberal   position   is,   of   course,   challenged   by   alternative   schools   of   thought,  
most   prominently   the  Marxist   position   and   the  Minskian   view.   On   the  most   general   level,  
what  unifies  Marxist   accounts   is   their   conviction   that   crises   are  both  endemic   to   capitalism  
and  ultimately  unavoidable.  This  stands  in  stark  opposition  to  the  classical,  liberal  accounts  in  
which   crises   are   thought   of   as   exogenous   to   capitalism   itself,   and  hence   at   least   potentially  
avoidable.   Within   Marxist   accounts,   the   disagreement   lies   in   what   exactly   makes   crisis   in  
capitalism  unavoidable  –  where  exactly  the  line  of  friction  is  to  be  found.  While  some  defend  
the   idea   that   the   inevitability   of   crisis   in   capitalism   springs   from   the   inner   contradictions  
within  and  between  the  spheres  of  production  and  exchange  (see  for  instance  Harvey,  2006),  
others  take  the  line  of  friction  to  be  between  capitalism  as  an  economic  system  and  the  polity  
or  society  (see  for  instance  Streeck  2012,  2014).  Minsky,  in  turn,  proposed  that  finance  was  the  
locus  from  which  crises  originated  (2008).  During  long  periods  of  stability,  the  confidence  of  
creditors   and   debtors   grows,   leading   them   to   take   on   ever   larger   and   riskier   debt   in   the  
pursuit  of  profit.  Instability  does  not  originate  outside  of  the  system,  but  in  the  very  financial  
institutions   that  make   capitalism   possible.   Instability   then,   “is   an   inherent   and   inescapable  
flaw  of  capitalism”  (Minsky,  2008,  p.134).    
56  Devlin,  1989,  p.  65.  
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economists   believe   that   whenever   deviations   from   the   perfect   allocation   of   credit  
occur,  creditors  tend  to  under-­‐lend  rather  than  to  over-­‐lend.57    
The  technical  explanation  for  this  is  called  credit  rationing.  As  profit-­‐seeking  
rational   agents,   creditors   will   attempt   to  maximise   their   expected   return   on   loans,  
subject   to   the   risk  of   loss-­‐inducing  non-­‐payment  of  borrowers.  Put  differently,   they  
will  continue  to  extend  credit  to  the  point  when  the  debt  levels  are  so  high  that  the  
probability  of  illiquidity,  insolvency,  or  the  repudiation  of  debt  becomes  too  large.  In  
a  world  of   imperfect   information,  however,   creditors   cannot   calculate   the  points   of  
illiquidity,   insolvency,   or   repudiation   with   precision.58   According   to   liberal  
economists,   this  makes   creditors   cautious.   If   there   is   a   deviation   from   the   efficient  
allocation  of  credit  by  financial  markets,   it  must  be  a  tendency  to  under-­‐lend  rather  
than  over-­‐lend.    
   But   if  creditors,  on  the  supply  side,  are  cautious  and  rational,   it  must  be  the  
behaviour   of   sovereign   debtors,   as   the   demand   side,   that   makes   debt   burdens  
unsustainable.  Liberal  economists  thus  lay  emphasis  on  the  bad  management  of  the  
debtor  country;  on  expansionary  macroeconomic  policies  and  fiscal  deficits  leading  to  
the  accumulation  of  unsustainable  levels  of  debt.  Consider,  for  instance,  how,  in  the  
wake  of  the  2001  crisis,  Argentina  was  denounced  as  a  parasite  state  which,  despite  its  
rich  resources,  survived  at  the  cost  of  the  global  financial  economy,  and  how  Greece  
in  the  current  crisis  is  referred  to  as  a  black  sheep,  a  free  rider  and  a  profligate  state.  
These  allegedly  descriptive  claims  are  made  in  highly  moralised  language,  suggesting  
that  the  economic  arguments  are  intertwined  with  arguments  about  moral  blame.    
The  agential  story  –  based  on  the  two  pillars   just  described  –  is  embodied  in  
the  SD&CR.  First,   on   the   level  of  principle,  one  norm  governs   the  SD&CR:   the   idea  
that   “sovereign  borrowers  must   repay,   regardless  of   the   circumstances  of   the   initial  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57  Buchheit  et  al.,  2013.  
58  Buchheit  et  al.,  2013.  
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debt  contract,  the  actual  use  of  the  loan  proceeds,  or  the  exigencies  of  any  potential  
default.”59  The   legal   expression  of   this   ‘repayment  norm’60   is  Pacta   Sunt   Servanda   –  
agreements  must  be  kept.61  As  put  by  Barry  and  Tomitova:  “Pacta  Sunt  Servanda,  or  
‘pacts  must  be   respected,’   is   the  basic  norm  that  underlies   the  present   treatment  of  
sovereign  debt  contracts.”62  The  repayment  norm  is  the  embodiment  of  the  agential  
story   on   the   level   of   principle,   because   by   emphasising   the   normative   weight   of  
contracts  to  the  detriment  of  everything  else,  it  assumes  that  states  accrue  debt  in  a  
position  of  freedom  and  equality.  Failing  to  live  up  to  this  contractual  obligation  thus  
becomes  a  sign  of  irresponsibility  on  the  part  of  the  sovereign.  
   Second,  on  the  level  of  institutional  design,  “the  international  financial  system  
lacks  clear  and  systematic  procedures  for  restructuring  sovereign  debt  and  handling  
sovereign  default.”63  The  absence  of  a  facility  to  restructure  sovereign  debt  has  been  
referred  to  as  ‘the  gaping  hole’  of  the  international  financial  system,64  and  the  Group  
of   77   and  China   are   currently   fighting   to   see   such   a   facility   established.   65   The   first  
step   towards   such  an  establishment  was   taken   in  September  2015,  when   the  United  
Nations  General  Assembly  adopted  basic  principles  on  sovereign  debt  restructuring.  
To   date,   however,   nothing   has   followed   from   this   declaration.   The   absence   of   a  
sovereign  debt  restructuring  facility  exemplifies  the  agential  story  on  an  institutional  
level,   because   it   places   all   the   burdens   arising   from   restructuring   on   the   sovereign  
debtor.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  Lienau,  2014,  p.1.  
60  Lienau,  2014,  p.1.  
61  Wollner,  2017,  p.1.  
62  Barry  and  Tomitova,  2006,  p.  53.  
63  Wollner,  2017,  p.1.  The  distinction  between   ‘the  principle   level’  and  the   ‘institutional   level’  
also  comes  from  Wollner.    
64  Krueger,  2001.  
65  I  call  it  SDRF  to  encompass  all  different  proposals  made  (both  statutory  and  market-­‐based),  
and   to   distinguish   it   from   Krueger’s   specific   proposal,   which   she   termed   ‘Sovereign   Debt  
Restructuring  Mechanism’.    
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The   most   important   players   of   the   SD&CR   today   are   private   creditors   and  
multilateral   public   creditors.   Private   creditors   coordinate   their   interests   in   Bank  
Advisory  Committees,  founded  in  1975  and  soon  nicknamed  ‘the  London  Club’  due  to  
its   location.66   The   London   Club   continues   to   be   of   great   importance   today,   as   no  
international,   contractual   sovereign   debt   restructuring   facility   currently   exists.  
Multilateral   public   creditors   such   as   the   IMF,   the  World   Bank,   and   other   regional  
banks  are  also  central  actors  in  the  sovereign  debt  regime.  Not  only  do  they  lend  to  
countries   in   distress,   often   becoming   lenders   of   last   resort,   but   also   tend   to  
coordinate   the   interests   of   other   creditors.   Private   creditors   give   deference   to   the  
Fund  “because  it  is  seen  as  lead[ing]  the  ‘creditor  coalition.’”67     
Private   creditors   fear   that   establishing   a   contractual   solution   to   sovereign  
debt  crises  is  not  only  an  implicit  recognition  that  sovereign  debt  crises  do  occur  but  
may   also   lower   the   costs   of   restructuring.68   This   is   thus   a   ‘debtor   moral   hazard’  
argument:  if  the  costs  of  default  are  reduced  through  the  establishment  of  an  orderly  
sovereign   debt   restructuring   facility,   the   sovereigns   may   have   less   incentives   to  
repay.69   In   other   words,   if   it   is   easier   to   restructure,   there   exists   less   incentive   to  
repay,  and  more  restructuring  may  occur.70       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  The  interests  of  bilateral  public  creditors,   in  turn,  are  coordinated  by   ‘the  Paris  Club’,  also  
labelled   by   its   location.   The   Paris   Club   is   composed   of   18   countries,   though   six   of   them  
(Germany,   the   U.S.,   the   U.K,   Italy,   France   and   Japan)   hold   most   of   the   late   developing  
countries’  debt  and  thus  dominate   the   forum.  Although  the  Paris  Club  continues   to  exist,   it  
lost  some  of  its  significance  starting  from  the  1970s  onwards,  as  the  influx  of  petrodollars  into  
the  international  financial  system  let  the  share  of  private  credit  being  extended  to  sovereigns  
increase,  and  that  of  public  credit  decrease  (Cooper  and  Momani,  2005,  p.307).  Moreover,   it  
lost  further  significance  when  contractual  solutions  to  sovereign  debt  were  first  established  in  
1996,   first   through   the   Heavily   Indebted   Poor   Country   Initiative   and   then   through   the  
Multilateral  Debt  Relief  Initiative.  
67  Cooper  and  Momani,  2005,  p.307.  
68  Buchheit  et  al,  2013.  
69  Becker  et  al.,  2003;  Simpson,  2006.  
70  There  is  very  limited  empirical  evidence  showing  that  debtor  moral  hazard  actually  occurs  
in   the   realm   of   private   sovereign   debt   (Becker,   2003;   Rogoff   and   Zettelmeyer,   2002;   Anesi,  
2008).   As   the   report   Revisiting   Sovereign   Bankruptcy   of   the   Committee   on   International  
Economic  Policy  and  Reform  shows,  sovereign  debtors  tend  not  to  restructure  too  much  and  
too   fast   (as   the  debtor  moral  hazard  hypothesis,   following   the  enforcement  problem,  would  
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   Private   creditors   also   prefer   to   resolve   sovereign   debt   crises   on   an   ad   hoc  
basis,   because   negotiating   in   a   bilateral   manner   with   only   one   debtor   at   a   time  
inhibits   the  emergence  of  a   ‘debtor  coalition’   that  might  be  able  to  push  for  greater  
debt  haircuts.71  The  private  creditor’s  preferred  option  is,  of  course,  an  international  
bailout.   What   occurs   when   a   sovereign   debtor   is   bailed   out   by   bilateral   and  
multilateral  creditors  is  that  taxpayer  money  is  used  to  pay  back  private  creditors.  It  is  
thus  unsurprising  that  international  bailouts  –  combined  with  austerity  policies  in  the  
debtor   state   –   are   the   preferred   option   of   private   creditors.72   By   avoiding   the  
establishment  of   a   facility   to   restructure  private   sovereign  debt,   the   ‘creditor   cartel’  
managed  to  get  its  way  and  succeeded  in  “pushing  the  primary  adjustment  burden  to  
the  crisis  on  to  the  debtor  countries.”73  
In  sum,  the  agential  story  is  based  on  two  pillars:  what  I  have  called  the  ‘crisis  
problem,’  which  puts   the   crisis   at   the   centre   stage   and   the   ‘debtor  problem,’  which  
maintains  that  it  is  the  excesses  of  the  debtor  state  that  trigger  the  crisis.  The  agential  
story   is   embodied   in   the   SD&CR,   illustrating   clearly   how   economic   theory,   moral  
arguments,   and   policy   proposals   are   intimately   connected   in   practice.   Having  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suggest)  but  too  little  and  too  late  (Buchheit  et  al,  2013).  Politicians  with  short-­‐term  political  
horizons,  who  wish  to  avoid  reputational  costs_  and  maintain  (or  regain)  continued  access  to  
external   resources   are   often   reluctant   to   restructure   their   debts.   As   a   result,   they   sub-­‐
optimally  postpone  unavoidable  defaults   and   settle   for  quick  debt   restructurings   that   fail   at  
restoring   debt   sustainability.   Restructuring   also   inflicts   collateral   damage   on   a   debtor  
countries:  “Defaults  may  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  country’s  overall  reputation  (not  just  its  
reputation  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  its  creditors)  and  increases  the  costs  of  all  its  transactions  and  agreements  
(economic  and  political,  domestic  and  international)”  (Buchheit  et  al,  2013,  p.14).    
71  In  debt  restructuring,  a  haircut  is  a  percentage  reduction  of  the  amount  that  will  be  repaid  
to  creditors.  
72   Here,   a   line   of   disagreement   can   be   found   among   private   creditors   and   the   IMF.  While  
international   bailouts   are   clearly   the   preferred   option   of   private   creditors,   the   IMF  worried  
about  the  creation  of  an  incentive  structure  in  which  private  creditors  would  be  encouraged  to  
make  ever  riskier  loans,  knowing  that,  in  case  of  a  debtor’s  inability  to  pay,  a  bailout  from  the  
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  (and  from  multilateral   institutions  more  broadly)  would  
spare   them  from  shouldering   the  costs  of   restructuring.  Against   the  backdrop  of   this  worry,  
Anne  Krueger,  deputy  managing  director  of  the  IMF,  thus  proposed  to  implement  a  statutory  
Sovereign  Debt  Restructuring  Mechanism.  This  proposal  was,  however,  rapidly  put  to  bed  and  
a  more  minimal,  market-­‐based  solution  was  implemented,  namely  the  inclusion  of  Collective  
Action  Clauses  into  bond  contracts  (Rogoff  and  Zettelmeyer,  2002).    
73  Helleiner,  2009,  p.93.    
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reconstructed  the  agential  story  and  shown  how  it  is  embodied  in  the  SD&CR,  in  the  
next  section  I  now  turn  to  criticising  it.  What  this  agential  story  fails  to  account  for  is  
the  importance  of  deeper  underlying  structural  phenomena.    
  
Structural  Explanations,  the  SD&CR,  and  Financialisation  
Thus   far,   the   debt   histories   of   individual   countries   have   been   explained   exclusively  
with   reference   to   the   agency   of   the   debtor   state.   In   this   section,   I   argue   that   this  
agential  story  needs  to  be  complemented  with  a  structural  explanation.  A  structural  
explanation  brings  into  focus  different  kinds  of  evidence  and  considers  a  broader  set  
of  empirical  phenomena.  Ultimately,   it   is  both  more  compelling  and  more  revealing  
of  the  various  kinds  of  injustices  that  lie  beneath  the  agential  focus  that  most  assume  
to  be  unassailable.74  
Concretely,   I   argue   that   a   country’s  debt  history  needs   to  be   explained  with  
reference  to  the  SD&CR.  The  SD&CR,   in  turn,   is  embedded  in  a  highly-­‐financialised  
economy  which   shapes   the   regime.   To   offer   an   alternative   to   the   standard   agential  
story   that   is   normally   told   about   a   country’s   sovereign   debt   history   thus   requires  
paying   attention   to   both   the   SD&CR   and   the   way   the   latter   is   shaped   by  
financialisation   (see   figure   below).   In   this   section,   I   defend   this   argument,   first,   by  
defining   what   ‘structures’   are;   second,   by   justifying   the   need   for   a   structural  
explanation;   and,   third,   by   showing   how   the   SD&CR,   embedded   in   a   highly-­‐
financialised   economy,   are   the   relevant   structures   that   need   to   be   understood   to  
explain  a  country’s  debt  history.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74   Although   the   structural   explanation   does   allow   us   to   identify   injustices   that   would  
otherwise  remain  obscure,  I  only  address  these  injustices  in  the  next  chapter.  In  this  chapter,  I  
limit  myself  to  arguing  for  the  need  of  a  structural  explanation.    
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What  are  structures?  The  vast  diversity  of  answers  given  to  this  question  can  
be  clustered  around  two  main  positions.  One  defines  structures  as  a  field  or  space  in  
which   positions   stand   in   relation   to   each   other   and   condition   an   actor’s   realm   of  
action.75   Each   position   is   characterised   by   a   particular   option   set,   or   choice  
architecture,  and  each  position  stands  in  particular  relationships  with  other  positions.  
The   space   of   possibilities   that   the   occupier   of   a   position  has   is   limited  by   relations  
internal  to  the  structure.  The  second  position  focuses  on  what  constitutes  structures,  
arguing   that   structures   are   networks   of   social   practices  which   are   sustained   by   the  
interplay  between  schemas  and  resources.76  Resources  are  things  of  all  sorts  –  human,  
nonhuman,  animate  or  not  –  that  are  taken  to  have  some  (including  negative)  value.77  
Schemas  are  collective  concepts,  beliefs  and  expectations  that  are  public,  but  can  also  
be   internalised,  and  that  guide  behaviour.  Social  practices  exist  when  resources  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75   Blau   (1977)   and   Bourdieu   (2005)   are   representatives   of   this   first   way   of   conceptualising  
structures.  
76  Giddens  (1979),  Sewell  (2005)  and  Haslanger  (2016).  
77  Haslanger  2016,  p.126.  
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schemas  “mutually  imply  and  sustain  each  other”78  –  when  public  schemas  interpret,  
conceptualise,  and  respond  to  resources,  resources  are,  in  turn,  utilised  and  modified  
to  fit  schemas.  
   I  take  these  two  positions  to  be  complementary.  Whereas  the  first  focuses  on  
the   constraints   of   occupying   a   concrete   position,   the   second   concentrates   on   the  
more  ontological  question  of  what  constitutes  structures.  Rather  than  rival  accounts,  
these  two  positions  offer  definitions  of  structures  that  should  map  on  to  each  other.  
Google  Maps  serves  as  a  useful  analogy  here:  while  the  ‘map  option’  of  Google  Maps  
identifies   the  main  buildings  and  streets,   showing   its  users  how  these   intersect,   the  
‘satellite   option’   fills   the   street-­‐skeleton   with   content,   providing   real-­‐life   images   of  
how  buildings,  streets  and  intersections  look  in  the  real  world.  Although  the  map  and  
satellite   options   of   Google   Maps   highlight   different   things   and   may   be   useful   for  
different   purposes,   both   describe   the   same   reality.   Analogously,  while   the   first   and  
second   account   -­‐   the   map   and   satellite   option,   respectively   –   focus   on   different  
aspects,  what  they  both  identify  as  ‘structure’  is  the  same.  A  complete  analysis  of  any  
given   structure  would   require   both   levels   of   analysis.   At   the   same   time,   one  might  
want  to  focus  on  any  one  of  these  two  levels  for  different  purposes.    
When   and   why   are   structures   important   to   explain   an   agent’s   actions?   I  
contend   that   when   an   agent’s   actions   are   constrained   by   the   position   he   or   she  
occupies  in  a  given  structure,  a  good  explanation  would  explain  his  or  her  actions,  at  
least   in   part,   with   reference   to   that   position.   Put   differently,   when   a   structure  
determines  the  space  of  possibilities  of  actors  as  occupiers  of  positions,  constraining  
possibilities   in   such   a   manner   that   only   some   are   genuinely   available,   then   an  
adequate  explanation  of   the  agent’s  behaviour  must  be   sensitive   to   the   structure.  A  
structural  explanation  does  just  this.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78  Sewell,  2005,  p.13.  
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   The  justification  for  a  structural  explanation  can  take  a  stronger  and  a  weaker  
form.  Let  me   illustrate   this  by  means  of   two   ‘classroom  analogies,’   starting  with  the  
stronger  justification  for  structural  explanation.  Imagine,  first,  a  situation  in  which  a  
teacher  decides  beforehand  that  the  overall  grade-­‐distribution  for  an  assignment  will  
contain  one  A,  twenty-­‐four  Bs  and  25  Cs.79  One  student,  Mary,  gets  the  A.  Now,  if  one  
were   to   ask   why   Mary   got   an   A,   the   answer   ‘because   she   wrote   an   original   and  
thoughtful  assignment’  is  inadequate.  It  is  inadequate  because  what  is  relevant  here  is  
that  Mary  wrote   the  best   assignment,   not   that   she  wrote   a   thoughtful   and   original  
one.   The   only   good   explanation   in   this   context   is   a   structural   one:   an   explanation,  
that   is,   that  makes  reference  to  the  other  students   in  the  class  and  to  the  particular  
grading  structure.80    
   A   second   classroom   analogy   that   delineates   the   contours   of   the   weaker  
justification  for  structural  explanations  is  offered  in  the  context  of  repudiating  purely  
agential   explanations   for   poverty   (‘explanatory   nationalism’).81   To   show   that   this  
“dominant  view  is  quite  true  on  the  whole,  but  also  totally  one-­‐sided,”82  we  are  asked  
to   think   of   a   class   with   great   variation   in   student   performance.   Although   this  
variation  must  be  due  to  student-­‐specific  factors,  it  does  not  follow  that  these  factors  
alone  explain  the  performance  of  the  class.  Other  ‘global’  factors,  such  as  the  quality  
of   the   teacher’s   teaching,   also   impact   the   overall   student   performance.   Similarly,  
while  bad  policies  might  indeed  be  an  explanatory  variable  in  poverty,  this  does  not  
prove  global  factors  to  be  inert.  The  reason  why  such  agential  explanations  are  ‘totally  
one   sided’,   then,   is   because   they   “hold   fixed,   and   thereby   entirely   ignore,   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  Garfinkel,  1981,  p.41.  
80  This  example  is  also  given  in  Haslanger,  2016.  
81  Pogge,  2008.  
82  Pogge,  2008,  p.145.  
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economic  and  geopolitical  context  in  which  the  national  economies  and  governments  
of  the  poorer  countries  are  placed”  in.83    
   All   things   considered,   the   stronger   justification   for   structural   explanations  
sustains   that,   iff   an   agent’s   actions   are   constrained   by   virtue   of   the   position   s/he  
occupies   in   the   structure   -­‐  being  part  of  a   ‘structured  whole’84-­‐      then   the  only   good  
explanation   will   be   a   structural   one.   The   weaker   justification   for   a   structural  
explanation  does  not  discard   the  purely  agential   explanation  altogether,  holding  on  
to  the  idea  that,  while  it  may  not  always  be  accurate,  it  is  ‘quite  true  on  the  whole.’  A  
purely   agential   explanation   must   simply   be   complemented   by   a   structural  
explanation  to  make  it  less  one  sided.    
While  I  tend  to  agree  with  the  stronger  justification  more  than  I  do  with  the  
weaker   one,   note   that   the   weaker   defence   for   structural   explanations   suffices   to  
ground   the   importance   of   providing   a   structural   explanation   for   a   country’s   debt  
history.   If   I  manage  to  convince  my  readers  that  structural   factors  affect  a  country’s  
debt   history   –   that   not   only   good   or   bad   governance   factors   into   a   country’s   debt  
history  -­‐  it  would  be  sufficient  justification  for  why  a  structural  analysis  is  necessary.  
Having  defined  what  is  meant  by  structures  and  delineated  the  cases  in  which  
a  structural  explanation  is  needed,  I  now  wish  to  show  that  structural  factors  affect  a  
country’s   debt   history   and   that,   therefore,   a   structural   explanation   is   required   to  
complement  and/  or  offer  an  alternative  to  the  standard  agential  story  that  is  usually  
told   about   a   country’s   debt   history.   I   do   so   by   looking   at   the   developments   in   the  
global   economy   since   the   abolition   of   the   Bretton   Woods   regime,   at   how   this  
impacted   the   SD&CR   and   at   how   this,   in   turn,   impacted   individual   country  
trajectories.   Where   one   situates   the   starting   point   for   such   a   historical   analysis   is  
somewhat   arbitrary,   since   every   event   has   its   pre-­‐history.   Yet   the   idea   that   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83  Pogge,  2008,  p.149.  
84  Haslanger,  2016.  
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abolition  of  Bretton  Woods  represents  some  form  of  a  critical   juncture  that  marked  
the  end  of  one  era  and  the  beginning  of  another  has  become  common  place  and  thus,  
I  chose  to  lay  my  historical  starting  point  here.    
In  1944,  toward  the  end  of  World  War  II,  representatives  of  the  allied  nations  
came  together  in  Bretton  Woods,  New  Hampshire,  with  the  aim  of  contributing  to  a  
more   peaceful   future   by   sketching   out   a   new   international   financial   and  monetary  
order  that  was  to  be  implemented  after  the  war’s  conclusion.  In  a  diplomatic  tour  de  
force,   an   agreement   was   reached   to   institute   a   fixed,   but   adjustable   exchange   rate  
system.85   In   addition   to   effectively   fixing   the  dollar   as   the  world’s   reserve   currency,  
the  Bretton  Woods  regime  offered  widespread  provision  of  deposit  insurance  to  stop  
bank   runs   by   strict   regulations   of   the   financial   system,   such   as   the   separation  
between  commercial   from   investment  banking,  and  by  strict  capital  controls.  These  
restrictions   kept   the   financial   system   under   tight   regulatory   control,   making   the  
Bretton  Woods  era  a  period  of  remarkable  financial  stability.86  
   With  the  outbreak  of  the  Vietnam  War  and  the  rise  of  the  United  States’  fiscal  
and   current   account   deficits,   it   became   ever   more   difficult   to   sustain   a   fixed   yet  
adjustable   exchange   rate   regime   that   relied   on   confidence   in   the   dollar.   As   U.S,  
creditors   started   fearing   that   there   was   not   enough   gold   to   back   the   dollars   in  
circulation,  Nixon  took  the  unilateral  decision   in  August  of   1971   to  unpeg  the  dollar  
from   gold,   thereby   single-­‐handedly   abolishing   the   international   monetary   and  
financial   system   that   had   been   in   place   since   the   end   of  WWII.87   This  marked   the  
beginning   of   the   period   of   ‘financialisation’   in   which   the   tight   fiscal   control   and  
stability   of   the   Bretton  Woods   era   was   replaced   by   an   international   financial   and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  Conway,  2017.  
86  Ruggie,  1982.  
87   “It  was  not   just   that  Nixon  deliberately   abolished   the  Bretton  Woods   fixed   exchange   rate  
system   –   though   often   referred   to   euphemistically   as   the   ‘collapse’   of   the   system,   it   was  
actually  more  like  a  deliberate  act  of  sabotage”  (Strange,  1998,  p.40-­‐41).  
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monetary   environment   in   which   the   financial   sector   could   blossom,   both   at   the  
domestic  and  international  levels.88       
   To  understand  the  impact  that  Nixon’s  freeing  of  the  exchange  rate  had,  it  is  
useful   to   look  at  Mundell  and  Fleming’s   Impossible  Trilemma  and  the  solution  that  
had   been   agreed   upon   during   the   Bretton   Woods   era.   According   to   Mundell   and  
Fleming,  governments  typically  find  three  things  desirable,  namely:  a  stable  exchange  
rate,  free  capital  mobility,  and  the  ability  to  set  monetary  policy  to  achieve  domestic  
objectives.  A  stable  exchange  rate  is  thought  to  be  valuable  because  it  contributes  to  
an   increase   in   national   and   world   income   growth.   On   the   national   level,   this   is  
because   a   stable   exchange   rate   contributes   to   greater   price   stability,   and   on   the  
international  level,  it  allows  for  a  greater  expansion  of  trade  and  investment,  both  of  
which   are   said   to   contribute   to   income   growth.89   Free   capital   mobility   is   seen   by  
many   economists   as   beneficial,   since   it   facilitates   efficient   capital   allocation   across  
the  globe,  as  resources  flow  from  countries  that  have  savings  in  excess  of  investment  
needs   to   those   with   investment   needs   unmatched   by   domestic   savings.90   Finally,  
setting  monetary  policy  independently  is  valuable  as  domestic  objectives,  such  as  full  
employment,  can  be  pursued.    
The  hypothesis  of  Mundell   and  Fleming,  which  gives   the  model   its  name,   is  
that   governments   cannot   have   all   three   of   these   allegedly   desirable   things  
simultaneously   for   an   extended  period   of   time.  The  Bretton  Woods   solution   to   the  
impossible   trilemma  was   therefore   to   have   fixed   but   adjustable   exchange   rates   and  
autonomous  monetary  policy,  with  the  ‘price’  of  putting  in  place  capital  controls.91  In  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88   Although   the  meaning   of   the   concept   of   ‘financialisation’   is   disputed,   I   chose   to   adopt   a  
fairly  minimal   definition,   defining   it   “as   a   tendency   for   profit  making   to   occur   increasingly  
through  financial  rather  than  through  trade  and  commodity  production”  (Krippner,  2011).  See  
also  Lapavitsas  (2013),  Orhangazi  (2008)  and  Epstein  (2005).    
89  Reddy,  2003,  p.87.  
90  Turner,  2016,  p.124.  
91  Conway,  2017.  
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contrast,   the   solution   to   the   impossible   trilemma   that   emerged   in   the  Post-­‐Bretton  
Woods   era   is   one   in   which   independent   monetary   policy   is   sacrificed.   Advanced  
economies  adopted  floating  exchange  rates  and  free  capital  mobility,  with  the  price  of  
targeting  their  monetary  policy  in  a  way  that  protects  the  stability  of  their  economy’s  
external  links  (especially  the  exchange  rate)  rather  than  meeting  domestic  objectives.  
Late   developer   countries   started   progressively   moving   in   that   direction,   as   well.  
While   they   initially  adopted  capital   controls   to  have  a   fixed  exchange   rate   (pegging  
their   currency   to   the   U.S.   dollar)   and   benefiting   from   an   independent   monetary  
policy,  they  progressively  dismantled  capital  controls,  at  the  expense  of  autonomous  
monetary  policy,  as  a  response  to  IMF  pressure.  
The  dismantling  of  capital  controls  at  the  international  level  and  the  adoption  
of  floating  exchange  rates  made  domestic  credit  controls  appear  unnecessary.  In  the  
United  States  -­‐  considered  the  pioneer  in  banking  innovation  -­‐  the  Glass-­‐Steagall  Act  
of  1933  was  abolished.  92  With  its  abolition,  banks  became  free  to  combine  commercial  
banking   (which   took   deposits   and   made   loans)   with   investment   banking   (which  
underwrote,  bought,  and  sold  securities).93  Although  the  United  States  took  the  lead  
in   deregulating   the   banking   system,   and   despite   meaningful   national   and  
institutional   differences   among   OECD   countries,   the   trend   towards   progressive  
deregulation   of   the   banking   sector   became   a   common   feature   among   advanced  
economies.94       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92  Strange,  1998,  p.  40-­‐41.  
93  The  Act  suffered  a  death  by  a  thousand  cuts  from  the  late  1980s  onwards,  and  -­‐  after  intense  
lobbying  by  commercial  and  investment  banks  –  its  remnants  were  abolished  by  Congress  in  
1999  via  the  Financial  Services  Modernization  Act  (Suarez  and  Kolodny,  2011).    
94  While   some   authors   argue   that   the   deregulation   of   the   banking   and   financial   sector  was  
“made   in   America”   (Strange,   1998,   p.41),   others   emphasise   that   the   deregulation   of   the  
financial  system  was  a  ‘shared  sickness’  (Roubini  and  Mihm,  2011,  p.125-­‐127)  among  advanced  
economies.   For   an   analysis   on   the   national   institutional   differences   among   advanced  
economies,  see  the  literature  on  varieties  of  capitalism.  A  good  introduction  can  be  found  in  
“An   Introduction   to   Varieties   of   Capitalism”   in   Peter   A.   Hall   et   al.   (eds),   Varieties   of  
Capitalism.  The  Institutional  Foundations  of  Comparative  Advantage’  (2001).    
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   The  push   for   financial  deregulation   resulted   in  an   increase   in   intra-­‐financial  
activities,   as   well   as   in   a   surge   of   financial   innovations.  Whereas   in   the   1960s,   the  
typical  bank’s  balance  sheet  was  made  up  of  loans  to  households  or  businesses,  with  
the   exception   of   government   bonds   and   cash,   today  more   than   half   of   the   balance  
sheets  of  the  biggest  banks  worldwide  are  made  up  of  loans  or  deposits  between  them  
and   other   financial   institutions.  While   the   growth   of   intra-­‐financial   activities   since  
the   1970s   was   spread   out   across   many   different   types   of   assets,   one   of   the   most  
important  ones  was  the  increase  in  credit  securities.  Credit  securities  allow  banks  to  
pool   loans   and   sell   them   to   other   financial   institutions,   thereby   eliminating   them  
from  the  bank  balance  sheet.95     
   Not  only  did  the  emergence  of  credit  securities  allow  the  spread  of  risk,  but  it  
also  contributed   to   the  growth  of  many  non-­‐bank   financial   institutions.  These  non-­‐
bank   financial   institutions   constitute  what   we   today   refer   to   as   a   ‘shadow   banking  
system,’   since   they   replicate   the  maturity   transformations   of   banks,   but   they   do   so  
outside   the   regulatory   system   that   governs   traditional   banks.   These   shadow   banks  
took  over  many  of  the  traditional  roles  of  banks,  and  where  banks  remained  involved,  
they  did  so  only  as  one  more  link  in  a  multi-­‐step  lending  chain.96  Non-­‐financial  firms  
also   became   increasingly   dependent   on   financial   revenues   for   a   supplement,   or  
substitute,   of   the   profit   made   in   their   traditional   productive   activities.97   The  
automobile   producer   Ford  Motor   Company,   for   instance,   has   in   recent   years  made  
the   vast   majority   of   its   revenues   from   selling   loans   to   purchase   cars   rather   than  
through  the  sale  of  the  cars  themselves.98  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95  Turner,  2016,  p.24-­‐25.  
96  Turner,  2016,  p.9.  The  United  States  was,  once  more,  “the  epicentre  of  these  developments.  
(…)  But  the  impact  of  these  changes  was  global”  (Turner,  2016,  p.96).    
97  Krippner,  2011,  p.3.  
98  Froud  et  al.  in  Krippner,  2011,  p.4.  
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To  sum,  the  changes  in  the  international  monetary  and  financial  system  that  
took   place   since   1971,   as   well   as   the   changes   in   the   domestic   economies   that   the  
abolition   of   the   Bretton   Woods   System   propelled,   resulted   in   a   process   of  
‘financialisation’,  both  on  the  domestic  and  on  the  international  levels,   in  which  the  
financial  sector  expanded  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  the  real  economy.    
   Crucially,   for   our   purposes,   this   process   of   financialisation   of   the   economy  
impacted  and  altered  the  SD&CR.  Financialisation  is  itself  a  structure  that  constrains  
the  SD&CR.  This  ‘structuring’,  in  turn,  is  one  of  a  structure’s  key  characteristics,99  for  
structures,   as   Sewell   put   it,   “empower   what   they   designate.”100   Thinking   about  
financialisation  as  a  structure  also  rightly  defies  a  static  understanding  of  structures.  
Despite  being  a  noun,  ‘financialisation’  connotes  a  process,  namely  the  financialising  
of   domestic  markets   and   of   the   global   political   economy.   Calling   financialisation   a  
structure   hence   highlights   the   importance   of   conceiving   of   structures   as   dynamic  
constructs.  
Once   freed   from   the   constraints   of   the   Bretton  Woods   fixed-­‐exchange   rate  
regime,  and  in  the  context  of  the  slowdown  of  post-­‐war  economic  growth,  advanced  
economies   started   making   use   of   the   printing   press   to   stimulate   their   economy.101  
Even   before   the   1973   oil   crises,   this   use   of  monetary   policy   resulted   in   inflation   in  
OECD   countries.   Stagflation   –   the   combination   of   high   inflation   and   recession   –  
followed,   with   the   two   oil   shocks   in   1973   and   1979.   Stagflation,   diminished   the  
demand  for  credit  in  OECD  countries.     
   Stacked  with  petro-­‐dollars   they   found  difficult   to   invest   in  OECD  countries,  
Western  banks  with  excessive  liquidity  started  lending  to  late-­‐developing  countries.102  
Developing   states  welcomed   this   increased  willingness  by  Western  banks   to   extend  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99  Giddens,  1979.  
100  Sewell,  2005,  p.2.    
101  Streeck,  2013,  p.13.  
102  Cardoso  and  Helwege,  1992.  
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loans  since,  in  contrast  to  multilateral  public  loans,  these  private  debt  contracts  were  
unconditional  and  were  not  linked  to  political  or  technical  conditions.103  The  need  for  
fresh   private   loans,   moreover,   grew   steadily   throughout   the   decade:   while   the  
maturities  were  long  in  the  early  1970s,  they  shortened  throughout  the  decade.  This  
lay  bare  a  temporal  gap  between  the  repayment  dates  of  the  loans  and  the  financial  
return   generated   by   the   investment   of   these   loans   in   late   developing   countries.  
Consequently,   debtor   states  had   to   return   to   the  market   to   be   able   to   service   their  
debt  obligations,  essentially  paying  old  debts  with  new  ones.  This  created  a  ‘treadmill  
effect’  in  which  accruing  debt  today  generated  greater  demand  for  credit  tomorrow.104  
     
   As  the  decade  progressed,  the  stagflation  in  advanced  economies  continued  to  
worsen.  It  was  not  until  Paul  Volcker  became  the  chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  in  
August  of  1979  that  the  easy  monetary  policy  that  had  characterised  the  decade  was  
reversed.  To  control   inflation,  Volcker   sharply   raised   interest   rates   “to   stratospheric  
levels.”105   As   central   bankers   around   the  world   emulated   him,   advanced   economies  
faced  a  ‘shock  treatment’:  a  deep  recession  with  high  levels  of  unemployment,  which,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103  Devlin,  1989,  p.  47.  
104   Devlin,   1989,   p.   51.   Although  more   and  more   late   developing   countries   gained   access   to  
private   bank   loans   as   the   decade   advanced,   it   is   in   the   1970s   where   we   also   witness   a  
divergence  between  two  sets  of  late  developing  countries,  namely  emerging  economies  on  one  
hand  and  Least  Developed  Countries  (LDCs)  on  the  other.  While  the  former  gained  access  to  
private   bank   loans,   the   latter   remained   unattractive   for   foreign   creditors   and   remained  
dependent   on   concessionary   loans   from   public   creditors   (Fogarty,   2013).   This   marked   the  
beginning  of  what  can  be  called  a  two-­‐tier  developing  country  debt  regime,  in  which  emerging  
economies   are   associated  with  private   sovereign  debt   and  LDCs  with  public   sovereign  debt.  
Until   fairly   recently,   this   traditional   distinction   was   upheld   and   the   policy   responses   to  
sovereign  debt  crises  erupting  in  each  of  the  two  sets  of  countries  diverged.  While  contractual  
solutions  were  sought  for  public  sovereign  debt  crises  in  LDCs  -­‐  namely  the  Heavily  Indebted  
Poor   Countries   Initiative   (I   &   II)   and   the   Multilateral   Debt   Relied   Initiative   (MDRI)   –   the  
resolution   of   private   sovereign   debt   crises   still   lacks   such   a   contractual   approach   (Fogarty,  
2013;  Helleiner,  2009).  Since  2006,  however,  twelve  Sub  Saharan  African  countries  made  their  
debut   in   international   financial  markets.  Eight  of   these   twelve  countries  emerged   from  debt  
write-­‐offs  only  a  few  years  before  under  HIPC  and  MDRI  (Mecagni  et  al,  2014).  This  challenges  
the   traditional   association   of   emerging   markets   with   private   sovereign   debt,   and   of   LDC  
(almost  exclusively)  with  public  sovereign  debt  (Fogarty,  2013).  
105  Roubini  and  Mihm,  2011,  p.25.  
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although  short-­‐lived,  was  socially  and  politically  costly.  While  governments,  such  as  
those   of   Reagan   and   Thatcher,   “were   willing   to   trade  mass   unemployment   for   the  
restoration  of  ‘sound  money’  and  to  crush  the  expected  social  resistance  at  whatever  
cost,”106  the  radical  turnaround  in  monetary  policy  was  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  
sovereign   debt   levels,   as   governments   tried   to   cushion   the   impact   of   the  monetary  
shock   treatment   on   the   population.   By   the  mid   1980s,   inflation  was   controlled   and  
advanced   economies   entered   into   an   era   of   low   inflation,   high   growth,   and   mild  
recessions,  an  era  referred  to  as  ‘the  Great  Moderation’.    
What   constituted   a   cure   for   inflation   in   advanced   economies   came   at   the  
price  of  a  relatively  short-­‐lived  recession.  But  for  those  developing  countries  that  had  
extensively   borrowed   from   Western   banks   in   the   preceding   decade,   this   same  
prescription   became   a   recipe   for   disaster.   When   Volcker   increased   the   Federal  
Reserves’   interest   rates   in   the   early   1980s,   a   debt   crisis   erupted,   starting   first   with  
Mexico´s   default   in   1982,   and   spread   like  wildfire   throughout   Latin  America   in   the  
years   that   followed.107   The   rise   in   interest   rates   led   to   a   dramatic   increase   in   Latin  
America´s  debt,  much  of  which   carried   floating   interest   rates.  Moreover,   the   short-­‐
lived  recession  in  OECD  countries  resulted  in  a  reduction  in  exports  from  the  debtor  
countries.108  The  decline  in  exports,  in  turn,  created  (in  Argentina  and  Venezuela)  and  
further   aggravated   (in   Brazil   and   Mexico)   trade   deficits,   making   Latin   American  
countries   even   more   dependent   on   loans   to   finance   the   excess   of   imports,   loans  
which  now  became  much  more  expensive  to  acquire.109  Finally,  higher   interest  rates  
made   it   all   the   more   attractive   to   save   money   abroad,   pulling   foreign   investment  
away  from  Latin  America  and  further  exacerbating  capital  flight.110       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106  Streeck,  2013,  p.34.  
107  Cardoso  and  Helwege,  1992;  Weeks,  1989.  
108  Cardoso  and  Helwege,  1992,  p.116-­‐118.  
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   Ultimately,   the   crisis   was   resolved  with   the   introduction   of   the   Brady   Plan.  
The   plan   consisted   of   offering   emerging   economies   in   crisis   the   opportunity   to  
exchange  their  outstanding  bank  loans  into  new  sovereign  bonds,  which  were  partly  
collateralised   by  U.S.   Treasury   bonds.111   The   Brady   Plan   can   be   seen   as   the   starting  
point   for   the  modern-­‐day  era  of   sovereign  bond   trading   for  emerging  economies  or  
what  has  been  referred  to  as  the  securitisation  of  the  global  economy.112  The  ability  to  
issue   tradable   instruments  created  a   liquid  secondary  market   for   sovereign  bonds.113  
This  made  lending  to  emerging  economies  less  risky  and  hence  lowered  the  interest  
rates,   since   private   creditors   could   sell   the   sovereign   debt   obligations   on   the  
secondary   market.   Consequently,   this   period   witnessed   a   vast   diversification   in  
private   creditors.   Long-­‐term   institutional   creditors   were   joined   by   shorter-­‐term  
domestic   creditors,   including   retail   investors,  mutual   funds,   and   banks   that   sought  
high   returns  with  high-­‐yield   funds  and   liquid   instruments  as   reserves.  Hedge   funds  
and   governments   of   advanced   economies   also   started   purchasing   emerging  
economies’  bonds  at   the  end  of   the  decade,  creating  a   situation   in  which  “there  are  
now  numerous  holders  of  sovereign  debt  covering  a  very  wide  geographic  distribution  
and  varying  in  size  and  sophistication  from  retail  to  institutional  investors.”114  
   Against  this  backdrop,  the  early  1990s  were  a  period  of  low  interest  rates  and  
large   capital   inflows   into   emerging   economies.   It  was  not  until   the  outbreak  of   the  
South-­‐East  Asian  crisis  in  1997  and  the  Russian  crisis  in  1998  that  these  large  capital  
flows  dried  up.  The  contraction  in  capital   flows  and  lending  to  emerging  economies  
that   resulted   from   the   South-­‐East   Asian   and   Russian   crises   led   to   further   crises   in  
emerging   economies.   Brazil   devalued   its   currency   in   1999   and   was   followed   by  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111  Das,  Papaioannou  and  Trebesch,  2012,  p.11.  
112  Helleiner,  2009.  
113  Das,  Papaioannou  and  Trebesch,  2012,  p.13.  Such  a  market  last  existed  during  the  interwar  
period.    
114  Marx,  Echague  and  Sandleris,  2006,  p.57.  
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outright  default  in  Ecuador,  Turkey,  Ukraine  and  Pakistan  in  the  year  2000.115  In  2001,  
Argentina  defaulted  on  its  private  sovereign  debt.  In  2002-­‐2003,  Uruguay  managed  to  
avoid  succumbing  to  Argentina’s  fate  by  undertaking  a  voluntary  restructuring  of  its  
debt.116    
   Despite   the   severity   and   sheer   number   of   crises   erupting   in   developing  
economies  at  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  these  events  did  not  disrupt  the  discourse  
surrounding   the   era   of   ‘Great   Moderation’   in   advanced   economies.117  
Notwithstanding,   in  the   1990s,  governments   in  advanced  economies  began  to  worry  
about   the   rising   sovereign   debt   levels,   while   creditors   –   not   least   due   to   their  
experiences   in   developing   economies   -­‐   began   to   have   doubts   about   the   ability   of  
states  to  repay  their  growing  debt.118     
   The  governments’  response  was  a  second  wave  of  capital  market  liberalisation  
and   a   continued   deregulation   of   the   financial   sector.   Under   the   Clinton  
administration,   attempts   were   made   to   balance   the   budget   mainly   through   social  
spending   cuts.   Most   advanced   economies   emulated   this   strategy   and   the   rising  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115  Marx,  Echague  and  Sandleris,  2006,  p.64.  
116   Panizza,   2014.   If   one   compares   these   crises   at   the   turn   of   the  millennium  with   the   Latin  
American  debt  crisis  in  the  1980s,  one  can  recognise  important  differences  in  the  dynamics  of  
crisis  eruption  and  contagion  that  are  important  for  the  analysis  at  hand.  First,  whereas  in  the  
1980s,   the   crisis  was   triggered  by   adverse   external   shocks   that   affected   emerging   economies  
instantaneously  (most  prominently,  the  sharp  increase  of  interest  rates  in  the  U.S.),  the  crises  
of   the   late   1990s   and   early   2000s   were   a   consequence   of   changes   in   creditors’   perceptions  
about   the   ability   and/or   willingness   of   the   debtor   countries   to   service   their   debts   (Marx,  
Echague  and  Sandleris,  2006,  p.65).  Second,  whereas  the  crisis  in  the  1980s  can  be  understood  
as  a   sovereign  debt  crisis  narrowly  defined,   the  crises   in   the   late   1990s  and  early  2000s  only  
turned   into  sovereign  debt  crises   in   the  wake  of  an  ongoing  capital  account  crisis.  Narrowly  
defined,  sovereign  debt  crises  can  be  understood  –  in  line  with  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  -­‐  as  crises  
that  erupt  when  a  country  is  not  able  or  willing  to  service  its  foreign  or  domestic  debt,  under  
the   terms   agreed.   Now,   whereas   in   the   1980s   the   Latin   American   crisis   originated   as   a  
sovereign  debt  crisis  –  in  which  the  very  crisis  was  constituted  by  the  fact  that  Latin  American  
governments   were   unable   to   service   their   debt   obligations   –   the   crises   at   the   turn   of   the  
millennium  originated  as   capital   account  crisis.  These  crises,   then,   are   sovereign  debt   crises  
broadly  defined,  for  they  did  not  erupt  due  to  a  government’s  inability  to  service  its  debts,  but  
only  resulted  in  sovereign  debt  crises  as  the  economic  conditions  deteriorated.  Here,  I  adopt  
this  broad  definition  of  sovereign  debt  crises.    
117  Roubini  and  Mihm,  2011,  p.30.  
118  Streeck,  2013,  p.36.  
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sovereign   debt   levels   that   characterised   the   previous   decade   were   replaced   by   a  
growing  private  debt  burden.  Regulations  were  adopted   that  enabled  households   to  
supplement  their  income  with  private  sector  credit  rather  than  with  state  benefits.119  
   While   this   form  of   ‘privatised  Keynesianism’120   allowed   advanced   economies  
to   adhere   to   the   discourse   of   the   Great  Moderation   and   to   avoid   the   fate   of   their  
counterparts   in   developing   countries,   the   2007-­‐2008   subprime  mortgage   crisis   that  
erupted   in   the   United   States   and   reverberated   through   the   world   economy   put   an  
abrupt  and  unquestionable  end  to  this.  The  crisis  also  raised  serious  doubts  about  the  
process   of   deregulation   and   financialisation   that   had  been   going   on   since   the   early  
1970s  and   that  had  been,   if  not  actively  praised  and  defended,   least  accepted  as   the  
epoch’s  unquestioned  background  tune.       
   What  this  brief  historical  analysis  reveals  is  that  an  individual  country’s  debt  
history   cannot   be   understood   in   isolation   from   the   SD&CR   and   the   process   of  
financialisation   that   shaped   it.   In   a   heavily   financialised   economy,   credit   and   debt  
flows  move   rapidly   from   different   regions   in   the   world   to   others.  When   advanced  
economies   were   battling   inflation   and   recession   in   the   1970s,   debt   flows  moved   to  
developing  countries.  Once  the  Latin  American  debt  crisis  erupted,  debt  flows  moved  
back   to   the   advanced   economies   and   sovereign   debt   levels   rose   there.   With   the  
introduction  of  the  Brady  Plan  and  the  progressive  shift  from  sovereign  debt  levels  to  
private   debt   levels   in   advanced   economies,   debt   flows   returned   to   developing  
countries.   Finally,   since   2008,   and  parallel   to   the   eruption   of   the   debt   crises   at   the  
heart   of   the   European   Union,   there   has   been   a   sharp   rise   in   the   debt   levels   of  
emerging  economies,   especially  China,   “which   could  host   the  next   leg  of   the  global  
leverage  crisis.”121  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119  Streeck,  2013,  p.39.  
120  Crouch,  2009.  
121  Buttiglione  et  al,  2014,  p.3.  
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The   geographical   interdependency   and   the   contagion   effects   between  
different   countries   and   regions   in   the   world   challenge   explanations   of   a   country’s  
debt   history   that   exclusively   focus   on   agential   aspects   such   as   ‘fiscal   responsibility’  
and   ‘good   governance.’   They   suggest   that   a   country’s   debt   history   cannot   be   solely  
explained  with  reference  to  agential   factors.  To  use  the  classroom  analogy,  doing  so  
would  be  parallel   to   trying   to   explain   a   student’s   performance  without   reference   to  
the   quality   of   the   teacher,   or   to   try   to   explain   poverty   solely   based   on   the   policies  
adopted  by  a  developing  country’s  government.  It  would,  in  short,  be  an  ‘explanatory  
nationalist’  explanation.122  Such  an  explanation  is,  at  best,   insufficient,  for  whether  a  
state  will   be   able   to   service   its   debt   depends   in   part   on  whether   it   has   historically  
been  plagued  by  default  and/or  restructuring,  which  in  turn  depends  on  the  position  
that  the  state  occupies  within  the  regime.    
  
Conclusion  and  Road  Ahead  
In  this  chapter  I  sought  to  bring  the  ‘firstly’  of  individual  country’s  debt  histories  into  
the  picture  by  drawing  attention  to  the  structures  that  affect  an  individual  country’s  
trajectory.   First,   I   reconstructed   the   agential   story   by   arguing   that   it   rests   on   two  
main  pillars,  namely   the   idea   that   the  crisis   itself   is   the  main  problem  and   that   the  
debtor  state   is  solely  responsible   for   it.  Second,  I  defended  the  need  for  a  structural  
explanation   in   cases  where   structural   factors   affect   an   agent’s   trajectory.   Structural  
explanations   enable   different   kinds   of   evidence   to   come   into   view   and   consider   a  
broader  set  of  empirical  phenomena.  I  thus  looked  at  the  historical  developments  in  
the  global  economy  from  1971  until  present  day.  This  revealed  that  structural  factors,  
namely   the   SD&CR   and   the   financialisation   of   the   economy,   do   indeed   affect   a  
country’s  debt  history  and,  therefore,  a  structural  explanation  is  required.    
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   My   aim   in   the   rest   of   this   thesis   is   to   challenge   the   agential   story   most  
commonly  told  and  to  provide  an  alternative,  structural  explanation.  While   the  rest  
of  Part  I  is  concerned  with  challenging  the  first  pillars  of  the  agential  story  –  the  idea,  
that  is,  that  the  crisis  itself  is  the  main  problem  –  Part  II  questions  the  second  pillar  –  
the  idea  that  the  debtor  alone  is  responsible  for  the  outbreak  of  sovereign  debt  crises.  
In  the  next  chapter,  I  provide  a  structural  explanation  of  a  country’s  debt  history  by  
adopting   the   ‘macro   view’   introduced   in   this   chapter.   I   argue   that   the   SD&CR   is   a  
highly  asymmetrical  structure,  which  puts  certain  individuals  qua  citizens  of  certain  
states   and   qua   members   of   particular   classes   in   a   position   of   disadvantage.   Those  
occupying   a   disadvantaged   position   in   the   asymmetrical   SD&CR   are   vulnerable   to  
domination  and  exploitation  by  virtue  of  the  position  they  occupy.    
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CHAPTER  2    
ON  THE  WRONGS  OF  THE  SD&CR  
There   is   something  wrong  with   the  way   in  which  sovereign  debt  and  credit  operate  
today.   The   signs   held   by   protestors   in   the   street   of   Athens   –   with   slogans   such   as  
“IMF   Go   Home,”   “Troika   –   Keep   Calm   and   Go   to   Hell,”   and   “People   Over   Banks”  
contain  complaints  that  are  much  older  than  the  outbreak  of  the  most  recent  Greek  
debt  crisis,  and  resonate  with  the  demands  made  by  many  around  the  world.    
   In   this   chapter   I   explore   what   precisely   is   wrong   with   the   SD&CR.   What  
makes  the  contemporary  SD&CR  normatively  problematic,  I  argue,  is  the  fact  that  it  
puts   agents   –   individuals   qua   citizens   of   a   particular   state   and   qua   members   of   a  
particular   class   –   in   a   position   of   disadvantage,   which   makes   them   vulnerable   to  
domination  and  exploitation  when  the  state  accrues  debt   in  their  name.  This  builds  
on  and  nuances  the  analysis  of  the  previous  chapter,  since  it  is  a  critique  of  the  first  
pillar   of   the   agential   story,   namely   the   idea   that   all   that   is   wrong  with   the   way   in  
which  the  financialised  global  economy  works  today  is  the  rare  outbreak  of  a  crisis.  It  
nuances   the   analysis   of   the   previous   chapter   because,   while   it   is   true   that  
financialisation  structures  the  SD&CR  and  thereby  shapes  the  sovereign  debt  history  
of  all  countries  (something  which  makes  a  structural  explanation  necessary),  not  all  
states  and  classes  are  shaped  equally.   Instead,   financialisation  (re)produces  a  highly  
asymmetrical  SD&CR,  with  clear  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage.    
   I  proceed  as  follows:  After  short  preliminary  remarks,  I  describe  the  empirical  
features  of  the  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage  that  exist  within  the  SD&CR.  
Positions   of   advantage   and   disadvantage   are   structured   along   two   axes,   namely  
statehood   and   class.   The   statehood   axis   describes   how   individuals   qua   citizens   are  
vulnerable   to   domination   and   exploitation   in   virtue   of   the   position   that   their   state  
occupies  within  the  SD&CR.  The  class  axis  further  nuances  the  state  axis,  for  a  state’s  
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citizenry   is   not   a   homogeneous   group.   Although   certain   individuals   may   be  
disadvantaged  qua   citizens  of   a   disadvantaged   state,   they  may  occupy   a  position  of  
advantage  qua  members  of  a  given  class.  Both  axes  need  thus  be  considered.  Second,  I  
define  what  I  mean  by  ‘structural  domination’  and  ‘structural  exploitation’  and  show  
how   individuals   qua   citizens   of   disadvantaged   states   and   qua   members   of   a  
disadvantaged   class   are   vulnerable   to   domination   and   exploitation   when   debt   is  
accrued  in  their  name  due  to  their  position  in  the  structure.    
   Crucially,   this   chapter   brings   to   the   fore   that   the   problem   is   not   with  
sovereign  debt   as   such.  After   all,   nearly   all   states   are   sovereign  debtors.   Yet  not   all  
individuals   are   vulnerable   to   domination   and   exploitation  when   their   state   accrues  
debt   in   their   name   –   only   those  who   find   themselves   in   a   position   of   disadvantage  
within   the   regime.   While   sovereign   debt   itself   is   not   necessarily   problematic,  
sovereign   debt   accrued   by   those   in   a   position   of   disadvantage   within   a   highly  
asymmetrical  SD&CR  is.123  
  
Preliminary  Remarks:  Self-­‐determination  and  Self-­‐Development  
The  reflections  in  this  chapter  start  from  the  conviction  that  agents  have  an  interest  
in   at   least   two   things:   in   being   self-­‐determined   and   in   self-­‐development.   It   also  
presupposes   that   individuals   and   communities   should  have   an  opportunity   –   and   a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123  In  Chapter  8  I  complement  this  view  by  arguing  that  there  is  a  second  element  that  makes  
sovereign   debt   problematic.   First,   as   argued   here,   sovereign   debt   may   result   in   structural  
exploitation  and  structural  domination  when  accrued  by  a  state  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  
within   the   regime.   Second,   sovereign   debt   is   problematic   when   too   much   debt   is   accrued  
(quantitative   aspects)   and   invested   in   a   way   that   is   neither   equitable   nor   sustainable  
(qualitative   aspect).   Crucially,   as   will   be   argued   in   Chapter   8,   the   question   is   not   only   one  
about  ‘debt  sustainability’  as  a  technical-­‐economic  threshold,  but  also  as  a  political  threshold:  
When   the   state  accrued   too  much  debt,   it  becomes  unable   to  act   in   the  name  of   those   it   is  
supposed  to  represent.    
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roughly  equal  opportunity,  at  that  –  of  being  self-­‐determined  and  of  developing.124  To  
this  extent,  this  chapter  presupposes  a  “moderate  ethical  universalism.”125    
   A  self-­‐determined  agent  can  shape  the  terms  that  govern  his  or  her  existence.  
S/he   has   a   certain   control   over   his   or   her   fate.   Of   course,   all   agent   actions   are  
constrained   to   a   certain   extent   by   the   structures   that   s/he   inhabits.   But   a   self-­‐
determined  agent  can  choose  from  a  range  of  viable  options  what  course  of  action  to  
pursue.   Self-­‐determination,   then,   does   not   reside   in   the   totally   unconstrained   and  
unencumbered  actions  of  individuals,  but  in  the  conscious  and  intentional  choice  of  a  
particular  course  of  action,  given  a  reasonable  choice  architecture  or  decision-­‐tree.126  
For   individuals   qua   citizens   of   democratic   states,   the   political   expression   of   self-­‐
determination   resides   in   the  ability   to   shape   the  political  arrangements   that  govern  
their   existence.   They   are   self-­‐determined   because   they   participate   in   a   democratic  
process   that   results   in   self-­‐legislated   laws   that   shape   their   lives.   If   one   holds   the  
conviction   that   agents   should   have   a   roughly   equal   opportunity   to   being   self-­‐
determination,  one  “should  study  and  should  criticize  codified  and   institutionalized  
human   actions   that   create   patterned   asymmetries   in   the   social   capacity   to   act.”127  
Doing  so  for  the  SD&CR  is  the  ambition  of  this  chapter.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124  Hayward  and  Lukes,  2008,  p.9.  
125  White,  2003,  p.262.  
126   Conversely,   if   individuals   are   so   structurally   constrained   that   they   are   unable   to   act  
otherwise,   their   actions  are  determined,  not   self-­‐determined.  They   simply  enact  or   transmit  
the  dictates  of  the  structures  that  uniquely  constrain  them.  But  this  is  rare,  for  structures  do  
not   tend   to   determine   action,   but   produce   predictable   patterns   of   actions.   Structures   are  
problematic,  or  the  occupation  of  a  given  position  in  the  structure  is  problematic,  when  two  
conditions  hold:  First,  when  certain  forms  of  action  are  made,  “if  not  impossible,  then  highly  
improbable,  and  others,  if  not  inevitable,  then  exceedingly  likely”  (Hayward  and  Lukes,  2008,  
p.   16).  Second,  when  the  abilities  of  occupiers  of  certain  positions  are  so  constrained  due   to  
things  that  are  social  in  origin.  While  I  focus  on  the  first  of  these  two  features  in  this  chapter,  
the   next   chapter   is   devoted   to   showing   that   the   constrains   that   those   in   a   position   of  
disadvantage  within  the  SD&CR  suffer  from  are  social  in  origin.    
127  Hayward  and  Lukes,  2008,  p.16.  
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   Self-­‐development   entails   the   ability   to   cultivate   and   exercise   one’s  
capacities.128  I  explicitly  abstain  here  from  endorsing  any  specific  theory  of  ‘the  good  
life’   and/or   conception  of   the   virtuous   agent.  Whatever   conception  of   the   good   life  
and  of  the  virtuous  agent  one  endorses,  however,  self-­‐development  entails  the  ability  
to  progressively  realise  that  conception.  To  that  extent,  self-­‐development  can  be  seen  
as   a   form   of   flourishing.   Self-­‐development   has   certain   prerequisites   relating   to   the  
production  of  distributive  inequalities.  An  agent  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  within  
the   structure   cannot   self-­‐develop   when   the   structure   s/he   inhabits   is   such   that  
distributive   inequalities   are   reproduced   through   the   continuous   transfer   of  
productive  powers  from  those  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  to  those  in  a  position  of  
advantage.   While   self-­‐determination   is   thus   connected   to   an   agents’   political  
standing   -­‐   the   citizens’   ability   to   shape   the   terms   that   govern   their   existence   via  
democratic   participation   –   self-­‐development   is   predicated   on   the   agents’   ability   to  
reap  the  fruits  of  their  labour.    
  
Positions  of  (Dis)advantage    
First  Axis:  Statehood    
As   I   have   shown   in   the   preceding   chapter,   financialisation   has   changed   the   option  
sets  of  all  states  acting  within  a  financialised  economy.  Not  all  countries  are  affected  
by   financialisation   equally,   however,   and   countries   can   occupy   different   positions.  
Identifying  these  positions  is  crucial  to  understanding  why  the  acquisition  of  debt  by  
a  sovereign  may  have  such  a  divergent  impact  on  citizens  of  that  state.  While  for  the  
citizens   of   states   that   occupy   a   position   of   advantage   within   the   regime,   the  
acquisition   of   debt   may   have   positive   effects   for   their   self-­‐determination   and   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128  Young,  1990,  p.38.  
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development,  for  citizens  of  states  occupying  a  position  of  disadvantage,  the  inverse  
is  true.  Whether  a  position  is  one  of  advantage  or  disadvantage  will  depend  on  two,  
interrelated   features,   namely   the   conditions   of   borrowing   and   the   vulnerability   to  
crisis.    
   Although  most   sovereign  states  borrow,   the  conditions  under  which   they  do  
so  vary  greatly  from  state  to  state.  Most  significantly,  the  interest  rates  that  different  
countries   need   to   pay   to   be   able   to   borrow   vary   significantly,   both   quantitatively  
(how  much  they  need  to  pay)  and  qualitatively  (whether  the  interest  rates  are  fixed  or  
floating.)   Floating   interest   rates   have   the   effect   of   pushing   the   risk   for   the  
deterioration   of   the   economic   and   financial   environment   on   the   debtor,   for   if   the  
economic  environment  changes,  the  interest  rates  will  change,  as  well.  In  an  unstable  
economic   and   financial   environment,   then,   a  disadvantaged  position   in   the   SD&CR  
will  be  characterised  by  high  and  floating  interest  rates.    
   Another   central   difference   characterising   positions   of   advantage   and  
disadvantage  in  the  SD&CR  relates  to  the  currency  denomination  in  which  the  debt  
contract  is  made.  Most  importantly,  the  question  is  whether  the  state  can  accrue  debt  
in  its  own  currency  and  whether  other  states  use  said  currency  to  accrue  debt.  Being  
able  to  borrow  in  one’s  own  currency  and  having  other  states  do  the  same  provides  
vast  advantages.  A  position  of   ‘exorbitant  privilege’129   in   the  SD&CR,   then,   is  one   in  
which  you  are  not  only   able   to  borrow   in  your  own  currency,  but  where   also  other  
countries  prefer  your  currency  to  save,  trade,  and  speculate.    
   To   be   able   to   borrow   in   your   own   currency   and   have   others   do   the   same  
brings   vast   advantages.   First,   if   states,   foreign   banks,   and   firms   trust   and   value  
holding   your   country’s   currency,   they   will   be   willing   to   hold   it   by   charging   lower  
interest  rates  and  earning  less.  This  provides  cheap  foreign  finance  and  keeps  interest  
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rates  low.  The  result  of  this  advantage  can  be  substantial:  the  U.S.  –  which,  after  the  
Nixon’s   abolition   of   the   Bretton  Woods   regime,   continues   to   be   the   issuer   of   the  
world’s  preferred  currency   for  saving,   trading  and  speculating  -­‐  needs  to  pay  two  to  
three   percentage   points   less   on   its   foreign   liabilities   than   the   rate   of   return   of   its  
foreign   investments.   This,   in   turn,   allows   the  U.S.   to   run   an   external   deficit   in   the  
amount  of  this  difference,  importing  more  than  it  exports  and  consuming  more  than  
it  produces  without  growing   its   external  debt.130  A   second  advantage   is   seigniorage.  
Seigniorage  can  be  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  value  of  money  and  what  it  
costs   to   produce   it.   If   the   seigniorage   is   positive,   the   government   will   make   an  
economic  profit,  and  when  it  is  negative  it  results  in  economic  loss.  On  the  domestic  
level,   a   positive   seigniorage   is   used   by   governments   to   finance   part   of   their  
expenditure   without   having   to   raise   taxes.   On   the   international   level,   a   positive  
seigniorage  consists  of  the  real  resources  that  other  countries  provide  to  the  issuer  of  
the  preferred  currency  to  obtain  it.  As  Eichengreen  writes,  “it  costs  only  a  few  cents  
for  the  Bureau  of  Engraving  and  Printing  to  produce  a  $100  bill,  but  other  countries  
have  to  pony  up  $100  of  actual  goods  and  services   in  order  to  obtain  one.”131  A  third  
advantage  is  what  Robert  Wade  calls  the  ‘hegemonic  debtor’s  gain,’132  which  describes  
the  situation  in  which,  when  your  debt  is  denominated  in  your  own  currency,  a  fall  in  
that  currency  translates  into  a  reduced  debt  burden.  133    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130  Eichengreen,  2011,  p.4.  
131  2011,  p.3.  About  $500  billion  of  U.S.  currency  circulates  outside  the  United  States,  for  which  
foreigners  have  had  to  provide  the  United  States  with  $500  billion  of  actual  goods  and  services  
(Eichengreen,  2011,  p.3).  
132  Wade,  2003  
133   Wade   qualifies   this   hegemonic   debtor’s   gain   by   saying   that   the   ability   of   external   and  
domestic  debt  to  increase  by  running  large  deficits  is  not  infinite.  Focusing  his  analysis  on  the  
U.S.  dollar,  he  argues  that  the  limits  to  the  U.S.  autonomy  in  its  monetary  policy  are  greater  
than  one  may  think,  since  creditors  themselves  also  have  an  interest  in  a  stable  dollar.  On  one  
hand,  countries  trading  with  the  U.S.  also  benefit  from  a  stable  dollar  and  diversifying  out  of  
dollars  would  make   the  dollar  more   volatile.  Thus   “they   see   the   likely   commercial   losses   as  
bigger   than   the   likely   financial   losses  of  holding  mainly  dollars”   (Wade,  2003,  p.83).  On   the  
other   hand,   if   most   of   a   country’s   reserves   are   denominated   in   dollars,   a   fall   in   the   dollar  
would  also  signify  a  fall  in  the  value  of  that  country’s  reserves.    
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Conversely,   if  you  are  unable   to  borrow   in  your  own  currency,  a  decrease   in  
your   currency’s   value   results   in   an   increased  debt  burden.  This  makes   it   harder   for  
countries  who  are  unable  to  borrow  in  their  own  currency  to  attract  capital  because,  
knowing  that  shocks  affecting  the  real  exchange  rate  can  disrupt  a  country’s  ability  to  
service   its   debt,   foreigners   become   less   willing   to   lend.   134   Moreover,   if   a   country’s  
external   debt   is   denominated   in   foreign   currency,   then   real   exchange   rate  
depreciation   will   make   it   more   difficult   to   service   that   debt   by   reducing   the  
purchasing  power  of  domestic  output  over   foreign  claims.  Therefore,  a  debt  burden  
that  may  be  manageable  for  some  countries  becomes  unsustainable  for  others.135    
   In  addition   to   the   structuring  of  positions  of   advantage  and  disadvantage   in  
the   SD&CR   with   differential   conditions   for   borrowing,   a   country’s   position   is   also  
structured  along  a  second  axis,  which  is  vulnerability  to  crisis.  Countries  who  are  not  
able   to   borrow   in   their   own   currency,   for   instance,   are   more   vulnerable   to   the  
monetary   decisions   of   those   controlling   the   major   world   currencies   and,  
consequently,  also  more  exposed  to  crisis.  The  Latin  American  crisis  of  the  1980s  is  a  
case   in  point,  where   the   sharp   increase   in   the   interest   rates  by   the  Federal  Reserve  
triggered  the  Mexican  default  and  the  debt  crises  that  followed.  While  “it  is  difficult  
to   establish   that   the   rise   in  world   real   interest   rates  was   the  decisive   factor   in  debt  
crisis   (…)   it   is   clear   at   the   very   least   that   timing   and   scale   of   the   debt   crisis   were  
linked  to  the  rise  in  world  real  interest  rates  (…).  The  developing  country  debt  crisis  
was  an  unintended  consequence  of  U.S.  monetary  policy.”136    
   More   generally,   fluctuations   in   the  major   currencies   significantly   determine  
global   liquidity   and   the   supply   of   capital   to   invest,   thereby   affecting   the   cost   of  
borrowing   in   the  global  market.  This,   in   turn,  affects   individual  countries   in  several  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134  Reddy,  2007.  
135  Reddy,  2007.  
136  Reddy,  2007,  p.84.  
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ways.   First,   increases   in   the   costs   of   borrowing   influence   the   cost   of   repayment   for  
those  debt  obligations  that  are  constantly  rolled  over.  As  it  becomes  more  expensive  
to  accrue  more  debt,  servicing  the  old  one  becomes  more  expensive.  Second,  the  cost  
of  borrowing  may  also  influence  the  level  of  domestic  income.  An  increase  in  the  cost  
of   borrowing   on   the   international   market   can   lead   to   a   decrease   in   domestic  
consumption   and   investment,   which   in   turn   lowers   domestic   growth.137   Third,   the  
cost   of   borrowing   also   affects   a   country’s   balance   of   payments   and   thereby   its  
exchange   rate.  While   all   countries   immersed   in   the  global   economy  are   affected  by  
the  world  credit  market  and  by  the  monetary  decisions  taken  by  the  issuers  of  global  
currencies,  “[d]eveloping  countries  experience  them  in  the  most  acute  way.”138  To  this  
extent,   the   issuing   of   sovereign   debt   can   be   seen   as   a   consequence   of   existing  
inequality  among  states  and  their  position  in  the  international  monetary  system.     
   When   asked  what   factors   affect   the   position   a   country  holds   in   the   SD&CR  
along   the   two   axes   –conditions   of   borrowing   and   vulnerability   to   crisis   –   most  
orthodox  economists  will   point   to   variables   such  as   the   trust   that   creditors  have   in  
repayment   (a   variable   which   is   further   influenced   by   the   underlying   health   of   the  
economy),   a   country’s   credit   ratings,   and   a   country’s   history   of   restructuring   and  
default.   Reinhart,   Rogoff   and   Savastano,   for   instance,   argue   that   the   inability   of  
emerging   markets   to   manage   levels   of   external   debt   that   are   manageable   for  
advanced  countries  –  something  they  call   ‘debt  intolerance’  –  is  explained  “by  a  very  
small   number   of   variables   related   to   its   repayment   history.”139   Countries   that   have  
defaulted  in  the  past  and  that  exhibit  histories  of  inflation  have  lower  credit  ratings  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  Reddy  acknowledges  here  that  these  linkages  may  be  of  a  diverse  kind.  It  may  be  the  case,  
for  instance,  that  a  slowdown  of  economic  growth  elsewhere  increases  the  investment  flows  to  
a   particular   country,   Yet,   “insofar   as   the   foreign   investors’   animal   spirits   toward   any   given  
country  are  determined  primarily  by  the  global   level  of  economic  activity,  that   is  unlikely  to  
be  true”  (Reddy,  2007,  p.84).    
138  Reddy,  2007,  p.85.  
139  Reinhart,  Rogoff  and  Savastano,  2003.  
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the  present,  which  makes  a  debt  burden   that   is  manageable   for  advanced  countries  
unsustainable  for  emerging  markets.  Reinhart,  Rogoff  and  Savastano’s  is  thus  a  purely  
agential  explanation  of  a  country’s  debt  history.    
   Eichengreen   and   Hausmann   endorse   the   insight   that   a   country’s   history   of  
default   affects   its   credit   rating   and   also   demonstrate   that   the   ability   to   borrow   in  
one’s  own  currency  affects  a  country’s  credit  rating,  thereby  affecting  their  conditions  
for  borrowing  and  their  vulnerability   to  crisis.  The  ability  or   inability  of  a  sovereign  
state   to   borrow   in   their   own   currency,   they   argue   further,   is   largely   determined  by  
factors  that  lie  outside  a  country’s  control.  This  is  why  they  chose  to  call  a  country’s  
inability   to   borrow   in   their   own   currency   ‘original   sin.’   The   choice   of   the   label   is  
supposed   to   convey   the   idea   that   the   problems   that   spring   from   not   being   able   to  
borrow   in   one’s   own   currency  may  not   result   only   from   the   actions   of   the   affected  
country,  but  may,  as  they  argue,  “have  something  to  do  with  factors  largely  beyond  its  
immediate   determination   and   control.”140   Put   differently,   the   position   that   a  
particular   country   has   within   the   SD&CR   may   have   less   to   do   with   a   country’s  
repayment  history  (as  Reinhart,  Rogoff  and  Savastano’s  agential  explanation  suggests  
with  their  concept  of  debt   intolerance),  and  more  to  do  with  the  position  a  country  
occupies   within   the   global   political   economy   more   generally   (a   structural  
explanation).    
In   sum,   while   financialisation   made   credit   available   to   a   broader   set   of  
countries,   it   also   created   and   reinforced   positions   of   relative   advantage   and  
disadvantage.   Whether   the   position   that   a   particular   country   occupies   within   the  
SD&CR  is  one  of  advantage  or  disadvantage  depends  on  two  crucial  features,  namely  
the  conditions  of  borrowing,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  country’s  vulnerability  to  crisis,  
on   the  other.  An  advantageous  position  within   the   regime  will  be  one   in  which   the  
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conditions  of  borrowing  are  very  favourable  and  in  which  the  state  qua  occupier  of  a  
particular  position,  will  be  less  exposed  to  crisis.    
   Looking  at  the  different  positions  that  exist  within  the  SD&CR  demonstrates  
once   more   why   particular   debt   histories   must   be   understood   in   relation   to   the  
position  that  any  given  country  occupies  within  the  regime,  since  it  is  a  crucial  part  of  
the   explanation   for  why  different   countries   can  accrue  more  or   less  debt,  why  debt  
tolerance   and   sustainability   levels   differ,   and   why   certain   countries   are   more  
vulnerable  to  sovereign  debt  crises.    
  
Second  Axis:  Class  
The  analysis  so  far  has  revealed  how  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage  within  
the   SD&CR   are   structured   along   lines   of   statehood.   Yet   leaving   the   analysis   here  
would  miss  the  crucial  role  that  class  plays  at  the  global   level.  Before  turning  to  the  
normative  diagnosis  of  what  is  wrong  with  the  SD&CR,  in  this  section,  I  discuss  this  
second  axis  and  show  how  financialisation  did  not  only  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  
field  structured  along  lines  of  statehood,  but  also  along  lines  of  class.    
   A  good  starting  point  to  see  how  class  matters  in  the  global  arena  in  general,  
and  the  SD&CR  in  particular,  is  to  ask  why  the  state  would  adopt  policies  to  create  a  
macro-­‐economic  environment  conducive  to  the  rise  of   finance  in  the  first  place.141  A  
prominent   response   is   that   OECD   countries   turned   to   finance   because   it   allowed  
them  to  avoid  confronting  domestic  political  dilemmas  that  it  faced  in  the  late  1960s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141   Four  main   theory   clusters   trying   to   explain   the   rise   of   financialisation   can   be   identified.  
These   theories   are   not   necessarily   contradictory.   Whereas   the   theories   that   explain  
financialisation   through   speculative   manias   focus   on   how   speculative   bubbles   emerge   and  
develop,   theories   focusing   on   the   rise   of   shareholder   value   as   a   new  mode   of  management  
seek   to   explain   the   financialisation   of   non-­‐financial   firms.   Marxist   and   World-­‐System  
theorists,   in  turn,  provide  a  systemic  explanation  for  the  rise  of  finance.  Finally,  the  theories  
explored  here  try  to  explain  the  state’s  motivation  in  adopting  policies  that  are  conducive  to  
the  rise  of  finance.  
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and   early   1970s.142   Over   the   course   of   the   post-­‐war   period,   states   had   assumed  
responsibility   for   providing   direction   to   the   economy   and   for   managing   the   social  
consequences  of  growth.  But  as  growth  slumped  and  unemployment  grew,   fulfilling  
these  obligations  became  ever  more  challenging  and  the  state  was  threatened  by  the  
eruption  of   a   ‘triple   crisis.’   First,   a   social   crisis   loomed   large  on   the  horizon,   as   the  
distributional   conflicts   heightened   over   a   pie   that   was   no   longer   expanding   at   the  
same  pace  as  before.143  Second,  OECD  countries   faced  a   fiscal  crisis,  as   tax  revenues  
ceased  to  be  sufficient   to  cover   its  expenditures.  Third,  a   legitimation  crisis  became  
ever   more   likely,   as   advanced   economies   feared   having   to   adopt   politically   costly  
austerity  measures  to  bring  expenditures  in  line  with  its  revenues.    
   Turning   to   finance   offered   a   temporary   way   out   of   this   triple   crisis.   First,  
advanced   economies   started   accruing   substantial   debt.144   When   creditors   started  
fearing  that  the  state  would  not  be  able  to  service  its  debts,  the  advanced  economies  
adopted   policies   to   expand   private   credit.145   Not   wanting   to   implement   a   more  
progressive  tax  system,  nor  wishing  to  lower  expenditure,  policies  that  allowed  both  
the  state  and  consumers   to  borrow   from  private   financial  markets  was  an  attractive  
solution  for  the  state  to  postpone  the  materialisation  of  any  of  the  three  crises.  This  
turn   to  borrowing   (either  directly  by   the   state,  or   indirectly  by  establishing  policies  
that  allowed  individuals  to  borrow)  is  what  Streeck  calls  the  transition  from  the  ‘tax  
state’   to   the   ‘debt   state.’146   Rather   than   financing   its   expenses   through   the   rising   of  
taxes,   a   debt   state   “covers   a   large,   possibly   rising,   part   of   its   expenditure   through  
borrowing,  (…)  thereby  accumulating  a  debt  mountain  that  it  has  to  finance  with  an  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  See  Krippner,  2011  and  Streeck,  2013  for  a  more  extensive  defence  of  this  response.  
143   While   Streeck   is   explicit   on   this   social   conflict   being   one   between   capital   and   labour,  
Krippner  talks  about  it  in  more  general,  less  Marxist  terms.    
144  For  an  analysis  of  this  argument  for    the  U.S.,  see  Krippner.  For  a  defence  of  this  argument  
for  Western  Europe,  see  Streeck.  
145  Streeck,  2013.  
146  Streeck,  2013.  
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ever  greater   share  of   its   revenue.”147   Interestingly,   the   turn   to   finance  and   the  move  
away   from   a   ‘tax’   to   a   ‘debt   state’   was   a   choice   made   across   partisan   divisions   by  
political  leaders  across  the  political  spectrum.148  
   A  crucial  implication  of  this  rise  of  finance  is  that  financialisation  was  neither  
inevitable   nor   planned.   It   was   not   inevitable,   but   rather   political,   because   it   arose  
from   state   officials   attempting   to   extricate   themselves   from   the   problems   that   the  
slowdown  of   the   economy  posed   in   the   1960s.   It  was   thus   the  outcome  of   concrete  
political   choices.   It  was  not  planned,  either,   for   the   financialisation  of   the  economy  
was   not   what   policy-­‐makers   intended   when   adopting   the  macro-­‐economic   policies  
that  ultimately  resulted  in  the  expansion  of  finance.  In  that  sense,  financialisation  can  
be   seen   as   the   inadvertent   result   of   policy-­‐makers’   attempts   to   solve,   or   at   least  
postpone,  the  triple  crisis  that  the  state  was  facing  in  the  1960s.  
   A   further   unintended   consequence   that   came   hand   in   hand   with   the  
financialisation   of   the   economy   was   the   rise   of   a   financial   class   that   became  
increasingly  detached  from  the  domestic  economy  that  nurtured  their  riches.149  With  
the  changes  witnessed  at  the  international  level  since  the  end  of  the  Bretton  Woods  
era,   domestic   upper   classes   with   capital   to   invest   had   the   chance   of   going   global,  
investing   not   only   in   their   own   state,   but   also   in   others.   The   abolition   of   capital  
controls  and  the  domestic   regulatory  changes   that   followed  allowed  the  upper  class  
to   seamlessly   move   their   capital   across   territorial   borders.   What   the   gradual  
financialisation   and   liberalisation   of   the   global   economy   permitted,   then,   was   a  
progressive  detachment   of   the  new   international   creditor   class   from   their   domestic  
economies-­‐cum-­‐societies.   It   allowed   a   ‘going   global’   of   the   domestic   upper   class,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147  Streeck,  2013,  p.72.  
148  Hopkin  and  Lynch  (2016)  show,   for   instance,  how  financialisation   in  Britain  was  not  only  
the  outcome  of  policies  adopted  under  the  Thatcher  government,  but  continued  under  New  
Labour.    
149  Duménil  and  Lévy,  2011,  p.7.  
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which   seizes   the   opportunities   for   profit   that   the   financialisation   of   the   global  
economy  offers,  to  secure  the  maximum  return  on  their  capital.  150  
   With  the  securitisation  of  the  economy,  ever  more  members  of  this  financial  
class  became  the  state’s  creditors.  Recall   that  during  the  bankerisation  of  the  global  
economy,   the   main   private   lenders   to   states   were   banks,   which   operated   as  
intermediaries   between   debtors   and   creditors.   After   the   securitisation   of   the  
economy,  banks   stopped  operating  as   intermediaries,   and  became  creditors   in   their  
own   right.   Moreover,   the   transition   from   loans   to   bonds   also   lead   to   a   great  
diversification  of  creditors,  ranging  from  individual  pensioners  to  hedge  funds.  151    
The  political  power  attained  by  this  financial  class  with  spare  capital  to  extend  
credit   to   states  precedes   any   contractual   agreement,   for   the  mere   fact   that   one  has  
what  the  other  requires,  creating  a  power  imbalance  that  allows  the  financial  class  to  
threaten   the   state   with   termination   of   lending.   This   political   power   is   exacerbated  
when   the   financial   class   extends   credit   to   their   own   and   to   other   governments,   for  
once  a  debt  contract  is  signed,  the  financial  class  attains  a  new  form  of  claim  on  states  
–  one  based  on  commercial  contractual  agreements.    
To  use  Walzer’s  distinction  between  monopoly  and  dominance,  the  financial  
class  becomes  dominant.152  The  good  they  hold  –  spare  capital  -­‐  does  not  only  allow  
them  to  command  control  within  one  sphere  (monopoly),  but  also  to  determine  value  
in   all   the   spheres   of   distribution   (dominance).   Our   society   today   is   “organized   on  
what  we  might  think  of  as  a  social  version  of  the  gold  standard:  one  good  or  one  set  of  
goods  is  dominant  and  determinative  of  value  in  all  the  spheres  of  distribution.  And  
that  good  or  set  of  goods  is  commonly  monopolized.”153  
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151  Helleiner,  2009,  p.95.  
152  Walzer,  1983.  
153  Walzer,  1983,  p.10.  
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Streeck   makes   a   similar   argument,   labelling   what   I   call   ‘financial   class’   the  
state’s  ‘second  constituency,’154  whose  claims  the  debt  state  must  consider,  and  whose  
interests   can   come   into   conflict   with   the   state’s   citizenry,   whose   claims   on   public  
policy  are  predicated  not  on  a  commercial  contract,  but  on  their  membership  in  the  
state   as   a   political   community.   According   to   Streeck,   the   rise   of   this   second  
constituency  challenges  the  first  constituency.  The  dilemma  that  the  debt  state  faces,  
then,  is  trying  to  satisfy  these  two  different  constituencies,  both  of  which  operate  on  
the  basis  of  incompatible  logics.  The  politics  of  the  debt  state  thus  becomes  one  of  a  
distributional   conflict   between   citizens   and   creditors.   In   moments   of   crisis,   it  
becomes  apparent  that  this  distributional  conflict  between  the  two  constituencies  is  
resolved  in  the  interest  of  the  former.  First,  the  debtor  state  itself  tends  to  prioritise  
repayment  to  its  second  constituency,  the  domestic  and  international  creditors.  This  
is  so  in  cases  of  both  sovereign  debt  crises  and  in  cases  in  which  the  crisis  erupts  in  
the   private   sector,   in   which   financial   institutions   are   saved  with   public   funds.   The  
attempts   to   solve   Europe’s   ongoing   crisis   and   the   resolution   of   the   2008   crisis   that  
originated   in   the   subprime  mortgage   sector   are   emblematic   examples   in  which   the  
interests  of  the  creditors  were  prioritised  over  those  of  the  country’s  citizens.  Streeck  
refers  to  this  prioritisation  of  the  second  constituency  as  the  transition  from  the  ‘debt  
state’  to  the  ‘consolidation  state,’  the  main  objective  of  which  is  to  reassure  creditors  
that  they  will  be  repaid.155  
While  my  argument  resembles  Streeck’s,  I  think  that  he  is  mistaken  in  calling  
the   financial  class  a   ‘second  constituency’  and   in  stating   that   their   interests  conflict  
with  those  of  the  state’s  first  constituency.  What  this  occludes  is  that  this  is  a  relation  
of  class,  not  of  constituencies.  This   is  particularly  problematic  when  thinking  about  
Streeck’s   first  constituency,   for   it   is  by  no  means  a  homogenous  group.   It   is  not  the  
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first   constituency   as   a   whole   that   is   the   counterpart   to   the   financial   class,   but   a  
particular  class  therein.  The  fight  against  inflation  as  the  maximal  policy  priority  and  
the  implementation  of  austerity  measures  does  not  harm  the  whole  citizenry  equally.  
They  are,  in  fact,  class-­‐specific  policies.  The  policy  of  cutting  inflation  is  best  thought  
of  as  a  class-­‐specific  tax  since  it  targets  the  interests  of  creditors  over  those  of  debtors:    
When   ‘too  much  money’   chases   ‘too   few  goods’  –  an   inflation  –   it  
benefits   debtors   over   creditors   since   the   greater   the   inflation,   the  
less   real   income   is  needed   to  pay  back   the  debt   accrued.   (…)  The  
politics  of  cutting  inflation  therefore  takes  on  the  form  of  restoring  
the   ‘real’   value   of  money   by   pushing   inflation   rate   down   through  
‘independent’   (from   the   rest   of   us)   independent   central   banks.  
Creditors   win,   debtors   lose.   One   can   argue   about   the   balance   of  
benefits,  but  it’s  still  a  class-­‐specific  tax.156    
  
Austerity   is   also   a   class-­‐specific   policy,   for   its   effects   are   felt   differently   across   the  
income  distribution  –  those  at  the  bottom  of  the  distribution  lose  more  than  those  at  
the   top.157   There   are   several   reasons   for   this.   First,   austerity   policies   result   in   an  
increase  in  unemployment  rates.  While  labour  income  is  the  major  source  of  income  
for  the  middle  and  lowest  income  percentiles  -­‐  what  I  call  the  wage-­‐dependent  class,  -­‐    
the  higher   income  population  has   alternative   or   additional   sources   to   finance   their  
living   standards.158   Thus,   an   increase   of   unemployment   rates   disproportionately  
affects   those  who  are  already  relatively  worse  off.  This  effect   is  exacerbated  because  
austerity   also   entails   a   cut   in   public   services,   services   on   which   the   lower   income  
brackets   rely   more   than   the   higher   income   brackets.   These   policies   also   affect   a  
deteriorating  middle   class.159   Furthermore,   austerity   does  not   only   affect   those  who  
currently   find   themselves   towards   the   bottom   of   the   income   distribution,   but   also  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156  Blyth,  2015,  p.9.  
157  Blyth,  2015,  p.8.  
158  D’Errico  et  al.,  2015.  
159  Balourdos,  2014.  
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future  generations.   It   is   future  generations   that  will  no   longer  have   the  possibilities  
that  the  welfare  state  provided  to  enhance  intra-­‐generational  social  mobility.160    
   What   I   am   arguing,   then,   is   that   in   addition   to   financialisation   structuring  
along   lines   of   statehood,  we   see   how   the   rise   of   finance   goes   hand   in   hand  with   a  
further   entrenchment   of   positions   along   class   lines.   On   one   hand,   we   have   the  
financial   elites   who   become   the   state’s   creditors.   On   the   other   hand,   we   have   the  
domestic   lower   and  middle   income  classes   that  depend  on   their  wage   and  who  are  
most  affected  by  the  attempts  to  re-­‐establish  monetary  and  fiscal  discipline.161  These  
two   classes   –   which,   for   simplicity’s   sake,   I   will   call   the   financial   and   the   wage-­‐
dependent  classes  –  are  co-­‐constitutive,  for  the  advantages  that  the  financial  class  qua  
creditors  of  the  state  enjoys  are  causally  connected  to  the  disadvantages  of  the  wage-­‐
dependent  class.    
The   understanding   of   class   that   I   adopt,   therefore,   is   not   one   that   defines  
social   classes   in   terms   of   clusters   of   individual   attributes   and   conditions,   but   as   a  
relational   concept.   My   argument   is   that   the   international   financial   elite,   which  
becomes   the   state’s   creditors,   constitutes   a   class   whose   advantages   are   causally  
connected  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  wage-­‐dependent  class,  both  in  the  debtor  state  
–   via   austerity   measures   that   are   supposed   to   ensure   the   repayment   of   the  
outstanding  debts  –  and  in  creditor  countries,  where  they  are  asked  to  shoulder  part  
of  the  burdens  of  restructuring  via  bailouts  and  rescue  packages.  162  
It   is   not   only   the   consolidation   state   through   which   these   two   classes   are  
reproduced.  The  SD&CR  also  functions  in  a  way  that,  in  moments  of  crisis,  prioritises  
the  repayment  of  private  creditors  and  the  interests  of  the  financial  class.  As  we  saw  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160  Blyth,  2015.  
161  I  say  more  regarding  why  this  is  the  case  in  the  proceeding  paragraphs.    
162  This   is  a   relational  understanding  of  class.  For  an  excellent   topology  of  different   forms  of  
understanding  class,  see  Wright  (2015).    
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in  the  proceeding  chapter,  the  SD&CR  lacks  any  form  of  sovereign  debt  restructuring  
facility,  which  results  in  the  bailing  out  of  private  creditors  in  moments  of  crisis.    
   This  burdening  of  the  global  wage-­‐dependent  classes,  both  in  the  debtor  state  
(through   austerity   measures)   and   in   those   countries,   that   subsidise   the   bailout   of  
private  creditors,  became  ever  more  apparent   in   the   last  40  years.  During   the   1980s  
debt  crisis,  there  was  at  least  a  legitimate  concern  that  the  default  to  private  creditors  
(in   this   case,   mostly   banks)   signified   a   systemic   risk   to   the   financial   system   as   a  
whole.  Conversely,  by  1994,  the  Mexican  government  was  defaulting  on  thousands  of  
individual  bond-­‐holders  in  northern  Mexico.  Here,  “bailouts  now  appeared  simply  to  
reward   investors   for   their   poor   investment   choices   at   the   taxpayers’   expense.”163  
When   the   1997-­‐1998   crisis   struck   the  East  Asian   region,   large   international  bailouts  
were   once   again   offered   to   repay   private   creditors   and   stem   the   crisis,   which  
provoked  some  opposition  from  many  European  countries,  and  especially  the  United  
States.   Paul   O’Neill,   the   treasury   secretary   under   the   Bush   administration,   was  
particularly   critical   that   international   investors   gained   from   bailouts   at   taxpayers’  
expense,   stating   that   “as  we   in   the   finance  ministries   of   the  world   talk   glibly   about  
billions  of  dollars  of  support  for  policies  gone  wrong,  we  need  to  remember  that  the  
money   we   are   entrusted   with   came   from   plumbers   and   carpenters   who   sent   25  
percent  of  their  $50,000  annual  income  to  us  for  wise  use.”164     
   As  O’Neill’s  complaint  makes  apparent,   the  critique  of   international  bailouts  
stretches   beyond   partisan   divisions.   On   one   side   of   the   political   spectrum,   free-­‐
market   advocates   oppose   them  due   to   the  market  distortions   they   cause.   Similarly,  
they  are  concerned  with  moral  hazard:  the  fear  that  if  global  investors  know  that  they  
will  be  bailed  out,  they  will  have  the  incentive  to  make  increasingly  risky  loans.165  On  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163  Helleiner,  2009,  p.96.  
164  Helleiner,  2009,  p.99  
165  Gallagher,  2011,  p.8  
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the  other  side  of   the  political   spectrum,   the  critique   is  presented  as  one  of   fairness,  
for  bailouts  seldom  help  the  nation  regain  its  economic  footing,  and  essentially  send  
taxpayer   money   outside   of   the   economy   to   repay   creditors.166   Often   evoked   in  
political  discourse  that  calls  for  greater  solidarity,  bailouts  –  the  policy-­‐manifestation  
of   the   repayment   norm   -­‐   treats   states   as   homogeneous   units   with   joint   liability,  
paying   no   attention   to   relations   of   class,   and   turning   international   support   for   the  
sovereign  debtor  into  solidarity  with  the  creditor  class.       
The  absence  of  a  sovereign  debt  restructuring  facility  and  the  practice  of  both  
domestic  and  international  bailouts  clearly  illustrates  how  the  rise  of  a  financial  class  
as   the   unintended   consequence   of   financialisation   structures   the   SD&CR.   We  
recognise,   moreover,   that   this   is   a   ‘gaping   hole’   in   the   international   financial  
architecture167   and   the   policy   response   by   governments   protect   the   riches   of   the  
financial   elite   in   times   of   busts,   while   the   wage-­‐dependent   class   in   debtor   and  
creditor  states  carry  the  burdens  of  unsustainable  public  and  private  debt.    
To   summarise,   understanding   a   country’s   debt   history   in   all   its   scope   –   not  
looking  only   at   the   eruption  of   crises,   but   also   at   the   responses   to   them  –   requires  
that  we  consider  financialisation  and  the  structuring  effect  it  has  on  the  SD&CR  along  
the  axes  of  both   statehood  and  class.  As   I  proceed   to   show   in   the  next   section,   the  
existence  of  these  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage  structured  along  the  axes  
of   statehood   and   class   makes   individuals   qua   citizens   of   a   state   in   a   position   of  
disadvantage  and  qua  members  of  a  disadvantaged  class  vulnerable  to  the  systematic  
undermining  of  their  self-­‐determination  and  self-­‐development.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166  Gallagher,  2011  
167  Soederberger,  2005  
   74  
The  Wrongs  Befalling  the  SD&CR      
So   far,   I   have   argued   that   the   SD&CR   is   an   asymmetrical   regime   structured   along  
lines   of   class   and   statehood   rather   than   a   level   playing   field.   In   this   section,   I  
demonstrate  that  when  a  state  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  accrues  debt,  individuals  
qua  citizens  of  that  state  and  qua  members  of  a  particular  class  become  vulnerable  to  
domination   and   exploitation.168   Because   this   occurs   by   virtue   of   the   position   they  
occupy   within   the   regime,   I   call   the   two   main   wrongs   characterising   the   SD&CR  
‘structural   domination’   and   ‘structural   exploitation.’   I   have   relatively   little   to   say  
about  agent-­‐relative  forms  of  domination  and/or  transactional  exploitation.169    
  
Structural  Domination    
I  define  structural  domination  as  the  systematic  constraint  on  self-­‐determination  that  
an   agent   suffers   due   to   the   position   of   disadvantage   s/he   occupies   within   the  
structure.  The  lack  of  control  of  an  agent  over  his/her  fate  is  problematic  because  it  
violates   the   minimally-­‐universalistic   value   of   self-­‐determination.170   When   it   is   the  
self-­‐determination  of  a  political  community  that  is  being  systematically  undermined,  
it  erodes  the  democratic  accountability  of  governments  to  their  citizens.    
Of  course,  all  agents’  actions  are  constrained  to  a  certain  degree  by  virtue  of  
the   position   they   occupy.   An   agent   is   subject   to   structural   domination,   however,  
when   their   choice  architecture   is   so  constrained  by   factors   that  are   social   in  origin,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168   I   am   bracketing   the   debate   on   how   the   two   wrongs   that   I   am   concerned   with   here   –  
domination  and  exploitation  –  relate  to  each  other.  For  the  view  that  exploitation  is  a  form  of  
domination,   see  Vrousalis   (2013).  For   the  position   that,  on   the  conceptual   level,  domination  
implies   exploitation,   see   Roemer   (1989).   For   the   position   that   as   an   empirical   matter,  
domination  and  exploitation  often  coincide,  but  that  more  people  are  dominated  than  those  
who  are  exploited,  see  Young  (2011).    
169   Agent   relative   domination   can   be   defined   as   the   ‘pre-­‐institutional’,   ‘unregulated   state   of  
nature  where  relationships  of  brute  mastery  obtain’  (Laborde,  2010,  p.10;  Pettit,  1997,  chapter  
2).   Transactional   accounts   of   exploitation  maintain   that   ‘A   exploits   B   when   A   takes   unfair  
advantage  of  B’.    
170   To   this   extent,   a   concern   with   domination   thus   presupposes   a   ‘moderate   ethical  
universalism’  (White,  2003,  p.262).  
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that   they   cannot   participate   in   determining   their   actions   or   the   conditions   of   their  
actions   in   a   meaningful   manner.171   According   to   the   definition   proposed   here,   to  
determine  that  an  agent  is  structurally  dominated,   it   is  neither  required  to  make  an  
empirical,   causal   assessment   that   proves   it   was   impossible   for   an   agent   in   a   given  
situation   to   act   otherwise,   nor   to   show   that   those   in   a   position   of   advantage   fully  
determined   the   actions   of   those   in   a   position   of   disadvantage.   Making   this   causal  
assessment  is,  in  a  way,  the  wrong  approach.  What  is  important,  instead,  is  that  those  
in   a   position   of   disadvantage   see   their   self-­‐determination   significantly   and  
systematically  inhibited.  
Within  the  SD&CR  an  agent  is  structurally  dominated  when  it  is  so  positioned  
that   the   acquisition   of   debt   results   in   the   systematic   undermining   of   the   self-­‐
determination  of  individuals  qua  citizens  and  members  of  a  particular  class.  Note  that  
merely  occupying  a  position  of  disadvantage  is  not  enough  to  make  the  citizenry  of  a  
given   state   and   the   classes   therein   vulnerable   to   domination.   Similarly,   the  
acquisition   of   sovereign   debt   as   such   does   not   make   all   citizens   and   all   classes  
vulnerable   to   domination.   That   is   why   something   that   can   signify   a   reassertion   of  
political  position  and  economic  strength  for  some  can  result  in  the  exact  opposite  for  
others.  A  state’s  citizenry  and  particular  classes  therein  are  vulnerable  to  domination  
when  a  state  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  in  the  SD&CR  accrues  debt  in  their  name.    
Concerns   about   the   systematic   undermining   of   the   self-­‐determination   of  
debtor  states  and  individuals  qua  citizens  and  the  disadvantaged  classes  therein  have  
long   been   articulated   with   regards   to   conditionalities   imposed   by   multilateral  
creditors.  Citizens  of  states  in  Asia,  Africa  and  Latin  America  that  have  been  subject  
to   Structural   Adjustment   Programs   with   highly   specific   and   demanding  
conditionalities   have   expressed   this   critique   since   the   IMF’s   inception.   As   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171  Here  I  closely  follow  Young’s  definition  of  domination  (1990,  p.37).  
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European   Debt   Crisis   unfolded,   citizens   of   the   ‘European   periphery,’   or   ‘PIIGS’  
countries   (Portugal,   Italy,   Ireland,   Greece,   and   Spain),   joined   their   plight.   Their  
concern  seemed  to  be  one  about  multilateral  creditors  imposing  policies  on  allegedly  
democratic   states,   thereby   undermining   the   self-­‐determination   of   the   citizenry.   As  
Hurrell   states,   “the   economic   choices   of   developing   countries   are,   if   not   dictated,  
then   certainly   shaped   by   institutions   dominated   by   the   strong   an   often   backed   by  
coercion   in   the   form   of   an   expanding   range   of   conditionalities.”172   These  
conditionalities  are  problematic  because,   “quite  apart   from  the  question  of  whether  
conditionality   is   actually   effective   (…)   it   undercuts   the   meaningfulness   of   political  
community  and  runs  directly  counter  to  such  favoured  liberal  goals  as  the  democratic  
accountability  of  governments  to  their  citizens.”173    
Moreover,  as  we  saw  in  the  preceding  section,  the  rise  of  a  financial  elite  also  
has   the   potential   of   systematically   undermining   the   self-­‐determination   of   those  
classes   occupying   a   position   of   disadvantage   within   the   highly-­‐financialised   global  
political  economy.  First,  as  states  finance  more  of  their  expenses  via  the  acquisition  of  
debt  (rather  than  taxes),  their  dependence  on  the  financial  elite  qua  creditors  grows.  
If  the  state  begins  to  act  in  the  interest  of  this  international  financial  elite  rather  than  
in  the  interest  of  its  citizenry,  the  latter  will  see  their  self-­‐determination  undermined  
by  virtue  of  the  position  of  disadvantage  they  occupy  within  the  regime.    
Second,   as   we   also   learnt   in   the   preceding   chapter,   the   absence   of   an  
international  restructuring  mechanism  allows  for  the  creation  of  a  ‘creditor  cartel’  in  
the  London  and  Paris  Clubs,  backed  by  powerful  multilateral  institutions  that  further  
undermine   the   capacity   of   the   debtor   state   to   shape   the   terms   of   repayment   and  
conditionalities.   The   worry   regarding   the   undermining   of   the   debtor   states'   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172  Hurrell,  2001,  p.43.  
173  Hurrell,  2001,  p.49.  
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determination  and  that  of  the  citizenry  it  allegedly  represents  thus  no  longer  applies  
exclusively  to  public,  multilateral  sovereign  debt,  but  also  to  private  sovereign  debt.  
I   do   not   claim   that   every   debtor   state   is   dominated,   nor   that   all   domestic  
wage-­‐dependent   classes   are,   but   the   structure   of   the   SD&CR   as   described   in   the  
previous  section  makes  it  an  imperative  to  analyse  what  position  different  states  and  
classes   occupy.   If   a   debtor   state   or   a   given   social   group   occupies   a   position   of  
disadvantage   along   the   empirical   lines  described   above,   then   it   is  my   view   that   the  
state  or   social   group   is   vulnerable   to   structural  domination  once  debt   is   accrued   in  
their   name.   This   is   because   the   acquisition   of   debt   requires   the   state   to   make  
empirical   choices   that   result   in   the   systematic   constraint   of   the   individuals’   self-­‐
determination.  Along  the  lines  of  statehood,  these  choices  may  entail  the  adoption  of  
conditionalities  that  are  not  self-­‐legislated.  Along  lines  of  class,  the  dilemma  may  be  
one   about   the   interests   of   the   financial   elite  qua   private   creditors   being   prioritised  
over  those  of  the  citizenry.    
To  be  sure,  what   is  normatively  significant  about  a  state  being  dominated   is  
not  that  the  state  officials  who  act  in  its  name  are  dominated,  but  that  its  citizenry  is.  
If  we  assume  that  the  ultimate  unit  of  moral  concern  is  the  individual,  and  that  the  
state’s   value   derives   from   serving   the   interests   of   its   citizenry,   then   the   normative  
significance   of   the   state’s   domination   is   not   the   direct   effect   this   status   has   on   the  
state  or  on  state  officials,  but  the  effect  it  has  on  the  state’s  citizenry.    
Moreover,   despite   the   fact   that   the   main   victims   of   domination   are   the  
citizens  of  the  debtor  state,   it   is  not  true  that  the  citizens  are  a  homogenous  group.  
An   important   caveat   is   that   some   citizens   of   the   debtor   state   are   also   part   of   the  
second  constituency,  in  the  sense  that  they  are  domestic  creditors  to  the  state.  These  
citizens,  then,  have  some  form  of  double  identity,  first  as  citizens  of  the  debtor  state,  
and   second,   as   part   of   the   second   constituency.   Since   these   domestic   creditors   are  
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seeing   their   interests   represented   both   by   multilateral   creditors   and   by   their   own  
states,  who  give  priority   to   their   claims  over   those  of   their   fellow  citizens,   they  can  
only   partly   be   thought   of   as   dominated.   By   virtue   of   their   identity   as   the   state’s  
private  creditors,  they  are  actually  part  of  the  dominating  party.    
  
Structural  Exploitation    
I   define   structural   exploitation   as   the   process   through  which   the   productive   power  
from   those   in   a   position   of   disadvantage   is   progressively   transferred   to   those   in   a  
position   of   advantage,   thereby   systematically   constraining   the   self-­‐development   of  
the   former.174   I   use   productive   power   rather   than   ‘surplus   product,’   since   surplus  
product   has   a   strong   connotation   of   industrial   forms   of   capitalism   and   is,   in   that  
sense,   too   restrictive.   I   also   want   to   remain   neutral   with   regard   to   whether   every  
transfer   of   productive   labour   necessarily   means   that   the   powers   of   those   in   a  
disadvantaged   position   are   “diminished   by   more   than   the   amount   of   transfer.”175  
According  to  Macpherson,  labouring  not  only  uses  an  individual’s  labour  power,  but  
also   reduces   his/her   development   power   –   “his   ability   to   use   his   energies   and  
capacities   for  all  other  purposes,   that   is,  his  ability   to  engage   in  activities  which  are  
simply  a  direct  source  of  enjoyment  and  not  a  means  of  material  production.”176    
Adopting  this  definition  distances  me  from  those  defending  a  liberal  account  
of   exploitation  with   focus   on   transacting   individuals.177   According   to   the   definition  
endorsed  here,  exploitation  is  not  always  agential  and  transactional,  but  may  be  built  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174  Here  I  follow  closely  Young’s  definition  of  exploitation,  who  sees  it  as  one  of  the  five  faces  
of  oppression  (1990).    
175  Macpherson,  1973,  p.64.  
176  Macpherson,   1973,  p.64.  This   is  an   insight  picked  up  by  Young,  who  builds  on   it   to  argue  
that   exploitation   is   one   face   of   oppression   –   one  way,   that   is,   in  which   self-­‐development   is  
institutionally  constrained.  
177  Disagreement  continues  to  exist  among  scholars  defending  these  transactional  accounts  of  
exploitation,   regarding   what   makes   a   transaction   unfair   (Wertheimer,   1996;   Goodin,   1987;  
Sample,  2003;  Miller,  1999).  
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into  the  very  structure.178  Structural  exploitation  captures  the  process  through  which  
the  positions  of  disadvantage  are   reproduced  and   thereby  describes  how   those  who  
already   occupy   a   position   of   disadvantage   are   rendered   worse   off.   In   other   words,  
“structural   exploitation   both   takes   those   subjects   pre-­‐positioned   as   socially   inferior  
and   constitutes   subjects   as   socially   inferior,   and   extracts   their   productive   powers,  
reinforcing  their  disadvantage.”179  If  one  holds  the  conviction  that  agents  should  have  
a  roughly  equal  opportunity  to  flourish,  then  structural  exploitation  is  a  normatively  
problematic  feature  of  any  order  it  characterises.  
   Analytical  Marxists  have  long  debated  whether  exploitation  is  a  normative  or  
a  technical  concept.180  Among  those  scholars  who  defend  exploitation  as  a  normative  
concept,   there   is  vast  disagreement  on  what  makes  exploitation  wrong.  While  some  
argue  that  what  makes  exploitation  wrong  is  the  fact  that  it  is  a  forced  transfer  of  the  
productive   power   of   a   disadvantaged   group   to   those   in   a   position   of   advantage,181  
others   argue   that   the   wrong   resides   in   the   unequal   distribution   of   assets   in   the  
background   against   which   an   exchange   takes   place.182   Others   still   argue   that  
exploitation  is  wrong  because  it  violates  other  values  we  care  about,  such  as  the  duty  
of   protecting   the   vulnerable   for   Goodin,   or   because   it   is   a   form   of   domination   for  
Vrousalis.  The  understanding  of  exploitation  adopted  here   is  a  version  of   this   latter  
argument:   what   makes   exploitation   wrong   is   that   it   inhibits   self-­‐development.183  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178   Jeffrey  Reiman  argues   that   the   force   that   structural   exploitation   entails   is   invisible  under  
capitalism,   precisely   because   it   is   not   overt   and   always   agential,   but   built   into   the   very  
structure   of   capitalism   as   a   social   order.   The   origin   of   the   structural   force,   according   to  
Reiman,  is  the  class  system:  the  effect,  that  the  positions  of  individuals  differently  positioned  
within   this   class   system,   face   a  different   ‘array  of   fates’.   This   array  of   fates   in   turn  makes   it  
seem  rational  for  the  worker  to  seek  employment  in  a  factory.    
179  McKeown,  2016,  p.177.  
180  For  a  defence  that  it  is  a  technical  concept,  see  Arneson  (1981).  For  an  exegetical  critique  of  
the  view  that  Marx’s  own  view  on  exploitation  is  a  technical  one,  see  Vrousalis  (2016).  
181  Reiman,  1987;  Holstrom,  1977.  
182  Roemer,  1986.  
183  This   is  not   to   say   that   this   is   the  only   thing   that  may  make  exploitation  wrong.  One  can  
adopt  a   ‘list   theory’  approach   to   the  wrongs  of  exploitation,  according   to  which   there   is  not  
necessarily  only  one  thing  that  makes  exploitation  wrong.  Such  an  argument  has  been  made  
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Ultimately,   then,   the   concern   about   exploitation   is   driven   by   the   commitment   to  
human  emancipation  and  by  the  conviction  that  individuals  and  communities  should  
have  the  opportunity  to  flourish.  Such  a  project  is  inherently  normative.184    
Within   the   SD&CR,   an   agent   is   vulnerable   to   exploitation   when   s/he   is   so  
positioned   that   the   acquisition  of  debt   results   in   the  progressive   transfer  of  his/her  
productive  power  to  those  occupying  positions  of  advantage  within  the  structure.  In  
combination   with   the   empirical   description   of   the   asymmetrical   SD&CR   in   the  
previous   section,  my   contention   is   that   those   citizens   and   classes   therein   that   find  
themselves   in   a   position   of   disadvantage   within   the   regime   are   vulnerable   to  
exploitation  when  debt  is  accrued  in  their  name.    
The   worry   that   the   progressive   transfer   of   resources   from   debt   servicing  
agents   to   their   creditors   may   be   exploitative   has   been   raised   in   the   past.   In   the  
context   of   the  Highly   Indebted   Poor   Country   Initiative,   for   instance,   organisations  
campaigning   for   debt   relief   and   debt   forgiveness   were   particularly   forceful   in  
denouncing   the   bleeding   out   of   states   via   debt   servicing,   something   which   was  
portrayed   as   a   progressive   transfer   of   resources   from   the   poorest   to   the   wealthiest  
countries.   Arguments   were   made   regarding   usurious   interest   rates,   which   ensured  
that   the   poorest   nations   continued   to   have   debt   servicing   obligations   even   after  
having  paid  back  the  principal  in  full.185  Comparing  debt  servicing  with  development  
aid   figures,   the   question  was   raised   about   who  was   really   developing  whom,   using  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by   Butt   (2013)   about   the   wrongs   of   colonialism.   This   understanding   of   the   wrongs   of  
exploitation   is   particularly   plausible   when   one   conceives   of   exploitation   as   a   ‘family  
resemblance’   concept   (McKeown,   2016).   There   is   not   one   core   conception   of   exploitation;  
there  may   be   different   kinds   of   moral   wrong   at   play   when   exploitation   occurs   in   different  
settings  (in  intimate  relationships,  market  transactions  or  within  economic,  social  or  political  
systems).    
184  See  Hayward  and  Lukes  for  a  similar  point  regarding  the  definition  of  power  (Hayward  and  
Lukes,  2008,  p.9).  
185  Some  go  as  far  as  arguing  that  the  principal  has  already  been  repaid  ‘multiple  times’.    
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estimates   of   what   could   have   been   achieved   had   the   resources   been   invested   in  
poverty  alleviation  and  development  initiatives  instead  of  debt  servicing.186    
   Indeed,  many   have   pointed   out   that   the   very   logic   of   debt   predisposes   and  
magnifies   unequal   social   positions.187   It   predisposes   these   positions   because   it  
requires  an  agent  (the  creditor)  with  spare  capital  that  it  does  not  need,  to  extend  it  
to  another  agent  (the  debtor),  who  does  require  it  for  a  specific  end.  The  very  logic  of  
debt,  then,  rests  on  this  initial  inequality  of  positions,  no  matter  how  minor  it  may  be  
initially.   Debt   then   takes   on   the   job   of   magnifying   this   initial   inequality,   most  
prominently   through   the   charging   of   interest.   It   is,   to   use   Piketty’s   language,   a  
mechanism  of  divergence.  Those  with  spare  capital  to  invest  will  thus  see  their  capital  
expand  through  the  magic  of  compound  interest.  If  it  is  a  risky  debtor,  creditors  will  
be  able   to  charge  extra   to  compensate   the   risk   they   take   in  extending  credit.  These  
credit  conditions  can  play  a  major  role  in  exacerbating  inequality.    
   My  argument  here  differs  from  the  argument  that  debt  itself  is  a  mechanism  
of  divergence,   for  what   I  am  arguing   is   that,  while  some  states  can  accrue  debt  and  
see   it   work   in   their   interest   (creating   the   preconditions   for   self-­‐development),   for  
other  states  -­‐  their  citizenries  and  particular  classes  therein  –  the  opposite  is  often  the  
case.  For  debt  to  be  a  mechanism  of  divergence,  those  who  already  occupy  a  position  
of   disadvantage   within   the   SD&CR   need   to   be   the   ones   accruing   debt.   Ultimately,  
then,  it  is  those  who  already  occupy  a  vulnerable  position  within  the  regime  that  end  
up  paying  more,  benefitting  those  who  are  already  occupying  a  position  of  advantage.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186   See,   for   instance   https://www.one.org/international/issues/debt-­‐cancellation/.   Denham  
(1990)   summarizes   the   attitude   of   NGO’s   to   debt   reduction.   The   largest   NGO   coalition  
campaigning  for  debt  relief  was  Jubilee  2000.    
187  In  “Debt:  The  First  5000  Years”,  David  Graeber  makes  this  point,  arguing  that  throughout  
history,  relatively  small  initial  differences  in  wealth  resulted  in  debt  contracts  between  the  less  
and   the   more   affluent   that   could   produce   long-­‐term   dependency   and   even   debt   bondage  
(2011).  
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This   applies   as   much   to   debt   accrued   by   natural   persons   as   it   does   to  
sovereign  debt.   First,   as   is   the   case   for   individual   borrowers,   developing   states   that  
are  considered  risky  will  borrow  on  worse  conditions  than  advanced  economies  that  
are   seen   as   safe   debtors.   Moreover,   as   the   debt   burden   increases   and   creditors  
become  wary  of   the   sovereign  debtor’s  willingness  or   ability   to   repay,   interest   rates  
and  risk  premiums  increase  further  for  the  already-­‐disadvantaged.  Second,   if  debt  is  
accrued  with  any  purpose  other  than  sustainable  investment  into  the  economy,  it  can  
be  another  mechanism  by  which  inequality  is  exacerbated.  This  is  most  evident  when  
new   debt   is   accrued   to   service   older   debt   obligations.   As   Devlin   puts   it,   when  
describing  the  treadmill  effect  that  Latin  American  countries  faced  in  the  1970s:  “due  
to   the   law  of  compound   interest,  greater  and  greater  proportions  of  a  given   level  of  
borrowing   were   committed   to   repaying   old   debt.   Thus,   to   maintain   a   given   net  
transfer  (new  loans  >  debt  service)  a  country  had  to  borrow  ever  greater  amounts.”188  
This   form  of   critique  highlights  debt  as   a  mechanism  of  divergence  and  points   at   a  
structural  process  through  which  resources  are  transferred  from  those  in  a  position  of  
disadvantage  to  those  in  positions  of  advantage.    
Along  the  lines  of  statehood,  those  vulnerable  to  exploitation  are  the  citizens  
of   debtor   states,   who   find   themselves   in   a   position   of   disadvantage   within   the  
SD&CR,   a   position   characterised   by   the   empirical   features   outlined   in   the   previous  
section.   Note   here   that   adopting   the   structural   viewpoint   allows   us   to   respond   to  
potential  critics  who  point  out  that  nearly  all  countries  are  debtors  and  that,  because  
of   this,   it   would   implausible   that   sovereign   debt   serves   as   a   mechanism   of  
exploitation.  Such  a  critic  would  have  missed  a  key  dimension  of  the  global  political  
economy  that  governs  modern-­‐day  debt.  The  analysis  provided  thus  far  renders  this  
argument  outdated.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188  Devlin,  1989,  p.51.  
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   Structural   exploitation   also   occurs   along   lines   of   class,   where   the   exploited  
group   are   those   social   classes   that   find   themselves   in   a   position   of   vulnerability  
characterised   by   the   empirical   features   outlined   in   the   previous   section.  Here,   it   is  
important   to   highlight   that   it   is   not   solely   the   domestic  wage-­‐dependent   classes   of  
the   debtor   state   who   are   vulnerable   to   exploitation,   but   also   those   of   creditor  
countries,  albeit  through  different  channels.  Domestic  wage-­‐dependent  classes  of  the  
debtor   state   are   vulnerable   to   exploitation   as   the   government   takes   on   new   loans  
from  multilateral  institutions  to  service  private  debt  -­‐  increasing  the  debt  burden  and  
making   it   even   more   difficult,   if   not   impossible,   to   restructure   -­‐   all   the   while  
imposing   austerity  measures   on   the   population,   justified   on   the   basis   of   having   to  
meet   their   contractual   obligations.   Domestic   wage-­‐dependent   classes   in   creditor  
states   are   vulnerable   to   exploitation   as   their   governments   help   finance   bailout  
packages  for  the  private  bondholders  of  crisis-­‐stricken  countries.  In  Chapter  4,  I  will  
return   to   the  discussion  about  how  these   two  axes  of  disadvantage  –  statehood  and  
class  –  interact.    
  
Conclusion  and  Road  Ahead  
In   this   chapter   I   have   shown  why  we   have   reason   to  worry   about   the   asymmetries  
described   in   the   preceding   section.  We   have   reason   to   worry   firstly   because   those  
citizens   and   classes   in   positions   of   disadvantage   can   be   dominated   and   exploited  
when   debt   is   accrued   in   their   name,   by   virtue   of   the   position   they   occupy   in   the  
regime.  In  the  next  chapter,  I  will  argue  that  the  positions  of  disadvantage  that  make  
their   occupiers   vulnerable   to   domination   and   exploitation  when   debt   is   accrued   in  
their  name  are  social  in  origin.  That  they  are  social  in  origin  does  not  mean,  however,  
that  one  dominating  and/or  exploiting  agent  can  always  be  identified  and  singled  out  
as  the  culprit,  rather  that  the  wrongs  of  the  regime  have  a  structural  origin.       
   84  
CHAPTER  3  
ON  THE  SOCIAL  ORIGINS  OF  THE  INJUSTICES  OF  THE  SD&CR    
  It   is   time   to   explode   once   and   for   all   the   popular  myth   that   the  
IMF  was  dictating  policy   to  Buenos  Aires   through   the   1990s.   This  
view   is   based   on   a   cartoonish   sort   of   logic   that   paints   cause-­‐and-­‐
effect   correlations   with   an   absurdly   broad   brush,   not   unlike  
blaming  juvenile  delinquency  on  rock  and  roll.189  
The   previous   chapter   was   devoted   to   establishing   what   makes   the   SD&CR  
normatively   worrisome.   First,   I   presented   the   empirical   features   characterising   the  
asymmetrical  SD&CR.  Then  I  argued  that  we  have  reasons  to  be  worried  about  these  
asymmetrical   positions,   since   certain   individuals   are   vulnerable   to   domination   and  
exploitation  based  on  that  very  position  once  their  state  accrues  debt.  Yet,  I  said  very  
little   -­‐   if   anything   at   all   –   about   the   origins   of   these   normatively   troublesome  
asymmetries.    
Doing   so   is   relevant   in   at   least   two   regards.   First,   it   is   important   because   a  
judgment   of   injustice   requires   that   these   normatively   worrisome   asymmetries   be  
social   in   origin.   Put   differently,   judgments   of   injustice   do   not   apply   to   the  
consequences,   even   if   they   are   normatively  worrisome,   of   any   form   of   non-­‐human,  
natural  catastrophe  –  they  need  to  be  produced  and  reproduced  by  human  agents.190  
Second,  showing  how  these  normatively  troublesome  asymmetries  are  reproduced  is  
important   in   order   not   to   fall   prey   to   what   financial   journalist   Paul   Blustein  
denounces   as   a   “cartoonish   sort   of   logic.”   Evaluating   the   2001   Argentine   crisis,   a  
sovereign  debt   crisis  often  compared   to   the  Greek  case,  he  warns  us  against   simply  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189  Blustein,  2005,  p.  198-­‐99;  p.196.  
190  In  the  assessment  of  what  makes  a  global  order  unjust,  I  follow  Pogge,  according  to  whom  a  
global   system   of   rules   and   norms   is   unjust   when   it   systematically   creates   positions   of  
advantage   and   disadvantage,   imposed   by   those   who   benefit   from   it   (Pogge,   2002).   As   will  
become  clearer  as  I  proceed,  I  revise  the  second  part  of  this  definition,  arguing  that  the  global  
order   is   not   unilaterally   imposed   by   those   who   benefit   from   it,   but   that   it   is   reproduced  
through  structural  processes,  in  which  both  winners  and  losers  participate.    
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blaming  prominent  actors,  such  as  the  IMF,  for  the  vulnerability  to  domination  and  
exploitation  of  those  in  a  position  of  disadvantage.191    
In  this  chapter  I  show  how  these  positions  of  disadvantage  are  social  in  origin.  
First  I  argue  that  neither  of  the  two  responses  given  so  far  regarding  the  social  origins  
of  the   injustices  –  the  agential  thesis  and  the  structural   injustice  thesis  –  manage  to  
fully  grasp  how  the   injustices  of   the  SD&CR  are   reproduced.  To  grasp  how  they  are  
reproduced,  we  need  to  expand  our  conceptual  apparatus.  To  do  so,  I  introduce  a  case  
study,  namely  the  adoption  of  the  first  Greek  ‘rescue  package’  in  2010.  On  this  basis,  I  
argue   that   the   injustices   in   the   SD&CR   are   produced   and   reproduced   through  
structural  processes  that  can  be  grouped  into  three  distinct  heuristic  categories,  what  
I  call  structural  processes  proper,  the  structural-­‐relational  and  the  structural-­‐systemic  
level.    
  
Preliminary  Remarks:  Agential  Thesis  &  Structural  Injustice  Thesis    
The  central   feature   that  differentiates   injustices   from  cases  of  misfortune   is   the   fact  
that  in  the  former,  the  asymmetries  are  social  in  origin,  whereas  in  the  latter  they  are  
not.  Whereas  injustice  is  human-­‐made,  misfortune  is  not,  and  can  be  a  consequence  
of  natural   catastrophes.  Consequently,  while   there   is   a   group  of   agents  who   can  be  
held  responsible  for  having  caused  injustice,  there  is  no  such  group  for  misfortunes.192  
Who  can  be  held  responsible  for  an  unjust  global  order  is  something  which  continues  
to  be  debated  among  global  justice  scholars  and  scholars  of  structural  injustice.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191   The   similarities   between   the   Argentine   and   the   Greek   debt   crises   inspired   financial  
journalists  and  academics  alike   to  compare   the   two  (Mercille,  2013;  Krugman,  2012;  Roubini,  
2012;  Weisbrot   and  Montecino,   2012).  While   some   see   the  Argentine   crisis   resolution  as   the  
European’s   worst   nightmare,   others   present   the   Argentine   default   and   non-­‐voluntary  
restructuring   as   the   preferable   alternative   over   austerity   policies,   which   they   see   as  
asphyxiating  the  economy.    
192  Kahn,  2012,  p.51.  
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   In  his  work  on  world  poverty  and  human  rights,  Thomas  Pogge  tried  to  show  
how  the  global  political  economic  order  foreseeably  and  avoidably  puts  some  agents  
in   a   systematic   position   of   advantage   and   others   in   a   position   of   disadvantage.193  
Crucially,  he  shows  how  this  order  is  produced  and  reproduced  by  those  who  benefit  
from  it.  I  will  call  this  the  ‘agential  thesis.’  Pogge  goes  as  far  as  comparing  ‘the  moral  
position’  of  those  in  advantaged  positions  (citizens  of  affluent  states,  in  his  account)  
with   that   of  Mao   Tse-­‐Tung.194   How   exactly   and   to   what   extent   citizens   of   affluent  
states   (re)produce   the   global   political   economic   order,   however,   continues   to   be  
debated.195    
   The  central  contribution  of  the  structural  injustice  literature  has  been  to  show  
that,  although  no  single  agent  or  group  can  be  held  responsible   for   the  existence  of  
structural   injustice,   individuals   whose   actions   contribute   to   its   creation   and  
instantiation   through   a   combination   of   actions,   policies   and   social   practices,   can  
indeed  be  held  responsible  for  it.  I  call  this  position  –  the  position  that  maintains  that  
injustices  can  be  reproduced  by  the  interplay  of  manifold  actions,  none  of  which  can  
be   isolated   and   held   solely   responsible   for   the   unjust   outcome   –      the   ‘structural  
injustice  thesis.’  Structural  injustices  are  defined  as  those  “produced  and  reproduced  
by   thousands   or   millions   of   persons   usually   acting   within   institutional   rules   and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193  Pogge,  2002.  
194  “To  be  sure,  we  do  not  intend  these  harms  [global  poverty],  and  we  are  thus  not  on  a  par  
with   Stalin,  who  used   economic  policies   and   institutions   specifically   in  order   to   impoverish  
and  kill  segments  of  the  population  he  deemed  hostile  to  the  Soviet  regime.  We  may  not  even  
have   foreseen   these   harms   when   we   constructed   the   new   global   economic   architecture  
beginning  in  the  late  1980s.  Now  that  we  do  know,  our  moral  situations  is  more  akin  to  that  of  
Mao  Tse-­‐Tung  in  1959.  Mao  did  not  foresee  that  his  Great  Leap  Forward,  begun  in  1958,  would  
acutely  aggravate  poverty  in  China.  But  when  the  catastrophic  effects  of  these  policies  became  
evident   in   the   great   famine  of   1959-­‐62,  he   continued  his  policies   and  declined   foreign  help.  
Twenty   to   thirty   million   Chinese   perished   as   a   direct   consequence   of   this   moral   failure.  
Continuing  our  current  global  economic  structures  and  policies  unmodified  would  manifest  a  
similar  moral  failure”  Pogge,  2002,  p.10.  
195  For  an  excellent  critique  on  Pogge’s  argument   that  citizens  of  affluent   societies  harm  the  
global  poor,  see  Risse,  2013.    
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according   to  practices   that  most  people   regard  as  morally  acceptable”196  or  as   those  
“which  cannot  be  causally  linked  to  a  specific  perpetrator  and  is  not  imposed  by  any  
identifiable   actor   or   agency.”197   The   contributions   made   by   different   agents   to   the  
instantiation  of  this  structural  injustice  is  not  specified.    
   In  this  chapter  I  defend  two  claims.  First,  I  show  that  the  asymmetries  of  the  
SD&CR   are   indeed   social   in   origin   and   that   those   who   are   in   a   position   of  
disadvantage  are  therefore  victims  of  injustice  and  not  merely  of  misfortune.  Second,  
I  argue  that  neither  of  the  two  responses  given  so  far  regarding  the  social  origins  of  
the   injustices   of   the   global   political   economic   order   –   the   agential   thesis   and   the  
structural  injustice  thesis  –  manage  to  fully  grasp  how  the  injustices  of  the  SD&CR  are  
reproduced.    
In   the   case   of   the   SD&CR,  we   can   observe   that   those  who   benefit   from   the  
regime   do   not   unilaterally   impose   the   unjust   order,   but   only   do   so   in   conjunction  
with   the   actions   of   other   actors,   many   of   whom   occupy   the   instantiated  
disadvantaged   positions.   To   that   extent,   structural   injustice   scholars   are   right   in  
arguing  that  the  injustices  characterising  the  SD&CR  cannot  be  linked  to  one,  specific  
perpetrator.  At  the  same  time,  however,  analysing  a  concrete  case  in  which  injustice  
is   perpetuated   in   the   SD&CR   also   reveals   that   more   can   be   said   about   the  
reproduction  of  injustices  in  the  SD&CR  than  just  that  they  are  instantiated  through  
structural   processes   to   which   millions   of   individuals   contribute.   I   propose   to  
distinguish  between  three  dimensions  through  which  the  injustices  in  the  SD&CR  are  
reproduced.  Although  I  distil  these  dimensions  from  an  analysis  of  a  concrete  case  in  
which  injustices  within  the  SD&CR  are  reproduced,  they  are  applicable  to  other  cases  
within  the  SD&CR  and  to  other  domains  of   injustice  altogether,  serving  as  heuristic  
categories  to  analyse  the  perpetuation  of  other  unjust  structures.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196  Young,  2011,  p.97.  
197  Kahn,  2012,  p.59.  
   88  
  
First  Greek  Restructuring    
To   live   up   to   the   promise   of   providing   a   nuanced,   non-­‐dogmatic   answer   to   the  
question  of  how  the  injustices  characterising  the  SD&CR  are  reproduced,  I  propose  to  
look   in  greater  detail  at  one  concrete  case   in  which  positions  of  disadvantage  along  
class  and  statehood  are  reproduced.  The  concrete  case  I  have  chosen  is  the  adoption  
of  the  first  Greek  rescue  package.  Those  familiar  with  the  case  can  skim  through  the  
next   paragraphs,   in   which   the   context   of   the   adoption   of   the   rescue   program   is  
introduced.    
After   assuming   power   in   2009,   Papandreou   declared   that   the   debt   levels,  
which  had  been  made  public  by  the  previous  government,  did  not  correspond  to  the  
country’s   grim   reality.   As   yields   on   Greek   bonds   continued   to   grow,   the   quandary  
confronting  Papandreou  and  Papaconstantinou  –  his   finance  minister  -­‐  was  what  to  
do   if  market  sentiment   turned  so  negative   that   fresh   funds  became  unavailable  at  a  
reasonable   cost.   Since   they   knew   better   than   to   expect   credit   from   their   European  
partners,   who   adhered   to   the   ‘no   bailout   clause’   of   the   Maastricht   treaty,   which  
forbade  emergency  aid,  Papandreou  turned  to  the  IMF.    
During   the   January   2010   World   Economic   Forum,   Papandreou   and  
Papaconstantinou  met  with  the  then-­‐Managing  Director  of  the  IMF,  Strauss  Kahn,  in  
a  restaurant  kitchen  in  Davos.  According  to  Papaconstantinou’s  memoir,  Papandreou  
begged  the  managing  director  to  promise  IMF  funds  if  the  financial  markets  dried  up  
or   became   too   expensive,   to   which   Strauss   Kahn   replied   that   “lending   money   to  
countries  which   had   lost   access   to  markets  was   the   Fund’s  mission;   if   Greece   asks,  
[the   IMF]  would   have   to   help.”198   The   fact   that   this  meeting   took   place   in   a  Davos  
kitchen   is   particularly   telling:   recounting   the   situation  using   extensive   primary   and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198  Papaconstantinou  in  Blustein,  2016,  p.81.  
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secondary   research,   financial   journalist   Paul   Blustein   states   that   the   restaurant’s  
kitchen  was   “one  of   the   few  places  where  Papandreou   and  Papaconstantinou   could  
parley  with   the   IMF  managing  director  away   from  the  prying  eyes  of   the  numerous  
journalists   attending   the   conference.   Waiters   bearing   trays   laden   with   dishes   and  
glasses  were  bustling  in  and  out,  and  security  guards  were  keeping  a  watchful  eye  for  
unwelcome   intruders   as   the   three  men   stood   and   talked.”199Although   Strauss   Kahn  
initially  expressed  the  IMF’s  support  for  Greece,  the  negotiations  that  led  to  the  first  
rescue   package   dragged   on  much   longer   than   anyone  would   have   wished   for.   The  
main  reason  behind  this  delay  was  disagreement  between  the  IMF  and  the  European  
Central  Bank  (ECB)  on  the  involvement  of  the  private  sector  –  on  the  question,  that  
is,  of  whether  Greece  should  also  engage  in  a  voluntary  restructuring  with  its  private  
creditors.    
The  IMF  insisted  on  private  sector  involvement  due  to  what  became  known  in  
IMF  jargon  as  the  ‘No  More  Argentinas  Rule.’  The  IMF’s  greatest  debacle  occurred  at  
the   turn   of   the   century   in   Argentina,   a   country   which,   throughout   the   1990s,   had  
been  the  darling  of  Wall  Street  and  of  the  IMF.200  In  August  of  2001,  the  Fund  decided  
to  lend  Argentina  $8  billion  on  top  of  the  $14  billion  rescue  package  that  the  IMF  had  
previously  provided.  The  Argentine  default,  which  came  four  and  a  half  months  later  
and   was   the   biggest   default   of   the   time,   proved   that   the   Fund   had   done   a   major  
disservice   to   the  Argentine  citizens.  The  extra   funds  provided  by   the   IMF  had  gone  
directly   to   the   bank   accounts   of   some   of   Argentina’s   private   creditors,   leaving   the  
nation’s   taxpayers   with   a   bigger   burden   of   debt,   one   that   was   even   harder   to  
restructure  due  to  the  Fund’s  preferred  creditor  status.  The  lesson  learned  by  the  IMF  
was   that   it   should   only   give   an   exceptionally   large   loan   to   a   country   if   a   rigorous  
analysis  showed  that  the  country’s  debt  had  a  ‘high  probability’  of  being  sustainable.  
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If  this  standard  was  not  met,  the  Fund  would  provide  aid  only  on  the  condition  that  
the  country’s  private  debt  was  restructured.  The  IMF’s  concern  with  giving  Greece  a  
loan   was   that   the   ‘No   More   Argentinas   Rule’   was   not   met.   Giving   Athens   a   big  
international   rescue   loan   with   no   haircut   would   shift   the   burden   from   private  
creditors  to  taxpayers,  and  to  the  wage-­‐dependent  classes  therein.    
ECB   president   Trichet,   however,   was   radically   opposed   to   any   debt  
restructuring.   According   to   several   negotiators,   he   ‘blew   up’   every   time   it   was  
mentioned.201  His  rationale  was  based  on  the  fear  of   losing  the  trust  of   the  markets.  
Once   faith   in   the  credit  worthiness  of  one  Eurozone  country  was  shattered,  Trichet  
feared  that  confidence  in  the  bonds  issued  by  other  European  governments  would  be  
destroyed  as  well,  resulting  in  a  Lehman-­‐like  event  in  which  investors  pulled  money  
out  of  markets  all  over  the  continent.  Trichet’s   fear  of  market  panic  and  his  anxiety  
over  financial  contagion  was  widely  shared  in  Europe.  
Ultimately,   as   a   junior   partner,   the   IMF   had   to   concede,   and   the   program  
approved   in   2010   did   not   involve   the   private   sector.   The   conditionalities   of   the  
program   were,   moreover,   extremely   arduous   and   have   been   said   to   have   included  
‘everything   but   the   kitchen   sink’.   This   ran   contrary   to   the   IMF’s   own   institutional  
development,   which   had   progressively   reduced   conditionalities,   emphasising   that  
‘ownership’   –   the  willingness   of   leaders   and   parliaments   to   pass   laws   and   faithfully  
implement   the   terms  –  was  crucial   for   the  program’s   success.  But   ‘the  kitchen-­‐sink’  
list  of  conditionalities  reflected  the  desire  of  the  Germans  and  other  European  policy-­‐
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The  Social  Origin  of  the  Asymmetries  of  the  SD&CR  and  the  Three  Dimensions  
Through  Which  the  Regime  is  Imposed    
  
What   do   the   negotiations   about   the   first   Greek   rescue   package   reveal?   It   is   my  
contention   that   Greek   citizens   where   dominated   qua   citizens   and   exploited   qua  
members   of   the  wage-­‐dependent   class   once   Papandreou   decided   to   accrue   debt   in  
their   name.   They   suffered   from   this   domination   and   exploitation   by   virtue   of   the  
choice  architecture   they  had,  or  believed   they  had,  at   their  disposal.  Analysing  how  
exactly  they  came  to  occupy  this  position  of  disadvantage  is  the  aim  of  this  section.    
   At   first   glance,   Greek   citizens’   self-­‐determination   does   not   seem   to   be  
systematically  constrained.  After  all,  it  was  Papandreou  who  first  approached  Strauss  
Khan   in   a   Davos   Kitchen,   asking   for   the   IMF’s   support   in   case  market   sentiments  
turned  sour.  The  complaints  of  those  who  denounce  the  ‘cartoonish  logic’  of  powerful  
multilateral   institutions,   such   as   the   IMF   and   the   ECB,   unilaterally   dictating   harsh  
conditionalities  on  “manipulable,  passive  victims”203  proves  justified.204  This  does  not  
demonstrate,   however,   that   Greek   citizens   protesting   on   the   streets   of   Athens,  
holdings   signs   such   as   ‘IMF  Go  Home’   or   ‘Troika   –  Keep  Calm   and  Go   to  Hell’   are  
wrong   about   being   dominated   by   the   IMF   and   the   ECB.   The   ‘everything   but   the  
kitchen   sink’   conditionalities   that   Greece’s   first   rescue   program   included   were  
anything   but   self-­‐legislated   and   certainly   bypassed   the   self-­‐determination   of   the  
Greek   citizenry.   To   that   extent,   Hurrell   is   right   in   his   claim   that   Greece’s   policy  
choices  were  “if  not  dictated,  then  certainly  shaped  by  institutions  dominated  by  the  
strong   and   often   backed   by   coercion   in   the   form   of   an   expanding   range   of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203  Kedar,  2013,  p.4.  
204   Often   those   denouncing   the   ‘cartoonish   sort   of   logic’   of   their   opponents   turn   their  
opponent’s  arguments  into  a  straw-­‐man,  too.  Although  I  recognise  this,  I  grant  that  many  of  
the   views  may  need  greater   refinement.   For   excellent,  nuanced  accounts  of   the   relationship  
between  the  IMF  and  its  borrowing  states,  see  Chwieroth  (2010)  and  Kedar  (2013).  
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conditionalities.”205   So   while   the   outcome   seems   to   be   one   in   which   the   self-­‐
determination  of  the  Greek  citizenry  was  systematically  constrained,  this  is  not  to  say  
that   the   way   in   which   this   occurred   is   through   the   unilateral   imposition   of  
conditionalities  by  the  Troika.    
The  Greek   rescue  package   that   ended  up  being  adopted  also   resulted   in   the  
progressive  transfer  of  the  productive  power  from  those  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  
(the  domestic  wage-­‐dependent  classes)   to   those   in  a  position  of  advantage  within  a  
structure   (the   financial   elite   qua   private   creditors).   As   Paulo   Nogueria   Batista   -­‐   a  
particularly   critical   and   outspoken   IMF   executive   director   –   argued,   the   program  
which   the   Troika   ended   up   negotiating   to   bail   out   Greece   “may   be   seen   not   as   a  
rescue   of   Greece,   which   will   have   to   undergo   a   wrenching   adjustment,   but   as   a  
bailout   of   Greece’s   private   debt   holders,  mainly   European   financial   institutions.”206  
What  we  witness  here,  then,  is  the  textbook  definition  of  an  exploitative  relationship  
in   which   the   productive   powers   of   one   particular   social   group,   namely   the   wage-­‐
dependent   class,   is   appropriated  by   another,   namely   its   private   creditors.  However,  
the  exploitation  of  the  wage-­‐dependent  class,  which  benefits  private  creditors  is  –  and  
this   is   crucial   –   not   directly   exerted   by   private   creditors   themselves.   Rather,   the  
exploitation   of   wage-­‐earners   and   the   benefit   of   the   financial   elite   qua   private  
creditors   is  mediated  by   the  adoption  of   the   first  Greek   rescue  program,  a  program  
whose   adoption   cannot   simply   be   reduced   to   an   alleged   unilateral   imposition   by  
multilateral   institutions,   co-­‐opted   by   the   interests   of   those   benefiting   from   the  
bailout  (private  creditors).    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205   Hurrell,   2001,   p.43.   Later   in   the   unfolding   of   the   Greek   debt   crisis,   the   systematic  
constraints  on  the  Greek  citizenry’s  self-­‐determination  became  even  more  blatant.  During  the  
negotiations   for   the  second  Greek  rescue  program   in  March  of  2012,   for   instance,   it  was  not  
even  a  Greek  negotiator  that  was  sitting  on  the  debtor  side  of  the  negotiating  table.  Rather,  an  
Italian   official   was   negotiating   with   private   creditors.   Despite   it   being   the   future   of   Greek  
citizens   that   was   on   the   negotiating   table,   no   Greek   official   was   present   during   those  
meetings.  
206  Blustein,  2016,  p.136.  
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This  class-­‐specific  effect  of  austerity  policies   is  well  established   in   the  Greek  
case.  According  to  an  OECD  working  paper  studying  the  distributive  consequences  of  
the   Greek   austerity   measures   from   2009-­‐2014,   absolute   poverty   rose   “steadily   and  
steeply.”207   The   proportion   of   population   whose   income   fell   below   an   anchored  
benchmark  (anchored  in  pre-­‐crisis  terms)  increased  from  13,2  %  in  2010  to  27,  4%  in  
2014.  Similarly,  inequality  and  unemployment  rose  as  the  recession  deepened.  Those  
most   affected   by   austerity   policies   were   the   unemployed,   the   self-­‐employed,   the  
young,   the  middle-­‐aged,   families   living   in  Athens,   and   –   crucially   for   the   relational  
understanding   of   class   I   adopt   here   -­‐   families   paying   rent   or  mortgage   rather   than  
property   owners.   Those   traditionally   seen   as   poor,   such   as   famers   and   the   elderly,  
were  particularly  affected  by  difficulties  in  the  access  of  health  care.  Moreover,  fiscal  
austerity  also  resulted  in  significant  increases  in  overall  suicide  rates  in  Greece.208    
The   adoption  of   the   first  Greek   rescue  package   thus   evidences   three   things.  
First,  it  unmistakably  shows  the  social  origins  of  the  injustices  suffered  by  those  in  a  
position   of   disadvantage   in   the   SD&CR.   Second,   it   shows   that   the   injustices  
characterising  the  regime  are  not  unilaterally  imposed  by  those  who  benefit  from  it  –  
the  agential  thesis  –  but  are  reproduced  by  the  interplay  of  actions  by  various  agents.  
The   domination   of   Greek   citizens   and   the   exploitation   of   the   domestic   wage-­‐
dependent  class   is  not  a  consequence  of  misfortune,  but  arises   from  the  position  of  
the   latter   in  a  highly  asymmetrical   SD&CR   that   is   reproduced  by   the  actions  of   the  
debtor   government,  multilateral   and  bilateral   public   creditors   and  private   creditors  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207  Leventi  and  Matsaganis,  2016.  
208   The   effects   of   austerity   on   suicide   were   found   to   be   gender   and   age   specific   in   Greece.  
Suicide  rates  significantly  increased  among  males,  with  no  significant  effects  on  female  suicide  
rates   (Antonakakis   and   Collins,   2014).   The   age   category   most   negatively   affected   is   the  
population  between  45  and  89  years  of  age  (since  this  is  the  age  bracket  most  dependent  on  
fixed   incomes,   such   as   state   pensions).   The   public   suicide   of   a   77-­‐year-­‐old  Greek  pensioner  
shooting  himself  with  a  handgun  in  front  of  one  of  the  capital’s  busiest  main  squares  near  the  
Greek  Parliament  is  thus  decisively  not  an  isolated  case  (Kitsantonis,  2012).    
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alike;  a  regime  which  –  as  argued  for  in  the  preceding  chapter  -­‐  is  further  embedded  
in  a  highly-­‐financialised  global  political  economy.    
Third,   presenting   the   empirical   case   of   the   first   Greek   bailout   package   in  
relative  detail  also  allows  us  to  recognise  that  there   is  more  to  the  picture  than   just  
the  contributions  of  manifold  actions   in   reproducing   injustices   in   the  SD&CR  –   the  
structural   injustice   thesis.   It   is   not   that   the   structural   injustice   thesis   is  wrong,   but  
rather  that  it  ought  to  be  used  as  a  starting  point  to  offer  a  more  granular  analysis  of  
different   contributions   made   by   those   producing   and   reproducing   structural  
injustices.  Concretely,  three  distinct  dimensions  can  be  distinguished  through  which  
injustices   are  perpetuated:   structural-­‐processes-­‐proper,   the   structural-­‐relational   and  
the  structural-­‐systemic  dimension.  
These   three   different   dimensions   of   structural   injustice   serve   as   a   heuristic  
device   to  provide   a  more  nuanced  picture  of   the  different  ways   in  which   structural  
injustice   is   produced   and   reproduced.  On   one   level,   the   three   dimensions   describe  
the  same  thing:   the  reproduction  of  structural   injustices.  What   I  call   the  structural-­‐
systemic   dimension,   for   instance,   is   not   something   different   or   apart   from   the  
structural  processes  proper,  or  from  the  structural-­‐relational  level  identified.  Rather,  
they   serve   as  heuristic  devices   to  delineate  different  dimensions   through  which   the  
structural  wrongs  of  the  regime  are  reproduced.    
The  importance  of  distinguishing  between  them  is  (at  least)  twofold.  First,  as  I  
argue  here,  distinguishing  between  these  three  dimensions  allows  me  to  give  a  more  
nuanced  view  of  the  paths  through  which  domination  and  exploitation  are  exerted  in  
the  SD&CR,  without  falling  prey  to  a  ‘cartoonish  sort  of  logic’.  Second,  as  I  move  on  to  
show   in   the   second   part   of   this   thesis,   distinguishing   more   clearly   between   these  
three   sources   also   allows   for   a   form   of   responsibility   attribution   that   –   while   fully  
recognising   the   structural   nature   of   the   injustice   we   are   facing   –   can   attribute  
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individual  responsibility,  not  only  in  a  forward-­‐looking  and  shared  manner,  but  also  
in  a  backward-­‐looking  and  distributive  manner.    
First,   structural   processes   proper   describe   those   processes   that   structural  
injustice   scholars   have   in   mind   when   defining   structural   injustice,   or   those   where  
“thousands   or   millions   of   persons   usually   acting   within   institutional   rules   and  
according   to   practices   that   most   people   regard   as   morally   acceptable.”209   Such  
structural  processes  surpass  individual  actions  –  they  lack  an  individually  identifiable  
perpetrator,  come  about   through  the   interplay  of  manifold  actors  going  about  what  
may  be   considered   their   day-­‐to-­‐day  business,   and  often   take   on   a  dynamic   of   their  
own.   Financial   crises  might   be   among   the   best   examples   of   dynamics   that   surpass  
individual   decision-­‐making.  Within   the   academic   discipline   of   economics,   financial  
crises  are  often  referred  to  as   ‘panic   in  the  theatre’  events.  Young  describes  them  as  
the  paramount  example  of  “large-­‐scale  social  processes  in  which  masses  of  individuals  
believe   they   are   following   the   rules,   minding   their   own   business   and   trying   to  
accomplish   their   legitimate   goals…   [resulting]   in   undesirable,   unintended  
consequences  when  looked  at  structurally.”210    
In   the   Greek   case,   we   can   see   how   structural   processes   proper   play   a  
significant   role.   It  was   the   looming  outbreak  of   a   liquidity   crisis   that  pushed  Greek  
officials   to   turn   to   the   IMF   in   the   first   place.   The   turning   of  market   sentiment,   in  
turn,  is  nothing  but  millions  of  individual  investors  ceasing  to  trust  Greek’s  solvency  
and   choosing   to   cease   lending   to   Greece.   Similarly,   the   fact   that   Papandreou   and  
Papaconstantinou  met  the  Managing  Director  of  the  IMF  in  a  kitchen  sheltered  from  
public  scrutiny  is  emblematic  of  the  fact  that  all  agents  feared  the  outbreak  of  such  a  
structural   process,   in   which   mere   rumours   about   Greece   requiring   IMF   assistance  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209  Young,  2011,  p.97.  
210  Young,  2011,  p.97.  
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could  result  in  individual  creditors  starting  to  sell  Greek  bonds  in  secondary  markets  
in  a  fire  sale.  
There   is  more   to   say,  however,  about   the   individual  agents’   contributions   to  
the  Greek  crisis  than  can  be  captured  by  the  ‘structural  processes  proper’  dimension.  
There   also   seem   to  be  distinct   contributions  of   individual   agents   to   the  production  
and   reproduction   of   structural   injustice,   which   can   and   ought   to   be   individuated.  
Normally,   agents   so   placed   as   to   make   such   a   distinct   contribution   to   structural  
injustice  are  those  in  positions  of  power  within  the  structure  they  inhabit.  I  call  these  
structural-­‐relational   contributions   to   structural   injustice.   They   are   structural-­‐
relational   because,   although   an   agent   of   wrongdoing   (a   dominating   or   exploiting  
agent,   in   our   case)   can   be   identified   -­‐   and   is   in   that   sense   relational   -­‐   their  
wrongdoing   is  structural   in   two  ways.  First,   just   like   individual  agents  contribute   to  
structural   processes   proper   by   going   about   their   daily   business,   these   actions   and  
decisions   are   also   part   of   the   overarching   structural   process   which   creates   and  
reproduces   structural   injustice.   Second,   these   agents   draw   on   and   require   various  
kinds   of   complicity   from   other   actors   and   from   enabling   structures   to   make   their  
individual  contribution  possible.211    
In  the  Greek  case,  we  can  see  how  the  adoption  of  ‘everything  but  the  kitchen  
sink’   list  of  conditionalities   is  a  case   in  which  the  structural   injustice   is  perpetuated  
via   the   structural-­‐relational   dimension.   As   discussed   above,   the   claim   that  
conditionalities  are  unilaterally  imposed  by  multilateral  institutions  on  ‘manipulable,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211   In   her   analysis   of   colonial   structural   injustices   and   of   Japanese   colonialism   in   Korea   in  
particular,  Lu  gives  a  powerful  example  of  how  such  a  structural-­‐relational  source  of  injustice  
looks.   Lu   convincingly   shows   how   the   unjust   social   structures   relating   to   class   and   gender  
both   in   international,   and   in   Korean,   society   were   necessary   for   the   structural   injustice   of  
Japanese  colonialism  to  come  about.  While  Japanese  colonisers  may  be  relational  wrongdoers,  
it   is   only   in   combination   with   the   unjust   structures   of   class   and   race   that   the   structural  
injustice  of  colonialism  can  be  explained  (See  Chapter  4,  2017).  
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passive’212   subjects   is   a   caricaturised   reading   of   how   structural   injustices   are  
perpetuated.213  Notwithstanding,  it  is  also  incorrect  to  cluster  all  contributions  to  the  
instantiation   of   structural   injustice   under   the   same   heading   of   morally   innocent  
contributions,   which   cannot   be   causally   connected   to   the   injustice.214   More  
specifically,   the  Troika  did   impose  conditionalities  on  the  Greek  citizenry,  and  even  
though   this   imposition   was  mediated   by   the   fact   that   the   debtor   government   first  
approached  the  IMF,  there  are  various  reasons  why  ae  debtor  government  may  have  
chosen  to  do  so,  which  will  be  discussed  below.    
What   is   important   here   is   that   the   contributions   of   the   Troika   to   the  
perpetuation   of   structural   injustices   can   be   individuated,   even   though   their  
contribution  also  draws  on  established   social  norms  and   relies  on   the  complicity  of  
other  actors  to  do  so.  While  the  Troika’s  contributions  are  comparable  to  ‘structural  
processes  proper,’  they  are  distinct  from  the  contributions  made  by  other  actors  who  
do   not   occupy   such   a   position   of   power   within   the   structure,   actors   such   as   non-­‐
institutional  bond-­‐holders  who  threaten  to  sell  Greek  assets  and  generate  a  ‘panic  in  
the  theatre’  type  event.    
These   two   dimensions   –   structural   processes   proper   and   the   structural-­‐
relational  –need  to  be  complemented  by  a  third  dimension,  what  I  call  the  structural  
systemic   level.  As   argued  back   in  Chapter   1,   a   country’s   individual   debt  history   can  
only  be  understood   in   the  context  of   the  SD&CR  first,  and  of   the   financialisation  of  
capitalism   second.  While   financial   crises   may   be   a   prototypical   example   of   what   I  
called   a   structural   process   proper,   they   also   occur   within   a   broader   institutional  
order.   The   concrete   political   decisions   taken   by   states   since   the   abolition   of   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212  Kedar,  2013,  p.4.  
213   As   I   argue   in   Chapter   7,   treating   those   occupying   positions   of   disadvantage   as   passive  
victims  is  not  only  descriptively  incorrect,  but  also  disrespectful  to  their  agency.    
214   I   defend   the  point   that  different   forms  of   contributions   to   the   reproduction  of   structural  
injustices   ought   to   be   more   clearly   distinguished   than   they   currently   are   by   structural  
injustice  scholars  in  Chapter  5.  
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Bretton  Woods  regime  and  analysed  in  the  preceding  chapters  resulted  in  a  process  of  
financialisation,   which  made   financial   crises   ever  more   likely.  While   it   is   also   true  
that  this  had  consequences  that  none  of  the  policy  makers  predicted  or  intended,  the  
financialisation   of   the   economy   was   a   result   of   concrete   political   decisions   that  
established  a  particular  institutional  social  order.    
Recognising   that   certain   positions   of   disadvantage   are   reproduced   not   only  
because  of  the  outbreak  of  structural  processes  proper  –  financial  crises  as  ‘fire  in  the  
theatre’  type  events  –  but  also  because  of  the  institutional  order  in  which  the  SD&CR  
is   embedded   is   crucial.   Injustices   in   the   SD&CR   are   not   only   reproduced   because  
thousands   or   millions   of   people   act   in   ways   that,   though   morally   acceptable,  
reproduce   positions   of   disadvantage,   nor   only   because   powerful   actors   draw   on  
established   norms   and   on   the   complicity   of   other   actors   to   make   distinct  
contributions   that   perpetuate   injustice.   Rather,   injustices   in   the   SD&CR   are   also  
reproduced   due   to   the   particular   institutional   social   order,   a   particular   form   of  
capitalism,  in  which  it  is  embedded.  If  we  fail  to  explicitly  draw  attention  to  this,  the  
critique   is   reduced  to  the  structural-­‐relational   level  and  structural  processes  proper,  
missing  what  I  propose  to  call  the  ‘structural-­‐systemic  level’.    
Alford  and  Friedland  use  the  game  metaphor  to  distinguish  between  the  three  
different   levels   of   analysis,   namely   the   systemic,   institutional   and   situational   levels.  
The  systemic  level  asks  what  game  to  play  (capitalism  or  socialism),  the  institutional  
level   concerns   the   rules   of   the   game   (varieties   of   capitalism,   for   instance),   and   the  
situational   level   relates   to   the   moves   within   a   fixed   game   with   fixed   rules   (the  
struggle   of   interest’s   groups   over   immediate   economic   interests.)215   The   analogy   to  
sport  is  helpful  to  elucidate  these  different  levels.  Think  about  two  different  athletes,  
one  who   is   tall   and   agile   and   the  other,  who   is   shorter,   but   very   strong   and  heavy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215  Wright,  2015,  p.119.  
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They   live   in   a   world   in   which   only   one   game   can   be   played.   Now,   if   basketball  
becomes  the  hegemonic  game,  clearly  the  former  of  the  two  athletes  would  have  an  
advantage   over   the   latter.   Conversely,   were   the   game   to   be   rugby,   the   heavier,  
stronger  athlete  would  have  an  advantage  over  the  taller  and  more  agile  athlete.  Once  
playing   a   particular   game,   rules   can   be   changed   to   favour   athletes   with   certain  
attributes.216   Finally,   given   a   set   of   fixed   rules,   the   players   adopt   specific   training  
regimes  and  strategies  to  maximise  their  chance  of  winning  the  said  game.217    
A   critique   in   line   with   what   I   call   the   structural-­‐relational   level   denounces  
relational  injustices  related  to  asymmetries  in  power  or  access  to  resources  that  arise  
from  the  position  that  different  agents  occupy  within  a  given  game  with  specific  rules  
and  moves.  Using  the  sport  analogy,  a  structural-­‐relational  critique  would  denounce  
that   there   are   non-­‐coincidental   reasons   that   establish   a   structured   relationship  
between  the  two  different  athletes,  such  as  the  game  and  the  rules  of  the  game  being  
played.   This   relational   critique   goes   beyond   a  mere   assessment   of   distribution.   To  
overcome  this  relational  injustice,  it  is  not  enough  to  simply  equalise  the  rewards  that  
result   from   winning   the   game.   Rather,   emancipation   from   this   form   of   injustice  
would  require  an  equalisation  of  the  forms  of  structured  relations.  
Applied   to   the   case   that   concern   us   here,   a   structural-­‐relational   critique  
denounces   those   relationships   of   domination   and   exploitation  where   an   agent   in   a  
position  of  power  within  the  regime  draws  on  the  complicity  of  other  actors  and/or  
on  enabling  social  norms  to  exploit  or  dominate  those  in  whose  name  debt  is  accrued  
while  they  are  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  within  the  regime.  Chapter  7  is  devoted  
to   further  dissecting   the  question  of   responsibility  of  different  actors  –   ‘the  primary  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216  The  change  in  the  rules  of  basketball  that  made  dunking  possible,  for  example,  added  to  the  
advantages  of  height.  
217  Wright,  2015,  p.119.  
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wrongdoer’   and   the   ‘complicit’   agent   –   in   cases   in   which   the   structural-­‐relational  
dimension  is  prominent.    
A  structural-­‐systemic  critique,  by  contrast,  goes  beyond  a  structural-­‐relational  
critique,   calling   the   whole   game   into   question.  What   is  missing   from   a   structural-­‐
relational   analysis,   then,   is   the   possibility   of   challenging   not   only   particular  
asymmetries  of  position  within  the  game,  but  the  ability  to  call   for  a  different  game  
altogether.   Take   the   case   of   gender   equality   in   the  workforce   as   an   example.  With  
important  variations  across  geographies,  sectors,  level  of  professional  skills,  and  race  
(to   name   just   a   few),   women   continue   to   encounter   important   challenges   when  
fighting   for   equality   in   their   workplace.   Not   only   are  many  women   inhibited   from  
joining   the  public   sphere,   but  when   they  do,   they   are  often  not   treated   as   equal   to  
their   male   counterparts.   A   structural-­‐relational   critique   would   denounce   this  
inequality.   What   this   form   of   critique   is   not   able   to   question,   however,   are   the  
working  conditions  of  all  the  workers.  Female  workers  may  fight  for  greater  equality  
with  men,  but  this  is  a  different  form  of  critique  than  one  challenging  the  capitalists’  
ownership  of  the  means  of  production.  The  latter  is  a  structural-­‐systemic  critique.  My  
contention  is  that  something  is  lost  if  we  only  have  tools  to  criticise  the  former,  but  
not  the  latter  form  of  injustice.  
On   the   structural-­‐systemic   level,  moreover,   all   participants   in   the   game   can  
suffer  from  injustices,  even  those  who  –  due  to  the  specificities  of  the  game  and  the  
rules  of  the  game  –  hold  a  position  of  advantage  within  the  game  being  played.  Each  
game  requires  certain  things  for  its  own  preservation  and  it  is  this  systemic  logic  that  
can  subjugate  all  participants  of  the  game  to  a  form  of  systemic  injustice.  Of  course,  
only   agents   can   act,   thus   the   game   being   played   has   no   agency   of   its   own.  
Nonetheless,  the  systemic  logic  imprints  itself  on  agent’s  choices  in  two  central  ways.  
First,   it   confronts   agents  with   a  particular   option   set  which  makes   it   their   rational,  
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material   interest   to   act   in   a  way   that  preserves   the  game  being  played.   Second,   the  
logic  of  the  game  being  played  is  internalised  by  the  agents  in  the  form  of  a  system  of  
thought  or  mode  of  consciousness.  The  systemic  logic  thus  imprints  itself  on  agents’  
choices  either  by  making  it  materially  rational  to  do  what  is  required  for  the  game’s  
preservation,  or  by  making   it   seem  rational.   I   give   empirical   examples   in   the  Greek  
case  of  both  ways  in  which  the  systemic  logic  imprints  itself  on  agents’  choices  in  the  
final  paragraphs  of  this  section.218    
   We  saw  how  Greek  officials   turned  to  the  IMF  due  to  the   fear  of  a  potential  
drying  up  of  financial  markets  and  thus,  of  being  cut  off  from  private  credit.  Anyone  
who  pays  even  the  slightest  bit  of  attention  to  developments  in  international  political  
economic  diplomacy  will  know  that  a  country  would  prefer  nearly  any  other  option  
over   asking   the   IMF   for   assistance.  But  Greece’s   alternative,  namely   the   inability   to  
pay  maturing  bonds,  pensions,  or   salaries  –   together  with   the  potential   for  panic   in  
the  markets  –  seemed  far  worse  than  the  medicine.219  In  a  way,  then,  Greece  officials  
considered   that   they   had   no   alternative   other   than   approaching   the   IMF   for  
assistance.    
The  fact  that  Greek  officials  thought  that  they  had  no  viable  alternative  speaks  
volumes   about   Greece’s   position   in   the   SD&CR,   a   position   of   disadvantage   that   is  
characterised   by   a   restricted   choice   architecture.   At   the   same   time,   the   fact   that   it  
seemed  rational  for  Greek  officials  to  turn  to  the  IMF  also  illustrates  how  the  systemic  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218  I  remain  purposefully  vague  about  how  exactly  I  wish  to  spell  out  this  logic.  First  generation  
Frankfurt  School  theorists  may  think  about  it  as  ideology.  For  them,  ideologies  are  particular  
modes   of   consciousness,   in   specific   historical   contexts   of   social   injustice,   in   which   the  
constructs   of   false   or  distorted   consciousness   (suffered  by   all   actors)   are   the  product  of   the  
modern   capitalist   system,   which   serve   to   maintain   and   reproduce   it   (Azmanova,   2014).  
Followers  of  the  work  of  Michel  Foucault,  instead,  may  want  to  think  about  it  as  a  normative  
reason  that,  when  it  becomes  ascendant,  takes  shape  as  a  governing  rationality  (Brown,  2015,  
p.30).  
219  As  the  saying  goes,  “The  only  thing  worse  than  being  exploited  by  capitalists,  is  not  being  
exploited  by  capitalists.”  
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logic   is   reproduced   in   action,   by   imprinting   itself   in   the   minds   of   actors   and  
presenting  itself  as  the  only  alternative.    
The   fear   of   extreme   reactions   of   the   market   is   shared   by   other   players,   as  
well.220  Trichet’s  justification  for  the  lack  of  private  creditor  involvement  was  that  he  
feared  market   hysteria.   Besides   Greek   officials,   the   IMF   itself   also   seemed   to   have  
succumbed  to  a  ‘There  Is  No  Alternative’  logic  (TINA).  The  minutes  released  from  the  
IMF  board  meeting  on  9  May  2010,   in  which  the  program  was  approved,  reveal  that  
the  IMF  opposed  the  first  Greek  rescue  package  on  the  basis  that  it  violated  the  ‘No  
More  Argentinas’  rule.  Notwithstanding,  they  determined  that  no  plan  B  existed.  As  a  
commentator   noted:   “as   they   entered,   the   directors   and   other   IMF   personnel  
attending   the   meeting   knew   how   it   would   end.   Given   the   combustible   market  
environment,   the   board   was   certain   to   approve   the   program,   based   on   the   usual  
consensus  or  something  very  close  to  it.”221  This  brings  to  the  fore  a  central  feature  of  
the  structural-­‐systemic  level  that  my  definition  of  domination  accommodates,  namely  
that  there  are  instances  in  which  all  players  in  the  game,  or  all  agents  living  under  a  
highly-­‐financialised   form  of  capitalism,  are  dominated  by  virtue  of   the  game   that   is  
being  played.    
That  everybody  can  see  their  self-­‐determination  systematically  constrained  by  
virtue  of  the  game  being  played  does  not  mean  that  power  relations  cease  to  matter.  
Again,  using  the  example  of  gender  equality  in  the  workforce  as  a  useful  analogy,  one  
can   see   that   both   types   of   critique   –   the   structural-­‐relational   and   the   structural-­‐
systemic   –   can   run   parallel   in   the   same   domain   of   injustice.   Both   workers   and  
capitalists   can  be   said   to  have   their   self-­‐determination   constrained  by   virtue   of   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220  Interestingly,  the  notion  of  the  market  here  functions  as  an  oxymoron,  personifying  what  it  
abstracts.  The  way  in  which  the  market  is  talked  about  involves,  first,  an  idealisation  in  which  
one  abstracts   from  the   individual   investors   that  actually  constitute   the  market,  only   to   then  
exalt  and  personify  ‘the  market’.    
221  Blustein,  2016,  p.133.  
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institutional  social  order  under  which  they  live.  This  does  not  suggest,  however,  that  
the   power   relations   between   workers   and   capitalists,   and   the   relative   position   of  
advantage  of  male  workers  over  female  workers,  ought  to  be  ignored.    
The   same   applies   to   an   asymmetrical   and   unjust   SD&CR   embedded   in   a  
highly-­‐financialised   economy.   Trichet,   as   the   head   of   one   of   the   most   powerful  
institutions  relating  to  the  Greek  debt  debacle  -­‐  clearly  occupied  a  position  of  power.  
This   enabled  him   to  defend   the   interests   and   economic  orthodoxy  of   the  ECB  over  
and  above  the  opinion  of  that  of  the  IMF,  something  which  resulted  in  the  structural  
domination   of   the   Greek   citizenry   and   the   exploitation   of   the   domestic   wage-­‐
dependent   classes   across   Europe.   This   does   not   mean,   however,   that   he,   and   the  
institution  he   represented,  where  not   also   caught   in   the   systemic   logic   of   a  highly-­‐
financialised  form  of  capitalism  that  only  enabled  him  to  recognise  certain  options.      
Without  making  any  claims  of  exhaustiveness  regarding  the  systemic  logic  of  
financial  capitalism  in  the  Greek  debt  debacle,  two  aspects  of  the  systemic  logic  of  the  
game  come   to   the   fore,  namely   a   fear  of  market  panic   and,   relatedly,   a  TINA-­‐logic.  
We   can   recognise   this   systemic   logic   in   the   rationale   of   all   agents,   from   the  Greek  
officials  asking   for   IMF  assistance  due   to   fear  of   financial  markets  drying  up,   to   the  
IMF   board   of   directors   who   approved   a   program   that   they   knew   would   be  
unsuccessful   and   would   only   further   burden   domestic   wage-­‐dependent   classes,   to  
Trichet,   who   insisted   on   excluding   the   private   sector   from   restructuring   to   avoid  
losing  trust  in  the  market.222    
Indeed,  one  way  of  interpreting  the  history  of  the  past  half-­‐century  is  to  note  
that  there  has  been  a  gradual  shift  in  the  levels  of  the  game  at  which  the  ‘There  Is  No  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222  As  the  Greek  crisis  unfolded,  more  and  more  people  –in  public  discourse,  academia  and  the  
leading  political  and  public  policy  circles  –  started  seriously  considering  the  option  of  ‘Grexit’.  
This  was  not  an  option  considered  at  the  time  of  the  first  restructuring,  however.    
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Alternative’   logic   has   taken   root.223   Before   the   financialisation   of   capitalism   really  
took   off,   in   the   1960s   and   1970s,   TINA  was   not   yet   established   at   any   of   the   three  
levels.   By   the   1960s   and   1970s,   all   three   levels   –   the   system,   institutional   and  
situational   –   could   be   questioned.   In   the   1980s,   Thatcher   proclaimed   ‘There   Is   No  
Alternative’  and  with  the  collapse  of  the  USSR,  no  real  alternatives  on  the  level  of  the  
game  seemed  to  exist.  The  debate  moved  from  the  system  level,  where  capitalism  had  
become   the   only   game   in   town,   to   the   institutional   level,   where   the   debate  
surrounding  ‘varieties  of  capitalism’  boomed.  With  the  turn  of  the  century,  variations  
in  the  rules  of  the  game  of  capitalism  seemed  to  arise.  In  the  years  of  what  economists  
proudly   (and   mistakenly)   proclaimed   to   be   the   years   of   ‘the   Great   Moderation,’  
globalisation   and   financialisation   appeared   to   have   triumphed   in   regard   to   the  
optimal  rules  for  managing  the  capitalist  economy.  TINA  thus  spread  from  capitalism  
versus   socialism   to   variation   in   the   rules   within   capitalism   itself.   Today,   the   most  
contentious  debates  are  being  fought  on  the   level  of   the  moves  within  the  game,  or  
system.224    
The   TINA   logic   operates   on   the   two   different   levels   regarding   the   way   the  
systemic   logic   imprints   itself   on   the   choices   of   actors.   Take   different   forms   of  
financial  crises  as  an  example.  Sovereign  debt  crises  can  be  understood  as  crises  that  
erupt   when   a   country   is   not   able   or   willing   to   service   its   debt,   whether   foreign   or  
domestic,  under  the  terms  agreed.  Banking  crises  occur  when  an  actual  or  potential  
bank  run  induces  banks  to  suspend  the  convertibility  of  their  liabilities.225  The  TINA  
rhetoric  regarding  how  to  respond  to  these  crises  applies  to  both  equally.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223  Wright,  2015,  p.124.  
224  This  trajectory  notwithstanding,  recent  crises  triggered  moments  and  movements  in  which  
the  rules  of  the  game  became  questioned  again  outside  of  radical  circles.  Occupy  Wall  Street,  
los   Indignados,   and   the   student   movement   in   Chile   are   such   examples.   For   the   case   that  
concerns  us  here,  the  victory  of  Syriza  in  Greece  embodies  a  moment  in  which  the  rules  of  the  
game  are  called  into  question.  
225  Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  2009.    
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In  sovereign  debt  crises,  it  is  argued  that  default  and  obligatory  restructuring  
of  private  debt  must  be  avoided  at  all  costs  and  that  voluntary  restructuring  involving  
the  private  sector  are  also  strongly  discouraged.  This  rhetoric  is  clearly  demonstrated  
in  the  Greek  sovereign  debt  crisis.  The  rationale  is  that  all  players  would  be  materially  
worse  if  default  or  restructuring  were  to  occur.  The  Greek  officials,  in  particular,  were  
worried  about   the  reputational  costs  of  defaulting  or  of  a   forced  restructuring.   It   is,  
however,   very   questionable   whether   there   is,   in   fact,   no   alternative   in   the   case   of  
sovereign   debt   crises.   Historically,   we   see   that   states   who   default   or   are   forced   to  
restructure   regain   access   to   private   financial   markets   quite   rapidly,   so   the  
reputational  effect   is  not  as   long-­‐lasting  –  and  some  may  add,  not  as  grave  –  as   the  
TINA  rhetoric  suggests.  Ecuador  is  a  good  example  of  this.226    
This   is   not   the   case   for   banking   crises.   It   is   true   that   bailing   out   the   banks  
with   taxpayer   money   not   only   exacerbates   inequality   (distributively),   but   also   the  
structured  relations  of  inequality  between  the  financial  class  and  the  domestic  wage-­‐
dependent   classes.   Notwithstanding,   letting   the   banks   fail   would   be   immensely  
materially   costly   for   all   participants   of   the   game.   This   is   the   sense   in  which   banks  
have  become  ‘too  big  to  fail,’  and  it  is  also  in  this  sense  that  all  parties,  including  the  
wage-­‐dependent   class,   have   a  material   interest   in   saving   the   banks.   Sovereign   debt  
crises,   then,   are   good   examples   of   cases   in   which   the   power   of   the   systemic   logic  
comes  from  influencing  the  consciousness  or  systems  of  belief  of  the  agents.  Banking  
crises,  by  contrast,  are  a  good  example  of  the  systemic  logic  imprinting  itself  on  the  
choices  of  agents  by  truly  making  it  rational  for  everyone  to  do  what  is  required  for  
the  game  to  continue,  in  this  case  by  saving  the  banks.227    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226  Vidal,  2017.  See  also  Ecuador’s  winning  strategy  in  the  Economist,  June  17th,  2009,  
http://www.economist.com/node/13854456    
227   Blyth   makes   a   similar   point   concerning   austerity,   arguing   that   this   ‘bad   idea’   remains  
dominant  both  due  to  ideological  and  material  reasons  (2015).  
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Conclusion  and  Road  Ahead    
This   chapter   started   with   the   promise   of   showing   that   the   normatively   worrisome  
asymmetries   of   the   SD&CR   were   social   in   origin,   without   falling   prey   to   the  
‘cartoonish  sort  of  logic’  denounced  by  the  financial  journalist  Paul  Blustein.  I  argued  
that  while  the  agential  thesis  is  not  able  to  capture  how  injustices  are  reproduced  in  
the  SD&CR,  the   ‘structural   injustice  thesis’  can  be  developed  further  to  offer  a  more  
granular  analysis  of  how  injustices  are  actually  perpetuated  in  the  SD&CR.  First,  there  
are   sources   of   structural   injustice   that   truly   are   nothing   but   the   aggregation   and  
complex  interplay  of  the  actions  of  millions  of  individuals,  a  source  I  called  ‘structural  
processes  proper.’   Second,   there  are   individual  contributions   to   structural   injustices  
by  primary  wrongdoers  who  are  enabled  and  supported  by  wider  social  structures  in  
which  many  participate.  While   also   contributing   to   structural   injustice   and   feeding  
into  the  structural  processes  proper,  the  actions  of  primary  agents  of  wrongdoing  can  
and   ought   to   be   individuated   as   a   distinct   dimension   through   which   structural  
injustice  is  reproduced.  I  called  this  a  structural-­‐relational  contribution  to  structural  
injustice.  A  third  dimension  through  which  structural   injustice   is   instantiated   is   the  
institutional  social  order  within  which  structural  processes  unfold.  The   institutional  
social   order   -­‐   in   our   case,   a   highly-­‐financialised   form   of   capitalism   –   makes   the  
unfolding  of  certain  structural  injustices  more  likely.  
Crucially,   introducing   the   three   dimensions   proposed   here   as   heuristic  
devices  can  help  us  think  through  other  cases,  as  well.  In  no  way  am  I  suggesting  here  
that   private   creditors   as   members   of   the   financial   class   are   always   dominating   or  
exploitative.  While   the   three   dimensions   identified   are   a   powerful   tool   to   examine  
what  is  wrong  with  the  SD&CR,  one  still  needs  to  analyse  each  individual  debt  history  
in  more  detail  in  order  to  make  an  assessment  of  responsibility.  This  is  something  to  
which  I  will  pay  more  attention  in  the  second  part  of  the  thesis.    
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In   combination   with   the   analysis   made   in   chapters   1   and   2,   this   chapter  
provided   a   complete   structural   analysis   of   the   SD&CR.   In   Chapter   1,   I   emphasised  
how  the  most  visible  aspect  –  the  outbreak  of  a  sovereign  debt  crisis  –  is  only  the  tip  
of  the  iceberg  and  argued  that  we  would  do  well  to  resist  the  ‘black  swan’  logic  that  
certain  scholars  within  economics  continue  to  uphold.  In  Chapters  2  and  3,  I  showed  
how   the   far-­‐reaching   injustice   resides   not   in   the   event   itself   (the   sovereign   debt  
crisis),  which,  allegedly,  deviates  from  the  baseline,  but  in  the  underlying  background  
structure.  This   is  where  most  of  our  critical  attention  should  be  directed.  Finally,   in  
this  chapter,  I  have  shown  that,  whilst  financial  crises  are  the  best  examples  of  what  I  
have   been   calling   ‘structural   processes   proper,’   they   also   illustrate   how   these  
structural  processes  do  not  unfold  in  a  vacuum,  but  in  a  regulatory  and  institutional  
social  order  that  enable  them  -­‐  an  order  which  was  shaped  by  individual  actors  taking  
crucial   socio-­‐political   decisions   at   different   points   in   time   and   in   different   policy  
areas.  These  insights  will  prove  crucial  when  turning  to  the  question  of  responsibility  
allocation  for  structural  injustice  in  the  second  part  of  this  thesis.      
But   before   I   turn   to   questions   of   responsibility   for   structural   injustice,   a  
couple  of  open  questions  still  need  to  be  addressed  in  the  next,  and  final,  chapter  of  
the  first  part  of  this  thesis.  First,  while  this  chapter  answered  the  question  regarding  
the  main  wrongs  characterising   the  SD&CR,   little  has  been   said  about   the   role   that  
other   actors   play   therein.   The   financial   class   does   not   and   cannot   exploit   and  
dominate   the   wage-­‐dependent   class   directly,   but   requires   collaborators   to   do   so.  
Second,   although  we   know   that   positions   of   disadvantage   exist   along   lines   of   both  
class  and  statehood,  we  are  yet   to   learn  how  exactly   these  two  axes  of  disadvantage  
interact.  Finally,  although  Chapters   1-­‐3  provide  a  complete  structural  critique  of   the  
wrongs  pertaining  to  the  SD&CR,  we  are  now  left  to  wonder  what  might  be  potential  
   108  
emancipatory   routes   going   forward.   By   drawing   on   the   insights   from   scholars   of  
imperialism,  in  the  next  chapter  I  turn  my  attention  to  these  three  sets  of  questions.    
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CHAPTER  4    
ON  THE  SD&CR  AS  A  MECHANISM  OF  LIBERAL  IMPERIALISM    
If  in  earlier  times  domination  was  exerted  by  means  of  arms,  today  
the  new  servitude  is  external  debt.228    
	  
Allusions  to  the  imperial  nature  of  the  current  world  reside  in  popular  literature  and  
public  discourse  alike.  “‘Imperialism’,  as  a  word,  has  gone  imperial;   ‘colonialism’  has  
colonized   our   languages.”229   As   a   central   feature   of   the   contemporary   world   order,  
sovereign   debt   and   credit   has   often   been   denounced   as   an   instrument   for   imperial  
control.  The  allegation   is   that,  whereas   in   the  past   imperial   control  was  exerted  via  
arms  and  territorial  annexation,  “today  the  new  servitude  is  external  debt.”230  In  this  
chapter   I   want   to   interrogate   this   and   explore   the   extent   to   which   the   study   of  
imperialism  provides  a  fruitful  theoretical  lens  through  which  to  look  at  the  SD&CR.    
   I   proceed   as   follows:   In   Section   I,   I   provide   my   own   working   definition   of  
imperialism.   Since   most   recent   normative   work   within   political   theory   has   been  
concerned  with   colonialism   and  with   the   wrongs   that   characterise   it,   I   also   briefly  
discuss   how   imperialism   and   colonialism   differ   and   what   distinguishes   their  
respective  wrongs.  In  Section  II,  I  defend  the  first  substantive  claim  of  this  chapter:  I  
argue   that  we  do  not   live   in   a   post-­‐imperial  world.   The   end  of   colonialism  did  not  
bring  about  the  end  of   imperialism,  but  a  partial  shift   in  the  mode  that   imperialism  
takes  in  the  present.  While  most  states  in  the  world  enjoy  formal  independence,  and  
are  not   subject   to   coercive   forms  of   direct  political   control,   a   form  of   control   I   call  
liberal   imperialism   persists.   Against   this   backdrop,   the   first   claim   I   defend   in   this  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228  Olmos,  2004,  p.33,  my  translation.  
229  Howe,  2002,  p.11.  While  Marxist  scholarship  and  post-­‐colonial  theorising  probably  continue  
to  be   the   richest   and  most   established   sources   of   theorising   about   empire   and   imperialism,  
even   within   academia   the   study   of   imperialism   reached   the  mainstream.   See,   for   example,  
Held  and  McGrew,  eds.,  The  Global  Transformations  Reader.  
230  Olmos,  2004,  p.33.  
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chapter   is   that   sovereign   debt   and   credit   is   one   channel   through   which   liberal  
imperialism  is  exerted  today.    
Although   I   do   hope   to   convince  my   readers   of   the   plausibility   of   the   argument  
made  regarding  the  liberal  imperial  character  of  the  SD&CR,  the  rest  of  the  analysis  in  
this   chapter   does   not   depend   on   it.   A   sceptical   reader   can,   therefore,   reject   the  
argument   that   the   SD&CR   is   a   channel   through   which   liberal   imperialism   asserts  
itself,  and  still  see  value  in  the  remainder  of  the  chapter.  
In   sections   III   and   IV,   I   move   on   to   show   how   the   conceptual   apparatus   and  
theoretical  insights  provided  by  theories  of  imperialism  allow  us  to  answer  questions  
that   remained   open   from   the   preceding   chapters.   These   are,   first,   the   question  
regarding  how  exactly  the  two  axes  of  (dis)advantage  –  statehood  and  class  -­‐  interact  
(Section   III)  and,   second,   the  question  of  what  may  be   the  potential   routes   forward  
(Section   IV).   It   is   my   contention   that   debates   among   different   theorists   of  
imperialism  illuminate  the  possibilities  and  the  dangers  of  potential  ways  forward.    
In  providing  relevant  insights  to  answer  these  two  questions,  the  work  of  scholars  
on  imperialism  also  indicates  valuable  direction  for  those  wishing  to  contribute  to  the  
global   justice   debate.   In   Part   II   of   this   thesis   I   spell   out   a   few   of   the   normative  
conclusions  that  follow  from  some  of  the  most  crucial  insights  from  the  work  of  the  
scholars  explored  here.    
  
A  Working  Definition  of  Imperialism    
No   fixed  meaning   for   the   term   imperialism   exists,   in   part   because   of   the   following  
challenge:   “Define   the   term   too   narrowly,   and   particular   communities   who   have  
experienced   injustice  which   they   characterize   as   colonial   are   excluded;   too  broadly,  
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and   almost   any   form   of   relation   featuring   inequality   of   power   between   different  
international  parties  appears  to  be  an  instance  of  colonialism.”231    
The  closest  English  equivalent  to  the  Latin  imperium  is   ‘sovereignty’  or  ‘rule.’  
In  ancient  Rome,  imperium  denoted  the  dual  capacity  to  wage  war  and  to  make  and  
execute   laws.   A   further   connotation   was   size:   imperium   came   to   mean   rule   over  
extensive,   far   flung   territories,   far   beyond   the   original   homeland   of   the   rulers.  
European   Christian  monarchs   adopted   the   connotation   of   size,   adding   two   further  
associations,  namely  absolute  sovereignty  –  meaning  that  the  imperial  power  had  no  
overlord  or  rival  claimant  to  power  –  and  that  the  empire  builder  had  an  aspiration  of  
universality.232    
The   original   meaning   of   imperialism   was   thus   not   the   direct   or   indirect  
domination  of  colonial  or  dependent  territories  by  a  modern  industrial  state,  but  the  
personal  sovereignty  of  a  powerful  ruler  over  numerous  territories,  whether  in  Europe  
or   overseas.233   “If   an   empire   is   a   kind   of   object,   usually   a   political   entity,   then  
imperialism  is  a  process  –  or  in  some  understandings,  an  attitude,  an  ideology,  even  a  
philosophy  of   life.”234  For  most  late-­‐Victorian  users  of  the  word,   imperialism  did  not  
mean   the   facts   of   dominance,   conquest,   or   overseas   expansion,   but   a   policy,   a  
philosophy,   or   just   an   emotional   attitude   of   enthusiasm   for   such   things.235  Only   in  
later  years  did  the  notion  of  empire  and  imperialism  lose  the  connotation  of  a  system  
based  on  the  pre-­‐eminence  of  an  imperial  ruler  and  came  to  be  generally  understood  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231  Butt,  2013.  
232  Howe,  2002,  p.13.  
233  Friedjung,  1919.  
234  Howe,  2002,  p.22.  
235   Later,   Joseph   Schumpeter  was   to   build   a  whole   theory   around   the   idea   that   imperialism  
stemmed   from   mindless   aggression,   expansion   as   an   end   in   of   itself.   While   today   calling  
something   imperial   almost   always   implies  hostility   (viewing   it   as   immoral   and   illegitimate),  
this  has  not  always  been  the  case.   In  the  20th  century,   to  be  an  empire-­‐builder  was  to  be  an  
adventurer.  While  the  ‘Age  of  Imperialism’  (1890-­‐1900)  was  probably  the  last  time  in  history  in  
which   people   happily   called   themselves   imperialists,   in   the   last   century,   we   witnessed   a  
transition  from  general  approval  to  near-­‐universal  distaste.    
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as  signifying  the  expansion  of  a  nation  state  beyond  its  own  borders  for  the  purpose  
of   acquiring   overseas   dependencies   and,   if   possible,   uniting   them   in   a   world-­‐wide  
empire’.236    
Colonialism,  by  contrast  derives  from  the  Latin  ‘colon,’  –  which  means  farmer,  
tiller   or   planter   –   and   refers   to   the   Roman   practice   of   settling   in   a   territorial   unit  
outside  of   the  original  borders  of   the  Roman  Empire  by  citizens  who  retained   their  
rights   of   original   citizenship,   while   working   on   the   land   bestowed   to   them   by   the  
occupying   authorities.237   This   association   of   colonialism   with   the   settlement   of  
geographical  areas  outside  of  the  original  borders  of  the  motherland  remained  central  
in  the  16th  and  17th  centuries  with  the  colonialisation  of  the  Americas.    
Some  scholars  continue  to  use  the  term  colonialism  in  a  way  which  remains  
closer  to  its  etymological  root.  While  other  forms  of  colonialism  that  did  not  involve  
settlement  also  exist(ed),  the  defining  feature  shared  by  all  forms  of  colonial  control,  
according  to  this  narrow  definition,  is  that  the  political  community  being  subjugated  
does   not   enjoy   formal   independence   and/or   formal   political   sovereignty.238   Others,  
however,  have  broadened  the  original  meaning  of  the  word,  using  it  to  identify  “the  
general   imperial   policy   of,   in   particular,  Western   states   from   the   sixteenth   century  
onwards.”239   Scholars   of   neo-­‐colonialism   or   post-­‐colonialism   do   precisely   this,  
disassociating   colonialism   from   direct   colonial   rule   and   emphasising   the   many  
indirect   ways   in   which   political   and   economic   control   continue   to   be   exerted   on  
dependent  territories  after,  and  despite,  formal  political  independence.240    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236  Mommsen,  1980,  p.4.  
237  Ypi,  2013,  p.162.  
238   Descriptively,   the   lack   of   territorial   independence   is   connected   with   the   lack   of   formal  
independence.   This   is   not   to   say   that   distinguishing   these   two   aspects   normatively   is  
important.  See  Ypi,  2013.    
239  Butt,  2013.  
240  For  a  canonical  (by  now)  definition  of  neo-­‐colonialism,  see  Nkrumah,  1965,  p.1-­‐6.  
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If   one   adopts   the   narrow   understanding   of   colonialism   as   direct   rule,   then  
colonialism  can  be  understood  as  a  specific  form  of  imperialism,  namely  one  in  which  
the   political   community   is   directly   dominated   by   a   separate   metropole.   Put  
differently,   if   a   political   community   retains   formal   independence   and   political  
sovereignty,   it   cannot   be   colonialism,   but   it   can   be   imperialism.   If,   however,   one  
adopts   the   broader   definition,   then   colonialism   and   imperialism   become   more  
difficult  to  differentiate.    
I   propose   to   adopt   the   narrow   descriptive   definition   of   colonialism,   which  
describes   it   as   a   subset   or   a   particular   type   of   imperialism.   I   define   it   as   the  
domination,   often   accompanied   by   exploitation,   of   a   political   community   by   an  
external  agent.   I  define  political  community  as  any   large-­‐scale  association  of  people  
who  are   capable  of   and  claim  a  de   jure   right   to   self-­‐rule.241  This   includes  but   is  not  
limited   to   states.   The   fact   that   it   is   a   political   community   that   is   dominated   and  
exploited   is  crucial,   for   it   is  precisely   this   that  differentiates   imperialism  from  other  
forms  of  dominating  and  exploitative  relations  and  structures.242    
Two   caveats  need   to  be   added   to   this  definition,   one   regarding   the  political  
community   being   dominated   and   exploited,   and   the   other   relating   to   the   imperial  
master.   First,   I   adopt   an   individualised   understanding   of   political   community,  
according  to  which,  the  normatively  significance  comes  from  the  fact  that  individual  
members   of   a   political   community   are   being   dominated.   As   I   argue   in   the   next  
section,  while  it  is  a  political  community  that  is  being  dominated  and  exploited,  and  
while  individuals  composing  that  community  are  victims  of  this  form  of  subjugation  
by   virtue   of   their   membership,   this   does   not   necessarily   entail   –   and   in   practice  
seldom   does   -­‐   that   all   members   are   equally   dominated   and   exploited.   This   is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241  Vrousalis,  2016,  p.73.  
242   As   Ypi   writes,   “colonialism   is   a   practice   that   involves   collective   political   agents,   not  
individuals,  family  members,  interest  groups  or  civil  society  associations”  (2013,  p.162).  
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emphasied   by   theorists   of   imperialism   across   the   board,   from   classical   liberals,   to  
Marxists  and  neo-­‐Marxists,  to  post-­‐colonial  theorists  and  even  contemporary  liberals.    
Second,   the   definition   proposed   is   purposefully   vague   regarding   the  
dominating   and   exploiting   agent.   Some   definitions   erroneously   assume   that   the  
dominating  agent  also  needs  to  be  a  political  community.243  While   this  may  be  true  
for  the  definition  of  empire,  I  do  not  believe  it  applies  to  imperialism.  Empires  must  
be   composite   entities,   formed   out   of   previously   separate   political   communities.  
Diversity   –   ethnic,   national,   cultural,   and   often   religious   –   is   their   essence,   but   it  
cannot   be   a   diversity   of   equals.   If   it   were,   if   there   were   no   relation   of   domination  
between   ‘core’   and   ‘periphery,’   then   the   system   is   not   an   empire   but   more   like   a  
commonwealth.244  The  dominating  and  exploitative  agent  can  be  a  state  or  groups  of  
states,   as   well   as   other   economic   actors,   such   as   trading   companies,   multinational  
corporations,  or  financial  institutions.    
Another  distinct  feature  of  imperialism’s  definition  proposed  here  is  that  it  is  
a   moralised   definition   in   that   it   incorporates   into   its   very   definition   two   wrongs,  
namely   domination   and   exploitation.245   Many   scholars   of   imperialism   across  
disciplinary   boundaries   define   imperialism   in   this   way.   In   his   introduction   to   the  
study  of  empire,  for  instance,  Howe  states  that  while  it  comes  in  very  different  guises  
and  takes  different  forms  throughout  time,  imperialism  is  characterised  by  the  same  
“underlying   inflexible   relations   of   dependency…[in  which]   a   small   group   of   powers  
dominates   and   exploits   the   rest   of   the   world”   (my   emphasis).246  Writing   about   the  
wave  of  colonialisation  of  the  Americas,  post-­‐colonial  writer  Anibal  Quijano  proposes  
to   think   about   imperialism   as   a   “form   of   political   domination   and   economic  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243  See  Vrousalis,  who  defines   imperialism  as  “the  domination  of  one  political  community  or  
state  by  another.”  
244  Howe,  2002,  p.15.  
245  In  line  with  the  definition  adopted  in  the  previous  chapter,  I  take  both  of  these  to  be  not  
merely  technical,  but  normative,  concepts.    
246  Howe,  2002,  p.24-­‐25.  
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exploitation”   (my   emphasis).247   Similarly,   Vrousalis,   who   as   we   saw   in   the   previous  
chapter  sees  exploitation  as  one  particular  type  of  domination,  defines  imperialism  as  
the  “the  domination  of  one  political  community  or  state  by  another.”248  
Now,  while  adopting  a  moralised  definition  of  imperialism  is  not  uncommon,  
and  although  many   scholars  point  at   the   two  wrongs   singled  out  here,   it   remains  a  
contentious   definition.   By   adopting   a   moralised   account   of   imperialism,   the  
conceptual  question  of  how   to  define   imperialism   leads   straight   into   the  normative  
debate   regarding   what,   if   any,   are   the   distinctive   wrongs   of   imperialism   or  
colonialism.    
Broadly   speaking,   political   theory   provides   three   answers   to   the   question   of  
what  makes  colonialism  distinctively  wrong.  On  one  side  of  the  spectrum,  there  are  
those  who  argue   that,  whilst   colonialism   is  wrong   for   countless   reasons  and  can  be  
associated   with   a   wide   range   of   injustices,   none   of   them   are   necessary.249   On   the  
other   end,   there   are   those   who   contend   that   the   thing   that   makes   colonialism  
uniquely  wrong  is  the  fact  that  it  embodies  a  particular  form  of  problematic  political  
relation,   namely   one   that   “denies   its   members   equal   and   reciprocal   terms   of  
cooperation”250   and   one   where   the   subjects   cannot   affirm   the   political   institutions  
imposed  on  them  by  their  rulers.251  In  between  these  positions,  there  are  scholars  who  
provide   a   list   of   wrongs   commonly   associated   with   colonialism.   Butt,   for   example,  
identifies   three   such   wrongs:   exploitation,   domination,   and   cultural   imposition.252  
According  to  proponents  of  this   ‘list  theory,’   the  sheer  diversity  of   forms  of  political  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247  Quijano  and  Ennis,  2000.  
248  Vrousalis,  2016.  
249  Valentini  (2015)  is  one  proponent  of  this  view.    
250  Ypi,  2013.  
251  Stilz,  2015.    
252  Butt,  2013.  
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organisation  that  are  referred  to  as  colonial  makes  the  singling  out  of  one  wrong,  and  
the  provision  of  a  definite  definition  of  colonialism,  undesirable.253    
At   the   conceptual   level,   my   definition   takes   the   domination   of   political  
communities   by   an   external   agent   to   be   a   necessary   and   sufficient   condition   for  
imperialism.   It   associates   imperialism   with   exploitation,   although   exploitation   is  
neither  a  necessary  nor  a  sufficient  condition.254  This  does  not  necessarily  require  that  
I  take  political  domination  to  be  the  central  wrong  characterising  imperialism  (rather  
than  seeing  it  as  one  of  several,  as  with  the  list  approach).  I  want  to  remain  agnostic  
with   regards   to   this   question,   for   even   those   who   disagree   that   there   are   unique  
wrongs  that  distinguish  colonialism  and  imperialism,  and  those  who  argue  that   it   is  
only   political   domination   that   is   the   distinctive   wrong   of   colonialism,   could   agree  
with   the   descriptive   assessment   that   domination   and   exploitation   are   two   wrongs  
which  are  often  exerted  under  colonial/imperial  rule.  Thus,  despite  the  disagreement  
on   the   normative   terrain   regarding   what   makes   colonialism   and/or   imperialism  
wrong,   the   definition   of   imperialism   proposed   here   could   still   be   accepted   by   all  
parties,  as  long  as  the  more  limited  claim  is  accepted  that  both  political  domination  
and  economic  exploitation  are  defining   features  of   imperialism  and  colonialism.  My  
working   definition   of   imperialism   as   “the   domination,   often   accompanied   by  
exploitation,  of  a  political  community  by  an  external  agent”  will  become  more  refined  
as  the  discussion  proceeds.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253  Moore,  2016.  
254  David  Landes  warns  of  the  dangers  of  conflating  every  form  of  dependency  leading  to  the  
exploitation  of  native  populations  or   the  working  class  with   imperialism.  According   to  him,  
such  a  wholesale  definition  would  make  serious  research  impossible.  Instead,  he  proposes  to  
define  imperialism  in  a  way  which  explicitly  links  it  with  formal  or  informal  political  control.  
In  line  with  Landes,  I  contest  that  what  distinguishes  imperialism  from  market  relationships  
(that  result  in  exploitation)  between  countries  of  different  economic  potential,  is  the  presence  
of  what  I  call  liberal  and/or  coercive  domination  (Landes  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.  88).    
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The  SD&CR  as  a  Liberal  Imperialist  Order    
In   Chapter   3   I   argued   that   the   structural   injustice   pertaining   to   the   SD&CR   is  
characterised  by  domination   and   exploitation   across   the   two   axes   of   statehood   and  
class.   Having   defined   imperialism   as   the   domination,   often   accompanied   by  
exploitation,   of   a   political   community   by   an   external   agent,   I   now   argue   that   the  
SD&CR   can   be   seen   as   part   and   parcel   of   an   imperial   order   of   a   particular   kind,  
namely  a  liberal  or  informal  one.    
Contemporary   theorists   of   imperialism   and   post-­‐colonial   scholars   have   drawn  
attention   to   the   fact   that  while   formal,  direct   colonial   control  may  have   ended   (for  
the  most   part),   more   indirect,   informal   control   continues   to   be   exerted   by   former  
colonial  masters   on   newly-­‐independent   states.   A  major   distinction   here   is   between  
theorists   who   highlight   the   epistemic   dimension   of   imperialism   and   the   socio-­‐
psychological  consequences  of  imperialism  (scholars  who  mostly  self-­‐identify  as  post-­‐
colonial  writers),255  and  the  main  body  of  neo-­‐Marxist  writers  who  maintain  that,  to  
this   day,   there   exists   a   continued   dependence   of   colonies   on   their   former  masters,  
which   helps   explain   the   continued   under-­‐development   of   what   is   most   commonly  
referred  to  as   ‘the  periphery.’256  Contemporary  liberals  are  also  drawing  on  the  work  
of  classical  radical  liberals,  such  as  Hobson  and  Schumpeter,  to  analyse  the  extent  to  
which  imperialism  is  still  a  feature  of  the  contemporary  world  order.    
According   to   writers   working   in   this   tradition,   the   historical   turning   point  
demarcating  the  shift  from  formal  to  informal  imperialism  can  be  roughly  located  at  
the  end  of  WWII:  “On  the  morrow  of  the  Second  World  War,  the  colonial  revolution  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255  Scholars  such  as  Franz  Fanon,  Edward  Said  and  Anibal  Quijano.  
256   Scholars   such   as   Samir   Amin,   Dos   Santos,   Celoso   Furtando,   Geoffrey   Kay,   Bill  Warren,  
Osvaldo   Sunkel   and   Gunnar  Myrdal,   to   name   but   a   few.  While   in   Section   V,   I   turn   to   the  
contributions  that  the  central   insights  of  post-­‐colonial  writers  can  make  to  better   illuminate  
the  wrongs   of   the   SD&CR,   in   this   section,   I  mostly   focus   on   the  material   dimension   of   the  
continuity  of  imperialism.  
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shook   the   foundations   of   the   imperialist   system.”257   While   different   theories   exist  
regarding   the  catalyst   for   the   turn   from  formal   to   informal   imperialism,258   the  basic  
argument  is  that  metropolitan  countries  which,  up  until  then,  exerted  direct  colonial  
control,  moved   to   indirect   forms   of   control.   From   this   view,   the   colonial   period   of  
formal  imperial  control  served  the  aim  of  adapting  the  socio-­‐economic  institutions  of  
the  periphery  country,   as  well   as   the   international   economic,   financial   and  political  
structures  to  the  needs  of  the  metropolitan  core.  Once  these  structures  were  adopted,  
the  core  could  continue  to  exert  indirect  political  control  over  the  periphery,  even  in  
the  absence  of  direct  political  control,  for  these  structures  “guaranteed  that  the  forms  
of   colonial  domination   that  had  prevailed   in   the  past  would   ‘reproduce’   themselves  
indefinitely  without  the  need  of  further  political  action  by  the  ex-­‐metropolis.”259  
An  interesting  variation  of  this  argument  is  the  ‘continuation  theory’  advanced  by  
Robinson  and  Gallagher.  For  them,  identifying  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  as  a  
demarcation  point  between  two  radically  different  forms  of  imperialism  is  misguided.  
It  is  simply  not  the  case,  they  argue,  that  in  the  past  imperialism  was  primarily  formal  
in  nature,  whereas   today  we   chiefly   observe   informal   forms   of   political   domination  
and  economic  exploitation.  There  are,  in  fact,  numerous  types  of  informal  imperialist  
domination   which   precede   or   accompany   the   establishment   of   formal   rule,   even  
making   the   latter   unnecessary.   According   to   Robinson   and   Gallhager,   informal  
political   control  was   extended  whenever   possible,   and   formal   political   control   used  
only  when  it  was  necessary  to  preserve  economic  control  over  the  periphery.260    
What   is  most   decisive   about   this   view   of   informal   imperialism,   is   that   it   breaks  
with   the   tradition   of   defining   imperialism   exclusively   in   terms   of   formal   political  
control  over  a  colonial  territory.  The  crucial  feature  that  sets  imperialism  apart  is  not  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257  Mandel,  1962,  p.480.  
258  See  the  ‘peripheral’  school  of  imperialism  in  Mommsen,  1980.  
259  Magdoff  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.124.  
260  Gallhager  and  Robinson  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.88.    
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direct  political  control  over  a  territory,  but  political  domination,  often  with  the  aim  of  
economic  enrichment.261  While  territorial  control  may  be  associated  with  a  particular  
sub-­‐type   of   imperialism   (direct   colonial   rule),   it   is   political   domination   that  
characterises   imperialism   and   it   is   this   domination   which   continues   after   formal  
political  independence,  even  if  it  is  exerted  more  indirectly.262    
Vrousalis  makes  a  similar  argument,  distinguishing  between  ‘coercive’  and  ‘liberal’  
forms  of  domination.  Recall  that  one  central  feature  of  domination,  as  defined  in  the  
previous   chapter,   related   to   the  multifarious  ways   in  which   it   can  be  exerted,  often  
not  requiring  actual  force  or  interference,  but  being  “as  silent  as  gravity.”263  This  form  
of  silent  domination  is  what  Vrousalis  has  in  mind  when  defining  liberal  domination.  
Actual,  direct   interference,  by  contrast,   is  coercive  domination.264  Each  of   these  two  
forms   corresponds   to   one   form   of   imperialism:   coercive   domination   to   formal  
territorial  control  and  liberal  domination  to  liberal  imperialism.  Liberal  imperialism,  
then,  is  characterised  by  a  form  of  domination  where  the  bully  never  gets  her  hands  
dirty:  “Much  like  the  drug  pusher  who  increases  her  hold  over  the  addict  by  offering  
drugs,”   265   liberal   imperialism   may   enhance   the   dominated   states   genuine   options  
(such   as,   for   instance,   with   a   lucrative   trade   deal).   This   expansion   of   options  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261  This  is  in  line  with  the  normative  position  that  sees  political  control  as  the  main  wrong  of  
imperialism.  Ypi’s   answer   to   the  question  of  what   is  wrong  with   colonialism   is   congenial   to  
this  conclusion  (2013).  
262   This   differs   from   the   distinction   drawn   by   most   historical   scholars   of   empire   and  
imperialism,   who   sustain   that,   whereas   formal   imperialism   also   controls   the   political  
processes   via   territorial   control,   informal   imperialism  does  not   control   the  political  process.  
Conversely,   according   to   the   view   defended   here,   formal   and   informal   imperialism   do   not  
differ   in   terms   of   the   presence   or   absence   of   political   control   (for   political   control   or  
domination  is  present  in  both),  but  simply  in  the  means  used  to  exert  this  domination  (more  
direct,  through  territorial  control,  or  more  indirect  means).    
263  Pettit,  2012,  p.79.  
264  Formally,  Vrousalis  defines  coercive  domination  as  the  type  of  domination  that  “involves  P  
physically  forces  Q  to  do  things,  or  issues  coercive  threats,  or  coercive  offers  that  subordinate  
Q  to  P’.  Liberal  domination,  by  contrast,  involves  ‘P  getting  Q  to  do  things  in  non-­‐coercive  but  
subordinating  ways.  P  might  manipulate  or  deceive  Q,  bribe  Q  or  simply  brainwash  Q  to  want  
what  P  wants.”  
265  Vrousalis,  2016,  p.76.  
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ultimately  only   increases   the  hold  of   the   imperial  master   (the  drug  dealer)  over   the  
dominated  state  (the  addict).    
I   wish   to   adopt   Vrousalis’   definition   of   liberal   imperialism,   highlighting   two  
further   aspects.   First,   although   liberal   domination   is   associated   with   liberal  
imperialism   and   coercive   domination  with   formal   imperialism,   this   does   not  mean  
that   these   two   forms  of   domination   cannot  be   simultaneously   exerted.   In   line  with  
the   thesis   of   the   continuity   theory  –   according   to  which   informal   forms  of  political  
control  accompany  formal  means,  often  making  the  latter  unnecessary  –  I  conceive  of  
coercive  and  liberal  domination  as  complements.266    
Second,   although   liberal   imperialism   is   less   readily   apparent   than   coercive  
imperialism,  I  would  caution  one  from  deducing  that  the  former  is  necessarily  more  
benign.   Endless   horrors   can   be   assigned   to   formal   rule,   including   “burning   native  
settlements,  torturing  innocents,  slaughtering  children,  enslaving  entire  populations,  
[and]  exploiting  the  soil  and  natural  resources  available  to  them.”267  There  is  at  least  
one  way,  however,  in  which  liberal  imperialism  could  be  considered  more  pernicious  
than  coercive  imperialism.  The  allegation  is  that,  under  coercive  imperialism,  at  least  
some   responsibility   is   attributed   to   the   imperial   master   both   at   home   and   in   the  
international   arena,   but   under   liberal   domination   the   imperial   power   gets   a   free  
ticket.  “It  is  the  worst  form  of  imperialism.  For  those  who  practise  it,  it  means  power  
without  responsibility,  and  for  those  who  suffer  from  it,  it  means  exploitation  without  
redress.   In  the  days  of  old-­‐fashioned  colonialism,  the   imperial  power  at   least  had  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266   Vrousalis   sketches   three   possibilities:   formal   imperialism   in   which   the   imperial   master  
coerces   the   dominated   state   via   direct   political   control   (entailing   ‘an   army   and   a   viceroy’);  
liberal   imperialism,   in   which   the   dominating   agent   bullies   without   direct   political   control  
(involving  no  army  and  no  viceroy);  and  hybrid  forms  where  coercive  domination  forces  the  
door  open,  and  liberal  domination  keeps  it  that  way  (with  armies  but  no  viceroys)  (Vrousalis,  
2016,  p.78).  In  line  with  scholars  defending  the  continuity  theory,  I  would  add  to  this  that,  in  
the  same  way   in  which  formal  domination  may   ‘force  the  door  open’   for   liberal  domination,  
the  inverse  is  also  true  historically  and  may  actually  be  more  common.    
267  Ypi,  2013,  p.  162.  
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explain   and   justify   at   home   the   actions   it   was   taking   abroad.”268   According   to   this  
reading,  then,  liberal  domination  is  the  worst  of  both  worlds,  for  the  imperial  master  
can  wash  its  hands  and  claim  no  responsibility,  while  the  subjugated  state  continues  
to   lack  self-­‐determination  despite   formal   independence.269   “Many  may  even  develop  
nostalgia   for   the   days   of   formal   colonial   rule,   when   the   European   powers   were,   at  
least  in  principle,  responsible  for  developments  at  the  periphery,  whereas  today  they  
are  formally  relieved  of  the  burden.”270  
  I   have   already   described   in   previous   chapters   the   positions   that   disadvantaged  
states   can  occupy  within   the  SD&CR.  Empirically,   a  position  of  disadvantage   is  one  
where   the   disadvantaged   debtor   state   has  worse   conditions   of   borrowing,   entailing  
things  such  as  not  being  able  to  borrow  in  their  own  currency  or  borrowing  with  high  
and  fluctuating  interest  rates,  and  is  more  vulnerable  to  crisis.  Normatively,  I  argued  
that   disadvantaged   debtor   states   find   themselves   in   positions   where   they   are  
vulnerable   to   domination   and   exploitation.   According   to   the   structural-­‐relational  
critique  made   in   the   previous   chapter,  moreover,   it   is   private   and   public   creditors  
who   –   within   the   highly   asymmetrical   and   unjust   SD&CR   –   dominate   and   exploit  
debtor  states  and  particular  social  classes  therein.  These  private  and  public  creditors  
do   not   exploit   via   direct   forms   of   intervention,   but   via   indirect  means,   drawing   on  
and   requiring   various   kinds   of   complicity   from   actors,   as   well   as   the   existence   of  
enabling   structures   that   make   the   domination   and   exploitation   possible.   If   one  
accepts  the  analysis  of  the  previous  chapters  and  the  definition  of  liberal  imperialism  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268  Nkrumah,  1965,  p.3.  
269  Tully  emphasises  this  aspect  by  describing  liberal  imperialism  as  informal  and  interactive.  
It   is   informal  because   it  entails  a  complex   form  of   rule   that  governs   imperialised  peoples  by  
means   other   than   colonies.   It   is   interactive   because   hegemonic   powers   and   accompanying  
institutions  recognise  the  imperialised  or  subalternised  people  as  self-­‐governing  constitutional  
states  and  they  interact  with  them  on  that  basis,  leaving  intact  the  deeply  unequal  hegemon-­‐
subaltern   relations.   This,   in   turn,   allows   hegemonic   powers   to   renounce   all   forms   of  
responsibility  attribution  (Tully,  2008).    
270  Mommsen,  1980,  p.145.  
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I  propose  here,   then   it   follows   that   the  SD&CR  can   rightly  be  described  as  a   liberal  
imperial  regime.    
Vrousalis   himself   uses   the   example   of  Argentina’s   debt  history   at   the   end  of   the  
19th   century   to   illustrate  how   liberal   imperialism  operates   in  practice.   In   the   second  
half   of   the   19th   century,   Argentina   embarked   on   an   ambitious   railway   building  
program,  financed  by  debt  largely  provided  by  the  London-­‐based  Barings  Bank.271  As  
its  debt   levels  continued  to  rise,  Argentina  became  unable  to  service  its  debts  and  a  
sovereign  debt  crisis  ensued.  With  the  direct  involvement  of  Nathan  Rothschild  and  
other  prominent  British  bankers,   the  Bank  of  England  orchestrated  an   international  
bailout  for  the  Barings  Bank.  British  and  Argentinian  banks  raised  interest  rates  and  
the  Argentinian  government  embarked  on  a  decade-­‐long  austerity  program  with  the  
aim  of  servicing  the  debt  in  full.  Argentina’s  ‘recovery’  intensified  the  exploitation  of  
certain   domestic   classes,   namely   workers   and   peasants,   because   it   resulted   in  
reductions  in  real  wages  and  pensions,  and  a  surge  in  poverty  and  unemployment.    
   This   is  an  all   too   familiar  scene   for  European  taxpayers  on  the   losing  side  of  
the  most  recent  attempts  to  ‘save  the  Euro.’  As  Vrousalis  notes  “one  need  only  replace  
‘British   Empire’   with   ‘Germany’,   ‘Barings   Bank’   with   ‘Deutsche   Bank’   and   ‘Latin  
America’  with  ‘PIIGS’  (Portugal,  Italy,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain)  to  get  another  instance  
of   liberal   imperialism,   this   time   in   the   context   of   the   contemporary   European  
Union.”272   Indeed,   as   the  European  debt   crisis  unfolded,  Greek  and   Irish  news  were  
full  of  descriptions  of  the  Troika  officials  marching  into  government  ministries  as  “the  
country’s   de   facto   colonial   administrators.”273   An   editorial   in   the   Irish   Times   read:  
“having  obtained  our  political   independence   from  Britain   to  be  masters  of  our  own  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271  Vrousalis,  2016,  p.77.  
272  Vrousalis,  2016,  footnote  25.  
273  Blustein,  2016,  p.189.  
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affairs  we  have  now   surrendered  our   sovereignty   to   the  European  Commission,   the  
European  Central  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund.”274    
I   believe   that   the   most   plausible   interpretation   of   the   work   of   dependency  
scholars  is  one  where  they  are  seen  not  as  making  a  causal  claim  about  dependency,  
but  as  denouncing   this   form  of   liberal   imperialism.   In  certain   sections  of  academia,  
dependency   theory   is   looked   upon   with   suspicion.   While   some   argue   that  
dependency  theory  belongs  in  the  ‘dustbin  of  history,’275  others  argue  that  it  is  “alive  
and  well  in  other  guises.”276  After  an  initial  interest  from  global  justice  theorists,  the  
work   of   dependency   scholars   dropped   out   of   the   debate.   Independent   of   the  
explanatory   force   that   one   attributes   to   the   causal   mechanism   that   dependency  
scholars  identify  as  a  cause  for  underdevelopment,  I  believe  that  the  real  force  of  the  
account  lies  in  the  identification  of  the  structured  relation  between  the  core  and  the  
periphery,   where   the   former   dominates   and   exploits   the   latter   as   a   political  
community.  Put  differently,  dependency   theorists’   claims  can  be   re-­‐interpreted,  not  
to  explain  (under)development  (the  ‘development  of  underdevelopment’  thesis),  but  
about   the  nature  of   the  order  within  which  both   interact,  namely  a   liberal   imperial  
order.    
   First   generation   dependency   scholars   argued   that   it  was   the   inability   of   the  
periphery  to  innovate  technologically  which  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  structural  
dependence   between   core   and   peripheral   countries.  Whereas   the   former   produced  
manufactured   goods   for   itself   and   the   periphery,   the   periphery   mainly   produced  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274  The  Irish  Times,  2010,  ‘Was  it  for  this?’  November  18.  
275  Velasco,  2002.  
276  Topik,  1998;  Vernengo,  2006  and  Velasco,  2002.  
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commodities   for  core  countries.   277      It  was   this   international  division  of   labor  which  
resulted  in  the  ‘development  of  underdevelopment’  in  the  periphery.  278    
   Today,   a   second   generation   of   dependency   scholars,   largely   based   at   the  
Universidade  of  Campinas  and  the  Universidade  Federal  do  Rio  de   Janeiro,  makes  a  
different  argument.  They  suggest  that  the  ‘original  sin’  of  not  being  able  to  borrow  in  
their  own  currency,  and  not  the  lack  of  technological  innovation,  lies  at  the  heart  of  
the   periphery’s   dependence   on   the   core.   In   the   first   chapter,   we   encountered  
Eichengreen  and  Hausmann’s  claim  that  the  ability  or  inability  of  a  sovereign  state  to  
borrow   in   their   own   currency,   as   well   as   the   associated   problems   that   follow,   is  
largely  determined  by  factors  that  lie  outside  a  country’s  control.  Second  generation  
dependency  scholars  take  this  ‘original  sin’  argument  one  step  further,  arguing  that  it  
is  the  inability  to  borrow  in  one’s  own  currency  that  explains  the  late  and/or  under-­‐
development  of  countries  in  the  periphery.    
I  propose  a  reading  of  second  generation  dependency  scholars   that  does  not  
make  their  argument  stand  or  fall  only  on  the  predictive  power  of  their  causal  claim.  
Rather,   I   think   that   the  most   valuable   contribution  of   their   analysis   is   to  denounce  
the  existing  structural  relationship  between  core  and  peripheral  countries,  which  can  
rightly   be   described   as   liberal   imperialism.   According   to   this   interpretation   of  
dependency   scholars  work,   it   is   not   just   that   certain  market   relations   facilitate   the  
progressive  transfer  of  productive  power  from  the  periphery  to  the  core,  but  also  that  
these  interactions  are  ripe  with  forms  of  political  domination  of  a  liberal  kind.  If  we  
understand   the   contribution   of   dependency   scholars   in   this   manner,   I   think   that  
global  justice  scholars  may  have  been  too  quick  to  renounce  a  tradition  that  has  the  
potential  of  providing  extremely  valuable  insights  to  their  own  debates.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277  There  are  two  distinct  traditions  of  dependency  scholars,  namely  the  American  Marxist  and  
the  Latin  American  structuralist  tradition  (Brewer,  1980).    
278  Frank,  1991.  
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Robert  Wade  explicitly  adopts  the  line  of  argument  that  the  SD&CR  is  part  of  
a   liberal   imperial  order.   In  his  article,   ‘The  Invisible  Hand  of   the  American  Empire,’  
he   describes   a   post-­‐imperial   empire.   Encouraged   to   accrue   debt   denominated   in  
currencies  that  are  not  their  own  and  at  variable  interest  rates,  peripheral  states  are  
affected   by   the   decisions  made   by   core   countries   regarding   their   currency,   interest  
rates,  and  import  protections.  Not  only  is  the  inverse  not  true,  but  the  regime  has  a  
zero-­‐sum   logic   in   which   “currency   crises   in   poor   countries   help   your   [the   core  
country’s]   economic   growth,   your   economic   preeminence   and   your   hegemony.   (…)  
This  economic  system  depends  on  a  political  system  of  sovereign  states,  not  colonies,  
that   can   be   made   responsible   for   handling   the   crises   it   generates   in   particular  
territories.  It  is  a  post-­‐imperial  empire.”279  Similarly  to  the  contention  of  post-­‐colonial  
or   neo-­‐colonial   writers   such   as   Nkrumah,   for   Wade,   the   SD&CR   is   not   only   a  
mechanism  through  which  liberal  imperialism  is  exerted  today,  but  is  also  the  worst  
form  of  imperialism,  for  it  entails  influence  without  responsibility.    
Let  me  recap  the  argument  thus  far  in  this,  and  in  the  two  preceding  chapters.  
In   this   section,   I   identified   imperialism   as   the   domination,   often   accompanied   by  
exploitation,  of  a  political  community  by  an  external  agent.  Liberal   imperialism   is  a  
particular  form  of  imperialism  in  which  the  domination  is  of  a  liberal  sort.  In  Chapter  
3,   I   demonstrated   at   length   that   the   two   wrongs   that   characterise   imperialism   –  
domination  and  exploitation  –  characterise  the  contemporary  SD&CR.  Continuing  to  
work   backwards,   this   normative   diagnosis   of   Chapter   3   is   based   on   the   empirical  
analysis  of  Chapter  2.  So  the  diagnosis  that  the  SD&CR  is  a  mechanism  of  imperialism  
is   not   made   lightly,   but   rather,   linked   to   the   extensive   empirical   and   normative  
discussion   in   the   two  previous  chapters.  To  defend   the   liberal   imperial   character  of  
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the   order   at   large,   however,   is   a  much   larger   empirical   and  normative   project   than  
what  I  can  undertake  here.280      
To  be  clear,   the  analysis  made  in  the  two  preceding  chapters   is   independent  
from  the  claim  defended  in  this  section  regarding  sovereign  debt  being  a  mechanism  
through  which   liberal   imperialism   is   exerted.  One   could   agree  with   the   arguments  
defended   in  Chapters  2  and  3  and  still  disagree  with  the  claim  defended  here  about  
the   SD&CR’s   liberal   imperial   nature.   The   analysis   of   the   preceding   two   sections   is  
similarly   independent   from   the   claim   defended   in   this   section.   In   the   next   two  
sections  I  approach  the  work  of  scholars  of  imperialism,  asking  whether  parts  of  their  
analysis  or   the  conceptual   tools   they  offer  make  sense  of   two  questions  which  have  
remained  unanswered.  I  begin  the  next  section  with  the  question  of  how  exactly  the  
two  axes  of  disadvantage  identified  in  the  preceding  chapters  –  class  and  statehood  –  
interact.    
  
The  Interplay  Between  the  Two  Axes  of  (Dis)advantage    
The  discussion   in   the  preceding   chapters  demonstrated   that  positions  of   advantage  
and   disadvantage   within   the   SD&CR   are   structured   along   lines   of   class   and   of  
statehood.   In   Chapter   2,   I   argued   that   a   position   of   disadvantage   for   states   is   one  
where   the   debtor   state   cannot   borrow   in   its   own   currency,   faces   high   and   flexible  
interest   rates,   and   is   more   vulnerable   to   crisis   and   financial   contagion.   Domestic  
wage-­‐dependent   classes  occupy  a  position  of  disadvantage  by   virtue  of   inhabiting  a  
regime   where   no   restructuring   mechanism   exists   and   where   states   prioritise   the  
repayment  of  their  creditors  ahead  of  their  citizens.  The  portion  of  the  citizenry  most  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280   Defending   the   claim   that   the   contemporary   global   political   economic   order   is   a   liberal  
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work   of   Andrew  Hurrell   points   in   this   direction   (Hurrell,   2001).   Pogge   went   a   long   way   to  
show  what  follows  normatively  from  an  analysis  such  as  Hurrell’s.  Successfully  defending  the  
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   127  
burdened   with   debt   servicing   partly   depends   on   the   tax   system   in   place   (both   in  
debtor  states  to  service  the  debt  and  in  creditor  states  to  pay  for  the  bailout  of  private  
creditors).  The  more  regressive  the  tax  system,  the  more  the  burden  rests  with  those  
least   well-­‐off.   In   the   same   vein,   austerity   policies   in   the   debtor   state  
disproportionately   burden   the   less   affluent.281   In   Chapter   2,   I   argued   further   that  
those   in   positions   of   disadvantage   are   vulnerable   to   structural   domination   and  
exploitation,   a   vulnerability   that   is   produced   and   reproduced   through   different  
channels.    
   Emphasising  the   importance  of  the  class  dimension  is  crucial,  particularly   in  
light  of  the  near  total  neglect  of  this  subject  within  global  justice  debates.  Relegating  
the  question  of  class  to  debates  surrounding  social  justice,  the  global  justice  debate  so  
far   has   a   very   limited   theoretical   understanding   of   how   the   class   axis   structures  
positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage  internationally.  To  simply  present  class  as  a  
second   axis   along   which   (dis)advantage   is   structured   in   the   international   arena,  
however,  would  be  too  quick  of  a  fix.  Similarly,  it  also  seems  insufficient  to  ask  which  
one  of  these  axes  has  the  greater  effect  on  the  option  set  and  choice  architecture  that  
individuals   in  different  positions   face.  Rather,   the  more   interesting  question   is  how  
these  two  dimensions  -­‐  class  and  statehood  -­‐   interact.  This   is  a  question  that  I  kept  
open  until  now,  and  one  where  scholars  of   imperialism  can  provide  us  with   fruitful  
theoretical  lenses  that  the  global  justice  debate  still  lacks.    
   Concretely,  scholars  of   imperialism  bring  to  the   fore  two  crucial  aspects.  On  
one   hand,   they   emphasise   that   the   domination   and   exploitation   of   the   domestic,  
wage-­‐dependent   class   in   states   occupying   a   position   of   disadvantage   within   the  
SD&CR   are   intrinsically   connected   to   the   exploitation   of   those   domestic   wage-­‐
dependent   classes  who   occupy   positions   of   advantage   in   terms   of   their   citizenship.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281See  Blyth,  2015;  D’Errico  et  al.,  2015;  Balourdos,  2014;  Leventi  and  Matsaganis,  2016.  
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Second,  they  provide  us  with  an  appropriate  vocabulary  to  differentiate,  with  greater  
nuance,  between  financial  elites  and  wage-­‐dependent  classes  living  in  disadvantaged  
and  advantaged  states,  respectively.  I  will  now  examine  each  of  these  in  turn.    
   First,   scholars   of   imperialism  draw  attention   to   the   fact   that   often,   injustice  
along   the   lines   of   class   and   statehood   are   not   separated   from   each   other,   but   are  
intrinsically   connected.   As   J.A   Hobson,   a   classical   liberal   scholar   of   imperialism  
wrote:    
Aggressive  Imperialism,  which  costs  the  taxpayer  so  dear,  which  is  
of   so   little  value   to   the  manufacturer  and   trader,  which   is   fraught  
with  such  grave  incalculable  peril  to  the  citizen,  is  a  source  of  great  
gain  to  the  investor  who  cannot  find  at  home  the  profitable  use  he  
seeks   for  his   capital,   and   insists   that  his  Government   should  help  
him  to  profitable  and  secure  investment  abroad.282  
	  
What  Hobson  argues  here  is  that  imperialism  (domination  and  exploitation  along  
lines  of  statehood)  is  not  distinct  from  the  hierarchical  class  system.  Instead,  the  
anachronistic  political  structure  in  Britain  is  the  reason  why  imperial  subjects  are  
exposed  to  domination  and  exploitation  in  the  first  place.    
   From   a   Marxist   perspective,   Rosa   Luxemburg   draws   attention   to   the   same  
connection.  She  argues   that  one  of   the  drivers  of   imperialism   (which,   in  her  earlier  
work,   she   calls   ‘militarism’)   is   that   it   serves   as   “an   instrument   of   class   domination  
over   the   labouring   population   inside   the   country.”283   This   equation   of   imperialism  
with  reaction  and  repression  at  home  has  influenced  Marxist-­‐Leninist  thought  to  this  
day.  Luxemburg   is  most   famous   for   the  argument  made   in  her   later  work  regarding  
the  dependence  of  capitalism  on  economically  virgin  territories,  not  only  in  its  initial  
stages   of   development,   but   even   more   so   during   its   maturity.284   However,   what   is  
most  interesting  here  is  the  fact  that  she,  like  Hobson,  connects  the  domination  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282  Hobson,  2005,  p.55.  
283  Luxemburg  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.35.  
284  Luxemburg,  1976.  
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exploitation   of   the   population   in   colonial   territories   with   that   of   the   proletariat   at  
home.   It   is   the   restriction   of   the   purchasing   power   of   the   masses   which   makes  
impossible  the  transformation  of  surplus  value  into  investment  capital,  necessitating  
the  exploitation  of  pre-­‐capitalistic  social  structures.    
For   our   purposes,   the   analysis   of   the   previous   chapters   revealed   how   the  
domination   and   exploitation   of   wage-­‐dependent   classes   in   peripheral   countries   is  
connected  with   that   of   core   countries.   First,   as   Chapter   1,   showed,   debt   and   credit  
flows   seamlessly   between   core   and   peripheral   countries.   When   the   economic  
conditions  in  core  countries  are  disadvantageous  for  the  financial  class,  they  move  to  
the   periphery.   The   case   of   the   Latin   American   debt   crisis   in   the   1980s,   in   which  
stagnation   in   the   OECD   countries   led   to   the   extension   of   unsustainable   debt  
contracts  to  Latin  American  countries  and  eventually  caused  an  outbreak  of  crisis,  is  a  
perfect  example.  Second,  as  the  recent  European  crisis  revealed,  if  the  debtor  state  is  
bailed  out,  this  is  not  only  harmful  for  the  most  vulnerable  classes  in  the  debtor  state,  
but  also  for  the  wage-­‐dependent  classes  in  creditor  states,  who  need  to  shoulder  the  
costs  of  the  bailout  package.    
In  line  with  Hobson  and  Luxemburg’s  analyses,  then,  the  domestic  injustices  
in   the   core   countries   along   lines   of   class   are   neither   separate   from   the   domination  
and  exploitation  of  peripheral  states  on  lines  of  statehood,  nor  from  the  exploitation  
and   domination   of   the   disadvantaged   class   therein.   More   generally,   were   global  
justice  scholars  to  integrate  the  axis  of  class  into  their  future  analyses,  we  should  treat  
Hobson’s  and  Luxemburg’s  remarks  as  an  invitation  not  to  regard  questions  relating  
to  class  and  statehood  as  separate,  but  to  theorise  them  together.  
The  second  insight  that  we  can  gain  regarding  the  interplay  between  the  two  
axes   relates   to   the   exact   nature   of   the   stratification   of   the   categories   of  
(dis)advantage.  In  Chapter  3  I  argued  that  in  the  example  of  Greece’s  rescue  program,  
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we  observed  the  transfer  of  productive  powers  from  one  class  to  another.  This  is  not,  
however,  the  only  thing  that  we  can  learn  from  the  detailed  review  of  this  case.  While  
a   transfer   of   productive  powers   took  place   from  one   (the  wage-­‐dependent)   class   to  
another  (the  leading  financial  class),  what  we  also  witnessed  was  the  exploitation  of  
the   wage-­‐dependent   class   of   a   given   state   by   private   creditors.   In   the   discussion  
surrounding  the  exact  content  of  the  rescue  program  and  of  the  conditionalities  that  
were  to  be  imposed,  for  instance,  German  Chancellor  Angela  Merkel  insisted  that  the  
program  had  to  give  the  impression  of  being  tough  on  the  Greek  people.  This  was  not  
only  because  of  German  concern  with  moral  hazard,  but  also  because  Merkel  knew  
that   the  German  citizenry  was   “overwhelmingly  negative   toward   rescuing  a  country  
that  had  clearly  gotten  itself  into  a  mess.”285  If  only  because  politicians  are  concerned  
with  keeping  their  voters  somewhat  content,  and  precisely  because  of  the  position  of  
power   that   Germany   held   in   the   negotiations,   the   interests   of   the   German   wage-­‐
dependent  class  could  be  given  priority  over  those  of  the  Greek  citizenry.  As  Blustein  
writes,  the  rescue  packages  “piled  debt  atop  existing  debt,  extracted  crushingly  high  
interest  charges  and  imposed  excessively  harsh  conditions  on  the  countries  that  were  
borrowing  the  money  (…)  suited  nations  such  as  Germany  and  France,  whose  banks  
were  anxious  to  stave  off  losses  and  whose  voters  were  incensed  at  paying  to  bailout  
countries   they   perceived   as   irresponsible.   (…)   The   legitimate   interests   of   crisis-­‐
stricken  nations  were  sacrificed  in  the  process.”286  
This   point   comes   out   even  more   clearly   in   a   commentary   written   by   Barry  
Eichengreen  in  response  to  the  resolution  to  the  Irish  banking  crisis,  which  preceded  
the  Greek  debt  debacle.  The   Irish  banking   crisis,  which  has  been   referred   to   as   the  
‘canonical  case’  where  “a  moral  argument  could  be  made  for  administering  a  haircut,”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285  Blustein,  2016,  p.101.  
286  Blustein,  2016,  p.15.  
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was  resolved  by  burdening  the  Irish  taxpayers.287  In  an  article  entitled  ‘Irish  Taxpayers    
the  Sacrificial  Lambs  of  European  Financial  Stability,’   the  crucial  question  was  asked  
as  to  why  the  Irish  taxpayers  should  cover  the  cost  of  spillover  concerns  in  the  rest  of  
the   Euro   area.288   Barry   Eichengreen’s   answer   illustrates   how   both   class   and  
citizenship  matter   to   the   structuring  of  privilege.  According   to  Eichengreen,   “policy  
makers   in   Germany   –   and   in   France   and   Britain   –   are   scared   to   death   over   what  
Ireland  restructuring   its  bank  debt  would  do   to   their  own  banking  systems.(…)  The  
appropriate  response  is  not  to  lend  to  Ireland  –  to  pile  yet  more  debt  on  the  country’s  
existing  debt  –  but  to  properly  capitalize  their  own  banking  systems  so  that  the  latter  
can   withstand   the   inevitable   Irish   restructuring.”289   Why   was   this   option   not  
considered?  Because   “European  officials   are   scared   to  death  not   just  by   their  banks  
but  by  their  publics,  who  don’t  want  to  hear  that  public  money  is  required  for  bank  
recapitalization.”290   “In   other   words,   the   Irish   program   was,   in   substantial   part,   a  
bailout  of  European  banks.  If  such  a  bailout  was  needed,  fine;  but  why  put  so  much  of  
the   burden   on   the   Irish   government   budget   instead   of,   say,   those   of   France   and  
Germany?”291  
What   this   reveals   then,   is   that   while   wage-­‐earners   are   dominated   and  
exploited  qua  members  of   the  wage-­‐dependent  class,   some  are  more  exploited   than  
others.  Those  among  the  wage-­‐dependent  class  who,  by  virtue  of  their  citizenship,  are  
part   of   a   privileged   group   within   their   class   –  members   of   the   German,   French   or  
British  domestic  wage-­‐dependent  class,  for  example  -­‐  constitute  what  I  call,  inspired  
by  Lenin  and  Bukharin,  a  ‘wage-­‐dependent  aristocracy’.292  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287  Eichengreen,  2010.  
288  Carroll,  2010.  
289  Eichengreen,  2010.  
290  in  Blustein,  2016,  p.176.  
291  Eichengreen,  2010.  
292   For   an   excellent   analysis   of   the   commonalities   and   differences   between   Lenin’s   and  
Bukharin’s  understanding  of  the  ‘labour  aristocracy,’  see  Brewer,  1980,  p.123-­‐127.  
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Lenin   and   Bukharin  were  writing   at   a   time   in  which   the  working   classes   of  
Europe   were   killing   each   other   on   the   battlefields   of   the   First   World   War.   This  
horrible   fact   ran   completely   against   Marx’s   prediction   that   “working  men   have   no  
country.”293  How  could  this  be  explained?  Bukharin  and  Lenin’s  answer  was  that  there  
was  a  stratification  in  the  working  class  and  that  sections  of  the  working  class  in  the  
core   countries   benefited   from   the   position   that   their   capitalist  masters   held   in   the  
global   political   economic   order.   These  workers   no   longer   had   “nothing   to   lose   but  
their  chains.”294  According  to  Lenin  and  Bukharin,  ‘national  interest  did  exist  and  had  
a  real  material  basis’.295  
This   interplay   between   privilege   and   disadvantage   based   on   citizenship   and  
on   class   is   something   that   can   also   be   recognised  within   the   financial   class.   Recall  
that   with   the   abolition   of   capital   controls   that   came   with   the   dissolution   of   the  
Bretton  Woods  system,   it  became  easier   for  the   financial  class   to  move  their  capital  
around   the   globe.   This,   in   turn,   enabled   a   progressive   detachment   of   the   financial  
class  from  their  domestic  economies-­‐cum-­‐societies.  It  allowed  a  ‘going  global’  of  the  
domestic   financial   upper   class,   which   seized   the   opportunities   for   profit   that   the  
financialisation   of   the   global   economy   offered,   to   secure   the  maximum   return   and  
safety  for  their  capital.    
While   this   detachment   of   the   domestic   financial   upper   class   is   not   new   for  
peripheral   countries,   it   was   made   easier   for   the   financial   class   of   core   countries.  
Duménil   and   Lévy   describe   this   as   a   divorce   between   the   upper   classes   and   the  
domestic  economy  of  the  U.S.,  arguing  that:    
what  is  really  new  in  this  pattern  of  events  is  not  the  disconnection  
itself.  Many   countries   in   the   periphery   are   or   have   been   ruled   by  
upper  classes  or   fractions  of  classes  that  are  not  committed  to  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293  Brewer,  1980,  p.127.  
294  Brewer,  1980,  p.128.  
295  Brewer,  1980,  p.128.  
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progress   of   their   own   countries.   (…)   What   was   new   (…)      is   that  
neoliberal  strategies  meant  a  divorce  in  the  center  of  the  neoliberal  
world,   similar   to   that   observed   in   too   many   less   advanced  
countries.296  
Echoing   Hilferding’s   understanding   of   ‘finance   capital’297   and   Hobson’s  
description  of   “the   little  group  of   financial  kings,”298   the  differences   in  wealth   today  
became  so  extensive  that  they  gave  rise  to  a  fusion  of  economic  and  political  power.  
“It  may  already  have  gone  so  far  that  the  rich  may  rightly  consider  their  fate  and  that  
of   their   families   to   have   become   independent   from   the   fates   of   the   societies   from  
which  they  extract  their  wealth.”299  
Crucial   for   our   purposes   here,   however,   is   that   not   all   members   of   this  
financial   class   behave   the   same   way.   Whereas   financial   elites   from   peripheral  
countries   “exit   their   societies   to   let   them   rot,”   moving   preferably   to   New   York   or  
London,  members  of   the  American  financial  class   “are  both  more  cosmopolitan  and  
more  patriotic.”300  They  extract  their  wealth  globally  and  store  it  locally  in  the  global  
financial   firms   of  Manhattan,   exercising   their   political   influence   to   ensure   that   the  
United   States   remains   a   safe   haven   for   themselves   as   well   as   their   non-­‐American  
fellow   oligarchs.301   In   the   same  way   in   which  Merkel   does   not   only   care   about   the  
second   constituency,   but   also   about   her   voters,   the   American   financial   class   cares  
about   both   their   class   and   their   nation.  Here,   again,   we   see   the   interplay   between  
class  and  statehood,  which   takes   the   form  of  a   financial   class  aristocracy.  The   table  
below  summarises  this  interplay  between  class  and  citizenship  in  core  and  peripheral  
countries.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296  Duménil  and  Lévy,  2011,  p.27.  
297  Hilferding,  1981.  
298  Hobson,  2005,  p.57.  
299  Streeck,  2013,  p.28.  Streeck  calls  this  a  form  of  ‘neo-­‐feudalism’.  
300  Duménil  and  Lévy,  2011,  p.27.  
301  Streeck,  2013,  p.30.  
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To   summarise,   today’s   SD&CR   is   characterised   by   the   following   chain   of  
domination.  The  financial  elite  of  states  in  a  position  of  advantage  within  the  regime  
(the  financial  aristocracy)  dominate  the  financial  elite  of  those  states  in  a  position  of  
disadvantage,   as   well   as   the   domestic   wage-­‐dependent   class.   The   financial   elite   of  
disadvantaged  states,  in  turn,  dominates  the  domestic  wage-­‐dependent  class  of  states  
occupying  both  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage.  Finally,  the  domestic  wage-­‐
dependent   class   of   states   occupying   a   position   of   advantage   (the   wage-­‐dependent  
aristocracy)  are  complicit  in  the  domination  of  members  of  the  wage-­‐dependent  class  
of  those  states  occupying  a  position  of  disadvantage  within  the  regime.302  
   Core   Periphery    
Financial  Class   Care  first  about  their  class,  
then  about  their  state  
(Financial  class  
aristocracy)  
Only  care  about  their  class  
Political  Class   Care  first  about  the  
financial  class,  and  then  
care  about  their  voters  
Only  care  about  the  
financial  class  
Wage-­‐Dependent  Class   Care  first  about  their  state,  
then  about  their  class  
(Wage-­‐dependent  
aristocracy)  
Have  nothing  to  lose  but  
their  chains    
	  
	  
The  Role  of  the  State  and  Potential  Routes  for  Emancipation    
In   the   previous   section,   we   saw   how   some   of   the   theoretical   lenses   provided   by  
scholars   of   imperialism  proved   fruitful   to   better   comprehend   the  way   in  which   the  
two  axes  of  disadvantage  interact.  I  now  want  to  show  how  debates  among  theorists  
of  imperialism  concerning  the  preferred  routes  of  resistance  against  domination  can  
be   illuminating   for   the   case   at   hand.   Although   they   cannot   provide   us   with   one  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302   Vrousalis   expresses   this   formally   by   stating   that   CapitalRich   (Cr)   dominates   CapitalPoor  
(Cp),   LabourRich   (Lr)   and   LabourPoor   (Lp).   Cp   in   turn   dominates   Lr,   and   Lp   and   LR  
dominates  Lp.  This   is  bracketing  the  state  as  an  actor.  Incorporating  the  state,  the  following  
chain  of  domination  emerges:  Cr,  Sr  (StateRich),  Cp,  Sp  (StatePoor),  Lr,  Lp  (2016,  p.81).  
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definitive   answer   regarding   which   institutional   responses   have   the   greatest  
emancipatory  potential  in  the  current  predicament,  they  do  flag  the  dangers  posed  by  
some  of  the  proposals  that  are  currently  on  the  table.    
  
a)  The  state  as  a  mediator  and  collaborator    
Let  me  begin  by  returning  to  the  role  of  the  dominated  state  –  that  is,  the  state  that  is  
vulnerable   to  domination   and   exploitation  because  of   its   position   in   a   financialised  
economy  and  the  SD&CR  in  particular.  So  far,  I  have  remained  vague  about  how  the  
wage-­‐dependent  classes  in  both  the  dominating  and  dominated  states  are  dominated  
and  exploited.   I   talked  about   the  underlying   structure  of   the   regime  –   the   fact   that  
certain  states  occupy  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage.  I  talked  also  about  the  
absence  of  a  sovereign  debt  restructuring  facility  and  about  the  decision  of  heads  of  
states  to  prioritise  the  repayment  of  debt  contracts  over  the  fulfilment  of  obligations  
held  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  their  citizenry.  I  have  also  looked  in  greater  detail  at  how  the  decision  
to  adopt  the  first  Greek  bailout  package  was  reached,  to  understand  on  a  micro-­‐level  
how   such   decisions   are   actually   made   in   practice.   What   I   have   not   yet   drawn  
attention   to,  however,   is   that  whilst   the   financial   class  may  be   the  main  wrongdoer  
(in   the   case   of   structural-­‐relational   injustices)   and/or   beneficiary   (in   the   case   of  
structural  processes  proper  and  structural-­‐systemic  injustices),  the  domination  of  the  
wage-­‐dependent  classes  is  only  possible  with  the  collaboration  of  the  state.  303  It  is  the  
state   that   acts   in   the   international   arena   and   it   is   the   state   that   ultimately   decides  
what  to  do  with  its  always-­‐finite  resources.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303  When  talking  about   ‘the  state’  here,  I  am  referring  to  state  officials  acting  in  the  name  of  
“the  organization  which  is  at  the  back  of  law  and  government”  (Hobhouse  in  Skinner,  2009,  p.  
358).  With  ‘state  officials’  I  am  referring  to  all  public  functionaries  in  the  executive,  legislative,  
and  judicial  branches.  This   is   in   line  with  the  International  Law  Commission’s  (ICL)  Articles  
on  State  Responsibility,  which  regulate  whose  behaviour  counts  as  the  conduct  of  states  and  
determines  that  it  is  acts  of  a  ‘public  functionary  under  national  law’  (Crawford  and  Watkins,  
2010,  p.288).    
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   The   role   played   by   the   ruling   political   class   in   the   domination   of   the  
periphery,  both  during  periods  of  formal  and  informal  rule,  has  been  emphasised  by  
scholars   of   what   came   to   be   known   as   the   study   of   ‘peripheral   imperialism.’  
According  to  this  strand  of  theories,  classical  theories  of  imperialism  (both  liberal  and  
Marxist)  erroneously  assumed  “that  all  active  components  of   the   imperialist  process  
were   necessarily   European,   while   leaving   out   of   [their]   account   equally   vital   non-­‐
European   factors.”304   Contrary   to   the   classical   theories   that   saw   either   economic   or  
socio-­‐political   reasons   as   the  main   driver,   for   this   school   of   thought,   there  was   no  
‘grand   design’   explaining   imperialism.   305   Even   during   the   age   of   imperialism,   state  
officials   of   that   period   tended   not   to   have   the   imperial   mindset   that   was   so   often  
ascribed   to   them,   adopting,   instead,   a   hesitant   and   distrustful   view   of   imperialist  
expansion.  
Careful  historical  analysis  within   this   school  of   thought   suggested   that   the  move  
from   informal   to   formal   control   (and   vice   versa)   took   place   due   to   the   interplay  
between   the   actions   and   reactions   of   both   imperial   masters   and   their   subjects.   A  
particularly   pertinent   catalyst   for   the   move   from   informal   to   formal   rule   was   the  
collapse   of   the   more   or   less   informal   cooperation   between   native   elites   and   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304  Gallagher  and  Robinson  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.100.  
305   Mommsen,   p.109-­‐110.   The   argument   that   it   was   the   interplay   between   the   actions   and  
reactions  of  both  imperial  masters  and  subjects  that  led  to  the  establishment  of  formal  control  
does  not  only  challenge  the  unilateral  imposition  of  imperial  domination  on  passive  subjects,  
but   also   questions   the   ‘single   cause   theory’   of   imperial   expansion.   Also   writing   with   the  
tradition   of   ‘peripheral   imperialism,’   Fieldhouse,   for   instance,   explicitly   warns   against  
attributing  this  later  phase  of  European  expansion  policies  (formal  imperialism)  to  economic  
causes:  “It  is  impossible  to  devise  a  theory  of  imperialism  which  covers  all  possible  cases.  (…)  
In   each   case   the   situation   on   the   periphery   constitutes   a   framework   within   which   the  
traditional   type   of   Eurocentric   explanation   gains   considerably   in   plausibility.”   At   the   same  
time,   Fieldhouse   sustains   that   the   establishment   of   formal   rule   was   generally   preceded   by  
informal  economic  penetration,  and   it   is   this  economic  penetration  which  can  ultimately  be  
attributed   to   the   drive   for   economic   profit.   The   crucial   addition   of   the   peripheral   school   is  
that   the   connection   between   the   economic   motivation   of   the   metropolitan   core   and   the  
exploitation  of  the  periphery  is  always  mediated  by  the  latter,  and  by  the  local  political  elite  in  
particular  (Fieldhouse  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.105-­‐108).    
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Europeans.306  The  basic  premise  here  is  that  white  colonialists,  being  extremely  few  in  
number  and  with  relative  scarce  support  from  the  metropolitan  country,  could  have  
never  built  such  great  empires  without  the  support  of  local  collaborators.307  Periods  of  
informal   rule   were   characterised   by   a   relatively   smooth   cooperation   between   the  
imperial  masters  and  their  subjects.  In  due  course,  however,  the  cooperation  with  the  
imperial   powers  undermined   the  position  of   the   local   elites   in   their   own  countries,  
creating   a   situation   which,   exacerbated   by   European   rivalries,   necessitated   the  
establishment  of  direct  colonial  rule.    
I  find  that  the  peripheral  school  of  imperialism  offers  two  particularly  interesting  
insights.   First,   it   highlights   that   both   direct   and   indirect   forms   of   imperial  
penetration   in   the   periphery   require   the   dominated   state’s   cooperation.   This  
mediating   role   of   the   periphery   is   what   post-­‐colonial   writers   refer   to   as   “multiplex  
hegemon-­‐subaltern  relations.”308  The  basic  idea  here  is  that  imperial  relationships  are  
not   unilaterally   and  monologically   imposed   on   passive   subjects   who   submit   to   the  
logic   of   capitalist   development.309   Rather,   ‘hegemon’   and   ‘subaltern’   are   multiplex:  
“they  are  dispersed  across  complex,  criss-­‐crossing  and  overlapping   fields  of  unequal  
and   mutually   constitutive   relationships   of   interplay.   They   are   not   conveniently  
located  in  the  West  and  the  non-­‐West  or  the  North  and  South,  but  within  and  across  
these  binary  categories  of  colonial  geography.”310    
Second,  the  peripheral  school  of  imperialism  emphasises  that  liberal  domination  is  
preferred  (and  sufficient)  as  long  as  the  collaboration  of  the  dominated  state’s  leaders  
is   forthcoming.   Once   this   collaboration   deteriorates   and   can   no   longer   be   relied  
upon,  more  direct  forms  of  coercive  domination  are  adopted.  Wishing  to  avoid  falling  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306  Fieldhouse  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.108.  
307  Howe,  2002,  p.16.  
308  Tully,  2008,  p.159.  
309  Tully,  2008,  p.158-­‐159.  
310  I  say  more  about  what  is  entitled  by  and  what  normatively  follows  from  this  complicity  in  
Chapter  7.    
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back   on   the   ‘grand   design’   theory   of   imperialist   drivers,   the  most   recent   European  
crisis   demonstrates  how  once   the   collaboration  of   political   leaders   of   the  European  
periphery   started   to   recede,   some  heads   of   states  were   replaced  by   others  with   the  
‘right’   economic   orthodoxy   and   background   (a   background   not   in   politics,   but   in  
finance).  As  colorfully  depicted  by  Assheuer:    
The  market  whisperers,   reaching   for  Machiavelli’s   toolkit,   remove  
inconvenient   leaders   like   Berlusconi,   pull   the   strings   of   debtor  
countries,   chant   the   incantation  of   austerity,   and   respect  national  
sovereignty  precisely  for  as  long  as  it  obeys  the  dictates  of  Brussels  
and  the  market.311  
	  
Combining  the  insights  made  in  Chapter  3,  then,  we  can  see  how,  although  creditors  
may   be   identified   as   the   wrongdoers   in   cases   of   structural-­‐relational   forms   of  
structural   injustice,   the   state   always   serves   as   a   mediator,   and   sometimes   as   a  
collaborator.  More  will  be  said  regarding  the  subsequent  normative  consequences  in  
Chapter  7.    
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b)  The  state  as  an  agent  of  emancipation  and  potential  routes  forward    
Once   we   recognise   the   centrality   of   the   dominated   state   as   a   mediator   of   the  
domination  of  the  wage-­‐dependent  class,  the  question  becomes  whether  we  think  the  
state  capable  and  willing  of  becoming  an  agent  of  emancipation,  or  whether  we  are  
pessimistic  about   the  state’s  willingness  and  ability   to  do  so.  This   is   the  question  at  
the   heart   of   the   debate   held   by   two   of   Germany’s   most   prominent   contemporary  
public  intellectuals,  Jürgen  Habermas  and  Wolfgang  Streeck.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311  Assheuer,  2013,  my  translation.  
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Despite   their   differences   of   emphasis,   Streeck’s   and  Habermas’   views   on   the   ills  
befalling   the   European   Project   have   important   commonalities   and   are,   to   a   large  
extent,   compatible.   While   Habermas’   analysis   focuses   on   the   undermining   of  
democratic   values   and   practices   at   the   European   level,312   Streeck   argues   that   it   is  
behind  the  hidden  abode  of  Habermas’  Brüssler  Analyse  where  the  real  action  lies.  It  
is   only   by   moving   beyond   the   critique   of   the   obvious   democratic   shortfalls   of  
European   institutions   and   practices,   that   we   recognise   how   the   financial   elite   –  
Streeck’s   second   constituency   –   is   pulling   the   strings   to   turn   the   European   Project  
into  a  union  made  in  their  own  image  and  likeness.313    
The   real   disagreement   between   the   two   intellectuals,   however,   lies   in   their  
prescriptive   conclusions   regarding   the   way   forward.   On   one   hand,   Habermas  
advocates   for   a   deepening   of   the   fiscal   union,   for   greater   socio-­‐political   integration  
and   for   a   democratisation   of   European   institutions   and   decision-­‐making   processes.  
Without  such  a  deepening,  he  asserts,  national  democracies  would  drown  in  the  sea  
of  neoliberal  globalisation.314  In  sharp  contrast,  Streeck  calls  for  a  return  to  the  nation  
state   and   full   political   and   economic   sovereignty.   The   Euro   represents   a   ‘frivolous  
experiment’  conducted  on  the  hearts  of  the  Staatsvölker  of  Europe315  and  the  only  way  
to   protect   European   democracies   from   the   tyranny   of   the   market   and   European  
bureaucracy  is  to  return  to  national  currencies  and  national  sovereignty.316    
Interestingly,  a  similar  disagreement  and  deep  ambivalence  existed  among  Marxist  
scholars  in  the  early  20th  century.  On  one  hand,  Lenin  defended  the  idea  that  the  best  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312  Habermas   observes   how   in   the   ‘theatre   for   Europe’   that   Brussels   has   become,   politicians  
court  the  favour  of  the  markets  and  fall  prey  to  the  capitalist  bureaucratic  whirlpool.  That  is  
why   Europe   needs   to   be   radically   rebuilt   and   its   democracy   deepened.   In   the   last   years,  
Habermas  has  written  three  books  on  Europe  (2008,  2011,  2013).    
313  Streeck’s  analysis  of  the  dilemma  faced  by  the  debtor  state  regarding  whether  to  prioritize  
the  interest  of  the  first  or  of  the  second  constituency  has  already  been  presented.  For  Streeck’s  
analysis  on  Europe,  see  Chapter  4  of  Buying  Time  (2013,  p.  605-­‐689).  
314  Meyer,  2013,  p.18.  
315  Assheuer,  2013.  
316  Meyer,  2013,  p.18.  
   140  
way   for  workers   to  resist  exploitation  at  home  and   imperial  domination  abroad  was  
national   self-­‐determination.   The   encouragement   of   nationalism   in   the   periphery  
seemed  to  Lenin  a  promising  way  to  revolutionise  the  colonial  systems,  and  therefore,  
was   seen   as   an   excellent   weapon   with   which   to   combat   capitalism.317   Stalin   later  
adopted   this   view,   proclaiming   an   alliance   with   the   national   movements   in   the  
colonies  with   the  objective  of   overthrowing   capitalism   in   the  periphery,   even  when  
the   national  movements,   as   such,  were   bourgeois   and   not   proletarian.   By   contrast,  
Luxemburg   argued   in   numerous   pamphlets   at   the   time   that   nationalism   was   a  
bourgeois  ideology  and  no  longer  had  any  significance  for  the  proletariat.  She  wrote  
that   “the   duty   of   the   class   party   of   the   proletariat   to   protest   and   resist   national  
oppression  arises  not   from  any  special   rights  of  nations,   (…)  [but]  arises  solely   from  
the  general  opposition  to  the  class  regime  and  to  every  form  of  social  inequality  and  
social  domination.”318    
I   think   that   this   earlier   debate   sheds   light   on   some   of   the   difficulties   with   the  
Streeckian  position   in   the  contemporary  discussion   regarding   the  way   forward.  The  
comment  about  the  bourgeois  character  of  many  of  the  nationalist  movements  in  the  
periphery   is   crucial.   It  points   to   the  central   insight   that   the   rally  behind   the   flag  of  
nationalism  often  occludes:   the   fact   that  nationalist  mobilisation  serves  a  particular  
agenda,  namely  the  material  interests  of  the  political  and  economic  elites  of  the  given  
state.319    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317   see  Lenin’s   ‘Decree  of  Peace’  on  November  8,   1917,   in  which  Lenin  expressly  declared   the  
right  of  self-­‐determination  to  colonial  peoples  and  used  as  a  revolutionary  weapon  against  the  
capitalist  world.  “The  Right  of  Nations  to  Self-­‐Determination”.  
318  Luxemburg  in  ‘The  National  Question’:  Selected  Writings,  1976,  p.110.  
319  David  Miller   famously   argues   the   opposite   (1995).   “Social   justice  will   always   be   easier   to  
achieve  in  states  with  strong  national  identities”  (1995,  p.  96).  “The  welfare  state  -­‐  and  indeed,  
programmes  to  protect  minority  rights  -­‐  have  always  been  national  projects,   justified  on  the  
basis   that  members   of   a   community  must   protect   one   another   and   guarantee   one   another  
equal  respect.  If  national  identities  begin  to  dissolve,  ordinary  people  will  have  less  reason  to  
be  active  citizens,  and  political  elites  will  have  a  freer  hand  in  dismantling  those  institutions  
that  currently  counteract   the  global  market   to  some  degree””   (1995,  p.p.187).   I  offer  my  own  
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From  a  classical  liberal  perspective,  Hobson  and  Schumpter  both  make  this  point,  
highlighting   the   role   that   nationalism  plays   in  manipulating   the  masses   to   support  
things  that  are  against  their  own  material  interests.  As  discussed  above,  Hobson  did  
not   believe   that   imperialism  was   in   the  material   interest   of   the   “manufacturer   and  
trader”   or   of   the   citizen,   but   only   “a   source   of   great   gain   to   the   investor.”320  
Nationalism   and   the   ‘nationalist   enthusiasm   for   empire’   was   used   as   a   way   to  
manipulate  public  opinion  by  the  narrow  circle  of  the  ruling  class  to  get  the  masses  to  
support   something   (imperialism)   which   was   against   their   own  material   interests.321  
Hobson’s   analysis   of   the   political  milieu   that   enabled   the   upper   class   to   impose   its  
interests  on  society  was  later  taken  on  by  Hannah  Arendt  and  developed  in  a  broader  
context   so   as   to   link   imperialism   with   fascism.   In   a   nutshell,   then,   these   earlier  
debates  relating  to  the  potential  emancipatory  power  of  nationalism  bring  to  the  fore  
two   dangers,   dangers  which   anyone   endorsing   the   Streeckian   position  will   have   to  
respond  to.  First,   they  highlight  that  often,  behind  the  noble  exaltations  of  national  
self-­‐determination,  we  may   find   the  defence  of   the  material   interest  of   the   few,  not  
the   many.322   Second,   it   draws   attention   to   the   potentially   pernicious   and   highly  
dangerous  consequences  that  nationalist  movements  can  bring  about.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
critique  of   the  state's   limited  ability  and  willingness   to   serve   the  public   interest  qua  general  
interest  in  Chapter  8.    
320  Hobson  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.14.  
321  Hobson  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.14.  Post-­‐colonial  writers  also  make  this  point,  often  arguing  
not   only   that   nationalist  movements  were   projects   by   and   for   the   bourgeois,   but   also   for   a  
racialised  bourgeois.   “In   certain   Ibero-­‐American   societies,   then,   the   small  white  minority   in  
control   of   the   independent   states   and   the   colonial   societies   could   have   had   neither  
consciousness   nor   national   interests   in   common   with   the   American   Indians,   blacks   and  
mestizos.  On  the  contrary,  their  interests  were  explicitly  antagonistic  to  American  Indian  serfs  
and   black   slaves,   given   that   their   privileges   were   made   from   precisely   the   dominance   and  
exploitation   of   those   peoples   in   such   a   way   that   there   was   no   area   of   common   interest  
between   whites   and   non-­‐whites   and,   consequently,   no   common   national   interest   for   all   of  
them.   Therefore,   from   the   point   of   view   of   the   dominators,   their   social   interest   was  much  
closer  to  the  interests  of  their  European  peers,  and  consequently  they  were  always  inclined  to  
follow  the   interests  of   the  European  bourgeoisie.  They  were   in  this  specific  way  not  because  
they  were  subordinated  by  a  greater  economic  or  political  power”  (Quijano,  2008,  p.214).  
322  The  extent  to  which  this  is  the  case  is,  of  course,  open  to  debate.  As  we  saw,  David  Miller  
would  argue  that  the  opposite  is  the  case  and  that  social  justice  is  always  easier  to  achieve  in  
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Another   aspect   of   the   Streeck-­‐Habermas   debate   that   can   be   compared  with   the  
work  of  earlier   theorists  of   imperialism  brings   to   the   fore   the  somewhat  ambiguous  
assessment  of  the  state.  On  one  hand,  Streeck  goes  far  in  showing  how  the  state  today  
is  co-­‐opted  by  the  interests  of  the  Marktvolk  (his  second  constituency).  For  him,  the  
consolidation   state   is   the   ultimate   proof   that   the   state   has   positioned   itself   in   line  
with  the  financial  elite  and  against  the  state’s  citizenry.323  Against  this  backdrop,  his  
ardent   defence   of   the   return   to   the   nation   state   seems   somewhat   puzzling.   Why  
return   to   a   form   of   political   organisation   that   -­‐   according   to   Streeck   himself   -­‐   is  
classist  in  character?    
Hobson’s  argument  reveals  a  similar  tension:  writing  against  the  backdrop  of  the  
Boer  War,  the  roots  of  his  theory  go  back  to  studies  of  the  problem  of  mass  poverty  in  
the   great   industrial   cities   of   Britain.   As   a   radical   liberal,   he   did   not   think   that   the  
roots   of   imperialism   resided   in   capitalism   as   such,   but   rather   in   the   anachronistic  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
states  with   strong  national   identities.  Another   critic  may  argue   that   also  behind   the  hidden  
abode  of  noble  exaltations  of  internationalism  and/or  cosmopolitanism,  the  perpetuation  for  
particular  interests  can  be  recognised.  My  point  here  is  more  limited:  what  I  want  to  suggest  is  
that   it   cannot   be   assumed   that   in   the   contemporary   world   order,   rallying   around   the   flag  
necessarily  serves  the  interest  of  the  masses  and  that  the  state  is  both  able  and  willing  to  be  a  
champion  of  the  general  public  interest.  I  say  more  to  defend  this  position  in  Chapter  8.    
323  In  his  analysis,  Streeck  makes  it  seem  as  if  the  rise  of  the  second  constituency  is  something  
utterly  novel,  springing  from  the  breakdown  of  the  Bretton  Woods  System,  the  slowdown  of  
the  post-­‐WWII  economic  boom,  and  the  political  choices  made  by  states  to  turn  to  credit  to  
finance  their  expenses.  For  Streeck,  it  is  this  transition  from  the  ‘tax’  to  the  ‘debt-­‐state’  which  
explains  the  rise  of  the  second  constituency.  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  before  the  ‘tax  
state’   turned   into   the   ‘debt   state’   -­‐   during   the   post-­‐war   boom,   in   which   the   state   had   the  
ability  to  satisfy  the  interests  of  different  classes  –  the  state  acted  with  the  interests  of  its  first  
constituency  in  mind.  Scholars  of  imperialism  would  question  this  assumption.  Marxist  anti-­‐
imperialist   scholars  would  question  the  extent   to  which  the  state  can  and/or  did  ever  act   in  
the   interest   of   all   classes   constituting   the   first   constituency.  Moreover,   historically  minded  
anti-­‐imperialist  scholars  would  argue  that  the  colonial  state  has,  since  its  inception,  served  the  
interests  of  an  international  (and  largely  foreign)  class.  It  is  thus  neither  new,  nor  surprising,  
that   the   state,   in   the   context   of   the   historic   specific   form   that   capitalism   takes,   serves   the  
interests   of   an   international   financial   class.   Serving   the   interests   of   an   international   (and  
largely  foreign)  class  was  precisely  what  the  Westphalian  state  system  was  set  up  to  do  in  the  
colonies.  Tully,  for  instance,  argues  that  the  constitutional  modern  state  did  not  precede  the  
institutional   global   imperial   order.  Rather,   the   constitutional  modern   state   took   the   form   it  
did  within  an  imperial,  institutional  global  order.    This  is  important  because  it  points  out  that  
–  rather  than  a  break  with  a  formerly  sovereign  state  which  acted  in  the  interests  of  the  first  
constituency  it  allegedly  represents  –  the  rise  of  the  second  constituency  within  a  financialised  
economy  is  actually  no  more  than  the  continuation  of  an  imperial  relationship  under  different  
guises.    
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political  structure  which  enabled  the  upper  classes  to  co-­‐opt  the  state  and  make  it  a  
servant  of  its  particular  interests.324  Notwithstanding,  and  in  line  with  his  conviction  
that   capitalism   could   be   reformed,   he   believed   that   the   state   had   the   ability,   in  
principle,   to   radically   alter   the   character   of   the   economic   system   by   adjusting   the  
distribution  of  social  product.  Put  differently,  while  at  the  time  of  writing  he  saw  the  
state  as  a  puppet  of  the  interests  of  the  upper  class,  he  believed  in  its  ability  to  act  in  
the  interest  of  the  masses,  and  thereby  make  imperialism  an  unnecessary  solution  to  
the  problem  of  under-­‐consumption.  This  optimism  is  shared  by  Streeck.    
   Habermas  points  out  this  tension  that  Streeck  shares  with  Hobson.  Why  does  
Streeck   think,   Habermas   wants   to   know,   that   the   state   –   once   liberated   from   the  
restraints   that   the   European   Union   imposes   on   its   sovereignty   –   will   defend   the  
interests   of   the   Staatsvolk?  And  where  will   the   small,   isolated   democratic   states   of  
Europe  find  the  power  and  the  scope  of  political  influence  to  face  up  to  the  power  of  
the  Marktvolk?  While  I  think  that  Habermas  is  right  in  asking  these  questions,  I  think  
that  his  own  assessment  of  the  state  is  no  less  mistaken  and  his  positive  proposal  for  a  
greater  supranational  European  Democracy  no  less  naïve  than  Streeck’s  hope  that  the  
consolidation   state   may   magically   become   a   champion   of   the   interests   of   the  
Staatsvolk.    
Habermas   presents   a   picture   of   the   current   predicament   where   financial  
markets   ‘outgrew’   nation   states   and   globalising   markets   ‘ran   away’   from   politics.  
There  are  two  particularly  problematic  aspects  of  this  picture,  one  of  which  leads  to  
the   underestimation   of   the   state’s   ability   to   govern   the   economy,   and   the   second  
which  may  overestimate   its  willingness   to  do   so.  First,  Habermas’   imagery  makes   it  
sound   as   though   politics   and   the   economy   were   separate   from   each   other.   This  
misrepresents   the  multifarious  ways   in  which   the   state  daily   interferes   and  governs  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324  Hobson  in  Mommsen,  1980,  p.16.  
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the   market   economy   and   ensures   that   the   market   can   continue   with   ‘business   as  
usual.’  Contrary  to  the  picture  Habermas  paints,  where  the  state  is  unable  to  govern  
the  market,  the  state  is  extremely  capable  in  this  regard.  Second,  and  also  springing  
from  this  illusion  of  the  separateness  of  the  economy  from  politics,  Habermas  makes  
it  sound  as   if  the  economy  were  somehow  natural.  This  fails  to  recognise  that   if  the  
markets  ‘outgrew’  government  today,  it  would  precisely  because  the  latter  set  up  the  
institutional   framework   for   them   to   do   so.   If   today   the   state   insists   that   it   can   no  
longer  govern  the  markets,  this  lies  less  in  its  inability  than  in  its  unwillingness  to  do  
so.325   In   this   sense,   then,  Habermas   seems   to  overestimate   the   state’s  willingness   to  
regulate   the  market.  To   sum,  while  Habermas  may  underestimate   the  ability  of   the  
state  to  govern  the  markets,  Streeck  may  overestimate  the  state’s  willingness  to  do  so.    
To   a   certain   extent,   the   conclusion   to   draw   from   this   Streeck-­‐Habermas  
debate   may   seem   fairly   under-­‐whelming,   if   judged   by   the   theoretical   insights  
generated.   Ultimately,   it   seems,   the   debate   between   two   of   Germany’s   most  
prominent   contemporary  public   intellectuals  boils  down   to   an  empirical  question  –  
an  empirical  question  which,  it  will  suffice  to  say,  is  extremely  difficult  to  disentangle  
from  our  deepest  convictions  relating  to  the  emancipatory  potential  of  the  state  and  
market.   Put   differently,   the   debate   between  Habermas   and   Streeck   ultimately   boils  
down   to   an   empirical   judgment   regarding   the   basket   in  which  we  want   to   put   our  
eggs:  do  we  think  that  a  regional  organisation  such  as  the  European  Union  will  prove  
to  be  a  better  champion  of  the  interests  of  the  disadvantaged  along  lines  of  class  and  
statehood?  Or  do  we  think  that  the  nation-­‐state  is  the  most  able  and  willing  body  to  
serve  as  the  defender  of  said  interests?    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325  A  critic  of   this  view  may  argue  that  globalisation  has   fundamentally  changed  the  rules  of  
the  game,  curtailing  a  nation  state’s  ability  to  direct  and  control   the  economy.  Globalisation  
has   “weakened   the   ability   of   the   nation   state   to   regulate   capital   and   utilize   traditional  
economic  policy   instruments  to  secure  traditional  social  democratic  policy  goals”  (Whyman,  
2006,  p.  27).  
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The   connection   to   earlier   debates   among   theorists   of   imperialism,   however,  
allows   us   to   say   something   slightly   more   interesting   about   the   Streeck-­‐Habermas  
debate  and  the  positions  therein.  First,  prior  debates  quarrelling  over  the  potentially  
emancipatory   character   of   nationalism   rightly   highlight   the   dangers   that   this  
allegedly   emancipatory   solution   can  bring   about.  Anyone   endorsing   (the   return   to)  
the  nation-­‐state  will  have  to  respond  not  only  to  the  theoretical  warnings  regarding  
the  potential  dangers  of  a  return  of  nationalist  movements,  but  also  to  their  historical  
track-­‐record.    
A  promising  normative  position  is  the  one  put  forward  by  Vrousalis.  Writing  
in  defence  of   a  qualified  endorsement  of   a   right   to  national   self-­‐determination  as   a  
way   of   resisting   imperialism,   he   contests   that   states  whose  members   are   victims   of  
imperialism  have  a  right  to  national  self-­‐determination  “if  and  only   if   the  ascription  
of   such   a   right   strengthens   the   hand   of   the   victims   of   imperialism   taken   as   a  
whole.”326   Vrousalis’   endorsement   of   national   self-­‐determination   movements   thus  
represents  a  qualified,  cosmopolitan  defence  of  the  nation-­‐state  that  I  also  endorse.  It  
defends  the  nation-­‐state  to  the  extent  that  it  serves  the  aim  of  protecting  the  interests  
of  the  oppressed  across  national  borders.  Although  Vrousalis  is  silent  on  the  question  
of   how  much   the   rights   of  members   ought   to   be   ‘weighted’   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   those   of   non-­‐
members,  the  option  of  not  considering  the  interests  of  the  latter  at  all  is  excluded.  I  
say   more   regarding   the   type   of   actions   that   this   qualified   right   for   national   self-­‐
determination   entails   in   Chapter   7,   where   I   defend   the   view   that   under   certain  
circumstances,  the  state  has  a  duty  to  engage  in  acts  of  civil  disobedience.    
Second,  reviewing  the  positions  of  some  of  the  scholars  of  imperialism,  draws  
attention  to  routes  forward  that  neither  Habermas  nor  Streeck  emphasised.  The  real  
debate  does  not  seem  to  be  one  about  being  for  or  against  the  return  to  the  state  as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326  Vrousalis,  2016,  p.88.  
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such.  Nor  is   it  completely  accurate  to  argue,  a   la  Streeck,  that  the  state  is  presented  
with   a   binary   choice   between   acting   in   the   interests   of   its   first   or   its   second  
constituency.  Rather,  the  state  seems  to  face  an  amalgam  of  options,  ranging  from  the  
further   endorsement   of   a  neoliberal   orthodoxy   to   the   socialisation  of   the   economy,  
with   all   the   intermediary   options,   which   would   take   it   down   the   road   of   a   social-­‐
democracy.  This   is   the  point  that  the  preceding  discussion  of  the  work  Hobson  and  
Schumpeter   and   other   radical   liberals   emphasises.   Both   scholars   sustain   that  
capitalism   does   not   necessarily   result   in   an   imperialist   drive   outwards,   but   that   a  
certain   form   of   capitalism   does   –   a   form   of   capitalism   that   is   embedded   in   an  
anachronistic  socio-­‐political  structure.  Radically  overhauling  this  anachronistic  socio-­‐
political  structure  should  be  the  real  focus  of  any  emancipatory  struggle.327  Chapter  8  
of   this   thesis  will   say  more   about   this   intermediary,   conventionalist   account   of   the  
state  and  its  emancipatory  potential.    
  
Conclusion  and  Road  Ahead  
Let  me  conclude  by  summarising  the  main  insights  gained  thus  far.   In  Part  I  of  this  
thesis,   I   sought   to   provide   a   structural   explanation   for   a   country’s   debt   history.   I  
outlined   the   structures   (namely   financialisation   and   the   SD&CR)   and   laid   out   the  
relevant   considerations   to   explain   a   country’s   debt   history   with   reference   to   these  
structures.  I  argued  that  the  injustice  of  the  SD&CR  -­‐  a  crucial  part  of  a  financialised  
economy  -­‐  resides  in  the  existence  of  positions  of  advantage  and  disadvantage,  where  
those  in  the  latter  positions  are  vulnerable  to  structural  domination  and  exploitation.  
Characterised   by   these   wrongs,   the   regime   can   be   recognised   as   a   mechanism  
through   which   liberal   imperialism   is   exerted.   The   positions   of   advantage   and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327  This  seems  in  line  with  some  of  the  recommendations  made  by  Piketty  in  arguing  for  policy  
reforms,  such  as  a  global  capital  tax  (see  chapter  15  in  Capital  in  the  21st  Century,  2014).    
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disadvantage,   in   turn,   are   structured   along   lines   of   class   and   statehood,   and   these  
axes   interact   in   a   way   to   create   what   I   call   a   class   of   ‘taxpayer   aristocracy’   and   of  
‘financial  aristocracy.’  While  the  primary  wrongdoers  in  cases  of  structural-­‐relational  
injustices   are   the   members   of   the   financial   class,   the   debtor   state   is   a   necessary  
collaborator.   Provided   my   reader   finds   these   arguments   convincing,   the   structural  
explanation   given   leads   directly   into   the   following   question:   How   to   think   about  
responsibility   attribution   to   individual   actors   against   the   backdrop   of   such   a  
structural  explanation?  This  is  the  question  to  which  the  second  part  of  the  thesis  is  
devoted.  
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CHAPTER  5  
ON  RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  STRUCTURAL  INJUSTICE  
How   should   we   think   about   the   responsibility   of   particular   agents   against   the  
backdrop   of   structural   injustice?   This   is   the   question  with  which  we   shall   concern  
ourselves   here.   In   the   first   section   of   this   chapter,   I   present   two   different  
responsibility   models   (the   liability   and   the   social   connection   model).   The   social  
connection  model  was  developed  with  the  explicit  purpose  of  answering  the  question  
of  how  to  think  about  individual  responsibility  for  structural  injustice  and  it  remains  
the  most  insightful  account  of  responsibility  for  structural  injustice  to  this  day.  While  
the   social   connection  model  was  not   intended   to   replace,   only   to   complement,   the  
liability   model,   advocates   of   the   former   do   defend   that   it   is   the   most   appropriate  
model   to   make   sense   of   cases   of   structural   injustice.328   My   ambition   in   the   first  
section   of   this   chapter   is   to   disprove   this   claim.   I   argue   that   the   social   connection  
model   is   not   by   itself   sufficient   to  make   sense   of   the   full   responsibility   picture   for  
cases  of  structural  injustice.  Rather,  an  integrated  model  is  needed  that  combines  the  
social   connection   model   with   the   liability   model.   In   the   second   section   of   this  
chapter,  I  outline  how  such  an  integrated  responsibility  model  might  look  for  the  case  
that  concerns  us  here.  In  Section  III,  I  consider  a  powerful  objection  to  my  integrated  
model.   It   could   be   argued   that   integrating   different   understandings   and  models   of  
responsibility  is  like  wanting  to  have  the  cake  and  eat  it  too.  Ultimately,  my  critic  may  
argue,  the  logics  and  aims  of  these  understandings  of  responsibility  pull   in  different  
directions  and  are  incompatible.  In  the  third  section  of  this  chapter  I  respond  to  this  
critique  before  concluding.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328  Scholars  who  have  defended  the  social  connection  model   in  some  of   its   forms  are  Young  
(2006),   Moncrieffe   (2011),   Lu   (2011),   Kahn   (2012),   Parekh   (2011),   Calder   (2010),   Neuhäuser,  
(2014),  Hayward  (2017),  Ingram  (2011),  Mckeown  (2015),  among  others.    
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Two  Models  of  Responsibility  
The  traditional  way  of  thinking  about  responsibility  can  be  lodged  under  the  ‘liability  
model   of   responsibility.’329   The   liability   model   of   responsibility   focuses   on  
establishing  a  causal   link  between  action  and  outcome,  and  attributes  responsibility  
to  the  agent  who  brought  the  particular  outcome  about.  In  that  sense,  it  is  backward-­‐
looking  and  isolating:  backward-­‐looking  because  responsibility  is  attributed  for  an  act  
that  came  to  an  end  and  resides  in  the  past,  and  isolating  because  once  responsibility  
is  attributed  to  one  agent,  the  others  are  ‘off  the  hook.’    
The  social  connection  model  of  responsibility  is  opposed  to  the  liability  model  
in  many   ways.   It   holds   that   all   those   who   contributed   to   a   structural   process   that  
resulted   in   injustice   are   responsible   for   that   injustice.   The   responsibility   that   the  
contributing   actors   hold   is   forward-­‐looking   and   shared.   It   is   forward-­‐looking   in   the  
sense  that  responsibility  resides  in  taking  action  to  change  the  unjust  structures.  It  is  
shared  and  non-­‐isolating  because  the  fact  that  one  actor  is  held  responsible  does  not  
relieve   the   others   from   being   similarly   responsible.   Indeed,   since   the   injustices   at  
stake  are  structural,  and  therefore   it   is  highly  unlikely  that  one   individual  actor  will  
have   the  power   to   change   the   structures   by  him  or  herself,   the   responsibilities  will  
most   likely   have   to   be   discharged   collectively,   by   coming   together   and   organising  
politically  to  achieve  change.    
Though   the  social  connection  model   is   forward-­‐looking  and  shared,  and   the  
liability  model  is  backward-­‐looking  and  isolating,  these  responsibility  models  are  not  
rivals.   Instead,   the   social   connection   model   was   developed   with   the   aim   of  
complementing,   not   replacing,   the   liability   model.   The   claim   is   made   by   social  
connection  theorists,  however,  that  the  liability  model  is  not  applicable  to  injustices  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329  This  is  a  categorisation  introduced  by  Young  (2011),  which  was  then  picked  up  by  scholars  
working  on  responsibility  for  structural  injustice.    
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that  are  structural  in  nature.330  For  structural  injustices,  the  social  connection  model  
is  more  appropriate.    
   Structural   injustices  differ   from  relational  wrongs.  Relational  wrongs  deviate  
from  a  commonly-­‐accepted  baseline,  have  come  to  an  end,  and  can  be  causally  traced  
back   to   the   action   of   a   single   perpetrator.   Structural   injustices,   by   contrast,   are  
ongoing   and   are   “produced   and   reproduced   by   thousands   or   millions   of   persons  
usually  acting  within  institutional  rules  and  according  to  practices  that  most  people  
regard  as  morally  acceptable.”331  Albeit  it  may  not  be  difficult  to  identify  persons  who  
contribute   to   structural  processes   that  produce   injustice,   it   is   impossible   to   identify  
how   one   particular   individual   or   collective   agent   directly   produces   the   injustice.332  
The   unique   nature   of   structural   injustices,   then,   calls   for   a   different   responsibility  
model;  a  responsibility  model  to  complement  the  liability  model.    
   As   I   see   it,   the   definition   of   structural   injustice   contains   the   rationale   and  
justification  for  the  social  connection  model,  for  it  is  the  fact  that  structural  injustices  
are   (a)   produced   and   reproduced   by   thousands   or  millions   of   persons,   (b)  who   act  
according   to   what   most   would   accept   as   morally   acceptable   norms   and   practices,  
which   establishes   the   need   for   (c)   a   responsibility   model   that   attributes   forward-­‐
looking,   non-­‐isolating   and   not   distributed   responsibilities.   In   what   follows,   I   take  
issue  with  these  three  components  (a-­‐c).    
First,  I  argue  that  the  fact  that  millions  of  individual  agents  contribute  to  the  
structural  injustice  in  a  diffused  manner  does  not  inhibit  us  from  distinguishing  more  
clearly   between   different   sources   of   structural   injustice.   Returning   to   the   threefold  
distinction   made   in   Chapter   3   between   structural   processes   proper,   structural-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330   Young,   for   instance,   states   the   following:   “I   propose   a   social   connection   model   of  
responsibility  specifically  for  thinking  about  responsibility  in  relation  to  structural  injustice.  In  
proposing   this   model,   I   do   not   aim   to   replace   or   reject   the   liability   model.   I   am   claiming  
instead  that  the  liability  model  is  appropriate  in  some  contexts  but  not  all.”  (2011,  p.100).    
331  Young,  2011,  p.95.  
332  Young,  2011,  p.45.  
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relational,   and   structural-­‐systemic   contributions   to   structural   injustice,   I   argue   that  
failing   to  make   this   distinction   occludes,   behind   the   vague   invocation   of   structural  
processes,  the  very  responsibility  that  the  social  connection  model  is  supposed  to  be  
able   to  attribute.  Second,   I  argue   that  some  of   the  agents  contributing   to  structural  
injustice  are  by  no  means  morally  innocent  and  that  these  agents  ought  to  be  made  
individually   liable   for   their   contribution   to   structural   injustice.   Together,   this  
challenges  the  contention  that  the  social  connection  model  alone  is  enough  to  make  
sense  of  the  responsibility  picture  pertaining  to  cases  of  structural  injustice.    
  
(a)  Structural  injustice  is  produced  and  reproduced  by  thousands  or  millions  of  persons  
  
The  attribution  of  responsibility  under  the  liability  model  predisposes,  first,  a  causal  
connection   between   an   action   and   the   outcome   and,   second,   that   the   agent   to   be  
held   responsible   holds   certain   features   of   voluntary   agency.333   The   problem   with  
attempting  to  apply  the  liability  model  to  cases  of  structural  injustice  is  that  the  type  
of   causality   that   is   required   for   the   attribution   of   responsibility   under   the   liability  
model   is  not  present   in   the   latter   cases.   Since   the   type  of   causality   required  by   the  
liability  model  is  absent,  as  the  argument  goes,  the  model  is  inappropriate  for  cases  of  
structural  injustice.    
   The   diagnosis   that   the   identification   of   causality   in   cases   of   structural  
injustice   is  difficult   can   take  a   stronger  and  a  weaker   form.  The   stronger  version  of  
this  argument  maintains  that  the  attribution  of  the  isolating  form  of  responsibility  is  
problematic  because  it  is  epistemologically  impossible  to  directly  link  an  actor’s  deeds  
to  the  structural  injustice.  The  causal  link  is  so  occluded  by  complex  interactions  that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333  This   is  not  fully  correct,  as  there  are  forms  of  responsibility  attribution  under  the  liability  
model  which  do  not  require  causation.  Culpable  negligence  and  strict  liability  are  examples  of  
these.  Social  connection  theorists,  however,  see  these  as  mere  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  of  
the  liability  model.    
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it   is  not  possible   to   trace   the  causal  mechanism.  The  weaker   form  that   this  critique  
can  take  is  one  that  questions  how  sensible  it  is  to  identify  one  causal  mechanism  and  
single  it  out  as  the  normatively  relevant  one.  Even  if  it  were  possible  to  identify  one  
such  link  (a  possibility  that  the  stronger  version  of  this  critique  rejects),  how  sensible  
is   it   —in   light   of   the   complexity   of   the   causal   events—to   single   out   one   agent’s  
contribution  and  attribute  an  isolating  form  of  responsibility  to  that  agent?  
   So   far,   the   contention   of   social   connection   scholars   that   it   is   difficult   to  
identify   causal   connections   between   agents   and   outcomes   in   cases   of   structural  
injustice  has  been  criticised  in  two  ways.  First,  an  empirical  challenge  has  been  raised,  
according   to   which   it   is   possible   to   identify   a   causal   link   between   an   actor   and   a  
structural   injustice   in  more   instances   than   often   assumed.   Second,   the   critique  has  
been  made  that  the  understanding  of  causality  adopted  by  social  connection  theorists  
is   too  narrow.  According  to  this  critique,   there   is  no  reason  to  accept  the  particular  
causal   requirement   attributed   to   the   liability   model,   namely   the   criteria   that   the  
occurrence  of  harm  be  counterfactually  dependent  on  some  agent’s  conduct.334    
The   critique   I   want   to   make   is   neither   of   these   two,   but   a   third   one.   My  
contention   is   that,   in   failing   to  differentiate  between   the   three  dimensions   through  
which  structural  injustices  are  (re)produced,  we  lump  together  very  different  sources  
of  structural  injustice.  In  doing  so,  we  fail  to  recognise  that  different  contributions  are  
not   necessarily   comparable.  While   some   truly   are   nothing   but   a   contribution   to   a  
structural  process  (a  source  of  structural  injustice  I  call  ‘structural  processes  proper’),  
others   are   socio-­‐political   decisions   which   can   be   attributed   to   powerful   individual  
agents   (at   the   structural-­‐systemic   and   the   structural-­‐relational   levels.)   Like  
contributions  made  to  structural  processes  proper,  these  decisions  also  contribute  to  
the   structural   processes   that   result   in   structural   injustice,   but   they   need   to   be  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334  Barry  and  MacDonald,  2016.  
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individuated,   as  well.  Not   doing   so   runs   counter   to   the   professed   aim  of   the   social  
connection   model   of   holding   individual   agents   responsible   for   structural   injustice.  
The  rest  of  this  sub-­‐section  is  devoted  to  defending  this  argument.    
While  I  think  that  the  social  connection  model  is  appropriate  to  think  about  
structural   processes   proper,   it   is   insufficient   for   thinking   about   the   other   two  
dimensions   through   which   structural   injustice   is   reproduced,   namely   wrongful  
contributions  on  the  one  hand  (the  structural-­‐relational  level),  and  decisions  made  by  
powerful   actors   further   up   the   value   chain   on   the   other   (the   structural-­‐systemic  
level).335  My  worry  is  that  if  we  fail  to  distinguish  between  these  different    dimensions  
of   structural   injustices,   we   end   up   occluding   real   (often   political)   choices  made   by  
powerful   actors   in   related   or   unrelated  policy   areas.   Socio-­‐political   decisions   of   the  
most  powerful  actors  are  thereby  rendered  invisible.    
Social   connection   theorists   warn   us   of   the   danger   of   employing   reification  
strategically  as  a  way  of  avoiding  responsibility.  As  Young  suggests:    
Nearly   all   the   matter   of   the   world   we   encounter   is   marked   by  
culture,   human   projects,   and   human   decisions.   As   thus  
materialized,   however,   we   do   not   encounter   the   action   as   such;  
indeed,   many   of   these   actions   whose   material   consequences   we  
experience   were   performed   a   long   time   in   the   past.   The   inter  
material   things   and   constraints   we   encounter   bear  marks   of   past  
praxis’  336    
  
I   believe   that   the   failure   to   distinguish  more   clearly   between   these   three   forms   of  
contributions  –  those  of  powerful  individual  actors  who  either  act  wrongfully  or  who  
make  decisions  in  related  policy  areas  and  those  that  more  readily  fall  under  the  label  
of   ‘structural   process   proper’   –results   in   the   very   reification  Young  warns  us   about.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335  Examples  of  such  decisions  discussed  so   far  are,   for   instance,   the  abolition  of   the  Bretton  
Woods  Regime  by  Nixon.  In  the  Greek  case  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  an  example  of  a  structural-­‐
systemic   contribution   could   be   the   adoption   of   the   Euro   under   the   European   monetary  
arrangement  that  was  agreed  on  at  the  time.    
336  Young,  2011,  p.54.  
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This  is  not  only  deeply  problematic  socio-­‐politically,  but  also  runs  against  the  whole  
purpose  of  the  social  connection  model,  which  consists  of  conceptualising  individual  
responsibilities   in  relation  to   issues  of   structural   injustice.  As  Barry  and  MacDonald  
put  it,  there  is  a  clear  sense  in  which  the  social  connection  model  “absolves  agents  of  
responsibility  to  address  structural  injustice.”337  
Social   connection   scholars   might   counter   that   the   bracketing   of  
responsibilities   of   powerful   public   and   private   institutions,   and   the   focus   on  
responsibilities   of   civil   society,   are   intended   and   justified.   First,  most   theorising   on  
social  and  global  justice  has  focused  on  the  responsibilities  of  the  powerful  public  and  
private   institutions.   The   increased   attention   paid   to   civil   society   actors   by   social  
connection  scholars  could  thus  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  balance  out  the  scale,  
or  as  an  acceptance  of  a  certain  division  of  labour  within  the  discipline.  
The   second   reason   provided   by   social   connection   scholars   relates   to   the  
responsibilities  of  states  and  other  public  institutions.  Public  institutions  can  be  said  
to   be   failing   in   their   task   of   fighting   for   a  more   just   world.   These   institutions   are  
“indeed  important  and  powerful  agents  relevant  to  transforming  structural  processes  
to   make   them  more   just.”338   They   can   limit   the   power   of   private   powerful   agents,  
establish   incentive   structures   that  work   for   the  many   instead   of   the   few,   and   offer  
remedial   solutions   that   directly   improve   the   livelihoods   of   the   most   vulnerable.  
Often,  however,  
States  fail  to  do  some  or  all  of  these  things;  and  when  they  do,  it  is  
not   because   they   are   corrupt   or   incompetent.   More   often,   it   is  
because   the   rules   and   practices   of   these   institutions   are   more  
aligned  with  the  powers  and  processes  that  produce  or  perpetuate  
injustice   than   with   those   who   seek   to   undermine   it   (…).   The  
policies   and   programs   that   states   and   international   organizations  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337  Barry  and  MacDonald,  2015,  p.110.  
338  Young,  2011,  p.151.  
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enact   themselves   tend   more   to   reflect   the   outcome   of   those  
struggles  than  to  balance  between  or  adjudicate  them.339    
  
Since  citizens  cannot   turn  to   the  state  or   international   institutions  as   intermediates  
in   a   struggle  between  different   sets  of   interests,   it   could  be   concluded   that   citizens  
not   only   have   an   obligation   to   “demand   that   government   correct   injustice,”340,   but  
also   an   obligation   to   mobilise   politically   to   fight   the   structural   injustices   directly,  
without  the  state  or  other  public  institutions  as  intermediaries.    
This   is   hardly   a   justification,   however,   for   excluding   the   theorisation   of   the  
responsibilities   of   the   public   institutions   themselves.   Moreover,   it   is   somewhat  
puzzling   that   after   correctly   recognising   that   public   institutions   are   failing   to  meet  
their   obligations   to   work   on   reducing   injustice   in   the   status   quo,   the   questions   of  
whether,   for   what,   on   what   grounds,   and   with   what   consequences   these   public  
institutions  are  responsible,  is  completely  neglected  by  social  connection  scholars.  In  
my  opinion,  the  fact  that  public  institutions  turn  out  to  be  serving  the  winners  of  the  
struggle  between  different  sets  of   interests  gives  us  an  added  reason  to   theorise   the  
responsibilities   of   these   public   institutions,   not   a   reason   to   exclude   them.   In   the  
chapters   to   come,   I   explore   the   responsibility   of   public   institutions   (of   public  
multilateral  creditors  in  Chapter  6  and  of  the  debtor  state  in  Chapter  7).    
Another  surprising  thing  about  this  argument  is  that  it  upholds  an  extremely  
pessimistic   view   of   public   institutions   and   of   the   prospects   of   these   institutions  
choosing   to   act   otherwise,   parallel   with   a   very   noble   view   of   citizens   and   private  
actors.  This  portrays  a  picture  in  which  we,  as  private  actors,  will  simply  assume  the  
political  responsibilities  attributed  to  us.  But  if  there  is  one  thing  that  the  pessimistic  
and   overly   deterministic   vision   of   public   institutions   reveals,   it   is   that   there   are  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339  Young,  2011,  p.151.  
340  Young,  2011,  p.150.  
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powerful   private   actors   who   will   not   want   the   structures   to   be   changed.341   In  
assuming   that   everyone   wants   to   –   and   has   an   interest   in   –   changing   the   unjust  
structures,  the  argument  made  to  exclude  public  institutions  from  the  responsibility  
picture   is   neglected;   the   argument   –   that   is   -­‐   that   there   are   ingrained   material  
interests   that   militate   against   the   form   of   political   mobilization   advocated   for   by  
social  connection  theorists.    
To  summarise,  I  have  thus  far  argued  that  we  need  to  distinguish  more  clearly  
between   three   different   sources   of   the   production   and   reproduction   of   structural  
injustice,   namely   structural   processes   that   create   injustice,   and   individual   decisions  
(either   in   the   structural-­‐relational   or   in   the   structural-­‐systemic   variant)   made   by  
powerful   actors   which,   albeit   contributing   to   structural   injustice,   also   offer  
independent   grounds   on   which   to   hold   the   given   agent   liable.   Put   differently,   I  
understand   the   contributions   that   powerful   private   and   public   actors   make   to   the  
structural  process  to  differ  from  those  made  by  other  actors,  who  contributed  only  in  
way   of   being   part   of   the   structural   process   proper.342   While   powerful   private   and  
public   actors   should   not   necessarily   be   held   responsible   for   the   structural   injustice  
itself   -­‐   and   also   individual   consumers   should   be   held   responsible   for   their  
contribution  to  the  structural  process  -­‐  the  powerful  actors  can  be  made  responsible  
for   their   contribution   to   the   structural   process   in   a   way   that   latter   actors   can   or  
should  not.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341   If   those   actors  who   do   not   have   an   interest   in   seeing   the   structures   changed   fail   (as  we  
might   expect)   to   take   up   the   shared,   collective,   and   forward-­‐looking   responsibilities   that  
Young  ascribes  to  them,  the  structures  will  most  likely  not  be  changed.  This  is  a  real  problem  
for  social  connection  scholars  –  whose   focus,  after  all,   is  on  altering  unjust  structures,   -­‐  and  
further  adds  to  the  free  rider/time-­‐inconsistency  problem  identified  by  Nussbaum,  Barry  and  
MacDonald  (Nussbaum  in  Young,  2011;  Barry  and  MacDonald,  2016).    
342   It   may   be   the   case   that   all   of   these   different   sources   are   necessary   for   the   structural  
injustice   to   materialise.   Conversely,   it   may   also   be   that   either   one   of   these   sources   would  
suffice  to  bring  about  the  structural  injustice.  Independently  of  whether  or  not  the  structural  
injustice  is  over-­‐determined,  I  take  the  contribution  of  the  powerful  private  and  public  actors  
to  be  different  to  the  one  made  by  individual  consumers.    
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(b)  Structural  injustice  is  produced  by  agents  acting  within  institutional  rules  and  
according  to  practices  that  most  people  regard  as  morally  acceptable    
  
A   relatively   benign  definition  of   structural   injustice  underlies   the   social   connection  
model   of   responsibility.   It   is   because   of   the   twofold   feature   that   (i)   not   one,   but   a  
multitude  of  individual  actions  lead  to  the  production  and  instantiation  of  structural  
injustice   (the   causality   condition   discussed   above),   (ii)   most   of   which   are   not  
considered   immoral   (the   condition   I   discuss   here),   that   social   connection   theorists  
seem  to  scruple  to  assign  distributed,  backward-­‐oriented  responsibilities.  The  shared,  
collective   and   forward-­‐looking   distribution   thus   hinges   on   this   somewhat   benign  
definition  of  structural   injustice.  This,   in  turn,   lets  social  connection  theorists  reject  
the   intuition   that   attributing   backward-­‐oriented   responsibilities   is   possible   and  
desirable  in  the  context  of  structural  injustices.    
Here  I  want  to  argue  that  this  benign  definition  of  structural  injustice  misses  
the   fact   that   structural   injustices   are   not   only   produced   by   what   I   have   called  
‘structural   processes   proper,’  which  may   indeed   be  morally   innocent   contributions,  
but   also   by   the   type   of   contributions   I   referred   to   as   structural-­‐relational   and  
structural-­‐systemic.  More   often   than   not,   these   later   contributions   are   not  morally  
innocent.   The   benign   definition   of   structural   injustice   underlying   the   social  
connection  model  is  incapable  of  accommodating  these  forms  of  morally  guilt  or  the  
morally  tainted  contributions  to  structural  injustice.    
   Let  me   start   by   reviewing  Young’s  discussion  of   ‘Eichmann   in   Jerusalem.’   In  
her   discussion   of   Arendt’s   work,   Young   suggests   that   it   was   crucial   for   Arendt   to  
distinguish   between   the   contributions   made   by   Eichmann   and   those   made   by  
German   citizens,   whose   contributions   consisted   of   believing   in   the   Nazi   party   and  
supporting   its   leaders.   Young   endorses   Arendt’s   opposition   to   the   claim   that  
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Eichmann’s  contribution  is  comparable  to  those  of  other  German  citizens.  While  the  
contributions  made  by  German  citizens  reside  in  “dwell[ing]  within  the  social  system  
that  enables  the  crimes  and  supply[ing]  that  system  with  at  least  passive  support,”343  
Eichmann’s   contributions   lie   in   organising   the   movement   of   trainloads   of   Jews   to  
death  camps.  According  to  both  Arendt  and  Young,   these  contributions  to  the  Nazi  
horrors   are   different   in   nature   and   warrant   different   forms   of   responsibility  
attribution.  
While   Young   endorses   Arendt’s   distinction,   her   definition   of   structural  
injustice,   as  well   as   her   social   connection  model   of   responsibility,   ultimately   fail   to  
capture   it.   In   her   model,   all   contributions   for   structural   injustice   end   up   being  
assigned   the   same   heading   of   ‘responsible   but   not   guilty.’   Eichmann-­‐type  
contributions  seem  to  drop  out  of  the  picture  in  Young’s  social  connection  model  of  
responsibility.  Put  differently,  while  Young   forcefully   condemns  Eichmann’s   actions  
on   moral   grounds,   she   does   not   distinguish   between   his   contributions   to   the  
structural  process  that  resulted  in  the  death  of  millions  of  individuals  in  death  camps,  
and  those  of   individual  German,  whose  contribution  to  the  same  crime  consisted  of  
not  resisting  the  Nazi  regime.  But  Eichmann’s  acts  are  not  only  morally  culpable  on  
their   own   –   they   also   contribute   to   the   structural   injustices   of   the   Nazi   party.  My  
suggestion  is  that  while  we  should  blame  Eichmann  on  moral  grounds  for  his  actions,  
we   should   also   allow   that   moral   condemnation   to   enter   in   our   assessment   of   his  
contribution  to  the  structural  injustice  in  which  his  actions  resulted.344  
Contrary   to   this   benign   definition   of   structural   injustice,   in   which   the  
individual   agents   that   contribute   to   the   production   of   structural   injustice   are  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343  Young,  2011,  p.86.  
344   Distinguishing   more   clearly   between   these   two   forms   of   contributions   is   also   what  
Nussbaum   seems   to   suggest   in   her   introduction   to   Young’s   book,   where   she   argues   that  
although  we  should  not  “blame  an  agent  for  not  shouldering  the  entirety  of  the  social  task  all  
by   herself   (…)   we   [should]   blame   her   for   not   shouldering   the   part   that   she   ought   to   have  
shouldered,  and  thus  we  blame  her  for  her  contribution  to  the  bad  outcome”  (p.xxii).  
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depicted   as  morally   innocent,   the   example   given   above   clearly   suggests   that  not   all  
contributions  to  structural  injustice  are  equally  innocent.  This  a  point  made  by  many  
of   the   critics   of   the   social   connection   model.   Gould   argues   at   length   that   the  
involvement   of   the   CEOs   of   multi-­‐national   corporations   and   that   of   sweatshop  
workers   are   not   comparable.345   Goodhart,   in   turn,   argues   that   there   is   something  
‘perverse’   about   the   claim   that   the   contribution  of   sweatshop  workers   to   their   own  
exploitation  is  comparable  to  that  of  their  exploiters.346    
Moreover,   despite   the   emphasis   on   bringing   to   the   fore   the   underlying  
structures   that   constitute   injustice   (and   not  merely   the   deviations   therefrom),   it   is  
not   sufficiently   emphasised   that   these   very   background   norms   did   not   become  
dominant  by  chance,  but  to  serve  particular  interests.  Goodhart  introduces  the  notion  
of   ‘constitutive  power’   to  defend   the  claim  that   the  norms   that  become  accepted  as  
the   epoch’s   unquestioned   background   music   are   intentionally   shaped   by   powerful  
actors   with   particular   sets   of   interests.347   Many   of   the   social   processes   that   are  
characterised  as    
unintentional  or  as  complex,  compound  consequences  of  seemingly  
insignificant  or  harmless  individual  behaviour  are  actually  products  
of   constitutive   power   –   specifically,   of   a   carefully   orchestrated,  
decades   long   program   of   neoliberal   economic   policy   designed   to  
serve  the  interests  of  capital  and  to  restore  class  power.348  
	  
So  while  social  connection  theorists  might  be  correct  in  that  most  people  pursue  their  
aims   and   interests   innocently,   they   miss,   first,   that   some   actors   do   not   do   so  
innocently,  but  rather  benefit  purposefully  from  the  structural  injustice  to  which  they  
contribute.  They   fail   to  emphasise,   second,   that   it   is   the  very  actors  who  contribute  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345  Gould,  2009.  
346  Goodhart,  2017,  p.  p.190.    
347   Constitutive   power   “is   power   that   produces   effects   manifest   in   ‘the   identities   of   the  
occupations   of   social   positions’   –   their   self-­‐understandings,   subjectivities,   frameworks   of  
meaning,  and  so  on”  (Goodhart,  2017,  p.187).  
348  Goodhart,  2017,  p.187.  
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purposefully   to   structural   injustice  who   shape  background  norms   in   a  manner   that  
serves  their  material  interests.349  This  is  so  despite  the  stated  intention  of  bringing  the  
underlying   background   structure,   which   the   liability   model   is   said   to   accept   as   a  
given,  to  the  fore.    
   So   far,   the   resistance   to   attribute   isolating,   backward-­‐looking   responsibility  
and  the  insistence  on  keeping  responsibility  and  liability  separate  has  been  criticised  
most  forcefully  due  to  the  inter-­‐temporal  inconsistency  it  creates.  In  other  words:  
The  [social  connection]  model  simultaneously  claims  that  those  in  
a  position  to  achieve  results  by  alleviating  structural  injustice  have  
weighty  moral  reasons  to  do  so  while  also  being  committed  to  the  
view   that,   should   these  agents   fail   to   take  action,   they   should  not  
be  judged  to  have  weightier  reasons  in  the  future  than  they  would  
otherwise  have.350  
  
According  to  these  critics,   it   is   logically   inconsistent  and  gives  the  wrong  incentives  
to  hold  individuals  responsible  in  time  x  to  do  y  and  fail  to  hold  them  responsible  at  
time  x+1  for  not  having  done  y.  According  to  Nussbaum,  it  is  difficult  to  maintain  the  
retrospective/prospective   portion   of   the   distinction,   guilt   being   appropriate   only   to  
past  acts,  “for  the  simple  reason  that  time  marches  on.”351  If  the  distinction  is  upheld,  
then   people   would   get   a   free   pass   indefinitely,   since   no   task   they   have   failed   to  
shoulder  ever  goes  onto  the  debit  (or  guilt  side)  of  their  ledger.352  
   What   I   have   argued   in   this   section   is   that,   while   it   is   true   that   the   time-­‐
inconsistency   problem   creates   a   moral   hazard   type   structure,   which   creates  
incentives  for  free  riding  on  your  responsibilities,  this  only  adds  to  the  more  central  
problem   that   a  non-­‐distributive   type  of   responsibility  distribution  occludes   the   fact  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349  Paying  too  little  attention  to  how  the  background  norms  are  shaped  by  the  most  powerful  
actors,  she  also  fails  to  acknowledge  sufficiently  how  agents  are  shaped  by  structures.    
350  Barry  and  MacDonald,  2016,  p.110.  
351  Nussbaum  in  Young,  2011,  p.xx.  
352  Nussbaum  in  Young,  2011,  p.xxi.  
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that   some   of   the   contributions   to   structural   injustice   are   not   morally   innocent.  
Contributors  do  not  necessarily  purposefully  and  in  mean  spirit  reproduce  structural  
injustices   with   the   intent   to   harm,   or   because   they   are   thoughtless   (like   Arendt’s  
family   man).   Most   of   the   agents   contributing   to   structural   injustice   in   a   morally  
blameworthy,  or  even  in  a  morally  tainted  way,  know  very  well  what  they  are  doing,  
but  they  keep  on  doing  it  because  it  serves  their  material  interests.    
  
(c)  For  structural  injustice,  responsibility  attribution  needs  only  to  be  forward-­‐looking,  
non-­‐isolating  and  not  distributed    
  
Social  connection  theorists  resist  the  distribution  of  backward-­‐looking  responsibility  
in   cases   of   structural   injustice   for   three   main   reasons.   First,   focusing   on   the  
distribution   of   backward-­‐oriented   responsibility   can   be   said   to   be   consequentially  
unwise  for  mobilising  individuals  for  political  action,  for  it  renders  both  wrongdoers  
and  victims  passive.  While  wrongdoers  either  react  with  defensiveness  or  self-­‐indulge  
in   their   blame,   victims   adopt   a   slave  morality   and   cultivate   a   spirit   of   resentment,  
neither  of  which  is  useful  in  mobilising  action  to  change  unjust  structures.353  Second,  
a   focus   on   backward-­‐oriented   responsibility   can   also   be   said   to   be   deontologically  
erroneous,  for  it  is  “mean-­‐spirited  to  seek  equivalence  for  every  harm  that  must  come  
from  the  flesh  next  to  someone’s  heart.”354  Third,  as  argued  in  the  sub-­‐section  above,  
social   connection   scholars   tend   to   adopt   a   very   benign   definition   of   structural  
injustice.  This,   in   turn,  allows  them  to  reject   the   intuition  that  a   fair  distribution  of  
backward-­‐oriented  responsibility  is  possible  and  desirable  in  the  context  of  structural  
injustices.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353  Young,  2011,  p.  116.  
354  Young,  2011,  p.  115.  
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The   forms   of   responsibility   which   are   appropriate   to   attribute   in   cases   of  
structural  injustice  are  non-­‐isolating,  shared,  and  political.  Non-­‐isolating  means  that  
where   an   agent   is   found   responsible   for   acting   in   a   way   that   contributes   to   the  
production   of   a   structural   injustice,   this   attribution   does   not   absolve   others   from  
responsibility.355   Shared   responsibility   describes   a   form   of   responsibility   that   “I  
personally  bear,  but   (...)   I  bear   it   in   the  awareness   that  others  bear   [it]  with  me.”356  
Finally,   political   responsibility   is   one   that   can   only   be   collectively   discharged.  
Fulfilling   this   political   responsibility   entails   acting   with   others   to   alter   the  
background  structures  that  produce  and  reproduce  structural  injustices.357    
This  is  not  to  say  that  it  is  not  acknowledged  that  actors  differently  positioned  in  
social  structures  may  have  different  ‘“kinds  and  degrees”  of  political  responsibility.358  
To   provide   guidance   about   what   differently   positioned   agents   ought   to   do  
‘parameters  of  reasoning’  are  introduced.  These  ‘parameters  of  reasoning’  are  power,  
privilege,   interest,   and   collective   ability.   While   they   do   not   serve   the   aim   of  
distributing   responsibilities,   they   are   intended   to   guide   agents   in   their   efforts   to  
discharge   their   responsibilities   by   organising   politically   to   change   the   unjust  
structures.359    
As  the  analysis  in  the  previous  two  sub-­‐sections  suggests,  however,  it  is  crucial  to  
distinguish   more   clearly   between   the   different   forms   of   contributions   made   to  
structural   injustice.   Once   we   recognise,   first,   that   not   all   sources   of   structural  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355  Young,  2011,  p.106.  
356  Young,  2011,  p.  109-­‐110.  
357  The  other   two  characteristics  of  Young’s   social   responsibilities   are   that   they  are   forward-­‐
looking   (focusing   on   injustices   that   are   still   ongoing)   and   that   they   bring   neglected  
background   structures   to   the   fore   which,   albeit   often   considered   morally   acceptable,  
contribute  to  the  production  of  structural  injustice  (Young,  2011,  p.108).    
358  Young,  2011,  p.  144.  
359  Miller,  who  fears  that  undistributed  responsibilities  will  not  be  acted  upon,  would  not  be  
convinced  by  these  parameters  of  reasoning,  for  “an  undistributed  duty  such  as  those  to  which  
everybody   is   subject   is   likely   to  be  discharged  by  nobody  unless   it   can  be  allocated   in   some  
way”  (2007,  p.98).  
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injustice   are   comparable   -­‐   that   we   need   to   distinguish   more   clearly   between  
structural   process   proper   on   one   hand,   and   socio-­‐political   decisions   made   by  
powerful   actors   on   the   other   –   and,   second,   that   we   ought   to   distinguish   between  
morally   innocent   contributions   and   those   that   are  morally  blameworthy  or   tainted,  
the   resistance   to   responsibility   distribution   becomes   difficult   to   defend.   In   my  
opinion,  once  we  see,  for  instance,  that  the  background  norms  that  we  accept  are  not  
manna  from  heaven,  but  are,  more  often  than  not,  purposefully  shaped  by  and  in  the  
interest  of  powerful  actors,   it  becomes  both  acceptable  and  appropriate   to  attribute  
backward-­‐looking,   distributive   forms   of   responsibility.   Similarly,   once  we   challenge  
the  overly  benign  conceptualization  of  structural  injustice  and  begin  to  paint  a  more  
nuanced  and  granular  picture  regarding  the  different  forms  of  contributions  made  to  
structural   injustice,   the   intuition   to   put   the   moral   scale   back   into   balance   by  
assigning  backward-­‐looking,   distributive   responsibilities   resurfaces.360   This   becomes  
all   the   more   important   when   we   recognise   the   discrepancy   between   the   (overly)  
negative   and   deterministic   assessment   of   public   institutions   and   the   (overly)  
optimistic   conception   of   individual   citizens’   willingness   to   pick   up   their   share   of  
political  responsibilities.    
Put   differently,   only   assigning   forward-­‐looking,   shared   responsibilities,   which  
ought   to   be   collectively   discharged  with   the   aim  of   altering   the   unjust   background  
structures,  no  longer  seems  to  suffice.  Contrary  to  what  is  suggested  by  its  advocates,  
the   social   connection   model   by   itself   does   not   account   for   the   full   responsibility  
picture   in   cases   of   structural   injustice.   An   integrated   model   of   responsibility   that  
allows   us   to   both   alter   unjust   structures   and   attribute   backward-­‐looking  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360  Claiming  that  the  intuition  of  distributing  responsibilities  regains  force  is  not  the  same  as  
advocating   for   an   isolating   form   of   responsibility   attribution.   As   will   become   clearer   as   I  
proceed,   distributing   responsibilities   does   not   directly   nor   necessarily   translate   into   an  
isolating  form  of  responsibility  attribution.      
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responsibility   to   individually   liable   agents   becomes   desirable.   In   the   next   section,   I  
sketch  what  such  an  integrated  model  might  look  like.    
  
An  Integrated  Responsibility  Model  
Most   scholars   that   defend   different   responsibility   models   agree   that   an   integrated  
model   is   required   to   capture   the   full   responsibility   picture   of   concrete   sites   of  
injustice.  Notwithstanding,  to  this  day,  no  one  has  applied  them  to  a  concrete  site  of  
injustice  and  integrated  them  in  practice.  In  this  section,  I  want  to  do  precisely  this,  
applying  the  theoretical  question  of  the  previous  section  to  the  case  that  concerns  us  
here,   namely   the   injustices   of   the   SD&CR.   My   aim   is   to   show   how   the   different  
responsibility  models  pick  up  on  normatively  and  politically  relevant  features  of  the  
case   at   hand   and   how   the   different   responsibility   models   are   needed   in   order   to  
capture   the   full   responsibility   picture.   Thus,   in   this   section,   I   do   not   focus   on   the  
responsibility  of  concrete  actors  in  the  regime  -­‐  this  is  something  I  will  pick  up  in  the  
chapters  to  come.  Rather,  I  argue  that  other  understandings  of  responsibility  that  are  
excluded  from  the  social  connection  model  are  also  relevant  to  make  sense  of  the  full  
responsibility  picture  of  the  SD&CR.    
   In  the  previous  section,  I  suggested  that  distinguishing  more  clearly  between  
different  contributions   to   the   (re)production  of   structural   injustice   is   crucial   in   two  
ways:   first,   to   distinguish   between   different   sources   of   structural   injustice,   and  
second,   to   distinguish   between   those   agents   acting   in   a  morally   innocent   way   and  
those  whose  actions  are  morally  tainted  or  blameworthy.    
Distinguishing   more   clearly   between   the   millions   of   decisions   taken   by  
individual  agents  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  those  powerful  private  and  public  actors  on  
the  other,  also  points  at  the  forms  of  responsibility  attribution  that  is  appropriate  for  
each  of   these   sources   of   structural   injustice.   I   think   that   social   connection   scholars  
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are  right  in  arguing  that  those  participating  in  what  I  call  ‘structural  processes  proper’  
carry  a  forward-­‐looking,  shared,  and  collective  responsibility  to  politically  organise  to  
change  the  structures  that  shape  their  existence.  Take  the  example  of  a  bank  run  that  
results   in   a   sovereign   debt   crisis:   depositors   should   not   be   held   responsible   in   a  
backward-­‐looking  way  or  held  individually  liable  for  their  action  of  retrieving  money  
from  the  bank.  Individuals  connected  to  the  sovereign  debt  crises  arising  from  a  bank  
run  do,  however,  have  a  responsibility  to  mobilise  and  exert  pressure  on  key  decision-­‐
makers  to  change  the  monetary  and  financial  system  under  which  they  live.  They  can  
also   ameliorate   some   of   the   consequences   of   the   structural   injustice   by   organising  
alternative  forms  of  payment,  such  as  by  introducing  barter  or  different  currencies,  or  
by  providing  the  social  services  that  the  government  may  be  cutting  as  a  response  to  
the  crises.    
The   same  does  not   apply   for   individual   actors  who  made   the  decisions   that  
created   the   financial   and  monetary   structures  within  which   an   individual   country’s  
debt  history   is  embedded.  Not  only  are   these  concrete   socio-­‐political  decisions   that  
can  be   isolated   from   structural   processes  proper,   such   as   a  bank   run,   but   they   also  
more   closely   resemble   Eichmann-­‐like   contributions   to   structural   injustice   than   the  
contributions  of   individual  German  citizens.  Actors  making   these   types  of  decisions  
can  and  ought  to  be  held  individually  responsible  for  the  way  in  which  their  actions  
contribute  to  structural  injustice.361    
Stating  that  socio-­‐political  decisions,  such  as   the  abolishment  of   the  Bretton  
Woods   system,   more   closely   resemble   Eichmann-­‐like   contributions   to   structural  
injustice   is   not   to   say   that   I   find   these   actions  morally   comparable.   Eichmann  was  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361   That   they   can   be   held   individually   responsible   for   their   contribution   to   the   structural  
injustice  does  not  entail  that  these  actors  need  to  have  intended  the  outcome,  or  need  to  have  
been   able   to   control   or   foresee   it.   As   I   show   in   the   next   chapter,   these   capacity-­‐related  
requirements   are   only   needed   for   one   ground   on   which   responsibility   can   be   attributed.  
Responsibility  for  structural  injustice  can  also  be  attributed  to  individual  agents  on  the  basis  
of  their  authority,  even  when  they  lack  the  relevant  capacities.  
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doing   something   that   was   deeply   immoral,   whereas   Nixon   was   making   a   political  
decision   with   regards   to   how   the   U.S.   and   the   global   political   economy   was   to   be  
organised.  What  these  actions  have  in  common,  however,  is  that  they  are  individual  
contributors   to   structural   injustice,   which   ought   to   be   isolated   from   the   structural  
processes  proper.  The  grounds  on  which  they  can  be  made  liable,  in  turn,  are  various  
and   allow   us   to   distinguish   more   clearly   between   Eichmann-­‐like   contributions   to  
structural   injustice   and  Nixon’s   contribution.   In   the  next   chapter,   I   introduce   three  
such  grounds  on  which  private  and  multilateral  creditors  can  be  held  responsible.      
It   is   not  my   intention   here   to   defend   the   attribution   of   particular   forms   of  
responsibility  for  the  structural  injustices  pertaining  to  the  SD&CR  to  different  actors.  
In   the   chapters   to   come,   I  will   elaborate  on   the   varying   responsibilities   of  different  
agents.   For   now,   it   will   suffice   to   note   that   different   forms   of   responsibility   exist,  
some  of  which  may  draw  on  grounds  of  responsibility  attribution  associated  with  the  
‘liability  model,’  which  allows  us   to  make  sense  of   the   individual  contributions   that  
concrete  agents  make  to  the  (re)production  of  structural  injustices.    
Put   succinctly,   what   I   am   proposing   is   to   attribute   shared,   forward-­‐looking  
responsibility  to  all  agents  who  are  part  of  the  structural  process  proper  and  to  those  
who  made  socio-­‐political  decisions  from  higher  positions  of  influence.  In  addition  to  
the   forward-­‐looking,   shared   responsibility,   distributed   responsibility   (both   forward-­‐
looking  and  backward-­‐looking)  also  needs  to  be  attributed,  on  different  grounds,   to  
the  latter  agents.  Attributing  these  special  responsibilities  does  not  only  serve  the  aim  
of  holding  agents  accountable  and  avoiding  free  riding,  but  also  of  putting  the  moral  
scale  back  into  balance.    
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Objections  and  Response    
A  powerful  objection  to  my  proposal  of  combining  Young’s  social  connection  model  
with  other   forms  of   responsibility   that  are  more  backward-­‐looking   in  nature   is   that  
these   responsibility   models   have   different   logics,   pursue   different   aims,   and   are  
ultimately  incompatible,  if  not  contradictory.  This  is  a  serious  challenge  and  I  want  to  
devote  the  rest  of  this  chapter  to  responding  to  it.  I  argue,  first,  that  both  the  liability  
and  the  social  connection  model  are  more  closely  connected  theoretically  than  they  
appear  to  be  at  first  glance,  and,  second,  that  the  practical  implications  of  attributing  
shared   and   forward-­‐looking   vs.   distributed   and  backward-­‐looking   responsibility   are  
also   more   similar   than   previously   assumed.   The   models   are   therefore   both  
theoretically  and  practically  compatible.    
   Miller   introduces   a   useful   analogy   to   start   identifying   the   contours   of   the  
different  aims  pursued  by  the  different  models  of  responsibility.  He  asks  us  to  think  
about   a   classroom,  where   the   teacher   steps  out   for   a  minute   and,  upon  her   return,  
finds  the  classroom  in  a  state  of  chaos.  When  the  teacher  asks  who  is  responsible  for  
the   mess,   she   could   be   asking   one   of   two   things:   either   who   is   responsible   for  
producing  the  mess  or  who  is  responsible  for  clearing  it  up.362    
The   two   ways   in   which   the   teacher’s   questions   can   be   interpreted   hint   at   two  
different  aims  that  can  be  pursued  when  attributing  responsibility.  The  first  question  
is  primarily  concerned  with  singling  out  an  agent  from  a  general  stream  of  causation  
who  can  be  attributed  the  outcome,  and  who  can  be  praised  or  blamed.  The  reason  
we   want   to   single   out   this   agent   is   not   primarily   to   fix   the   situation   (the   messy  
classroom),   but   to  put   a  moral   scale  back   into  balance  which  was  disrupted  by   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362  As  Hart  suggests,  these  two  questions  are  not  exhaustive.  He  provides  a  different  analogy,  
namely   that   of   a   captain   on   a   ship   and   says   that  we   can  distinguish  between   four   different  
forms  or  responsibility,  namely:  causal  responsibility,  liability  (which  includes  moral  and  legal  
liability),  capacity  and  role  responsibility  (Hart,  1961,  p.211).  I  will  talk  about  all  of  these  forms  
of  responsibility  as  I  proceed.    
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actions   or   omissions   of   the   agent.   By   contrast,   the   second   question   of   who   is  
responsible  for  clearing  up  makes  the  cleaning  up  of  the  classroom  the  priority.  Here,  
we   are   not   primarily   concerned   with   praising   or   blaming   the   agent   we   deem  
responsible   in   the   first   place,   but   with   ensuring   that   the   situation   is   resolved.  
Whereas  the  first  question  can  be  associated  with  the  liability  model,  the  impulse  of  
the  second  question  is  best  captured  by  the  connection  model.363  
Miller’s   motivation   is   to   account   for   the   two   perspectives   of   human   agency.  
Humans,   so  Miller   believes,   are   both   agents   and   victims.364  While   the   first   way   of  
understanding   responsibility   privileges   the   agency   of   individuals   –   in   that   human  
beings   are   choosing   agents   who  must   take   responsibility   for   their   own   lives   –   the  
second  question  asked  by  the  teacher  in  our  class  room  analogy  puts  the  vulnerability  
of  humans  centre   stage.  While   the   liability  model  puts  human  agency  at   the  centre  
and  has  the  aim  of  putting  a  moral  scale  back  in  balance,  Miller’s  connection  model  
focuses  on  the  vulnerability  of  subjects  and  starts  with  an  urgent  situation  that  must  
be  put  right.    
If  we  think  about  the  different  understandings  of  responsibility  in  Miller’s  terms,  
my   proposal   of   combining   a   backward-­‐oriented,   distributive   understanding   of  
responsibility  with  a   forward-­‐looking,  shared  one  does   indeed  seem  to  be  pulling   in  
two  opposite  directions.  Thought  about  in  this  way,  these  are  two  ways  of  attributing  
responsibility   that  pursue  different  aims  and,  at   some  point,  we  will  have   to  decide  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363  Miller  calls  the  first  form  of  responsibility  ‘outcome  responsibility’  and  the  second  ‘remedial  
responsibility.’   Remedial   responsibility   is   to   be   attributed   on   the   basis   of   his   ‘connection  
theory.’   In   order   not   to   introduce   more   terminology   than   absolutely   necessary,   I   will   not  
discuss   remedial   responsibility   separately   here.  Moreover,   since   outcome   responsibility   falls  
under  the  ‘liability  model,’  I  will  discuss  outcome  responsibility  in  that  context.  In  Chapter  7  I  
also  discuss  outcome  responsibility  at  greater  length.    
364   “On   the   one   hand,   human   beings   are   needy   and   vulnerable   creatures   who   cannot   live  
decent,   let   alone   flourishing,   lives   unless   they   are   given   at   least   a   minimum   bundle   of  
freedoms,   opportunities   and   resources.   (...)  On   the  other  hand,  human  beings   are   choosing  
agents   who   must   take   responsibility   for   their   own   lives.   This   means   that   they   should   be  
allowed  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  success,  but  it  also  means  that  they  must  bear  the  burdens  of  
failure”  (Miller,  2007,  p.5-­‐6)  
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what   our   priority   is   –   to   put   a   moral   scale   back   into   balance   or   to   put   an   unjust  
situation  right.  Indeed,  on  the  face  of  it,  Young  seems  to  affirm  something  similar  to  
Miller   with   his   two   perspectives   on   human   agency.  When   discussing   the   practical  
problems   arising   from   attributing   backward-­‐looking   responsibility,   namely   the   fact  
that   it   makes   both   victims   and   perpetrators   passive,   she   seems   to   suggest   that  
focusing  on  putting  the  moral  balance  right  comes  at  the  expense  of  fixing  structural  
injustice.   On   a   deeper   level,   however,   Young   combines   these   two   perspectives   of  
human  agency  in  a  way  that  Miller  does  not,  thereby  challenging  the  idea  that  doing  
one   thing   (putting   the  moral   scale   back   into   balance)   comes   at   the   expense   of   the  
other  (fixing  the  problem).    
I   take  Miller’s  connection  model  to  be  a  non-­‐moralised  responsibility  model.  To  
be  sure,  some  of  the  grounds  he  identifies  do  make  an  appraisal  of  the  agent  to  whom  
responsibility   is   attributed.365   But   whether   or   not   a   ground   is   moral   makes   no  
difference   to   the   question   of   whether   it   ought   to   be   prioritised   in   any   specific  
situation.  What  matters  normatively  is  that  the  unjust  situation  be  remedied.  Rather  
than  bringing   a  moral   scale  back   into  balance,   the  obligation   to   relieve  deprivation  
and  suffering   is   the  overriding  concern.  As  Miller  states,   “by  using  multiple  criteria,  
we   ensure   that   there   is   always   some   agent   who   can   be   assigned   responsibility   for  
remedying  [the]  condition.”366    
Young’s   model,   by   contrast,   is   moralised.   Albeit   forcefully   defending   that   her  
account   is   neither   backward-­‐looking,   nor   interested   in   questions   of   blame   or  
culpability,   she   does   connect   the   teacher’s   two   questions   in   a  way   that  Miller   does  
not.  Recall  that,  for  Young,  responsibility  derives  not  from  a  constitutive  link  between  
action   and   outcome,   but   “from   belonging   together   with   others   in   a   system   of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365   Miller   distinguishes   between   moral   and   non-­‐moral   grounds,   with   outcome   and   moral  
responsibility  falling  in  the  former,  and  community,  capacity  and  causal  responsibility  in  the  
latter  category.    
366  Miller,  2001,  p.471.  
   171  
interdependent   processes   of   cooperation   and   competition   through   which   we   seek  
benefits  and  aim  to  realize  projects.”367  In  her  account,  the  answer  to  the  question  of  
who  is  responsible  for  creating  the  structural  injustice  (the  classroom  mess)  therefore  
is  connected  to  the  question  of  who  is  responsible  for  remedying  it  (cleaning  up  the  
classroom).  To  that  extent,  her  model  is  backward-­‐oriented  and  moralised.  Moreover,  
to  the  extent  that   it   is   the  social  connection  to  the  structural   injustice  that  grounds  
our   responsibility,  discharging   that   responsibility  politically  does  both   things  at   the  
same  time  -­‐  it  puts  the  moral  balance  back  right  and  remedies  the  structural  injustice.    
With   my   integrated   responsibility   model,   rather   than   keeping   Miller’s   two  
perspectives   of   human   agency   separately,   I   want   to   explicitly   endorse   what   Young  
does  implicitly,  namely  connecting  these  two  perspectives.  In  other  words,  I  want  to  
concentrate  on  fixing  injustice,  while  also  putting  the  moral  scale  back  in  balance  and  
holding  responsible  agents  accountable.  Young’s  social  connection  model  shows  that  
connecting  these  two  perspectives  and  aims  is  not  theoretically  untenable.    
A  critic  may  counter  that  there  is  still  a  way  in  which,  in  practice,  these  two  aims  
may  conflict  and  cases   in  which  one  will  have   to  choose  what  aim  to  prioritise.  On  
one  hand,  we  start  by  looking  at  the  problem  that  needs  fixing  and  ask  what  needs  to  
be  done.  All  players  who  are  in  a  position  to  do  something  to  fix  the  problem  ought  to  
do  so.  In  the  process  of  doing  so,  the  moral  scale  may  also  be  righted,  for  agents  who  
could   also   be   attributed   responsibility   individually,   in   a   backward-­‐looking  manner,  
are  discharging  these  by  acting  politically.  But  the  priority  is  to  remedy  the  situation.  
On   the  other  hand,  we  can   start  with   the  ambition  of  putting   the  moral   scale  back  
into   balance   and   ask,   as   a   second   step,   how   these   agents   can   discharge   these  
responsibilities  in  practice.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367  Young,  2011,  p.  105.  
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Since   this   is   an   empirical   objection,   I  will   respond   to   it  with   this   same   level   of  
argumentation.  My  contention  is  that,  whatever  perspective  of  human  agency  or  aim  
one   prioritises,   the   practical   steps   which   will   have   to   be   taken   to   discharge   these  
responsibilities  are  very  similar,  if  not  the  same.  Recall  that  even  when  aiming  to  put  
the   moral   scale   back   into   balance,   doing   so   will   require   that   the   agents   to   whom  
responsibility   was   attributed   also   discharge   these   responsibilities.  When   asking,   in  
turn,  how  these  responsibilities  can  be  discharged,  the  question  of  what  an  agent  in  
position   X   within   structure   Y   can   do   gains   relevance.   The   question   of   the   moral  
grounds   on   which   responsibility   can   be   attributed   then   becomes   a   question   about  
where  the  pressure  points  are  within  the  structure,  that  would  allow  for  meaningful  
change   to   occur.   On   this   level,   then,   shared,   forward-­‐looking,   and   distributed,  
backward-­‐looking   responsibilities   align.   Let   me   illustrate   this   by   giving   some  
examples  of  the  different  ways  in  which  agents  within  the  SD&CR  can  discharge  both  
shared  forward-­‐looking  and  distributed  backward-­‐looking  responsibilities.    
As  articulated  above,  the  vast  majority  of  states  are  simultaneously  creditors  and  
debtors.  This  creates  the  potential  for  collaboration  between  states  qua  debtors,  albeit  
a   small   one,   because   there  may   be   a  mutual   interest  in   building   a   set   of   rules   and  
institutions  to  govern  the  extension  of  credit,  the  debt  servicing  process,  and  the  debt  
restructuring  process  in  moments  of  crisis.  Institutions  serve  the  purpose  of  reducing  
uncertainty  and   stabilising  expectations.  They  do   so  by   revealing   the  preferences  of  
the   participants   in   the   institutions,   monitor   the   behaviour   of   others,   and   provide  
predictability.   In   the   case   of   sovereign   lending   and   borrowing,   the   absence   of  
institutions   that   govern   the   practice   leads   to   ad   hoc   crisis   management   and  
restructuring   negotiations.368   It   also   leads   to   economically   and   politically   costly  
bailouts   that   governments   around   the   world   have   an   increasingly   difficult   time  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368  Rogoff  and  Zettelmeyer,  2002.  
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justifying  to  their  taxpayers.369  Thus,  in  the  absence  of  a  formal  institution  to  govern  
the  practice  of  sovereign  borrowing  and  lending,  all  states  qua  debtors  are  worse  off.  
Even   the   minimal   shared   interest   among   states  qua  debtors   provides   one   pressure  
point   to   alter   this   structure.   By   virtue   of   the   possibility   that   this   common   interest  
creates,   no   matter   how   minimal,   states  qua  debtors   can   be   said   to   have   a  
responsibility  to  establish  a  coalition  to  set  up  such  institutions.370  
     Of   course,   one   may   counter,   not   all   countries   have   the   same   interests   in  
setting   up   these   institutions.   A   country’s   leading   political   class,   in   particular,   may  
hold  a  complex  set  of  interests:  the  more  it  sees  its  interests  aligned  with  those  of  the  
leading  financial  class,  the  less  likely  the  state  qua  actor  in  the  international  arena  is  
to   choose   to   support   a   sovereign   debt   restructuring   facility.  Moreover,   the  more   a  
state   thinks   of   itself  mainly   as   a   creditor   (instead   of  mainly   as   a   debtor,   which   all  
creditor  states  are),  the  less  likely  the  state  qua  international  player  will  be  to  support  
formal   institutions   to   govern   sovereign   lending   and   borrowing   practices.   Indeed,  
while  a  coalition  of  developing  countries  (the  G77  +  China)  have  been  fighting  to  see  
such   institutions   established,   powerful   creditor   countries   (the   U.S.,   the   U.K.,   and  
Germany,   most   prominently371)   have   been   throwing   sand   in   the   wheels   of   such  
negotiations.  Countries  that  occupy  a  position  of  relative  disadvantage  in  the  SD&CR  
are  thus  more  likely  to  push  for  the  implementation  of  formal  institutions  that  would  
ameliorate  the  injustices  of  the  regime.  To  that  extent,  they  have  the  responsibility  to  
continue  exerting  pressure  at  the  international  level  in  the  fight  for  the  establishment  
of  such  an  institution.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369  Helleiner,  2008.  
370  I  say  more  about  the  exact  nature  of  these  institutions  in  the  conclusion  of  this  thesis.  
371  Eleven  countries  opposed  the  UN  Resolution.  
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/11/debt-­‐campaigners-­‐hail-­‐un-­‐vote-­‐as-­‐
breakthrough.    
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   Conversely,   countries   occupying   a   particularly   influential   position   in   the  
global  political  economy  have  special  responsibility,  not  only  due  to  their   individual  
contributions   to   structural   injustice   in   the   past,   but   because   their   actions   have  
consequences   that   those   of   less   powerful   countries   do   not.   Issuers   of   the   main  
currencies  to  trade,  save,  and  speculate,  for  instance,  have  the  obligation  to  consider  
the  implications  of  their  monetary  policy  decisions  on  other  countries.  Although  this  
responsibility   must   be   specified   further,   for   now,   it   must   suffice   to   delineate   its  
contours  by  pointing  at  a  modern  practice  that  clearly  fails  to  meet  this  responsibility,  
a  practice  that  is  best  illustrated  by  John  Connally’s  statement  that  “the  dollar  is  our  
currency,  but  it  is  your  problem.”372    
   In   the   same  way   in  which   states  qua   debtors   are   not   a   homogenous   group,  
creditors  are  also  far  from  homogenous.373  The  heterogeneity  of  creditors  and  creditor  
interests   represents   a   political   opportunity   to   alter   the   current   unjust   structures.  
Importantly,  the  interests  of  multilateral  public  creditors  and  private  creditors  do  not  
always   align.   Indeed,   as   recent   crises   and   policy   discussions   regarding   the  
establishment   of   a   sovereign   debt   restructuring   facility   reveal,   a   progressive  
divergence   between   the   interests   of   these   two   sets   of   actors   can   be   observed.374  
Fearing   incentivising  creditor  moral  hazard,   the   IMF   is  sceptical  about   large  bailout  
packages.  Some  within  the  IMF  have  long  been  advocating  for  a  more  orderly  and  less  
ad  hoc  way  of  governing  sovereign  borrowing  and  lending  practices.375    
Moreover,  despite  being  portrayed  the  defender  of  private  creditors  and  as  the  
puppet   of   only   a   handful   of   its   member   states’   interests   –   those   with   the   largest  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372  http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/henry-­‐a-­‐kissinger-­‐prize-­‐schmidt-­‐
shultz-­‐has-­‐been-­‐friend-­‐of-­‐germans/6681918.html    
373  Lienau,  2014,  p.34.  
374  See,  for  instance,  “Greek  bonds  sell  off  sharply  as  EU-­‐IMG  rift  deepens“  
https://www.ft.com/content/95157062-­‐eee7-­‐11e6-­‐ba01-­‐119a44939bb6    
375  Anne  Krueger,  first  deputy  managing  director  of  the  IMF  between  2001  and  2006,  was  one  
of  the  main  advocates  of  the  implementation  of  a  Sovereign  Debt  Restructuring  Mechanism.  
See  Krueger  (2001,  2002).    
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quotas,   most   prominently   the   U.S.   -­‐   the   IMF   itself   is   by   no   means   a   unified  
institution.   Friction   exists,   for   one,   between   the   Fund’s   Independent   Evaluation  
Office,  known  for  publishing  very  critical  reports  of  Fund  policies,  and  the  rest  of  the  
IMF.376  Moreover,   although   the   IMF  presents   a  united   front,   detailed   studies   of   the  
institution  reveal   that  a  culture  of  discussion  exists  within  the   institution.377  Finally,  
the  division  between  the   institution’s  principal   (member  states)  and  the  agent  (IMF  
officials  and  bureaucrats)  also  opens  up  a  space   for  political  contestation  that  could  
create  a  less  unjust  SD&CR  .378    
Rather   than   continuing   to   push   for   the   traditional,   orthodox   set   of  
conditionalities,  for  instance,  the  IMF  could  start  putting  pressure  on  debtor  states  to  
implement  a  set  of  policies   that  make  them  less  dependent  on  sovereign  borrowing  
and,  consequently,  less  dependent  on  the  financial  elite  as  their  second  constituency.  
One   such   policy   is   tax   reform,   turning   the   ‘debt   state’   back   into   the   ‘tax   state.’   A  
conditionality  that  the  IMF  could   insist  on,  then,   is  to  adopt  a  more  progressive  tax  
system  and  a  global  tax  on  capital,  as  advocated  for  by  Piketty.379    
These   reflections   are   not   exhaustive   and   as   more   empirical   details   and  
political  feasibility  constraints  are  introduced,  the  picture  grows  blurrier.  However,  I  
hope  that  they  help  illustrate  how,  once  one  starts  thinking  about  responsibility  not  
only  in  terms  of  the  grounds  on  which  responsibility  can  be  attributed,  but  in  terms  
of   how   these   responsibilities   can   be   discharged   in   practice,   shared   forward-­‐looking  
and  distributed  backward-­‐looking  responsibilities  do  not  look  so  different  after  all.  If  
our   ambition   goes   beyond   the   purely   theoretical,   and   in   to   the   practical,   then   the  
most  crucial  question  may  indeed  be  what  each  individual  actor  can  do  today  to  start  
altering  unjust  structures.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376  Chwieroth,  2010.  
377  Breen,  2013;  Chwieroth,  2013;  Momani,  2007.  
378  Vaubel,  2006.  
379  Piketty,  2014,  chapter  15.  
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Conclusion  and  Road  Ahead    
In   this   chapter,   I   raised   the   question   of   how   we   ought   to   think   about   agential  
responsibility  attribution  against  the  backdrop  of  a  structural  diagnosis  of  the  wrongs  
of   the   SD&CR.   I   argued   that,   contrary   to   the   established   position   among   social  
connection  theorists  who  see  the  social  connection  model  as  the  only  appropriate  one  
for  cases  of  structural   injustice,  an  integrated  model   is  needed  to  make  sense  of  the  
full   responsibility   picture   in   cases   of   structural   injustice,   both   generally   and   in   the  
case  of   the  SD&CR  in  particular.   In  the   final  section  of   this  chapter,   I  defended  this  
position  from  possible  objections.    
   One  crucial  aspect  that  my  integrated  model  of  responsibility  shares  with  the  
social  connection  model  is  that  both  defend  a  more  expansive  view  of  responsibility,  
opening  space  for  responsibility  attribution.  As  Lu  states  in  the  context  of  her  analysis  
of   colonial   structural   injustice,   “a   structural   approach   to   assessing   responsibility  
admits  a  more  expansive  view  of   (…)   responsible  agents,  as  well  as  a  more  complex  
view   of   the   different   kinds   and   degrees   of   responsibility   that   attach   to   individual  
wrongful   actions   and   to   their   participation   in   background   social   structures   that  
produced  (…)  injustice.”380    
In  the  chapters  that  follow,  I  build  on  this  more  expansive  and  complex  view  
of   responsibility,   analysing   how   the   different   participants   in   the   said   structural  
processes   are   to   be   held   responsible.   In   Chapter   6,   I   look   at   the   responsibility   of  
creditors.  Chapters   7   and  8   are   concerned  with   the   responsibility   of   those   that   can  
rightly  be  identified  as  victims  of  injustice.  Chapter  7  tackles  the  responsibility  for  the  
structural   injustice   that   characterises   the   regime   as   a  whole,   arguing   that   creditors  
qua  members  of   the   financial  class  can  be  considered   ‘primary  wrongdoers’   in  cases  
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when   the   structural-­‐relational   level   is   at   play   and   considers   governments   of  
disadvantaged   debtor   states   to   be   ‘complicit’   agents.  While   Chapter   7   is   concerned  
with   assessing   the   responsibility   of   state   officials   qua   representatives   of   states   in   a  
position  of  disadvantage  within  the  SD&CR,  Chapter  8  turns  to  the  responsibility  of  
the  citizens  of  such  states.    
Chapter  6  and  8  are  narrower:  they  focus  on  offering  an  alternative  critique  of  
the  repayment  norm  to  the  one  provided  by  normative  scholars  working  on  sovereign  
debt.   Chapter   6   turns   the   tables   of   the   debate,   starting   with   the   question   of   what  
creditors  owe.  Chapter  8  identifies  two  sufficient  conditions  to  challenge  the  citizens’  
obligations  to  service  debt  accrued  in  their  name.    
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CHAPTER  6  
WHAT  CREDITORS  OWE  
  
It’s   like   a  nephew  who  becomes  dependent  on  a   very   rich,  doting  
uncle.   Suddenly   the  uncle   dies   and   leaves   the  money   to   someone  
else,  or  decides  he  doesn’t  love  the  nephew  anymore  and  cuts  him  
off.  You  can  ask—who  is  responsible—the  uncle  or  the  kid?381    
	  
The  agential  explanation  of  a  country's  sovereign  debt  history   is  characterised,   first,  
by   the   identification   of   the   crisis   itself   as   the   main   problem,   and   second,   by   the  
unilateral  responsibility  attribution  to  the  debtor  state.  This  agential  explanation  thus  
results  in  the  debtor  state  being  burdened  with  the  costs  that  arise  from  a  sovereign  
debt  crisis.  The  repayment  norm  and  its  legal  expression,  Pacta  Sunt  Servanda,  reflect  
this  agential  explanation.       
   While   both   the   government   and   the   citizenry   of   sovereign   debtors   are  
identified   in   public   discourse   as   primary   culprits   in   the   eruption   of   sovereign   debt  
crises,   the   responsibility   of   creditors   is   hardly   ever   thematised.  Whenever   creditors  
are  made  to  shoulder  part  of  the  burden  that  arises  from  the  eruption  of  debt  crises,  it  
is   only   for   the   pragmatic   reason   of   restoring   debt   sustainability,   which   ensures  
continued   debt   servicing.   The   primary   concern,   therefore,   is   to   maximise   the  
repayment  of  outstanding  debt,  maintaining  the  implicit  normative  assumption  that  
the  debtor  must  pay.       
   Against   the   backdrop   of   the   structural   diagnosis   of   the   injustices   of   the  
SD&CR  and  the  structural  genesis  of  sovereign  debt  crises,  this  unilateral  attribution  
of  responsibility  to  the  debtor  state  becomes  questionable.  In  light  of  the  complexity  
of   the   historical   genesis   of   debt   crises,   how   sensible   is   it   to   single   out   one   agent's  
contribution   (the   debtor),   attribute   responsibility   to   that   agent,   and   then   conclude  
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that   this   justifies   the   distributive   consequences,   letting   the   burdens   of   harm   fall  
where   they   lie?  As  McDonough,   former  President  of   the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  asks,  
“who  is  responsible  –  the  uncle  or  the  kid?”382       
   In   this  chapter,   I   seek  to   turn  the  tables  of   the  debate,   starting  not  with  the  
question  of  how  much  of  the  burden  creditors  can  be  made  to  carry,  but  how  much  
they   ought   to   carry.   Against   the   backdrop   of   the   integrated   responsibility  model   I  
defended   in   the   previous   chapter,   I   ask:   on   what   grounds,   if   any,   are   creditors  
responsible   for  carrying  part  of   the  burden  arising   from  sovereign  debt  crises?  Note  
that  the  focus  here  is  narrower  than  both  the  previous  and  the  following  chapter.  I  do  
not   start   by   asking   what   the   responsibility   is   of   creditors   for   the   injustices   of   the  
SD&CR,  as  outlined  in  Part  I  of  this  thesis,  but  on  what  grounds  responsibility  can  be  
attributed   to   creditors   to   carry   part   of   the   burden   of   sovereign   debt   restructuring.  
This   is   important,   since   it   allows   us   to   directly   challenge   the   repayment   norm,   the  
‘one  background  rule’  that  continues  to  govern  the  SD&CR.383       
   At   the   same   time,   examining   the   genesis   of   one   concrete   sovereign   debt  
history   –   namely   Argentina’s   debt   history   from   1976   to   present   –   by   using   the  
heuristic   categories   developed   in   the   preceding   chapter,   brings   to   the   fore   the  
contributions   of   creditors   to   the   regime’s   structural   injustices.   Thus,   while   starting  
with   the   narrower   aim   of   challenging   the   repayment   norm,   looking   at   the  
contributions   made   by   creditors   in   a   backward-­‐looking   manner   results   in   the  
attribution   of   responsibility   that   is   also   forward-­‐looking   and   requires   creditors   to  
discharge  these  responsibilities  by  working  together  to  alter  the  unjust  SD&CR.       
   Since  the  sheer  variety  of  types  and  the  number  of  creditors  makes  speaking  
“of  creditors  as  a  single  group  in  sovereign  lending  …  not  only  historically  problematic  
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but  also  theoretically  untenable,”384  in  this  chapter,  I  chose  to  focus  on  two  classes  of  
creditors,  namely  public  multilateral  institutions,  such  as  the  International  Monetary  
Fund,  and  private  creditors  qua  members  of  the  financial  class.       
   When  talking  about  the  responsibility  of  the  IMF,  I  assume  that  responsibility  
can  be  attributed  to  collective  agents  –   that   is,   I   treat   the   institution  as  an  agent   to  
whom   responsibility   can   be   attributed.   The   question   of   how   this   collective  
responsibility   is   to   be   distributed   to   different   natural   persons   who   comprise   the  
institution  is  one  which  I  chose  to  bracket  out  for  my  purposes  here.385       
   The  reason  I  chose  to  focus  on  private  creditors  qua  members  of  the  financial  
class   is   that   not   all   creditors   are   members   of   the   financial   class.   In   the   case   of  
Argentina’s  default   and   later  debt   restructuring,   for   instance,   the   ‘Italian  pensioner’  
was  often  invoked  as  a  symbol  that  led  to  the  condemnation  of  the  Argentine  default.  
It   seemed   intuitively   unjust   that   thousands   of   Italian   pensioners,   whose   pension  
funds   had   invested   in   Argentine   bonds,   were   driven   to   poverty   due   to   the   alleged  
irresponsibility  of  Argentina’s  government  and  its  citizenry.  In  this  chapter,  I  propose  
to   focus   solely  on   the   responsibility  of   creditors  qua  members  of   the   financial   class  
and  bracket  out  those  private  creditors  who  are  not.      
   To   begin,   I   briefly   review   the   underlying   logic   of   the   repayment   norm,  
focusing  both  on  the  economic  orthodoxy  on  which  it  rests  and  on  the  understanding  
of   responsibility   that   underlies   it.   Then   I   introduce   Argentina's   sovereign   debt  
history,  concentrating  especially  on  the  crisis  of  the  1980s  and  the  crisis   in  the  early  
2000s.   As   a   third   step,   I   show   how   the   three   dimensions   through  which   structural  
injustice   is   reproduced  make  possible   a   form  of   responsibility   attribution   that   does  
not  only  recognise  the  structural  nature  of  sovereign  debt  crises,  but  also  allows  us  to  
identify   distinct   normative   grounds   on  which   creditors   can   be   held   responsible   for  
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385  For  interesting  discussions  on  this  question,  see  Erskine,  2001,  2003;  Stilz,  2011.  
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the   perpetuation   of   structural   injustice.   Finally,   I   consider   objections   and   then  
conclude.    
  
Revisiting  the  Repayment  Norm    
Who   is   responsible   for   the   accumulation   of   unsustainable   debt?   How   should   the  
burden  of  adjustment  be  distributed  among  debtors  and  creditors  once  a  country   is  
unable   to   service   its   debt?   A   monolithic   answer   to   these   questions   implicitly  
underpins   the  dominant  academic  and  policy  debate:   the  debtor   country  must  pay.  
“Sovereign  borrowers  must  repay,  regardless  of   the  circumstances  of   the   initial  debt  
contract,   the   actual   use   of   the   loan   proceeds,   or   the   exigencies   of   any   potential  
default.”386   If   the   creditor   is   to   shoulder   any   of   the   consequences   of   a   country’s  
inability   to   service   its   debts,   this   is   only   for   the  pragmatic   reason  of   restoring  debt  
sustainability   and   so   ensure   continued   debt   servicing.   However,   morally,   the  
responsibility  and  burden  of  high  indebtedness  and  ultimate  default  resides  with  the  
debtor.    
   The   SD&CR,   with   the   absence   of   a   sovereign   debt   restructuring   facility,  
embodies   this   repayment   norm.  Moreover,   the   repayment   norm   is   also   reproduced  
with   vehemence   in   policy   discourse.   According   the   World   Bank,   for   instance,  
“international  lending  based  on  any  other  conception  than  that  ‘debts  are  debts’  was  
considered   as   not   only   financially   irresponsible   but   immoral.”387  Anybody   following  
the   coverage   of   the   Argentine   and   Greek   sovereign   debt   crises   in   mainstream  
international  newspapers  will  recognise  a  very  similar  logic  in  public  discourse.388    
   The   theoretical   commitments   on   which   the   repayment   norm   is   based   are  
twofold:  first,  it  relies  on  a  particular  understanding  of  how  the  economy  works  and  
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387  Mason  and  Asher,  cited  by  Lienau,  2014,  p.  18.  
388  Antoniades,  2012;  Horas,  2015.  
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how   sovereign   debt   crises   erupt   (the   descriptive   claim).   Second,   it   is   based   on   a  
particular   understanding   of   responsibility.   On   the   basis   of   the   discussion   in   the  
previous   chapter   surrounding   responsibility,   I   now   bring   to   the   fore   both   of   these  
claims.       
   First,  as  we  saw  in  Chapter  1,  the  monolithic  answer  that  the  debtor  must  pay  
is   predicated   on   a   particular   understanding   of   how   the   global   economy  works   and  
why   debt   crises   erupt.   Liberal   economists   depict   financial   markets   as   efficient  
intermediaries:   financial   markets   shift   savings   from   locations   where   they   are  
abundant   and   cheap   to   places   where   they   are   scarce   and   expensive   relative   to  
investment   opportunities.   In   so   doing,   they   allocate   both   credit   and   information  
efficiently   (the   efficient  market   hypothesis).  Whenever   deviations   from   the   perfect  
allocation  of  credit  occur,  creditors  tend  to  under-­‐lend  rather  than  over-­‐lend.389  But  if  
creditors,   as   the   supply   side,   are   cautious   and   rational,   it  must  be   the  behaviour  of  
sovereign  debtors,  as  the  demand  side,  that  makes  debt  burdens  unsustainable.  Bad  
management   of   the   debtor   country,   expansionary  macroeconomic   policies,   and   the  
running   of   fiscal   deficits   are   highlighted   as   the   main   reasons   leading   to   the  
accumulation  of  unsustainable  levels  of  debt.390  
   Second,   the  monolithic   attribution   of   responsibility   to   the   debtor   state   also  
rests  on  an  understanding  of  responsibility  that  is  in  line  with  the  liability  model.  It  is  
exclusively  backward-­‐looking,   isolating  and  has  immediate  distributive  implications.  
The   understanding   of   responsibility   underlying   the   repayment   norm   is   isolating   in  
the  sense  that,  if  one  agent  is  found  to  be  responsible,  then  others  are,  by  definition,  
relieved   from   their   responsibility   for   that   state  of   affairs.  The   repayment  norm  also  
seems   to  predispose   that   the  attribution  of   responsibility   implies   that   the  costs  and  
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benefits  of  an  outcome  for  which  the  agent  is  attributed  responsibility  should  remain  
where  they  fall  –  the  principle,  that  is,  of  “taking  the  rough  with  the  smooth”.391    
  
Argentina’s  Sovereign  Debt  History  and  the  Challenge  to  the  Repayment  Norm    
In   this   section,   I   present   Argentina’s   sovereign   debt   history   and   show   that   the  
understanding   of   responsibility   that   underlies   the   repayment   norm   —   with   its  
isolating   nature   and   the   distributive   implications   the   attribution   entails   —   is  
problematic   when   applied   to   a   real-­‐world   case,   rather   than   living   in   the   idealised  
world   of   orthodox   economic   models.   More   concretely,   I   defend   the   view   that  
attributing  responsibility  to  the  debtor  state  alone  rests  on  a  misleading  diagnosis  of  
the  genesis  of  debt  crises  (the  descriptive  challenge)  and  that  this,  in  turn,  challenges  
the   responsibility   story   of   the   dominant   position   that   follows   therefrom   (the  
normative  challenge).  
   Argentina   has   witnessed   two  major   external   sovereign   debt   crises   since   the  
1970s.392  First,  along  with  the  rest  of  Latin  America,  Argentina  started  accruing  debt  in  
the   1970s   after   gaining   access   to  private   financial  markets   (the  bankerisation  of   the  
global  economy).  During  the  period  of  Argentina’s  military  dictatorship  (1976–1983),  
Argentina’s   sovereign   debt   skyrocketed.393   When   the   U.S.   Federal   Reserve   sharply  
increased   its   interest   rates   in   the  early   1980s,  Argentina  was  confronted  with  a  debt  
crisis  that,  in  the  years  that  followed,  spread  like  wildfire  throughout  Latin  America.  
This  debt   crisis  was  only  overcome  with   the  help  of   the  Brady  Plan,  which   allowed  
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bank   loans   to   be   exchanged   for   U.S.-­‐backed   securities,   and   which   introduced  
Argentina   to   the  bond  market   (the  securitisation  of   the  global  economy).   In  2001,  a  
second   external   debt   crisis   erupted,   leading   to   the   biggest   sovereign   default   of   its  
time.    
In  both  cases,  we  see  three  different,  interacting  factors  at  play  that  ultimately  
resulted   in   the   eruption   of   a   full-­‐blown   sovereign   debt   crisis.   These   are,   first,   the  
coinciding   of   interests   between   the   Argentine   government   and   private   creditors;  
second,   the   incentives   for   and   actions   by   public   creditors;   and,   third,   the   general  
global   economic   environment.  We   can   see   this   by   briefly   examining   the   run-­‐up   to  
each  of  Argentina’s  crises.  
In   the   run   up   to  Argentina’s   sovereign   debt   crisis   in   the   1980s,   the  military  
junta  borrowed  extensively  from  private  creditors.  With  the  eruption  of  the  oil  crisis,  
Western  banks  —  stacked  with  petrodollars  and  with  few  investment  opportunities  in  
stagnating   OECD   countries   —   faced   strong   incentives   to   lend   to   developing  
countries.  The  opening  of  new  markets,  unscarred  by  competition,  was  an  attractive  
way   of   ensuring   growth   and   expansion,   so  major  Western   banks   started   extending  
bank   loans   to   emerging   economies.   The   unprecedented   growth   of   the   Argentine  
sovereign  debt  during  the  military  junta’s  rule  and  the  run-­‐up  to  the  1980s  debt  crisis  
can   thus   be   explained   by   what   Cardoso   and   Faletto   would   call   a   coincidence   of  
interests  between  the  government  and  private  creditors.394     
   The   IMF   was   also   implicated   in   the   outbreak   of   the   1980s   sovereign   debt  
crisis.  Before  assuming  power  in  Argentina,  the  newly-­‐elected  president  Raúl  Alfonsín  
pledged   that   all   debt   contracts   extended   under   the  military   dictatorship   would   be  
scrutinised,   and   stated   that  he   considered  debt   repudiation   as   a   policy   option.   Yet,  
under   the   threat   that   the   IMF   would   cease   granting   Argentina   loans   if   the   newly-­‐
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elected   government   did   not   recognise   the   accumulated   debt,   Alfonsín   nationalised  
the   private   and  public   debt  which  had   been   accrued   by   the  military   regime.395   The  
role   played   by   the   IMF  was   thus   crucial   in   the   size   of   the   Argentine   debt   burden.  
Moreover,   “in   its   role   as   the   broker   of   the   bank   cartel,”396   the   IMF   protected   the  
conditions   that   were   favourable   for   unrestrained   lending   and   allowed   commercial  
banks  to  exercise  monopoly  of  power.  
   The  interplay  between  the  actions  of  both  the  private  and  public  creditors  and  
the  Argentine  government   led  to  the  accumulation  of  a  vast  sovereign  debt  burden.  
The  catalyst  for  the  ultimate  outbreak  of  crisis,  however,  was  the  increase  in  interest  
rates   by   the   U.S.   Federal   Reserve   in   the   early   1980s.   Practically   overnight,   this  
dramatically  increased  Argentina’s  debt  burden,  most  of  which  was  based  on  floating  
interest   rates.   Moreover,   because   this   induced   another   recession   in   the   OECD  
countries,  the  higher  interest  rates  also  led  to  a  reduction  in  the  exports  of  the  debtor  
countries.   The   decline   in   exports,   in   turn,   created   trade   deficits,  making  Argentina  
even  more  dependent  on  loans  to  finance  the  excess  of  imports,  loans  which  became  
much  more  expensive  to  acquire  due  to  high  interest  rates.397  Finally,  higher  interest  
rates  made  it  all  the  more  attractive  to  save  money  abroad,  pulling  foreign  investment  
away  from  Argentina  and  exacerbating  capital  flight.398  
In  sum,  we  observe  three  distinct,  interacting  factors  that  ultimately  resulted  
in  the  eruption  of  the  sovereign  debt  crisis   in  Argentina,  namely  the  concurrence  of  
interests  between   the  Argentine  government  and   its  private  creditors,   the  decisions  
made   by   public,  multilateral   creditors,   and   a   rapidly   deteriorating   global   economic  
environment.      
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396  Weeks,  1989,  p.  53.  
397  Cardoso  and  Helwege,  1992,  pp.  116–118.  
398  Griffith-­‐Jones  &  Sunkel,  1985,  p.  107.  
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The   lead-­‐in   to   the   2001   crisis   shared   many   of   these   features.   First,   a  
coincidence  of  interests  between  the  Argentine  government  and  private  creditors  can  
be   observed.   On   one   hand,   it   was   the   unwillingness   to   incur   the   political   costs  
associated  with  exiting  what  became  known  as  the  ‘convertibility  plan,’  together  with  
a   tight   fiscal   budget,   which   made   the   Argentine   government   turn   to   the   financial  
bond   market.   In   an   attempt   to   curb   the   high   inflation   levels   that   had   plagued  
Argentina   since   the   prior   crisis,   in   1991,   the   newly-­‐elected   president  Carlos  Menem  
fixed  the  exchange  rate  (one  peso  to  one  U.S.  dollar).  By  pegging  its  currency  to  the  
U.S.   dollar,   the   Argentine   government   gave   up   its   independent   ability   to   create  
money.  The  convertibility  plan  thus  required  strict  fiscal  policies,  for  the  central  bank  
had  to  have  enough  dollars  or  gold  reserves  to  be  able  to  exchange  pesos  for  dollars  
and   to   inject  money   into   the  economy   in   times  of   recession.399  The  adoption  of   the  
convertibility   plan  was  not   enough,  however,   to   ensure   a   tight   fiscal   policy,   for   the  
government   could   still   borrow.  Unwilling   to  make   costly   political   reforms   (such   as  
confronting   powerful   domestic   interests   by   revising   the   functioning   of   the   federal  
system   and   the   high   payments   to   provinces),   the   Argentine   government   started  
borrowing.400  
On   the  other  hand,   the   incentive   structure  of   the   finance   industry  was   such  
that  private  creditors  were  keen  to  invest  precisely  in  those  emerging  economies  that  
already  had  the  most  outstanding  bonds.401  In  the  emerging  economies’  bond-­‐market,  
investment   firms  decide  whether  or  not   to  buy  a   sovereign  bond  on   the  basis  of  an  
index—the   Emerging   Markets   Bond   Index-­‐Plus   (EBMI-­‐Plus).   In   the   world   of   the  
EBMI-­‐Plus,   the   weighting   of   every   country   depends   on   the   number   of   bonds   sold  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399   The   inability   to   use   the   monetary   policy   lever   to   stimulate   the   economy   is   one   of   the  
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compared   with   all   bonds   issued   by   all   countries   combined.   Countries   with   the  
heaviest  weighting   in   the   index  —  those  with  the  most  bonds  outstanding  and  that  
are  the  most  heavily  indebted  —  are  the  ones  to  which  investors  are   incentivised  to  
direct   their   money.   From   1996   to   2001,   Argentina   tended   to   have   the   heaviest  
weighting  of  any  nation,  and  thus,  investors  continued  lending  it  vast  sums,  although  
they  knew  that  a  debt  crisis  was  likely.    
Second,   the   IMF  —   according   to   its   own   assessment  —   extended   loans   to  
Argentina   well   beyond   the   point   of   sustainability.402   With   the   IMF   enduring  
widespread  criticism  for   its   involvement   in  Asia  and  with  Western  capitalism  facing  
calamity  in  light  of  the  Russian  crisis,  the  IMF  wanted  to  be  able  to  point  to  at  least  
one  country  where  its  involvement  appeared  to  be  successful.403  
Third,  as  in  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  of  the  1980s,  the  onset  of  the  2001  crisis  
was   also  marked   by   a   deterioration   in   external   conditions.   The   appreciation   of   the  
U.S.  dollar,   the  devaluation  of   the  Brazilian   real,   and   the   loss  of  market   confidence  
due   to   the  Asian   financial   crisis   and   the   turmoil   in  Russia  weakened   the  Argentine  
economy   to   such   an   extent   that   convertibility   broke   down   and   the   crisis   erupted.  
Overall,   while   some   analysts   emphasise   the   role   of   domestic   politics,   such   as   the  
adoption   of   the   convertibility   plan,404   and   others   highlight   the   role   of   powerful  
international   actors   such   as   Wall   Street   firms   and   the   IMF,405   “the   Argentine  
economic  crisis  of  2001–2002  is  a  case  of  methodological  over  determination.”406    
   What   this   detailed   exposition   of   Argentina’s   sovereign   debt   crises   reveals   is  
that   the   dominant   position   can   be   challenged   both   on   the   descriptive   and   the  
normative  levels.  First,  on  the  descriptive  level,  what  this  historical  account  reveals  is  
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that   debt   crises   cannot   be   exclusively   explained   by   the   demand   side,   such   as   bad  
management  or  fiscal  overspending  by  the  debtor  state.  Rather,  sovereign  debt  crises  
spring   from   the   interplay   of   three   different   factors,   namely   the   coincidence   of  
interests   of   private   creditors   and   the   government   of   the   hour,   the   contributions   of  
multilateral   public   creditors,   and   deteriorating   market   conditions.   They   are,  
therefore,  the  result  of  a  complex  interplay  of  contributions.    
This   is   not   to   say   that   one   cannot   identify   distinct   contributions   made   by  
different  players.  There   is  more   to  say   than  simply   that   the  sovereign  debt  crises  of  
the   1980s   and   2000s   erupted   “through   the   interplay   of   the   actions   of   thousands   or  
millions  of  individuals,”407  which  is  the  explanation  that  would  be  given  by  traditional  
structural   injustice   scholars.   The   actions   of   the   Argentine   government   and   of   both  
private   and   public   creditors   can   be   individuated   in   a  much  more   concrete  manner  
than   the   vague   invocation   of   ‘structural   processes’   allows   us   to.   Yet,   there   are   also  
external  factors  at  play,  such  as  the  deterioration  of  the  global  and  regional  economic  
environment   –   factors   that   equally   contribute   to   the   ultimate   outbreak   of   the  
sovereign   debt   crises   -­‐   that   cannot   be   individuated   in   the   same   manner.   Put  
differently,  the  interplay  between  contributions  made  by  individual  players  (that  can  
be   distinctively   identified)  with   the   unfolding   chain   of   events  where   the   actions   of  
multiple  players  result  in  deteriorating  market  conditions,  resulted  in  the  outbreak  of  
both  of  the  Argentine  sovereign  debt  crises.  This  analysis  of  the  historical  unfolding  
of   sovereign   debt   crises   unequivocally   challenges   the   repayment   norm   and   the  
economic  orthodox  models  that  underlie  it.    
If  the  repayment  norm  is  challenged  on  the  descriptive  level,  the  singling  out  
of   the  debtor   state  as   the  sole  agent   to  whom  responsibility  ought   to  be  attributed,  
and   the   distributive   implication   that   this   entails,   becomes   difficult   to   justify.   An  
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isolating   understanding   of   responsibility   with   immediate   distributive   implications  
seems  inappropriate  for  cases  where  the  outbreak  of  sovereign  debt  crises  –  only  the  
tip  of  the  iceberg  of  a  structurally  unjust  SD&CR  –  is  the  result  of  the  contributions  of  
manifold  of  actors.    
This  normative  critique  does  not  only  question  the  singling  out  of  the  debtor  
as   the   responsible   actor,   but   questions   the  whole   exercise   of   singling   out   a   unique  
culprit.   It   equally   criticises,   therefore,   the   singling   out   of   creditors.   For   what   this  
isolation   of   individual   creditors   as   unique   culprits   does,   is   to   divert   attention   away  
from   the   structures   on   which   the   global   credit   and   debt   regime   is   predicated.   Put  
differently,  the  critique  states  that  singling  out  one  actor’s  contributions  in  the  light  
of   the   complex  historical   genesis   of   the  previously  mentioned   sovereign  debt   crises  
misunderstands   the  way   in  which  unsustainable  debt  burdens  are  accumulated  and  
the  way  in  which  debt  crises  emerge.  It  is  not  enough  to  turn  the  tables  of  the  blame-­‐
game  and  point  at  private  or  public  creditors  as  the  sole  responsible  agents.  What  is  
required  is  an  altogether  different  understanding  of  responsibility.    
The  obvious  alternative  to  an   isolating  understanding  of  responsibility   is   the  
social   connection   model   of   responsibility   reviewed   in   the   preceding   chapter.   The  
social   connection   model   explicitly   endorses   and   defends   a   more   expansive,   non-­‐
isolating   form   of   responsibility   attribution,   where   the   attribution   of   responsibility  
does  not  have   immediate  distributive  consequences.  Yet,  as  shown  in  the  preceding  
chapter,   the   social   connection   model   does   not   enable   us   to   do   something   which  
seems  of  utmost   importance  here,  namely  to  attribute  responsibility   for   the  distinct  
contributions  made  by  powerful  actors.  Moreover,  being  exclusively  concerned  with  
forward-­‐looking  forms  of  responsibility,  the  social  connection  model  does  not  offer  us  
the   necessary   theoretical   tools   to   make   a   more   nuanced,   backward-­‐looking  
assignation  of  responsibility.    
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In  the  next  section,  thus,  I  re-­‐introduce  the  integrated  model  of  responsibility  
defended   in   the   preceding   chapter,   to   show   how   it   allows   us   to   recognise   the  
structural  nature  of   the  outbreak  of   sovereign  debt  crises,  while  also  enabling  us   to  
hold  individual  agents  responsible  for  their  distinct  contributions.  This  responsibility  
is  both  backward  and  forward-­‐looking,  for  while  it  rests  on  the  distinct  contributions  
made   by   different   agents   in   the   past,   the   attribution   of   responsibility   entails   that  
these  very  same  agents  have  forward-­‐looking  responsibilities.  It  will  become  evident  
how   the   threefold   distinction   made   between   structural   processes   proper,   the  
structural-­‐relational,   and   the   structural-­‐systemic   level   are   not   only   useful   to  
understand   how   structural   injustices   are   reproduced,   but   also   hint   at   normatively  
relevant  grounds  on  which  to  attribute  responsibility  for  each  of  these  dimensions.  By  
associating  distinct  normative  grounds   for  each  of   these  dimensions   through  which  
structural  injustice  is  reproduced  within  the  SD&CR,  I  am  able  to  answer  my  research  
question   regarding   the   responsibility   of   public,   multilateral   creditors,   and   private  
creditors  qua  members  of  the  financial  class.    
  
Three   Normative   Grounds   to   Attribute   Responsibility   to   Creditors:   Moral  
Responsibility,  Benefit,  and  Role  Responsibility    
  
In  Chapter   3   I   argued   that   invoking  an  agent’s   contribution   to   a   structural  process,  
generally   defined,   occluded   the   very   different   forms   of   contributions   and   the  
dimensions   through   which   structural   injustices   are   reproduced.   I   identified   three  
such   dimensions:   structural-­‐relational   level,   the   structural-­‐systemic   level   and  
structural   processes   proper.   These   dimensions   are   not  mutually   exclusive,   but   are,  
instead,  heuristic  devices  that  allow  us  to  recognise  where  and  how  different  factors  
reproduce  injustice.  On  one  hand,  identifying  these  dimensions  helps  us  analyse  the  
different  ways   through  which   structural   injustice   is   perpetuated.   This   is   something  
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which   I   showed   in   Chapter   3.   But   it   also   allows   us   to   distribute   responsibility   in   a  
more   expansive   and   nuanced   manner.   It   is   my   contention   that   whenever   we  
recognise   that   structural   injustice   is   perpetuated   through   one   of   these   dimensions,  
we  will  also  be  able  to  identify  an  agent  who  is  distinctively  responsible.       
     In  this  section,  I  first  show  how  applying  the  three  distinctions  to  Argentina’s  
sovereign   debt   history   allows   us   to   better   understand   the   genesis   of   a   debt   crisis.  
Second,  it  enables  us  to  identify  distinct  normative  grounds  on  which  creditors  can  be  
held   responsible   for   carrying   part   of   the   burden   that   spring   therefrom.   While  
identifying   these   grounds   does   not   give   us   a   definitive   answer   to   the   question   of  
creditor   responsibility   in   general,   it   does   provide   us   with   the   relevant   normative  
categories   to   analyse   individual   countries’   debt   histories,   challenge   the   unilateral  
attribution  of  responsibility  to  the  debtor  state,  and  turn  the  tables  of  the  debate.     
   Argentina’s   sovereign   debt   history   can   be   interpreted   through   the   three  
dimensions   of   structural   injustice   described   in   previous   chapters.   First,   we   can  
recognise  the  structural-­‐relational  dimension  at  play.  Recall  that  structural-­‐relational  
contributions   to   structural   injustice   are   distinct   forms   of   contributions   for   which  
agents  can  be  held  liable.  While  an  agent  of  wrongdoing  can  be  identified  -­‐  and  is,  in  
that   sense,   relational   -­‐   their  wrongdoing   is   structural,   first,  because   the  actions  and  
decisions  are  part  of  an  overarching  structural  process  which  creates  and  reproduces  
structural   injustice  and,   second,  because   the  agents   require  enabling   structures  and  
acts  of  complicity  from  other  actors  to  make  the  individual  contribution  possible.    
   Consider,   for   instance,   the   role   of   creditors   during   Argentina’s   military  
dictatorship.  Here,   the  biggest  Western  banks  extended  credit   to   the  military   junta,  
despite   knowing   that   the   military   government   was   neither   democratically   elected,  
nor   using   the   accrued   debt   in   the   interest   of   the   people.   By   continuing   to   extend  
loans   to   the   military   government,   these   private   creditors   were   thus   violating   the  
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norm   set   out   by   the   ‘odious   debt   doctrine’   and   were   thereby   committing   a   moral  
wrong.408   By   pressuring   Alfonsín   to   nationalise   that   debt,   the   IMF  was   implicating  
itself  in  the  same  norm  violation.       
   While   individually   morally   deplorable,   these   actions   both   rely   on   and  
reproduce  structural  injustice.  First,  as  Alfonsín’s  decision  to  nationalise  odious  debt  
shows,   the  distinct  contributions  of  creditors   rely  on  the  complicity  of  other  actors.  
The   fact   that  Alfonsín   only   accepted   to   nationalise   the   debt   out   of   fear   that   future  
sources  of  credit  would  dry  up,  further  highlights  that  the  creditors’  contributions  to  
the   instantiation   of   structural   injustice   also   relied   on   the   internalisation   of   certain  
beliefs   of   how   the   global   economy   operates.   Second,   these   distinctive,   morally  
deplorable   actions   of   creditors   (lending   to   an   autocratic   regime   known   for   human  
rights  abuses)  also  contributed  to  the  structural  process  which  ultimately  resulted  in  
the  outbreak  of  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  as  well  as  in  the  reproduction  of  the  unjust  
background  structures  of  the  SD&CR.       
   If   asked   on  what   normative   ground   responsibility   ought   to   be   attributed   in  
cases   like   this,   where   the   structural-­‐relational   dimension   is   at   play,   I   believe   the  
answer   to   be   fairly   straight-­‐forward.   In   instances   where   the   structural-­‐relational  
dimension   seems   most   prominent,   responsibility   ought   to   be   attributed   on   moral  
grounds,  which  entails  making  a  judgment  of  moral  praise  or  blame.  To  hold  an  agent  
morally   responsible,   certain   conditions   of   agency   must   hold.   Hart   called   these  
relevant   features  of  agency   ‘capacity’:   “The  significance  of  capacity   is   that   it  enables  
individuals  to  control  themselves  and  their  environment,  and  in  that  way  to  influence  
their   impact   on   the   world   and   the   consequences   of   their   conduct’.409  While   some  
disagreement  remains,  there  is  some  limited  consensus  that  holding  an  agent  morally  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408   For   a   defence   of   why   extending   debt   to   an   autocratic   regime   is  morally   deplorable,   see  
Pogge  (2002)  and  Barry  and  Tomitova  (2006).  I  say  more  about  this  in  Chapter  8  of  this  thesis.    
409  Miller,  2001,  p.455.  
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responsible  requires  evaluating  whether  the  agent  intended  the  outcome,  whether  it  
could  have  been  foreseen,  or  whether  the  agent’s  behaviour  violated  some  standard  of  
reasonable   conduct   or   moral   norm.410   This   ability   to   control,   which   follows   from  
having  the  relevant  capacity,  grounds  the  attribution  of  moral  responsibility.  411  
   To  say  that  an  agent  is  morally  responsible,  then,  is  to  make  an  appraisal  of  an  
agent’s   conduct.   It   is   to   say   that   an   agent   has   done   something   that   attracts  moral  
praise   or   blame.   The   case   of   private   and   public   creditors   extending   loans   to   the  
Argentine  military  junta  is  a  clear  example  of  a  case  in  which  creditors  could  be  held  
morally   responsible   for   extending   odious   debt,   which   became   unsustainable,   and  
which  both  relied  on,  and  contributed  to,  reproducing  a  structurally  unjust  SD&CR.  
When  morally  responsible  in  this  manner,  creditors  can  be  attributed  backward  and  
forward-­‐looking   responsibility.   They   can   be   attributed   backward-­‐looking  
responsibility  by  virtue  of  their  moral  failings,  which  can  be  discharged  –  for  instance  
–  by  carrying  part  of   the  burden  of   restructuring.  But   they  are  also   responsible   in  a  
forward-­‐looking   manner,   to   change   the   structures   of   the   unjust   SD&CR   to   whose  
reproduction  they  contribute   .    
     As  has  already  been  highlighted,  not  all  contributions  to  structural   injustice  
are   morally   blame-­‐worthy.   There   are   indeed   those   contributions   to   structural  
injustice,   where   the   interplay   of   manifold   actions,   which   cannot   necessarily   be  
individuated   and   none   of   which   are  morally   deplorable   on   their   own,   constitute   a  
structural   injustice   in   the   aggregate.   I   have   called   these   forms   of   contributions  
‘structural  processes  proper’.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410  Miller,  2001,  p.455.  Miller  gives  two  boundary  examples  here  which  prove  useful.  He  asks  us  
to   think   about   an   exceptionally   talented   athlete,   who   wins   a   race   and   about   a   clumsy  
gardener.  While   in   both   cases   we   would   want   to   hold   the   agent   outcome   responsible,   we  
would  not  to  hold  them  morally  responsible,  for  neither  the  gardener  nor  the  athlete  violated  
or  excelled  in  meeting  a  moral  principle  -­‐  the  gardener  did  not  intend  the  lousy  outcome  and,  
in   both   of   their   cases,   the   outcome   depends   too   much   on   natural   talent   and   too   little   on  
qualities  of  intention  and  will  to  attract  moral  assessment  (Miller,  2007,  p.  90-­‐91).    
411  Cane,  2016,  p.  280.    
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   Examples   of   such   structural   processes   proper   are,   for   instance,   the  
deterioration  of  the  economic  environment,  following  the  increase  in  interest  rates  by  
the   Federal   Reserve.   The   increase   in   interest   rates   resulted   in   the   outbreak   of   a  
vicious  cycle  in  which  Argentina’s  debt  burden  was  radically  increased,  a  recession  in  
OECD  countries  broke  out,  Argentine  fell,  imports  became  even  more  expensive,  and  
capital  flights  skyrocketed.412  A  similar  chain  reaction  occurred  after  the  appreciation  
of  the  U.S.  dollar  and  the  devaluation  of  the  Brazilian  real  in  the  early  2000s.413       
   The   fact   that   individual,   agential   contributions   to   these   structural   processes  
proper   cannot   be   identified   does   not,   however,   mean   that   no   normative   grounds  
exists   on  which   distinct   actors   can   be   held   responsible   (both   in   a   backward   and   a  
forward-­‐looking   manner).   In   cases   in   which   injustices   are   reproduced   by   the  
uncoordinated  actions  of  thousands  or  millions  of  players,  I  find  it  most  appropriate  
to   attribute   responsibility   on   the   basis   of   benefit.   The   intuition   underlying   this  
ground  for  attributing  responsibility  is  simple:  “benefits  that  owe  their  origins  to  past  
or  present  injustice  are  ‘morally  tainted’  and  therefore  the  behaviour  of  beneficiaries  
of  injustice  itself  becomes  morally  tainted.”414       
   The   intuitive   appeal   behind   my   proposal   is   evident   in   the   case   of   private  
creditors  extending  credit   in   the   run-­‐up   to   the  debt  crises  of   the   1980s  and  of  2001.  
Here,  the  individual  lender  extending  credit  to  the  Argentine  government  was  not,  in  
itself,   morally   deplorable.   Yet,   the   lender’s   behaviour   does   not   seem   completely  
morally   innocent,   either.   In   particular,   the   continued   extension   of   credit   in  
circumstances   in   which   it   was   becoming   more   and   more   apparent   that   the   debt  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412  Griffith-­‐Jones  &  Sunkel,  1985,  p.  107.  
413  Kacowicz,  2013.  
414  Page  &  Pasternak,  2014,  p.  331.  
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burden  was   no   longer   sustainable   in   order   to  make   greater   earnings   seems,   at   the  
very  least,  ‘morally  tainted.’415    
Investment  banks  in  the  1990s  did  not  only  protect  themselves  from  suffering  
losses   once   Argentina’s   inevitable   collapse   materialised,   but   also   managed   to   gain  
from  it.  When  Argentina  restructured  its  debt  in  2001  in  the  megacanje  (mega-­‐swap),  
for   instance,  Wall  Street  firms  earned  a  commission  of  USD  $  137-­‐150  million.416  The  
IMF  was  also  free  from  suffering  the  negative  consequences  that  its  guidance  brought  
about.  As  Blustein  states,  the  role  of  “global  markets  and  the  IMF  in  pumping  up  the  
Argentine  bubble  would  be   less  deplorable   if   the  bubble  had  been  gently  deflated  –  
that   is,   if   the   international   community   had   effectively   assisted   Argentina   in  
minimising   the   impact  once   its   economy   fell  on  hard   times  and  market  psychology  
turned  negative.”417  They  did  not  do  so,  however,  and  the  pattern  which  emerges  is  a  
clear   one:   while   international   creditors   make   use   of   the   system   of   hierarchical  
interdependence  when  market  conditions  are  favourable,  it  is  the  weakest  actors  who  
pay  the  bill  when  things  turn  sour.  Regardless  of  whether  or  not  individual  actors  are  
also   structurally-­‐relationally   implicated   and   morally   to   blame,   beneficiaries   of  
structural   processes   proper   can   be   held   accountable   on   the   basis   of   this   benefit   to  
carry  special  responsibilities.    
   Finally,  the  third  dimension  through  which  structural  injustice  is  instantiated  
in   the   SD&CR   is   the   structural-­‐systemic   one.   The   structural-­‐systemic   level   draws  
attention   to   those   contributions   to   the   perpetuation   of   structural   injustice   that  
appear  from  the  institutional  social  order  in  which  the  SD&CR  is  embedded.  Capital  
flight   in   the   run   up   to   the   1980s   crisis,   and   the   incentive   structure   of   the   finance  
industry   in   the   late   1990s   and   early   2000s,   offer   excellent   examples   of   this.   First,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415  Page  &  Pasternak,  2014,  p.  331.  
416  Blustein,  2005,  p.113.  
417  Blustein,  2005,  p.8.  
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under   another   institutional   order   –   the   Bretton  Woods   system   –   capital   flight   was  
regulated   much   more   tightly   using   capital   controls.418   This   radically   decreased   the  
frequency   of   financial   crises.419   Second,   the   EBMI-­‐Plus   Index   neatly   illustrates   how  
the  institutional  order  may  negatively  impact  all  actors  involved.  The  EBMI-­‐Index  did  
not  reflect  the  interests  of  either  party  (debtor  or  creditors).  The  accumulation  of  an  
unsustainable   debt   burden   was   harmful   for   both   creditors   and   debtors   alike,   yet  
creditors   followed   it   blindly   nonetheless.   If   there   is   any   distinct   contribution   that  
ought   to   be   captured   here,   then   it   is   not   the   contribution   of   creditors   choosing   to  
further   extend   credit   to   those   states   which   were   already   most   heavily   indebted.  
Instead,   the  most  normatively   relevant   contribution  here   seems   to  be   that   of   those  
actors  who  enabled  the  creation  of  such  an  incentive  structure  in  the  first  place.       
   Against   this  backdrop,   in   instances  where   the  structural-­‐systemic  dimension  
seems   to   be   central   to   explaining   the   unfolding   of   a   sovereign   debt   crisis   and   the  
reproduction  of  structural  injustice  in  the  SD&CR,  I  think  that  the  most  appropriate  
grounds   on   which   to   identify   the   responsible   agent   is   role   responsibility.   Role  
responsibility  is  a  form  of  responsibility  which  pertains  “whenever  a  person  occupies  
a   distinctive   place   or   office   in   a   social   organization,   to   which   specific   duties   are  
attached  to  provide  for  the  welfare  of  others  or  to  advance  in  some  specific  way  the  
aims  or  purposes   of   the  organization.”   420   In   contrast   to   a  morally   relevant   agent,   a  
role   responsible   agent   does   not   need   to   have   the   capacity   to   control   the   outcome.  
Role  responsibility  rests  on  authority  -­‐  the  power  of  one  person,  under  a  given  system  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418  Roubini  and  Mihm,  2011,  p.24.  
419  Reinhart  anf  Rogoff,  2009.  
420  Hart,  1968,  p.212.  Whenever  an  agent  is  role  responsible  in  this  manner,  s/he  can  be  said  to  
be   responsible   for   the   performance   of   these   duties,   or   for   doing   what   is   necessary   to   fulfil  
them.  The  very  point  of  creating  roles   is   to  promote  certain  outcomes.  To  ensure  that   these  
outcomes  are  met,  a  role-­‐responsible  agent  must  be  held  accountable.  Accountability,  “refers  
to   a   relationship   in   which   an   agent,   A,   is   required   to   ‘give   account’   to   another   B,   of   A’s  
involvement  in  phenomenon  X”  (Cane,  2016,  p.  280).    
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of   norms,   to   alter   the   normative   position   of   another   person  within   that   system.   421  
Authority   attaches   to   agents   as   office-­‐holders,   not   as   possessors   of   capacities.   422  
While  the  attribution  of  moral  responsibility  requires  a  certain  capacity  to  control  the  
conduct  of  events,  role  responsible  agents  can  be  held  responsible  regardless  of  this  
control.  
   The   intuition   underlying   the   idea   that   agents   who   influenced   the   concrete  
form  that  the  institutional  social  order  takes  are  to  be  held  role  responsible  is  simple:  
Since   structural-­‐processes-­‐proper  do  not  unfold   in   an   institutional   vacuum,  but   are  
likely   to   occur   within   specific   institutional   orders,   in   cases   where   injustices   are  
reproduced   via   processes   that   may   appear   to   be   nothing   more   than   the   interplay  
between  the  uncoordinated  actions  of  millions  of  agents,  role  responsible  agents  also  
ought   to  be  held   accountable.  The   table  below   summarises  how   I   propose   to   think  
about   responsibility   in   cases   in   which   the   different   dimensions   through   which  
structural  injustices  are  reproduced  are  observed.      
Structural  dimensions   Grounds  for  responsibility  
Structural-­‐relational   Moral  responsibility    
Structural-­‐systemic   Role  responsibility  
Structural-­‐processes-­‐proper   Benefit  and  role  
responsibility    
  
Crucially,   I   am   not   maintaining   that   this   allocation   of   responsibility   is   always   the  
most   appropriate   for   every   individual   case.   Each   country’s   debt   history   is   different  
and  needs  to  be  individually  assessed.  No  single  answer  can  be  given  in  the  abstract  
regarding   who   is   responsible   for   the   injustices   of   the   SD&CR   and   who   should  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421  I  am  defining  authority  without  any  connotation  of  legitimacy.  
422  Cane  gives   the  extremely   insightful  example  of   ‘ministerial   responsibility’  under   the  UK's  
constitutional  system.  Under  the  UK's  system  it  seems  clear  that  ministerial  responsibility  for  
performance  of  public  functions  by  officials  in  a  hierarchical  relationship  with  a  Minister  does  
not   depend   on   the   capacity   of   the   Minister   personally   to   control   performance   of   those  
functions,   and   even   less   on   the   Minister’s   capacity   to   perform   those   functions.   Rather,  
ministerial  responsibility  is  grounded  in  the  authority  of  the  Ministers  -­‐  the  power,  that  is,  to  
alter  the  constitutional,  legal  and  political  positions  of  those  subject  to  their  authority.    
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shoulder   the   burden   of   sovereign   debt   crises.   What   I   propose   is   to   use   the   three  
dimensions   through   which   structural   injustice   is   reproduced   and   the   grounds   of  
responsibility  associated  with  them  as  a  heuristic  device  to  guide  our  reasoning  in  the  
assessment  of  individual  cases.  Doing  so  allows  us  both  to  acknowledge  the  structural  
nature   of   credit   and   debt   crises   and,   at   the   same   time,   hold   on   to   the   powerful  
intuition   that   not   all   contributions   to   structural   injustice   are   comparable.  
Importantly,   it  also  allows  us  to  recognise  that  there  are  morally  relevant  reasons  to  
want  to  distinguish  between  them.    
When   applied   to   Argentina’s   sovereign   debt   history,   we   recognise   that   can  
indeed  be  attributed  responsibility  on  the  basis  of  moral   responsibility,  benefit,  and  
role   responsibility.  This   insight   allows  us   to   challenge   the  monolithic   responsibility  
attribution  underlying  the  repayment  norm  and  turn  the  tables  of  the  debate,  starting  
not  with  the  question  of  how  much  of  the  burden  creditors  can  be  made  to  carry  (for  
the   pragmatic   reason   of   ensuring   debt   sustainability),   but   on  what   normative   basis  
they  ought   to  carry   them.  To  be  sure,  holding  creditors   responsible  on  any  of   these  
three  grounds  does  not  signify  that  creditors  need  to  carry  the  full  financial  burden  of  
sovereign   debt   crisis.   This   would   entail   falling   back   on   both   an   isolating   and   an  
immediately   distributive   understanding   of   responsibility.   What   it   does   entail,  
however,   is   that   the   repayment  norm,   in   the  way   in  which   it   is   currently  upheld,   is  
not  normatively  defensible.    
In   practice,   the   association   of   normative   grounds   to   attribute   responsibility  
with  the  three  dimensions  of  structural   injustice   is  a   two-­‐way  street.  Whenever  one  
recognises  one  of  the  dimensions  at  play,  it  is  likely  that  one  will  be  able  to  attribute  
responsibility  based  on  the  associated  normative  ground.  Similarly,  if  one  recognises  
that  an  agent   is,   for   instance,  morally  responsible  one  will  most  probably  be  able  to  
recognise  the  structural-­‐relational  level  at  play.    
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But   where,   some   may   counter,   does   the   emancipatory   potential   of   this  
analysis   lie?   I   believe   that   providing   a   counter-­‐narrative   to   the   dominant   position  
explicitly   opens   new   fields   of   contestation.   The   way   in   which   we   think   and   speak  
about  debtors  and  creditors,  debt  restructuring,  and  debt  crises  shape  the  norms  that  
ultimately  inform  the  functioning  of  the  SD&CR.  Thus,  by  thinking  differently  about  
both,   the   genesis   of   debt   crisis   on   the   one   hand   and   the   responsibility   picture  




Attributing   responsibility   on   the   basis   of   benefit,   moral   responsibility,   and   role  
responsibility   is  a  complicated  matter.  Many  may  not  be  persuaded  by  the   intuition  
that  underlies  it,  claiming  that  neither  basis  is  sufficient  to  ground  responsibility  and  
trigger  any  special  duties.  My  aim  here  is  not  to  convince  these  sceptics.  Rather,  it  is  
more  narrow:  I  am  preaching  to  the  converted  in  arguing  that  iff  one  has  the  intuition  
that   moral   responsibility,   benefit,   and   role   responsibility   are   sufficient   grounds   to  
trigger   duties,   responsibility   can   be   attributed   to   creditors   to   shoulder   part   of   the  
burden   of   restructuring,   whenever   the   respective   dimension   (structural-­‐relational,  
structural-­‐system  and  structural  processes  proper)   is  at  play.  Consider  the  following  
objections  to  my  argument.       
   First,  it  may  be  argued  that  it  may  not  be  clear  for  the  creditor  at  the  time  of  
entering   the   contract   whether   s/he   benefits   from   or   contributes   in   an   immoral  
manner  to  the  accumulation  of  an  unsustainable  debt.  Put  differently,  it  may  not  be  
clear  in  time  T1  whether  the  creditor  will  contribute  to  the  structural  processes  that  
result   in   a  debt   crisis   in   time  T2.  The  question   thus  becomes:  What   are   reasonable  
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assumptions  about  the  future  sustainability  of  debt?  There  are  two  ways  of  answering  
this.  First,  if  a  creditor  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  know  that  the  debt  will  become  
unsustainable,  yet  does  it  nonetheless  because  s/he  knows  that  s/he  will  benefit  from  
it  in  some  manner,  then  the  creditor  can  be  said  to  be  on  the  hook  for  carrying  part  of  
the  burden  that  comes  from  restructuring.  In  the  case  of  Argentina,  for  instance,  the  
argument   is  made   that,   knowing   that   Argentina   was   at   the   verge   of   a   severe   debt  
crisis,  the  IMF  continued  lending  because  the  institution  required  the  recognition.424  
Although   it   was   already   clear   in   1998   that   Argentina’s   debt   was   unsustainable,   the  
IMF   continued   to   give   the   country   credit,   for   Argentina,   as   its   poster   child,   “was  
needed   there,   for   the  worlds   sake,   if   not   its   own.”425  Wollner   calls   this   the   ex-­‐ante  
perspective.426  The  case  of  the  vulture  funds  that  purchased  Argentine  bonds  after  the  
country  defaulted  for  a  fraction  of  their  price,  only  to  litigate  against  the  state  and  be  
repaid  in  full,  is  an  even  clearer  case  in  which  it  was  obvious  to  the  creditor  that  the  
debt   was   unsustainable.   Second,   the   creditor   can   be   expected   to   carry   part   of   the  
burden  of  debt  restructuring  if  the  lender  shares  moral  responsibility  for  the  fact  that  
the  debt  became  unsustainable  (the  ex-­‐post  perspective).427  The  debt  extended  to  the  
military  junta,  which  was  odious  and  became  unsustainable,  is  a  case  in  point.     
   A  second  objection  that  could  be  made  to  my  argument   is   that,   in   the  same  
way  in  which  the  structural  production  of  injustice  makes  the  attribution  of  isolating  
forms  of  responsibility  implausible,  the  complex  web  of  interactions  between  agents  
that  create  and  instantiate  structures  also  makes  the  allocation  of  moral  responsibility  
and   benefit   implausible.   After   all,   moral   responsibility   and   benefit   also   rest,   to   a  
certain  extent,  on  some  link  between  an  agent  and  an  outcome.  This   is  a  version  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
424  Takagi,  2004.  
425  Blustein,  2005,  p.  59.  
426  Wollner,  2017.  
427  Wollner,  2017.  
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the  argument  disproven  in  the  previous  chapter,  regarding  the  incompatible  logics  of  
the  liability  model  and  the  social  connection  model.      
   Although  I  agree  that  moral  responsibility  and  benefit  require  the  existence  of  
such  a  link  between  agent  and  outcome,  it  does  not  need  to  be  —  and  this  is  crucial  
—  a  direct  causal  link  between  an  agent’s  action  and  the  production  and  constitution  
of   the   outcome.   In   the   case   of  moral   responsibility,   it   can   be   argued   that,   in   some  
cases,   causal   responsibility   is   not   necessary   at   all   for   the   attribution   of   moral  
responsibility.  This  is  so,  for  instance,   in  cases  in  which  an  agent  negligently  fails  to  
take  steps  to  prevent  something  from  occurring.428  Moreover,  even  in  cases  in  which  
the  attribution  of  moral  responsibility  goes  hand-­‐in-­‐hand  with  causal  responsibility,  
it  can  be  argued  that  it  is  the  acting  in  a  way  in  which  the  agent  knows  it  contributes  
to  harm,  rather  than  the   indirect  contribution   itself,   that  grounds  the  attribution  of  
responsibility.   It   is   in   the   knowing,   and   not   in   constituting   the   outcome,   that   the  
normative   work   is   produced   here.   In   the   case   of   benefit,   it   is   the   fact   of   having  
profited  from  the  production  of  harm,  rather  than  one’s  own  contribution  to  it,  which  
establishes  a  moral  link  between  an  individual  agent  and  the  outcome:  “Beneficiaries  
of  injustice  may  have  played  no  causal  role  in  the  creation  of  this  injustice.”429  
  
Conclusion  and  Road  Ahead    
The  norm  that  sovereign  debtors  must  repay  their  debts  remains  largely  unchallenged  
in   the   global   financial   economy.   Indeed,   against   the   backdrop   of   the   most   recent  
sovereign  debt  crises,  it  can  be  argued  that  this  repayment  norm  is  as  powerful  today  
as  it  has  ever  been.  The  repayment  norm  is  not  only  embodied  in  the  SD&CR,  and  in  
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the   dominant   discourse   in   academia   and   policy   debates,   but   also   in   the   economic  
orthodoxy  that  underlies  them.       
   In  this  chapter,  I  challenged  this  dominant  norm.  I  argued  that  the  genesis  of  
debt   crises   is   structural   (the   descriptive   challenge)   and   that   this   structural  
explanation  requires  an  altogether  different  understanding  of  responsibility   from  an  
isolated  account  of  responsibility  (the  normative  challenge).  Applying  the  integrated  
model  of  responsibility  to  Argentina’s  sovereign  debt  history,  I  argued  that  creditors  
can   be   held   responsible   on   the   grounds   of  moral   responsibility,   benefit,   and  moral  
responsibility.  This  responsibility  is  both  backward  and  forward-­‐looking,  for  while  it  
rests   on   the   distinct   contributions   made   by   different   agents   in   the   past,   the  
attribution   of   this   responsibility   entails   that   these   very   same   agents   have   forward-­‐
looking  responsibilities  to  change  the  unjust  SD&CR  of  which  they  are  an  active  part.  
   Associating  these  normative  grounds  for  responsibility  attribution  to  the  three  
dimensions  introduced  in  the  preceding  chapters  (the  structural-­‐relational  level,  the  
structural-­‐systemic  level  and  structural  processes  proper)  allows  me  to  recognise  the  
structural   genesis   of   debt   crises,   which   brings   to   the   fore   the   unjust   background  
structures   characterising   the   SD&CR  without   giving   up   the   powerful   intuition   that  
the  contributions  of  different  agents  are  not  comparable  and  ought  to  be  normatively  
distinguished.   By   associating   distinct   normative   grounds   with   each   of   these  
dimensions   through   which   structural   injustice   is   reproduced   within   the   SD&CR,   I  
provided   the   relevant   normative   categories   to   answer   the   question   of   the  
responsibility  of  public,  multilateral  creditors,  and  private  creditors  qua  members  of  
the  financial  class.    
   The  inevitability  of  the  inter-­‐weaving  of  moral  and  economic  arguments  also  
became   clear   throughout   this   chapter.   First,   the   examples   given   of   how   –   in   policy  
circles,   public   discourse,   and   academia   –   sovereign   debtors   are   referred   to   as  
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parasites,  black  sheep,   free  riders,  and  profligate  states,  who  are  not  only  financially  
irresponsible,   but   immoral,   illustrates  how   the   intertwining  of   economic   and  moral  
arguments  has  long  taken  root  in  practice.  More  importantly,  however,  the  argument  
made  here  also  shows  that  this  intertwining  seems  ultimately  unavoidable.  As  I  tried  
to   show,   it   is   not   enough   for   economists   to   rely   on   theoretical  models   of   how   the  
economy  works  to  be  able  to  attribute  responsibility  to  debtors.  They  must,  instead,  
specify   what   they  mean   by   responsibility   for   their   argument   to   work.   At   the   same  
time,   normative   scholars   cannot   say   anything   informative   about   the   practice   of  
sovereign   borrowing   and   lending   —   indeed,   they   may   not   even   know   what   the  
relevant   normative   concepts   and   questions   are  —   if   they   do   not   also   engage   with  
both   theoretical  economic  arguments  and  historical  evidence  about   the   functioning  
of   the  market.   They   will   not,   at   the   very   least,   be   able   to   say   anything   about   how  
responsibility  ought  to  be  attributed  in  individual  sovereign  debt  histories.    
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CHAPTER  7    
WHAT  GOVERNMENTS  OWE  
Are  we,  who  live  and  work  in  the  developing  world,  fated  to  remain  
consumers   of   acts,   whether   these   are   acts   of   harm   or   of   duty,  
performed  by  the  West?  (…)  Do  we  lack  status  as  moral  beings  who  
count?430  
Those   who   can   properly   be   argued   to   be   victims   of   structural  
injustice   can   also   be   called   to   a   responsibility   they   share   with  
others   to   engage   in   actions   directed   at   transforming   those  
structures431  
  
Current  debates  approach  the  question  of  global  justice  by  asking  “what  do  we  owe  to  
the  Global  poor?”432  By  understanding  the   ‘we’   the  affluent  minority  of  the  so-­‐called  
Global   North,   this   question   reveals   a   binary   vision   of   responsibility,   in   which   the  
duties  of  the  affluent  minority  in  the  Global  North  are  discussed  with  respect  to  the  
deprived   and   disenfranchised   majority   in   the   Global   South.   While   looking   at   the  
duties   of   those  who   establish   and   benefit   from  unjust   global   structures   is   certainly  
important,  Young’s  statement  rightly  captures  the  lacuna  in  the  contemporary  global  
justice  debate  concerning  its  silence  on  the  duties  held  by  those  “who  can  properly  be  
argued  to  be  victims  of  structural  injustice.”433  Recognising  agents  whose  options  are  
constrained  by  unjust  global  structures  not  only  as  victims,  but  also  as  duty  bearers,  
however,   is   critical.   First,   it   is   important   because   it   respects   the   agency   of   the  
marginalised.  Global   justice   theories  must   seek   to   strike  a  delicate  balance  between  
treating   actors   as   vulnerable   creatures   who   may   be   in   urgent   need   of   help   and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430  Chandhoke,  2010,  p.  80.  
431  Young,  2011,  p.  17.  
432  Satz,  2005,  p.  47.  
433  Young,  2011,  p.17.  The  gap  in  current  global  justice  literature  must  be  qualified  in  two  ways.  
First,   this   gap   exists   most   prominently   regarding   the   responsibilities   of   vulnerable   states.  
When  it  comes  to  the  responsibility  of  individuals,  responsibility  or  diminished  responsibility  
is   often   assigned   to   victims   of   injustice.   This   is   so,   especially   in   the   context   of   the   criminal  
justice   system.   Second,   a   small   handful   of   scholars   have   started  wrestling  with   these   issues  
and   made   invaluable   contributions.   See   Caney   (2015),   Culp   (2014),   Gans   (2010),   Guariglia  
(2010)  and  Erskine  (2001;  2003).  
   205  
assistance,   while   at   the   same   time   honouring   them   as   responsible   agents   with  
choices.434  It  is  the  failure  to  recognise  this  agency  that  Chandhoke  denounces  when  
rhetorically   asking,   “do   we   lack   status   as   moral   beings   who   count?”435.   Second,  
recognising  the  agency  of  the  victims  of  injustice  is  instrumental  in  helping  mobilise  
them  to  take  the  actions  required  to  alter  these  injustices.    
   In  this  chapter,  I  contribute  to  filling  this  lacuna  by  drawing  attention  to  the  
responsibilities  held  by  the  governments  of  those  states  in  a  position  of  disadvantage  
within   the   SD&CR:   debtor   states   whose   citizens   –   or   the   wage-­‐dependent   class  
therein  -­‐  are  vulnerable  to  domination  and  exploitation  by  virtue  of  the  position  the  
state  occupies  in  the  asymmetrical  and  unjust  SD&CR.    
To   turn   the   tables   on   the   global   justice   debate   and   answer   the   question   of  
what  responsibilities  and  duties  disadvantaged  governments  may  hold,  I  draw  on  two  
main   bodies   of   literature.   First,   I   draw   on   the   work   done   by   various   theorists   on  
‘complicity.’   Complicity   is   a   fascinating   normative   concept   that   allows   us   to   think  
about  the  responsibility  of  those  that  can  rightly  be  called  victims  of  injustice.  At  the  
same   time,   the   work   done   on   complicity   so   far   has   not   adopted   a   structural  
viewpoint.   The   language   used   to   describe   an   act   of   complicity   is   thus   very   much  
anchored  in  the  liability  model  of  responsibility:  what  defines  an  act  of  complicity  is  
that   it   enables,   in   one   way   or   another,   the   wrongdoing   of   the   primary   agent   of  
wrongdoing.   While   this   way   of   thinking   about   responsibility   is   useful   for   the  
structural-­‐relational   dimension   identified   in   the   preceding   chapters,   it   is   more  
difficult   to   apply   to   the   structural-­‐systemic   dimension   and   to   structural   processes  
proper.  In  this  chapter,  I  will  thus  focus  on  the  structural-­‐relational  dimension.  To  be  
sure,   this   does   not   mean   that   I   am   working   within   the   liability   model   of  
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responsibility.   Rather,   it   offers   an   opportunity   to   further   develop   the   conceptual  
apparatus  of  the  integrated  model  of  responsibility  defended  in  Chapter  5.    
Second,   I   illustrate   my   analysis   with   Argentina’s   debt   history.   Instead   of  
focusing  on  the  run  up  to  the  crises  in  the  1990s  and  2000s,  like  I  did  in  the  preceding  
chapter,  I  mainly  focus  on  Argentina's  negotiations  after  the  2001  default  –  the  biggest  
default   of   its   time.   Argentina’s   negotiation   tactics   with   its   creditors   are   fascinating  
because   they   show   the   space   for   manoeuvre   that   states   have,   despite   their  
disadvantaged   position   in   the   SD&CR.   Following   the   outbreak   of   the   crisis,   a  
unilateral   debt   moratorium   was   imposed   on   Argentina’s   private   debt.   Despite  
arduous  opposition  from  all  creditors,  Argentina  managed  to  separate  its  negotiations  
with   the   Fund   from   those  with   the   private   international   creditors,   breaking   up   the  
‘creditor   cartel’   and   adopting   a   ‘take   it   or   leave   it’   approach   with   the   latter.436  
Although  Nestor  Kirchner’s  negotiation  strategy  resulted   in  a   litigation  saga   in  New  
York   courts   in   the   decade   that   followed,   Argentina’s   economy   recovered   rapidly  
during   his   time   in   office.   It   is   against   this   backdrop   that   economists   such   as   Paul  
Krugman,  Mark  Weisbrot,   and  Nouriel  Roubini  often  present  Argentina’s  default   as  
an  alternative  to  the  austerity  policies  imposed  on  other  debt-­‐stricken  countries.437    
I  proceed  as   follows:  First,   I  argue  that  disadvantaged  governments  have  the  
duty  to  not  be  complicit  in  the  domination  of  its  members  and  non-­‐members  alike.  I  
then  turn  to  the  responsibilities  that  disadvantaged  governments  have  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  their  
own   citizens,   arguing   that   they   have   a   responsibility   to   resist   domination   and  
exploitation  by  creditors.  This  responsibility  entails  the  duty  to  resist  domination  in  
an   internal,   attitudinal   sense,   and   that   it   may   also   entail   resisting   externally,   by  
actions  of  state  civil  disobedience.    
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country  made  the  most  use  of  the  room  of  manouvre  it  had  available,  see  Cooper  and  Momani  
(2005).    
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On   the   Duty   of   Disadvantaged   Governments   to   Not   Be   Complicit   in   the  
Domination  and  Exploitation  Carried  Out  by  Creditors  
  
A  good  starting  point  to  discussing  what  responsibilities  disadvantaged  governments  
may  have   is   to  ask  where   the  normative   significance  of   the  domination  of   the   state  
lies.   In   this   chapter,   I   assume   that   the   state’s   value   in   instrumental.   I   assume,  
moreover,  that  the  legitimacy  of  the  coercive  authority  of  the  state  over  its  citizenry  
requires,   minimally,   that   the   state   itself   is   neither   dominating   and   exploiting   nor  
dominated  and  exploited.  In  the  following  section,  I  argue  that  the  obligation  not  to  
be  dominating  and  exploiting  that  states  have  vis-­‐a-­‐vis  their  citizens  grounds  a  duty  
of  disadvantaged  governments  not  to  be  complicit  in  the  domination  and  exploitation  
of   their   own   citizenry   by   other   agents.   I   argue,   furthermore,   that   disadvantaged  
governments  also  have  a  duty  not  to  be  complicit  in  the  domination  and  exploitation  
of  non-­‐members,  which  results  from  the  duty  not  to  harm,  a  duty  which  is  universal  
in  scope:  everyone  has  the  duty  not  to  harm  anybody  with  their  actions.  First,  I  define  
the  concept  of  complicity  and  delineate  which  acts  can  be  said  to  involve  complicity.  
Second,   I   elaborate   on   how   the   disadvantaged   government   is   complicit   in   the  
domination   and   exploitation   of   its   own   citizens.   Third,   I   elaborate   on   how   the  
dominated  state  can  be  complicit  in  the  domination  of  non-­‐members.  I  illustrate  this  
by  using  examples  from  my  case  study.    
In   its   simplest   form   (complicity   simpliciter),   complicity   can   be   defined   as   a  
contribution  to  another  actor’s  wrongdoing,  which  facilitates  or  magnifies  the  wrong  
itself.438  The  complicit  actor  does  not  commit  the  wrongful  act  him-­‐  or  herself  -­‐  s/he  
is  not   the  primary  agent  of  wrongdoing.  Rather,  by   “wrapping  up”439  or  making   the  
primary   agents   wrongdoing   possible,   the   complicit   agent   becomes   the   secondary  
agent  of  wrongdoing.  The  act  itself  is  not  necessarily  wrong,  but  becomes  so  by  virtue  
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of  its  contribution  to  the  wrongful  act.  S/he  is  complicit  in  the  primary  agent’s  wrong  
by  contributing  to   it.  These  contributions  can  be  both  actions  or  omissions,  may  be  
more  or  less  essential  to  the  overall  wrong,  and  may  come  before,  during  or  after  the  
principal  wrongdoing.440    
Not  every  act  that  causally  contributes  to  wrongdoing  can,  however,  qualify  as  
a   complicit   act.   Two   conditions   need   to   be   in   place   for   an   action   to   be   an   act   of  
complicity.  First,  an  action  must  causally  contribute  to  the  principal  wrongdoing  (the  
actus   condition).   According   to   this   minimal   understanding   of   complicity,   it   is   not  
necessary   for  the  action  to  be  a   joint  action  with  the  principal  wrongdoing.  Second,  
for   an   act   to   qualify   as   a   complicit   act,   the   actor  must  have   known  or   should  have  
known,   at   the   time   of   acting,   that   her   action   contributes   to   the   primary   actor’s  
wrongdoing   (the  mens   condition).  Note  here   that  no   intention   to  participate   in   the  
wrongdoing  is  required.  All  that  is  needed  for  an  act  to  be  an  act  of  complicity,  then,  
is  that  the  actor  know,  or  should  have  known,  that  his  or  her  action  would  contribute  
to   the   primary   actor’s   wrongdoing.   In   addition   to   fulfilling   the   actus   and   mens  
conditions,  for  an  actor  to  be  a  secondary  agent  of  wrongdoing,  none  of  the  excusing  
conditions   ought   to   apply,   such   as   involuntariness,   duress   and   unavoidable  
ignorance.441  
The   account   of   complicity   I   adopt   here   is   the   one   that   Lepora   and   Goodin  
defend  in  “On  Complicity  and  Compromise.”442  This  account  differs  from  Cristopher  
Kutz’s  account   in  his  book   “Complicity:  Ethics  and  Law   for  a  Collective  Age.”443  For  
Kutz,  an  act  is  only  an  act  of  complicity  if  the  secondary  agent  (i)  has  the  intention  to  
share  in  a  joint  action  with  the  primary  agent  of  wrongdoing,  and  (ii)  the  former  has  
the  intention  of  pursuing  a  purpose  that  s/he  shares  with  the  latter.  Kutz  focuses  on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440  Lepora  and  Goodin,  2013,  p.42.  
441  Lepora  and  Goodin,  2013.  
442  Lepora  and  Goodin,  2013.  
443  Kutz,  2007.  
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the  ‘participatory  intentions’  of  individual  agents,  because  he  seeks  to  make  sense  of  
the  collective  nature  of  many  of   the  wrongs  committed   today,  wrongs   in  which   the  
principal  wrongdoer  is  a  collectivity.  In  such  cases,  the  defining  criterion  of  whether  
an  act  qualifies  as  a  complicit  act  is  the  intentional,  and  not  the  causal,  participation  
in   the   wrong.   I   argue,   in   line   with   Lepora   and   Goodin,   that   weaker   forms   of  
contributing   acts   also   qualify   as   complicit   acts.   “We  do  not   deny   that   there   can  be  
joint  action  of  that  form;  we  do  not  deny  it  is  bad,  when  the  shared  purposes  are  bad.  
We   merely   deny   that   complicity   is   necessarily   confined   to   anything   so   strong   as  
that.”444   Voluntarily   performing   an   action   that   contributes   to   the   wrongdoing   of  
another,   while   knowing   that   it   does   so,   represents   the   necessary   actus   and  mens  
conditions   that   are   minimally   required   for   an   agent   to   be   complicit   with   the  
wrongdoing   of   another.   Sharing   the   other’s   wrongful   purpose   is   not   necessary.445  
Henceforth,  when  talking  about  complicity,  I  adhere  to  Lepora  and  Goodin’s  account.  
Complicity   is  a  central  normative  concept  for  the  purpose  at  hand,  since  the  
wrongs   being   considered   –   structural   domination   and   exploitation   –   are   collective  
actions.   It   is   a   collective   action   not   because   the   only   principal   wrongdoer   is   a  
collective  agent,  but  because  it  requires  the  contributions  of  manifold  actors.  We  saw  
how  the  injustices  of  the  regime  are  reproduced  through  structural  processes  proper,  
through   the   structural-­‐systemic,   and   through   the   structural-­‐relational   levels.  
Crucially,  even  when  zooming  in  on  the  structural-­‐relational  level  –  as  I  propose  to  do  
in   this   chapter   –   the   individual   wrongdoer   requires   the   contribution   of   others   to  
commit   the   wrong.   The   domination   and   exploitation   of   the   wage-­‐dependent   class  
requires   the   actions   of   the   agent   making   the   structural-­‐relational   contribution   to  
structural  injustice  –  the  ‘primary  agent  of  wrongdoing’  -­‐  and  of  ‘secondary  agents.’    
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Disadvantaged  governments  acquire  debt  in  a  SD&CR  characterised  by  highly  
asymmetrical   and   unjust   conditions.   Creditors   in   a   position   of   power   vis-­‐à-­‐vis  
borrowing   countries   abuse   their   position   to   engage   in   transactions   that   are   highly  
profitable   for   them.   Once   cash-­‐starved   governments   acquire   debt,   they   must  
continue  to  borrow  to  pay  interest  rates,  which,  in  turn,  steadily  increase  in  tandem  
with  the  total  sum  of  capital  owed.  The  resulting  dependence  of  the  borrower  on  the  
lender   puts   enormous   pressure   on   the   former   to   comply  with   the   guidelines   of   an  
economic   policy   laid   out   by   its   creditor   and   the   global   financial   interests   they  
represent.  The  implementation  of  these  policies  reproduces  the  unjust  structures  that  
characterise   the   SD&CR   and   that  made   the   initial   borrowing   necessary   in   the   first  
place.    
I   propose   to   think   about   certain   actions   of   creditors   as   primary   acts   of  
wrongdoing   and   those   of   disadvantaged   governments   as   secondary   acts   of  
wrongdoing.  To   increase   their  profits,   commercial   banks   exploit   the  dependency  of  
cash-­‐starved  governments  and  extend  loans  with  full  awareness  that  once  they  do  so,  
politicians   will   have   to   repay   them,   no  matter   how   high   the   price   may   be   for   the  
country’s   population.   The   IMF,   in   turn,   pressures   governments   to   repay   all   private  
debt  and  accept  debt  attained  under  exploitative  conditions,  as  if   it  were  legitimate.  
The  second  agents  of  wrongdoing  are  the  officials  who  accrue  unsustainable  amounts  
of  public  debt.  
What  is  crucial  here  is  that  the  domination  and  exploitation  that  the  creditor  
exercises  over  the  debtor  on  the  structural-­‐relational  level  is  not  possible  without  the  
debtor’s  contribution,  for  over-­‐lending  requires  over-­‐borrowing,  and  neither  can  take  
place  without  the  other.446  Moreover,  officials  of  disadvantaged  governments  are  also  
secondary  agents  of  wrongdoing  when  following  through  with  the  servicing  of  debts  
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accrued   under   dominating   and   exploitative   conditions.   A   similar   argument   can   be  
made  regarding  restructuring  programs  linked  to  adjustment  programs,  which  come  
at   the   expense   of   the   domestic,   wage-­‐dependent   classes   in   debtor   and   creditor  
countries   alike.   This   connects   back   to   the   crucial   insight   made   by   scholars   of  
imperialism   presented   in   Chapter   4,   namely   the   idea   that   the   imperial   domination  
(whether   coercive   or   liberal)   is   enabled   and  made   possible   by   the   contributions   of  
local  political  elites.    
To   assess   whether   officials   of   disadvantaged   governments   are   indeed  
secondary  agents  of  wrongdoing,  we  must  now  consider  whether  the  actus  and  mens  
conditions   are   fulfilled,   and  whether   any  of   the   excusing   conditions   apply.   First,   to  
the  extent  that  state  officials  know  or  could  know  that  particular  actions  or  omissions  
contribute  to  their  domination  or  exploitation  by  a  financial  elite,  they  are  complicit  
in  the  wronging  of  all   those  who  are  subject   to  the  primary  agent’s  domination  and  
exploitation.   In   the   case   of   sovereign   debt   accumulation,   state   officials  making   the  
decision  to  borrow  over  and  above  a  certain  quantitative  threshold  can  be  expected  to  
know   that   this   puts   their   state   in   a   dependent   position   in   relation   to   its   creditors,  
who,   in   turn,   can   easily   exploit   and   subordinate   them   in   pursuit   of   their   own  
interests.  Second,  I  believe  that  neither  of  the  excusing  conditions  applies.  Argentine  
state   officials   adopted   the   debt   voluntarily   and   not   merely   by   accident,   and   they  
knew,  or  most  certainly  should  have  known,  about  the  domination  that  creditors  can  
exercise   over   their   debtors   and   the   exploitation   that   can   result.   Furthermore,   they  
had   other   options   available   to   them.   As   its   default   and   the   subsequent   recovery  
suggests,  the  recognition  of  the  loans  and  the  continued  borrowing  were  not  forced,  
but  genuinely  chosen.  
Now,   by   being   complicit   in   the   wrongdoing   that   powerful   international  
players   exercise   over   the   vulnerable,   and   by   facilitating   the   primary   agent’s  
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wrongdoing   through   contribution   to   the   collective   action,   state   officials   of  
disadvantaged   governments   harm   those   being   subjugated.   On   one   hand,   they   are  
complicit   in   the  domination  and  exploitation  of   their  own  citizens  qua  members  of  
the   wage-­‐dependent   class,   who   will   have   to   service   the   accrued   debts   and   to   be  
vulnerable   to   the   enforcement   of   adjustment   programs   once   the   debt   requires  
restructuring  due  to  its  unsustainable  levels.  In  this  sense,  they  violate  the  obligation  
they   have   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   their   own   citizenry   not   to   be   dominating   and   exploitative,   an  
obligation   on   which   their   authority   rests.   But   they   are   also   complicit   in   the  
domination   and   exploitation   of   non-­‐members.   First,   they   are   complicit   in   the  
domination  and  exploitation  of  non-­‐members  qua  members  of   the  wage-­‐dependent  
class   of   creditor   states,   who   service   the   ‘solidarity   packages’   for   the   debtor   states,  
money  which  ultimately  ends  up  in  the  bank  accounts  of  the  financial  elites.    
Moreover,   since   the   same   actors   dominate   and   exploit   several   states,  
disadvantaged  governments  are  also  complicit   in  the  wrongdoing  against  citizens  of  
other  debtor   states.   In   the  Argentine  case,   for   instance,   the  very   same  actors  which  
dominated  and  exploited  Argentine  citizens  (public  and  private   lenders,  such  as  the  
IMF  and  commercial  banks)  also  wronged  other  states  and  their  respective  citizens.  
By   instantiating   the   power   of   these   international   players   through   their   own   policy  
choices,   the   disadvantaged   government   is   complicit   not   only   in   its   own   citizens’  
domination  and  exploitation,  but  also  in  that  of  non-­‐members.  
But   how   exactly   are   state   officials,   who   are   themselves   being   wronged,  
complicit   in   the   wronging   of   non-­‐members?   First,   they   are   complicit   simpliciter  
because  they   facilitate   the  domination  and  exploitation  of  members  of  other  debtor  
countries   by   “shut[ting]   the   eyes   to   their   domination   and   exploitation.”447  
Negotiations   involving  debt   restructuring  are  a   case   in  point.   In   these  negotiations,  
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public  and  private  lenders  negotiate  with  the  debtor  government  about  a  reduction  in  
the   amount   of   debt   (principal   or   interest   rates)   or   changes   in   the   maturity  
schedule.448   These   negotiations   have   always   been   asymmetrical:   while   lenders  
negotiate  as  a  bloc,  debtors  are  disorganised  and  scattered.449   It   is  not  coincidental,  
however,  that  debtors  negotiate  individually.  Commercial  banks  consciously  prevent  
solidarity  among  debtor  governments  by  insisting  on  case  by  case  battles  and  keeping  
the   bargaining   power   of   the   latter   limited,   preventing   them   from   pursuing   their  
interests   effectively.   The   IMF   supports,   and   in   fact,   advocates   for,   these   forms   of  
isolated   negotiations,   which   take   place   in   the   Paris   Club   (for   public   debt)   and   the  
London  Club  (for  private  debt.)450  
The  creditor’s  efforts  to  keep  the  individual  cases  separate  suggests  that  they  
do,   in   fact,   fear   the  power  of   the  debtor  countries,  were   they   to  negotiate   together.  
When  there  are  negative  financial  flows  from  borrowing  countries,  for  instance,  it  is  
the  debtor  governments  who  must  decide  to  repay  and  who,  consequently,  have  the  
greater   bargaining   strength.451   Were   debtor   governments   of   disadvantaged  
governments  to  unite,  they  would  have  much  greater  bargaining  power  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  the  
creditors,   being   able   to   better   resist   the   conditions   imposed   by   creditors   and   even  
demanding  their  own.452  Argentina’s  default   in  2001   is  a  powerful   illustration  of   just  
how   significant   the   repercussions   of   national   choices   made   by   disadvantaged  
governments   can   be   for   the   dominated   and   exploited   non-­‐members.   As   a   key  
participant   in   the   negotiations   of   Argentina’s   debt   restructuring   noted,   “The  
Argentine   restructuring   shows   that   in   case   of   default,   sovereigns   have  much  more  
power   than   before,   maybe   even   the   upper   hand.   The   rules   of   the   game   have  
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changed.”453   The   lack   of   IMF   involvement   in   the   design   and   management   of   debt  
restructuring,  and  the  record  amounts  of  restructured  debt  in  recent  history,  attest  to  
the   fact   that   Argentina’s   refusal   to   accept   the   demands   of   its   creditors   not   only  
reduced  the  influence  that  creditors  had  on  Argentine  citizens,  but  changed  the  rules  
of  the  game  in  a  way  that  also  benefits  non-­‐members.454  
If  uniting  with  other  debtor  countries  can  widen  the  universe  of  outcomes  in  
cases  of  sovereign  debt  restructuring  and  offer  the  opportunity  to  resist  domination  
and   exploitation   exerted   by   creditors,   then   failing   to   do   so   is   an   omission   that  
facilitates  the  creditors’  wrongdoing.  This  form  of  contribution  qualifies  as  complicity  
simpliciter  since  it  magnifies  and  facilitates  wrongdoing,  without  the  secondary  agent  
accepting  the  primary  agent’s  plan  of  wrongdoing  (complicity  by  collaboration).  
In   addition   to   being   complicit   simpliciter,   Argentine   state   officials   are  
complicit   by   connivance.   Being   complicit   by   connivance  means   to   tacitly   assent   to  
the  wrong  being  perpetuated  by  simply  standing  aside  while  the  wrongdoer  acts.  An  
act  of  connivance  becomes  an  act  of  complicity  under  conditions  in  which  the  same  
wrong   is   committed   repeatedly   by   the   same   actor,   and   a   secondary   agent’s  
connivance  makes  it  more  likely  for  the  wrongdoer  to  repeat  the  act  in  the  future.455  
The   global   context   is   one   in  which   domination   and   exploitation   is   indeed   a  wrong  
which   is   repeated   time   and   time   again   by   the   same   few,   powerful   global   payers.  
Disadvantaged   states,   which   simply   tolerate   their   domination   and   exploitation  
without  clearly  signalling  that  this  is  wrong,  are  therefore  causally  contributing  to  it.  
Again,  a  good  example  of  this  are  the  negotiations  in  which  debt  restructuring  
is  managed.  Creditors  have  the  expectation  that,  were  a  country  to  be  unable  to  repay  
its   debt,   asymmetrical   negotiations   will   ensure   that   their   interests   are   upheld   and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453  Rother,  2005,  March  4.  
454  Damill  et  al,  2006.  
455  Lepora  and  Goodin,  2013,  p.46.  
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prioritised.  Consequently,  creditors  have  strong  incentives  to  lend,  even  if  they  know  
beforehand   that   the   loans   are   irresponsible.   By   failing   to   unite   with   other   debtor  
countries  or  show  any  form  of  solidarity,  disadvantaged  governments  make  creditors  
believe  that  they  will  remain  mere  onlookers  in  the  future.  
State  officials’  complicity  by  connivance  implies  that  a  state  cannot  only  harm  
its   own   citizens   by   letting   them   be   wronged   indirectly   through   their   state’s  
domination   and   exploitation,   but   can   also   harm   citizens   from   other   disadvantaged  
governments  by  sending   the  message   that   it   is  permissible   for  external  actors   to  do  
so.   This,   in   turn,   can  make   domination   and   exploitation   seem   acceptable,   or   even  
make   it   appear   as   though   there   is   no  wrongdoing   at   all.456   By   sending   the  message  
that   it   is  permissible  for  powerful  players  to  dominate  and  exploit  vulnerable  states,  
the   disadvantaged   government   is   being   complicit   by   connivance   to   the  wrong   that  
the   primary   agent   of   wrongdoing   commits   by   subjugating   the   disadvantaged.   In   a  
nutshell,   disadvantaged   state   officials   are  not   only   victims  of   arbitrary   interference,  
but  can  also  contribute  to  the  domination  and  exploitation  of  non-­‐members  by  being  
complicit  in  the  wrongdoing  of  the  powerful.  
  
On   the   Disadvantaged   Government’s   Responsibility   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   its   Citizenry   to  
Resist  External  Domination  and  Exploitation  
  
Having  argued   that  disadvantaged  governments  have  a  duty,   towards  members  and  
non-­‐members  alike,  to  not  be  complicit   in  their  domination  and  exploitation,  I  now  
turn   to   the   question   of   the   responsibilities   that   disadvantaged   governments   can   be  
said  to  have  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  their  citizenry  specifically.  Let  us  return  to  the  basic  premise  of  
this   chapter   regarding   the   legitimacy   of   coercive   authority   possessed   by   the   state,  
which   requires,  minimally,   that   the   state   itself   is  neither  dominating/exploiting  nor  
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dominated/exploited.  State  officials  ought  to  represent  the  will  of  the  people  and  it  is  
the  control  of  the  latter  (either  through  deliberative  or  checked  control)  that  makes  
the   rule   of   the   former  non-­‐dominating.   In   the   international   arena,   this   entails   that  
the  state  is  supposed  to  operate  as  a  representative  of  its  citizenry,  thereby  enhancing  
their  control.    
Two  things  follow  from  this  regarding  the  disadvantaged  state’s  responsibility  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis  their  citizenry.  First,  if  we  assume  that  the  ultimate  unit  of  moral  concern  is  
the  individual  and  that  the  state’s  value  is  instrumental,  the  normative  significance  of  
the   state’s  domination  and  exploitation   is  not   in   the  direct  effect   this   status  has  on  
the  state  or  on  state  officials,  but  in  the  effect  it  has  on  the  state’s  citizenry.  What  is  
normatively  significant  is  that,  via  the  state  official’s  domination  by  external  parties,  
the   state’s   citizenry   loses   control.   Second,   since   state   legitimacy   is   based   on   being  
non-­‐dominated/exploited,   the   state   can  be   said   to  have   a   responsibility   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   its  
citizenry  to  protect  them  from  external  domination  and  exploitation.  If  state  officials  
are  dominated  by  the   interests  of   the  most  powerful,   the  choices   they  make  will  no  
longer  reflect  the  will  of  the  people  they  represent,  and  the  state  will  lose  legitimacy.    
   These  two  points  directly  lead  to  the  first  partial  answer  to  the  question  of  the  
responsibilities   of   disadvantaged   governments:   disadvantaged   governments   have   a  
responsibility  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  their  citizenry  not  to  be  dominated  and  exploited.  The  obvious  
objection  here  is  that  if  the  state  is  the  victim  of  domination  and  exploitation,  it  can  
hardly  be  said  to  have  a  responsibility  not  to  be  wronged  in  this  way.  While  increased  
interdependence  limits  the  ability  of  virtually  every  state  to  protect  its  citizenry  from  
external  domination  and  exploitation,  expecting   the   least  powerful   states   to  protect  
their  citizens  from  domination  and  exploitation  is  especially  problematic,  since  their  
very  position  makes   it  difficult   for   them  to  do   so.  What   I  propose,   therefore,   is  not  
that   relatively   powerless   states  have   the   responsibility   to  provide   complete   and   full  
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protection  from  domination  and  exploitation,  but  rather,  they  have  a  responsibility  to  
try  to  resist  in  any  way  that  is  feasible  and  consistent  with  other  moral  parameters.457    
As   I   will   illustrate   with   the   Argentine   case   in   the   sections   to   come,   the  
domination  and  exploitation  of  the  strong  over  the  weak  does,  indeed,  constrain  the  
disadvantaged  government’s  actions.  Nevertheless,  the  government  retains  the  ability  
to   act   as   an   intermediary   or   ‘transmission   belt’   which,   by   enacting   policy   in   the  
domains  of  capital  flows,  trade,  monetary  issues,  migration,  labour,  welfare  and  social  
spending,   can   ameliorate   or   exacerbate   the   effects   of   dominating   and   exploitative  
structures  and   relationships.458  Thus,   even   if  unable   to  provide  complete  protection  
from   domination   and   exploitation   for   its   citizens,   within   its   available   range   of  
policies,  the  state  can  choose  to  resist  the  wrongdoing  exerted  by  the  powerful.  
The  choice  of  the  concept  of  ‘responsibility’  rather  than  ‘duty’  is  crucial  here.  
Whereas  a  moral  duty  is  a  moral  rule  that  specifies  what  exactly  we  are  supposed  to  
do,  responsibility  is  more  flexible,  allowing  for  different  action  paths  to  be  taken.459  It  
does  not  prescribe  specific  actions,  but   is  a  general  maxim  that  must  be  adopted.460  
What,  then,  must  disadvantaged  governments  do  to  fulfil  the  responsibility  they  have  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis   their   citizens   to   resist   domination   and   exploitation?   In   the   following  
sections,  I  consider  ways  in  which  the  state  can  fulfil  this  responsibility.  In  contrast  to  
the   responsibility   to   resist   domination   and   exploitation,   I   call   these   possible   action  
paths  ‘duties,’  since  they  prescribe  a  concrete  action  which  ought  to  be  taken.    
On  the  Government’s  Duty  to  Recognise  Itself  as  An  Outcome  Responsible  Agent  in  The  
Name  of  Its  Citizens  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457   I   say   more   about   what   I   take   to   be   the   most   relevant   moral   parameter,   namely  
responsibilities  held  to  non-­‐members,  in  the  last  section  of  this  chapter.    
458   Held,   2004,   p.4-­‐5;   Kacowicz,   2013,   p.79;   Miller,   2000,   p.163.   For   an   extensive   empirical  
analysis  of  the  options  that  were  available  to  the  Argentine  state  (from  1982-­‐2008)  despite  its  
exposure  to  globalising  forces  that  disadvantaged  it,  see  Kacowicz,  2013,  chapter  5,  pp.143-­‐197.    
459  Feinberg,  1966;  Richardson,  1999.  
460  Hay,  2011,  p.29.  
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A   distinctive   contention   of   scholars   is   that   domination   does   not   only   reduce   the  
available   options,   but,   most   importantly,   results   in   a   ‘dominated   status.’   This   is  
something   that   republicans   and   post-­‐colonial   theorists   have   in   common.   Post-­‐
colonial  theorists  have  long  contested  that  the  domination  exerted  by  colonial  powers  
cannot  be  reduced  to  economic,  political  and  military  power,  but  “involves  also  and  
primarily  the  epistemic  foundations.”461  A  central  aspect  of  this  epistemic  dimension  
is   the   generation   of   collective   identities,   both   of   the   colonisers   and   the   colonised.  
What  Quijano  called  “the  coloniality  of  power”  is  nothing  but  “the  colonialization  of  
the  imaginary  of  the  dominated.”462    
For  republicans,  the  dominated  status  is  one  in  which  the  subjugated  party  is  
forced  to  take  the  wishes  of  the  dominator  into  account.  Once  the  subjugated  party  
becomes  aware  of  his  or  her  subjugated  position,  further  constraints  follow.  First,  the  
agent   starts   perceiving   his/her   actions   not   as   his/her   own   but   as   his/her   master’s.  
Second,   since   living   at   the   mercy   of   the   dominator’s   will   involves   an   “unending  
anxiety  about  one’s  fate,  to  have  permanently  to  anticipate  the  other’s  reactions,  and  
to   have   to   curry   favour   by   behaving   in   a   self-­‐bashing,   servile   manner,”463   the  
dominated  party  will  start  behaving  with  servility.  In  other  words,  “Not  knowing  what  
may  happen  to  them,  and  desperate  to  avoid  the  tyrants  rage,  they  tend  to  behave  in  
appeasing  and  ingratiating  ways,  becoming  ‘a  servile  crew’,  engaging  in  ‘flatteries  and  
prostrations,’  displaying  ‘the  perpetual  bowings  and  cringings  of  an  abject  people.”464  
Third,  since  the  dominating  power  can  take  everything  the  subjugated  agent  acquires  
from  him/her,   in  a   status  of   subjugation,   there   is  no   incentive   to  aim  to   succeed   in  
doing  things  that  are  considered  valuable.465  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461  Quijano,  2000.  
462  Quijano,  2008,  p.281.  
463  Maynor  and  Laborde,  2008,  p.5.  
464  Skinner,  2008,  p.90.  
465  Skinner,  2008,  p.90.  
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Once   the   dominated   subject   becomes   aware   of   this   position,   s/he   will   not  
only   start   behaving   and   acting   differently   –   by   taking   actions   which   reflect   her  
master’s  will,  behaving  with  servility,  and  not  necessarily  doing  that  which  is  socially  
valuable  –  but  will  also  start  conceiving  of  him/herself  in  a  different  manner,  namely  
as  a  victim  of  domination  and  a  servant  to  his  or  her  master’s  wishes.  S/he  will,  to  use  
the  language  of  post-­‐colonial  writers,  start  identifying  with  a  new  collective  identity,  
namely  that  of  the  dominated  and  exploited.  It  is  the  internalisation  of  this  image  as  a  
mere  victim  of  circumstance  and  not  as  a  meaningful  agent  in  his/her  own  right,  that  
we  witness  what   I   call   ‘internal  domination.’  An  agent   is   thus   internally  dominated  
when   s/he   comes   to   believe,   and   may   actually   endorse,   what   his/her   dominated  
status  threatens  to  turn  him/her  into:  a  mere  servant  of  the  will  of  the  dominator.  In  
this   light,   internal   domination   can   also   be   a   self-­‐fulfilling   prophecy:   a   dominated  
subject  can  become  what  everyone  already  believes  it  to  be.466  
While   the   language   employed   by   these   scholars   evoke   images   of   individual,  
natural  persons  behaving   in   this  way,   I  believe   that   it   also  applies   to  disadvantaged  
governments.   When   looking   at   the   rationale   given   by   Argentina’s   executive   to  
preserve   convertibility,   one   recognises   the   servile   attitude   Skinner   so   disdainfully  
describes   as   “the   perpetual   bowings   and   cringings   of   an   abject   people.”467  Afraid   of  
losing   the   ‘good   name’   it   had   so   arduously  worked   to   attain,   Argentina’s   executive  
thus  adapted  and  moulded  its  policy  choices  (i.e.  not  breaking  out  of  convertibility)  
to   what   it   perceived   to   be   in   its   creditors   interests.   “Argentina   had   no   sense   of  
multiple  objectives  or  strategies,   focusing  instead  on  pleasing  the  United  States  (….)  
[and]   a   fear   of   taking   foreign   or   economic   policy   action   that   could   threaten   (…)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466  Hay,  2011,  p.  26.  In  Fanon’s  famous  essay,  “Concerning  Violence,”  he  laments  that  the  only  
response  to  the  internalisation  of  this  identity  is  the  turn  to  violence.  “For  the  native,  life  can  
only  spring  up  again  out  of  the  rotting  corpse  of  the  settler.”  (2001,  p.73)  
467  Skinner,  2008,  p.90.  
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Argentina’s  image  as  a  ‘reliable  partner.”468  Argentina’s  state  officials  thus  internalised  
an  image  of  themselves  as  mere  servants  to  the  will  of  their  creditors.  They  thought  of  
themselves   not   as   agents   who   are   to   devise   their   own   policy   and  make   their   own  
choices,  but  as  subject  to  their  creditor’s  domination  and  exploitation.  
In   the   first   instance,   then,   for   state  officials   to   resist   their  dominated  status,  
no  actions  are  required.  Rather,  the  image  of  the  state  they  represent  as  a  dominated  
agent   needs   to   be   contested.  Dominated   state   officials   ought   to   resist   internalising  
the  image  of  the  state  for  which  they  act  as  a  mere  victim  of  circumstance.  I  believe  
that  this  attitudinal  change  can  occur  if  state  officials  of  disadvantaged  governments  
recognise   themselves  as  outcome  responsible  agents  and  embrace   the   responsibility  
to  resist  internal  domination.    
Coined   by   Tony   Honoré’s   1999   work,   “Responsibility   and   Fault,”   outcome  
responsibility  can  be  defined  as  “the  basic  type  of  responsibility   in  a  community,”469  
which  follows  when  an  outcome  can  be  rightly  attributed  to  an  agent.  When  asking  
whether  an  agent  is  outcome  responsible,  one  is  asking  whether  an  outcome  can  be  
rightly  assigned  to  that  particular  actor.  Can  a  line  be  drawn  between  a  changed  state  
of  affairs  in  an  existing  or  expected  world,  on  one  hand,  and  an  actor’s  intervention,  
on   the   other?   If   the   answer   is   affirmative,   an   agent   can   be   said   to   be   outcome  
responsible   for   bringing   about   that   state   of   affairs.   An   actor   is   in   control   of   the  
outcome   if   (i)   s/he   causally   contributed   to   it,   (ii)   s/he   possessed   the   capacity   to  
foresee  it  (iii)  and  s/he  had  the  ability  and  opportunity  to  take  steps,  on  the  basis  of  
what  could  have  been   foreseen,   to  avoid   it.470  As  such,  outcome  responsibility  must  
be   strictly   distinguished   from   both,  moral   and   legal   responsibility.  While   I   do   not  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468  Gutman  and  Cohen,  2003,  p.145-­‐146.  
469  Honoré,  1999,  p.27.  
470   Perry,   2001,   p.74.   In   contrast   to   moral   and   legal   responsibility,   these   are   very   minimal  
‘conditions   of   voluntariness’   (Miller,   2007,   p.90),   conditions   which   disadvantaged  
governments  can  fulfil.    
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deem  it  to  be  desirable  to  attribute  moral  or  legal  responsibility  to  dominated  states,  I  
do  think  that  outcome  responsibility  can  be  allocated  to  them  for  three  reasons.  
First,  attributing  outcome  responsibility  is  possible  even  when  the  freedom  of  
agents  is  restricted,  as  is  clearly  the  case  with  disadvantaged  states.  Miller  illustrates  
this   point   neatly   by   giving   an   example   of   a   bank   robbery:   a   bank   employee,  
threatened  by  an  armed-­‐robber,   is   forced  to  hand  over  the  money  in  the  safe  or  see  
her   colleague   being   killed.471   Although   it   seems   intuitively   wrong   to   make   the  
employee   responsible   for   the   situation   that   forces   her   to   choose   between   either   of  
these  bad  options,  she  can  indeed  be  called  to  account  for  her  choice  between  either  
handing   over   the   money   and   protecting   the   life   of   her   fellow   colleague,   or   not  
handing   over   the   money   and   seeing   her   colleague   killed.   By   assigning   outcome  
responsibility  to  her  in  this  way,  we  are  recognising  that  even  in  coercive  situations,  
she  is  still  an  agent  with  choices  to  make.  Abstracting  from  Miller’s  example,  we  can  
now  see  that,  while  attributing  moral  or  legal  responsibility  to  an  agent  in  a  coercive  
situation   seems   intuitively   undesirable,   attributing   outcome   responsibility   to  
disadvantaged   governments   does   seem   attractive.   The   concept   of   outcome  
responsibility   takes   into   account   that   the  options   available   to  disadvantaged  agents  
are  narrowed,  while  at  the  same  time  highlighting  that  the  disadvantaged  actors  can  
still  make  choices  that  reflect  their  will.  
Second,  assigning  responsibility  in  this  way  seems  desirable,  since  recognising  
the   outcome   responsibility   of   disadvantaged   governments   is   a   vindication   of   their  
status   as   agents.   According   to   Honoré,   our   status   as   agents   is   bound   up   with   the  
recognition  of  outcome  responsibility.  Subjects  act  in  the  world  and  these  actions,  in  
turn,  create  the  agent’s  history  and  identity.  In  order  for  actions  to  create  this  history  
and   identity,  however,   the  agent  needs   to  accept,   in  a  very   fundamental   sense,   that  
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the  consequences  of   its  actions  are  in  some  way  its  own.472  “If  their  behaviour  could  
not  be  attributed  to  them  in  this  way,  they  would  have  to  conceive  of  themselves  as  
attenuated   beings:   objects   to   which   things   happen.”473  What   holds   for   a   subjected  
individual   also   holds   for   disadvantaged   states.   As   Honoré   states,   “to   accept  
responsibility  (…)  can  be  for  a  nation  the  condition  of  self-­‐respect.”474  The  attribution  
of   outcome   responsibility   to   disadvantaged   governments   serves   as   a   vindication   of  
their  status  as  an  agent.475  Recognising  this  agency,  then,  is  a  sign  of  respect.  
Third,   assigning   outcome   responsibility   to   disadvantaged   governments   is  
valuable  because  it  encourages  socially  valuable  (and  discourages  socially  invaluable)  
behaviour.   Since   “being   responsible   serves  as  an   incentive   to  aim  at  and   succeed   in  
doing  things  that  are  regarded  as  valuable,”476it  is  “only  by  being  responsible  for  what  
we  do  and  take  on  can  we  be  motivated  to  get  things  right.”477  Knowing  that  they  will  
be   associated   with   a   particular   outcome   –   that   a   line   will   be   drawn   between   their  
actions  and  their  outcomes  –  encourages  state  officials  of  disadvantaged  states  to  only  
contribute   to   outcomes   that   they  want   their   state   to   be   identified  with.  While   the  
attribution   of   outcome   responsibility   thus   discourages   behaviour   such   as   that   of  
corrupt  leaders  allying  with  the  most  powerful  to  fill  their  own  pockets,  it  encourages  
disadvantaged  state  officials  to  take  on  the  role  as  ambassadors  and  lobbyists  of  the  
interests  of  the  most  vulnerable  they  represent.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472  Honoré,  1999,  p.29;  Perry,  2001,  p.  74.  
473   Honoré,   1999,   p.135.   In   moving   and   powerful   prose,   Fanon  makes   a   similar   point   when  
stating  “I  am  a  Negro,  and  tons  of  chains,  storms  of  blows,  rivers  of  expectoration  flow  down  
my  shoulders.  But  I  do  not  have  the  right  to  allow  myself  to  bog  down.  I  do  not  have  the  right  
to   allow   the   slightest   fragment   to   remain   in  my   existence.   I   do   not   have   the   right   to   allow  
myself   to   be   mired   in   what   the   past   has   determined.   I   am   not   the   slave   of   Slavery   that  
dehumanized  my  ancestors”  (p.231).  
474  Honoré,  1999,  p.133.  
475  Perry,  2001  p.71  -­‐72.  
476  Honoré,  1999,  p.  131.  
477  Honoré,  1999,  p.132.  
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A   possible   objection   that   could   be   put   forward   against   the   attribution   of  
outcome   responsibility   to   disadvantaged   governments   is   that   assigning   outcome  
responsibilities  does  not  only  have  positive  consequences,  such  as  the  ones  outlined  
here,  but  also  negative  consequences.  This  objection  presumes  that,  where  outcome  
responsibility  is  assigned,  the  gains  and  losses  that  agents’  actions  produce  ought  to  
remain   theirs.478  By   stating   that   the  disadvantaged   state   is  outcome  responsible,  we  
would   thus   be   saying   that   whatever   consequences   its   actions   have,   the   resulting  
outcome   should   not   be   altered.   This   seems   counterintuitive,   however,   since   the  
disadvantaged   state’s   condition   is,   after   all,   not   brought   about   merely   by   its   own  
choices,  but  most  importantly,  by  being  dominated  and  exploited  by  the  powerful.  I  
would   like   to   respond   to   this   criticism   by   pointing   at   two   different   interpretations  
that  can  be  given  to  the  concept  of  outcome  responsibility.  
Stephen   Perry   argues   that  Honoré’s   analysis   in   “Responsibility   and   Fault”479  
can   be   interpreted   in   two   different   ways,   which   he   calls   the   ‘social’   and   the  
‘personhood’   understanding   of   outcome   responsibility.   According   to   the   social  
understanding,  the  ascription  of  outcome  responsibility  brings  with  it  an  allocation  of  
“social  credits  and  discredits.”480  These  do  not  necessarily  need  to  be  material  benefits  
or   burdens,   but   can   be   such   intangible   things   as   an   apology   or   social  
approval/disapproval.   In   his   book   “National   Responsibility   and   Global   Justice,”481  
David  Miller  elaborates  on  this  social  reading  of  outcome  responsibility.  According  to  
Miller,   outcome   responsibility   asks   to   what   extent   an   agent   can   be   reasonably  
credited  and  debited  with  the  results  of   their  conduct.482  When  agents  are  outcome  
responsible,   the  gains  and   losses   resulting   from  a  particular  action  ought   to   remain  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478  Miller,  2007,  p.87.  
479  Honoré,  1999.  
480  Perry,  2001,  p.62.  
481  Miller,  2007.  
482  Miller,  007,  p.81.  
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theirs.   This   reading   of   outcome   responsibility   clearly   puts   its   emphasis   on   the  
(re)distributive  implications  and  sees  outcome  responsibility  as  a  system  of  outcome  
allocation.  
Although  correct,  the  (re)distributive  emphasis  on  outcome  responsibility  as  a  
system  of   allocation  of   social   credits   and  discredits   is  only  one  of   the   readings   that  
can  be  given  of  outcome  responsibility.  The  second  reading  of  outcome  responsibility  
–  outcome  responsibility  in  its  ‘personhood  understanding’483  –  is  not  concerned  with  
questions   of   (re)distributive   fairness   and   does   not   see   it   as   a   system   of   outcome  
allocation.  Rather,  it  focuses  on  the  role  that  the  attribution  of  outcomes  plays  in  the  
formation  of  a  subject  in  his  or  her  status  as  an  agent.  Outcome  responsibility  in  its  
personhood  understanding  emphasises  how  the  attribution  of  outcome  responsibility  
contributes   to   an   agent’s   identity   and   history:   “The   best   argument   for   outcome  
responsibility  is  surely  that  it  is  central  to  the  identity  and  character  of  the  agent.”484  
For  the  current  purpose,  I  concentrate  on  the  personhood  interpretation  and  
show  how  embracing  outcome  responsibility  can,  for  disadvantaged  state  officials,  be  
a   form   of   resisting   internal   domination.   Recognising   outcome   responsibility   is   one  
way   of   resisting   the   image   of   victimhood   that   disadvantaged   state   officials   are  
susceptible   to   internalising,   since   its   attribution   promises   to   reverse   the   three  
constraints  that  the  acknowledgment  of  their  subjugation  threatens  to  bring  about.    
First,  by  being  clearly  set  apart  from  moral  and  legal  responsibility,  outcome  
responsibility  makes   the   attribution  of   responsibility   possible   even   to   agents   acting  
under   coercive   situations.   As   such,   outcome   responsibility   enables   disadvantaged  
state  officials   to   recognise   the   state   in  whose  name   they  act   as   a   responsible   agent,  
albeit   acting   within   a   narrowed   set   of   options.   Disadvantaged   state   officials   can  
recognise  that  the  disadvantaged  state  on  behalf  of  which  they  act  still  has  choices  to  
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make  that  reflect  its  will.  In  the  same  way  in  which  Miller’s  bank  employee  decides  to  
hand   over   the   money   to   save   her   colleague,   despite   the   coercive   situation   under  
which  she  finds  herself,  disadvantaged  state  officials  can,  within  the  narrowed  set  of  
options,  make   choices   that   reflect   their   state’s   will.   Recognising   this   by   embracing  
outcome   responsibility   is   a  way   for   them   to   resist   the   thought   that   the   dominated  
status  produces,  namely  the  idea  that  the  choices  they  make  do  not  reflect  the  state´s  
will.  
Second,  by  recognising  that  outcome  responsibility  can  be  attributed  to  their  
state   in   this   manner,   disadvantaged   state   officials   can   resist   the   thought   of   being  
mere  servants  of  dominating  players  and  vindicate  the  disadvantaged  state’s  status  as  
an  agent.  Recall  Honoré’s  argument  that  accepting  authorship  over  outcomes  creates  
our  personal  history,  contributes  to  our  identity  and,  as  such,  is  part  of  what  makes  us  
an  agent.  By  seeing  themselves  as  authors  of  their  actions  and  not  merely  as  victims  
and  servants,  disadvantaged  state  officials  vindicate  the  agency  of  the  disadvantaged  
state   and   strengthen   the   very   condition   that   the   control   of   dominating   players  
threaten  to  take  away:  the  state’s  status  as  an  agent.485  
Third,  embracing  outcome  responsibility  also  provides  incentives  to  behave  in  
ways   that   are   socially   valuable.   Disadvantaged   state   officials   know   that   the  
consequences  of  their  actions  will  be  associated  with  their  state  and  thus,  will  seek  to  
contribute   only   to   those   outcomes   that,  within   their   limited   range   of   options,   they  
actually  want  to  be  associated  with  their  state.  This  provides  a  powerful  incentive  to  
act   in  ways   that   are   socially   valuable   and  counters   the   third   constraint   that   follows  
once  subjects  become  aware  of  their  domination  and  exploitation.  It  counters,  that  is,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
485  Here   the   collective   agency  of   states   complicates   the   individual   state   analogy.  Dominated  
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   226  
the   tendency   to   internalise   the   image   of   victimhood   and   servitude   that   their  
dominated  status  otherwise  produces.  
But   how   can   disadvantaged   state   officials   resist   internal   domination   by  
embracing   outcome   responsibility   in   practice?   Take   Argentina’s   acquisition   of   an  
unsurmountable   amount   of   debt   as   an   example.   In   the   run   up   to   the   crisis   of   the  
2000s,  Argentina’s  options  were  significantly  narrowed  by  external  economic  shocks  
and   by   the   behaviour   of   its   creditors,   who,   while   continuing   to   grant   financially  
irresponsible  loans,  used  the  threat  of  ceasing  to  do  so  as  a  means  to  put  pressure  on  
the  Argentine  government  to  act  in  their  interest.  That  their  options  were  narrowed,  
however,  does  not  mean  that  Argentine  state  officials  did  not  make  choices.  Within  
an  unfavourable  global  and  economic  order,  the  Argentine  state  did  have  choices  to  
make  and  decided  to  borrow  to  finance  its  deficits.  In  this  situation,  what  it  means  for  
Argentine  state  officials  to  embrace  their  outcome  responsibility,  is  to  accept  that  this  
acquisition   of   debt   was   their   choice.   By   recognising   that   these   decisions   and   the  
consequences   they   brought   about   were   their   own  making,   Argentine   state   officials  
challenge   the   image   that   their   domination   produces   –   the   image,   that   is,   of   being  
mere  victims  of  circumstance.    
   This   attitude   seems   opposite   to   the   one   that   Argentine   officials   adopted  
during   and   after   the   2001   crisis.   In   this   case,   state   officials   adopted   a   rhetoric   of  
victimhood  in  which  external  actors  were  blamed  for  Argentina’s  predicament,  trying  
to  stick  the  blame  on  someone  else.486  Despite  its  obvious  political  advantage,  such  an  
attitude   perpetuates   an   image   of   disadvantaged   governments   as   victims   and  not   as  
agents.  It  is  this  image  that  the  embracing  of  outcome  responsibility  by  state  officials  
seeks   to   reverse.   In   a   nutshell,   then,   by   embracing   outcome   responsibility,   and  
accepting  their  actions  and  the  outcomes  of  those  actions  as  their  state’s  own  doing,  
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disadvantaged   state   officials   can   free   their   state   from   the   image   of   being   a   mere  
victim  of  its  dominators’  actions,  interests  and  desires.  
So  far,  I  have  outlined  why  recognising  the  state  on  behalf  of  which  they  act  as  
outcome  responsible  agents  can  be  a  way   for  disadvantaged  state’s  officials   to  resist  
the   internal   domination   that   results   from   the   control   that   powerful   international  
players  exert  over  them.  I  have  not  yet  demonstrated  that  state  officials  ought  to  do  
so.  Recall   that   disadvantaged   state   officials   have   the   responsibility   to   try   to  protect  
the  individuals  they  represent  from  domination  and  exploitation.  It  is  by  virtue  of  this  
responsibility  that  resisting  the  self-­‐image  of  servitude  and  victimhood  becomes  their  
duty  rather   than  merely  a   right.  Due  to   the  position  they  hold   in   the  current  world  
order,  disadvantaged  state  officials  have  the  duty  to  recognise  the  state  they  represent  
as  an  outcome  responsible  agent.  
This  is  an  internal  duty,  an  attitude  towards  the  state  that  is  reflected  in  their  
actions,  rather  than  an  external  form  of  resisting  domination  and  exploitation.487  It  is  
internal  because   it  does  not  prescribe  what  actions  ought   to  be   taken,  but   suggests  
how   state   officials   ought   to   envision   the   state   that   acts   through   them.   What   is  
required  from  disadvantaged  state  officials   is  that  they  not  give  up  the   image  of  the  
state   they   represent   as   the   author   of   its   actions.   Even   while   being   dominated   and  
exploited,  they  must  conceive  of  the  state  as  an  actor  with  choices  to  make,  choices  
which  have  consequences  that  can  be  rightly  attributed  to  it  as  their  author.  
As   an   attitude   that   state   officials   ought   to   have   towards   the   state   they  
represent,   this  duty  does  not   conflict  with  other  duties   and  must,   therefore,  not  be  
weighted   and   ranked   in   relation   to   other   duties.   A   disadvantaged   state   can   fully  
recognise  itself  as  an  outcome  responsible  agent  without  hampering  its  capacities  to  
fulfil  other  social  or  global  justice  duties.  In  this  light,  there  is  no  latitude  with  regard  
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to  when  this  duty  applies.  State  officials  must  adopt  the  appropriate  attitude  on  every  
single  occasion.  
The  possibility  of  this  sort  of  resistance,  therefore,  captures  the  intuition  that  
there   is   something   that   can   be   done   by   victims   of   domination   and   exploitation   to  
resist  their  subjugation,  even  when  external  resistance  is  imprudent  or  impossible.488  
At   the   same   time,   however,   it   is   important   to   note   that   internal   resistance   is  
insufficient,  since  it  leaves  dominating  and  exploiting  structures  and  relations  intact.  
That  state  officials  envision  the  state  which  acts  through  them  as  a  responsible  agent  
is  a  crucial  prerequisite  for  taking  the  necessary  steps  to  establish  a  non-­‐dominating  
and   non-­‐exploiting   world   order,   but   it   needs   to   be   followed   by   a   change   in   state  
officials’  actions   in  order   for  disadvantaged  governments   to  get   the  chance   to  break  
free   from   domination   and   exploitation.   How,   then,   should   disadvantaged   state  
officials   act   in  order   to   fulfil   the   responsibility  of   resistance   that   they  have   towards  
their  citizens?  In  the  following  section  I  turn  to  the  question  of  what  disadvantaged  
governments  can  and  ought  to  do  to  resist  domination  and  exploitation  externally.  
  
On  the  Government’s  Duty  to  Engage  in  Acts  of  State  Civil  Disobedience  in  the  Name  of  
Its  Citizens  
  
While  democratic  political  theorists  acknowledge  civil  disobedience  as  a  measure  of  
last  resort  to  challenge  unjust  laws,  a  legitimate  form  of  defending  that  which  is  just  
over   and   above   that   which   is   legal,489   relatively   little   has   been   written   about   the  
possibility  of   state  civil  disobedience.490  Despite  being  significantly  under-­‐theorised,  
acts   of   state   civil   disobedience   can  be   a   form   in  which  disadvantaged   governments  
challenge   institutional   forms   of   domination   and   exploitation.   By   disobeying  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488  Hay,  2011,  p.32.  
489  Arendt  1972;  Habermas,  1983;  Bedau,  1961;  Dworkin,  1977;  Rawls,  1971.  
490  Notable  examples  are  Höffe,  1999;  Goodin,  2005;  Buchanan,  2004;  and  Neubauer,  2009.  
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international   rules,   state   officials   of   disadvantaged   governments   could   resist  
domination  and  exploitation  externally.    
Having  argued  that  disadvantaged  governments  have  a  responsibility  to  resist  
their  domination  and  exploitation  in  Section  2,  and  that  they  have  the  duty  to  do  so  
by   embracing   their   outcome   responsibility   in   Section   3,   I   now   argue   that   under  
particular  circumstances,  disadvantaged  governments  have  the  duty  to  engage  in  acts  
of   state   civil  disobedience.  First,   I   explore  what  a  normative   theory   legitimising   the  
violation  of  unjust  international  laws  by  states  might  look  like.  Then  I  illustrate  what  
state   civil   disobedience   entails   in   practice   by   applying   it   to   the   Argentine   debt  
management   experience   in   the   years   that   followed   the   2001   crisis.   Based   on   the  
arguments  presented   above   regarding   the   state’s   responsibility   to   resist  domination  
and   exploitation,   I   argue   that   the   domination   and   exploitation   of   citizens   of  
vulnerable   states   by   powerful   international   players   gives   rise   to   a   context   in  which  
states  do  not  only  have  a   right,  but  a  qualified  duty,   to  engage   in  acts  of   state   civil  
disobedience.  491    
What   would   a   normative   theory   legitimising   states   to   violate   unjust  
international   laws  look  like?  In  line  with  Goodin  and  Neubauer,  I  propose  to  extend  
the  standards  used  to  assess   individual  civil  disobedience  on  a  domestic   level  to  the  
actions   of   states   on   the   international   level.   Concretely,   I   propose   to   apply   Rawls’s  
conception   of   civil   disobedience   to   state   action.   According   to   Rawls,   civil  
disobedience   is   “a  public,  nonviolent,   conscientious  yet  political  act  contrary   to   law  
usually   done  with   the   aim  of   bringing   about   a   change   in   the   law  or   policies   of   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491  One  may  counter   that   there  may  be  disadvantaged  governments   that   are   “so   structurally  
constrained  or  determined  that  they  are  unable  to  act  otherwise  than  they  do”  (Hayward  and  
Lukes,   p.12)   If   this   is   the   case,   I   am   willing   to   concede   that   the   responsibility   to   resist  
domination  must  not  to  be  fulfilled  via  action  (Section  IV),  but  still  ought  to  be  resisted  in  an  
internal,  attitudinal  sense  (Section  III).  
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government.”492  Rawls  identifies  five  criteria,  or  moral  standards,  to  distinguish  mere  
rule   breakers   from   possible   rule-­‐makers.   To   qualify   as   such,   an   act   of   civil  
disobedience   must   be   (i)   illegal,   (ii)   conscientious,   (iii)   aimed   at   changing   law   or  
policies,  (iv)  non-­‐violent,  and  (v)  public.  I  now  assess  how  these  five  criteria  used  to  
define   an   act   of   civil   disobedience   can   be   extended   to   the   context   of   state   civil  
disobedience.  I  illustrate  what  this  means  in  practice  by  applying  it  to  my  case  study.  
First,   to   qualify   as   such,   an   act   of   state   civil   disobedience  must   be   illegal.493  
Establishing   this   illegality   is  much  harder   in   the   international   arena,   in  which   ‘soft  
law’   prevails,   than   in   the   domestic   realm   of   ‘hard   law.’494   In   contrast   to   hard   laws,  
which   are   precise   and   delegated   for   their   interpretation   and   implementation   to   an  
assigned   authority,   soft   law   is   “by   definition   imprecise,   and   has   no   authoritative  
interpreter   to  make   it   more   precise.”495   Thus,   the   only   way   to   establish   whether   a  
state’s  action  meets  the  illegality  criterion  is  to  assess  whether,  at  the  time  the  state  
committed  the  action,  it  was  likely  to  face  legal  prosecution  ex  post  facto.496  Second,  
acts  of  state  civil  disobedience  must  be  committed  conscientiously.  In  justifying  their  
act,  state  officials  must  appeal  to  universal  moral  arguments,  rather  than  to  reasons  of  
national   interest.497  Third,  a  state’s  act  of  civil  disobedience  must  seek  to  promote  a  
change  in  laws  or  policies  that  affect  other  states,  as  well  as  their  own.  States  can,  for  
example,   try   to  establish  a  new  customary   law,  change   the   interpretation  of   the  old  
one,  convince  international  courts  to  establish  new  case  law,  or  criticise  international  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492  Rawls,  1971,  p.364.  
493  Since  civil  disobedience  pursues  the  aim  of  challenging  the  illegality  of  the  committed  act  
and  might  turn  out  to  be  legal  retrospectively,  the  relevant  consideration  to  meet  the  illegality  
criterion  is  whether  the  act  was  illegal  at  the  time  it  was  committed.  
494  Goodin,  2005,  p.238.  
495  Goodin,  2005,  p.  239.  
496  Neubauer,  2009,  p.8.  
497  Neubauer,  2009,  p.8.  Note  here,  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  state  officials  to  exclusively  have  
interests  in  mind  that  surpass  the  national  interest  narrowly  defined.  
   231  
institutions.498  Fourth,  as  with  its  domestic  analogy,  state  civil  disobedience  must  be  
non-­‐violent.  A  state  action  can  only  be  an  act  of  civil  disobedience  as  long  as  it  does  
not  employ  extra  legal  violence.499  Finally,  state  civil  disobedience  must  be  public  in  
character.   This   criterion   is   easily   fulfilled,   since   the   type   of   actions  which   could   be  
considered  cases  of  state  civil  disobedience  cannot  possibly  be  kept  from  the  public.  
No  state  can  enact  laws  that  violate  an  international  treaty  privately.    
In  addition  to  the  conditions  posed  by  these  five  criteria,  I  would  also  like  to  
carry   over   Rawls’s   ‘last   resort   clause’   from   the   national   to   the   international   level.  
According  to  Rawls,  acts  of  civil  disobedience  are  only  acceptable  if  employed  as  a  last  
resort.  “The  normal  appeals  to  the  political  majority”  must  have  been  made  and  must  
have   failed.500  Acts  of   state   civil  disobedience  must  be  used  as   a   last   resort  because  
they  might  come  at  the  expense  of  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  the  disobedient  state  
and  have  detrimental  effects  upon  non-­‐members.  Take  the  example  of  a  government  
defaulting  on   sovereign  debt.  As  Pogge   argues,   the   refusal   of   governments   to   repay  
their   loans   may   lead   to   an   indiscriminate   reaction   of   creditors   not   to   lend   to   any  
fledgling   democracies.501   This   is   detrimental,   since   the   acquisition   of   reasonable  
amounts  of  debt  is  often  required  for  governments  to  fulfil  the  socio-­‐economic  rights  
of   their   citizens.   The   more   general   point   is,   therefore,   that   an   act   of   state   civil  
disobedience  might  have  negative  consequences   for  present  and   future  generations,  
both  at  home  and  abroad,  and  therefore,  ought  to  be  employed  with  care  and  used  as  
a  last  resort.  
But   should   Rawls’   criteria   be   carried   over   from   the   national   to   the  
international  level  without  amendments  or  addendums?  Rawls  clearly  delineates  the  
context   in  which  his   theory  of   civil   disobedience   applies,   namely   a   context   of   ‘near  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498  Neubauer,  2009,  p.10.  
499  Neubauer,  2009,  p.11.  
500  Rawls,  1971,  p.373.  
501  Pogge,  2008,  p.  160.  
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justice.’   A   near-­‐just   society   is   one  which   is   “well-­‐ordered   for   the  most   part,   but   in  
which   some   serious   violations   of   justice   nevertheless   do   occur.”502   It   is   due   to   this  
context  of  near  justice  that  Rawls  believes  that  acts  of  civil  disobedience  ought  to  be  
non-­‐violent   and   public.   By   acting   non-­‐violently   and   publicly,   the   disobeying   agent  
expresses   his/her   general   respect   for   a   nearly   just   law.   Although   imperfect,   s/he  
believes   the   law   to   be   worth   respecting   and,   through   disobedience,   wants   to  
contribute   to  making   it  more   just.   In  sum,  “The   law   is  broken,  but   fidelity   to   law   is  
expressed  by  the  public  and  non-­‐violent  nature  of  the  act.”503    
However,   the   international   context   of   domination   and   exploitation      –   a  
context  in  which  state  and  non-­‐state  public  and  private  actors  dominate  and  exploit  
the  most  vulnerable  in  the  pursuit  of  their  own  interests  –  clearly  does  not  qualify  as  a  
context  of  near  justice.  In  such  a  context,  I  do  not  believe  that  the  agents  engaging  in  
acts  of  disobedience  must  do  so  while  being  generally  committed  to  the  law.  It  seems  
absurd   to   demand   from   state   officials   who   ought   to   resist   their   domination   and  
exploitation   that   they   also   ought   to   be   generally   committed   to   the   law   that  
contributes   to   their   oppression.   To   the   extent   that   state   officials   of   disadvantaged  
governments  ought  not  to  show  themselves  as  being  generally  committed  to  the  law,  
the  question  becomes  whether   the  criteria  set  out  by  Rawls   for  a  nearly   just  society  
also  applies  for  the  context  at  hand.  I  contest  that  they  do,  albeit  for  different  reasons.  
In   contrast   to  Rawls,  who   argues   for   non-­‐violence   as   an   expression   of   one’s  
general  commitment  to  the  law  in  a  context  of  near  justice,  I  believe  that  acts  of  state  
civil  disobedience   in   the   international  context  of  domination  and  exploitation  must  
be  non-­‐violent  merely  because  of   the  harm,  destruction,  and  suffering  that  violence  
brings  about  in  human  terms.  This  is  especially  so,  given  the  means  available  to  states  
-­‐  to  wage  a  nuclear  war,  for  instance  -­‐  that  are  not  available  to  individuals.  A  second,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502  Rawls,  1971,  p.363.  
503  Rawls,  1971,  p.366.  
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more  practical  reason  for  why  I  wish  to  take  Rawls’s  non-­‐violence  criteria  over  to  the  
proposed  theory  of  state  civil  disobedience  is  that  non-­‐violence  is  usually  seen  as  the  
defining  criteria  distinguishing  civil  disobedience  from  other  forms  of  more  militant  
resistance.  Although  I  believe  it  is  worth  examining  whether  the  current  international  
legal   system   is   so   unjust   that   it   merits   other   forms   of   (militant)   resistance,504   the  
scarcity  of  normative  analysis  in  this  area  of  thought  makes  it  desirable  to  start  with  a  
case  in  which  the  legitimacy  threshold  is  somewhat  lower.  
Must  an  act  of  state  civil  disobedience  be  public?  I  see  one  normative  and  one  
practical  reason  to  answer  this  question  affirmatively.  Normatively,  I  believe  it  to  be  
of   relevance   that   state   officials   act   in   their   role   as   representatives   of   the   people.  
Representation,  in  turn,  requires  a  certain  degree  of  transparency.  Letting  the  public  
know   that   they   are   engaging   in   acts   of   state   civil   disobedience   is   part   of   such  
transparency.   Publicity   is   thus   required,   not   because   it   expresses   a   commitment   to  
the   law,  but  because  state  officials  owe  it  to  those  they  represent  to   inform  them  of  
their  actions.  More  pragmatically,  publicity  cannot  be  avoided   in  cases  of   state  civil  
disobedience,  since   the   type  of  action  which  could  be  considered   in   these   instances  
cannot  possibly  be  kept  from  the  public.  
What,   then,   does   an   act   of   state   civil   disobedience   look   like   in   practice?   In  
line  with  Neubauer,  I  would  argue  that  Argentina’s  refusal  to  pay  qualifies  as  an  act  of  
state  civil  disobedience.  First,  Argentina’s  refusal  meets  the  illegality  criterion.  In  the  
absence  of  both  legal  procedures  to  declare  sovereign  debt  invalid  in  cases  other  than  
state   succession,   as   well   as   of   state   insolvency   procedures,   international   credit   law  
dictates   that   indebted   countries   must   continue   servicing   their   debt   under   any  
circumstance.   Refusing   to   do   so,   thus,   qualifies   as   an   illegal   act.   Second,   the  
Argentine  presidents   Saá   (in   2001)   and  Kirchner   (in   2005)  both   justified   the   refusal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504  For  an  analysis  of  what  individuals  who  bear  the  brunt  of  global  injustice  are  entitled  to  do  
in  order  to  ensure  their  entitlements,  see  Caney  (2015).    
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with  reference  to  universal  moral  reasons.  While  arguing,  on  one  hand,  that  sovereign  
debt   could   not   be   serviced   “at   the   expense   of   [the]   hunger   and   exclusion”505   of  
Argentines,   they   also   pleaded   for   reform   of   international   credit   law   that,   by  
definition,  affects  all  states.  In  a  speech  addressing  the  UN  General  Assembly  in  2003,  
for   instance,   President   Nestor   Kirchner   demanded   a   reform   of   the   IMF   so   that   it  
would   serve   in   the   fight   against   poverty.   Third,   Argentina   combined   this  
conscientious   justification  with  concrete  initiatives  that  aimed  at  changing  laws  and  
policies.  A  case  in  point  is  the  establishment  of  the  Banco  del  Sur  (Bank  of  the  South),  
a  cooperative  project  between  Argentina,  Brazil,  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  Paraguay,  Uruguay  
and  Venezuela,  which  seeks  to  develop  an  alternative  to  the  IMF.  Finally,  in  refusing  
to   pay   its   debt,   the   state   of   Argentina   did   not   use   any   extra   legal   violence   and   it  
announced  its  decision  publicly.506  
I   believe   the   Argentine   case   illustrates   what   states   can   do,   despite   being  
dominated   and   exploited,   to   try   to   protect   their   citizen   from   wrongdoing.   While  
Argentine   state   officials   could   not   realistically   have   succeeded   in   protecting   their  
citizens   from  domination  and  exploitation,   they  were  able   to  put  up  a   fight  against  
those   dominating   and   exploiting   them   by   refusing   to   pay   the   debt   and   thereby  
engaging   in   an   act   of   state   civil   disobedience.   In   doing   so,   they   challenged   an  
international  legal  system,  which  gives  more  value  to  debt  servicing  than  to  the  most  
basic  rights  of  individuals.  State  civil  disobedience  thus  reveals  itself  as  one  possible  
way  in  which  the  responsibility  to  resist  domination  and  exploitation  externally  takes  
concrete  form.  As  such,  state  civil  disobedience  ought  to  be  seen  not  only  as  a  right  
held  by   states,   but   as   a  duty   that   state  officials   ought   to   exert   as   a  way  of   resisting  
external  domination  and  exploitation  in  the  name  of  their  citizens.  
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There   may   be   occasions,   however,   in   which   fulfilling   the   responsibility   to  
resist   domination   and   exploitation   by   engaging   in   acts   of   state   civil   disobedience  
might   seem   plainly   wrong.   It   might   be   the   case,   for   instance,   that   it   causes  much  
more  suffering  than  it  prevents  or  that  it  may  come  at  the  expense  of  other  values  we  
esteem.  Relevant  questions  here  are  how  the  disadvantaged  state’s  duty  to  engage  in  
acts  of  civil  disobedience  in  the  name  of  their  citizens  is  to  be  weighed  in  relation  to  
the   rights   of   non-­‐members   or   against   the   state’s   duty   to   guarantee   (basic)   socio-­‐
economic   rights;   how   future   generations   ought   to   be   considered   and   how   much  
weight  should  be  attached  to  their  interests  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  those  of  current  generations.  In  
other   cases,   the   duty   to   engage   in   acts   of   state   civil   disobedience   may   seem   too  
demanding.   Should   there   be   limits   regarding   state   officials’   responsibility   to   resist  
domination  by  engaging  in  acts  of  state  civil  disobedience?    
   Although  answering  these  questions  exhaustively  would  go  beyond  the  scope  
of  this  project,  I  do  wish  to  make  two  brief  comments  regarding  the  latitude,  first,  of  
the  duty  to  resist  domination  and  exploitation  via  acts  of  state  civil  disobedience,  and  
second,   of   the   responsibility   to   resist   domination   and   exploitation  more   generally.  
Beginning   with   the   former,   in   Chapter   4   we   saw   how   the   right   to   national   self-­‐
determination   is   a  qualified   right   that  depends  on   the  extent   to  which   the  national  
struggle   supports   the   emancipation   of   the   victims   of   imperial   domination   across  
national   borders.   I   believe   that   a   promising   avenue   to   continue   thinking   about   the  
limits   to   the   duty   of   resisting   domination   and   exploitation   via   acts   of   state   civil  
disobedience   in   the   future   is   along   these   lines.   The   idea  would   be   that   states   only  
have  a  duty  to  engage  in  acts  of  state  civil  disobedience  if  their  resistance  contributes  
to,  or  at  least  does  not  run  against,  the  struggle  of  all  those  resisting  domination  and  
exploitation  across  national  borders.    
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   These   limits   to   the   latitude   of   the   duty   to   engage   in   acts   of   state   civil  
disobedience   also   correspond   to   another   potential   objection.   It   can   be   argued   that  
one  meaningful  difference  between  the  international  and  the  domestic  arenas  is  the  
fact  that  the  former  relies  on  a  degree  of  compliance  and  cooperation  that  the  latter,  
due  to  the  coercive  powers  of  the  state,  does  not.  According  to  this  line  of  argument,  
states   must   play   by   the   rules   to   be   considered   members   in   good   standing   of   the  
international   order.   In   the   absence   of   sovereignty   and   the   associated   power   of  
coercion   on   the   international   level,   the   compliance   of   states   in   ensuring   that  
international   order   is   preserved   is   fundamental   in   a   way   that   the   obedience   of  
citizens   domestically   is   not.   Once   states   start   acting   up,   the   illusion   of   order  
disappears  and  the   international  order  collapses.  But   if  we   limit   the  duty   for  acts  of  
state  civil  disobedience  as  I  propose  here,  this  threat  is  contained.  It  is  only  when  the  
resistance   of   disadvantaged   governments   contributes   to   the   struggle   of   all   those  
dominated  and  exploited  that  the  resistance  is  both  justified  and  required.    
Let   me   conclude   by   saying   something   more   about   the   latitude   of   the  
responsibility   to   resist   domination   and   exploitation  more   generally.   There   are   two  
dimensions   along  which   the   latitude   of   this   responsibility   can   be   assessed,   namely  
latitude  regarding  what  action  ought  to  be  taken  and  latitude  regarding  when  action  
should  be  taken.507  Analysis  of  these  two  duties  reveals  that  latitude  exists  along  only  
the   first   of   these   dimensions.   Sometimes   state   officials   may   resist   domination   and  
exploitation  by  engaging   in  acts  of   state  civil  disobedience.  On  other  occasions   this  
might  not  be  demanded,  or  even  justified,  and  disadvantaged  state  officials  must  fulfil  
their   responsibility   to   resist   domination   and   exploitation   solely   by   recognising  
themselves   as   outcome   responsible   agents.   Latitude  does,   therefore,   exist   regarding  
what  state  officials  ought  to  do.  No  latitude  exists,  however,  with  regard  to  when  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507  Hay,  2011.  
   237  
responsibility  to  resist  domination  and  exploitation  applies.  While  state  officials  may  
not   have   to   engage   in   acts   of   state   civil   disobedience   on   every   occasion   to   resist  
domination  and  exploitation,  the  duty  to  resist  domination  internally  by  adopting  the  
right   attitude   and   conceiving   of   themselves   as   outcome   responsible   agents   always  
holds.  The  possibility  of  internal  resistance  therefore  means  there  is  the  potential  for  
disadvantaged   governments   to   resist   domination   even   in   instances   in   which   state  
officials  ought  not  to  engage  in  acts  of  state  civil  disobedience.    
  
Conclusion  And  Road  Ahead    
By  using  Argentina’s  most  recent  debt  history  as  an  example,  I  sought  to  analyse  the  
multifarious   forms   in   which   states   are   dominated   and   exploited.   I   attempted,  
however,   to   move   beyond   the   unilateral   attribution   of   responsibility   in   which   the  
dominating   and   exploiting   parties   are   demonised   and   the   victims   of   injustice  
portrayed  as  mere  bystanders,  raising  questions  about  the  responsibilities  and  duties  
of   disadvantaged   governments.508   I   argued   that   state   officials   in   states   occupying   a  
disadvantaged   position   within   the   SD&CR   system   have   the   responsibility   to   resist  
domination   and   exploitation.   As   a   general   maxim,   this   responsibility   allows   for  
latitude  with  regard  to  what  actions  are  to  be  taken  in  order  for  this  responsibility  to  
be  fulfilled.  I  argued  that  under  particular  circumstances,  the  responsibility  to  resist  
domination   and   exploitation  may   give   rise   to   a   duty   for   state   officials   to   engage   in  
acts   of   state   civil   disobedience.   When   these   conditions   are   not   fulfilled,   however,  
state   officials   still   have   the   duty   to   recognise   themselves   as   outcome   responsible  
agents.   Thus,   albeit   allowing   latitude   with   regards   to   what   actions   it   calls   for,   the  
responsibility   to   resist   domination   and   exploitation   does   not   allow   for   latitude  
regarding  when  it  holds.    
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It  may  be  countered,  however,  that  assigning  responsibility  to  disadvantaged  
governments   is  wrong,  since  it  seems  tantamount  to  blaming  the  victim.  “If  there   is  
an  obligation  to  resist  oppression,  after  all,  then  it  seems  that  those  who  fail  to  resist  
their   oppression   will   be   the   appropriate   subjects   of   blame.”509   However,   the  
attribution   of   responsibility   does   not   necessarily   need   to   be   isolating,   and   “finding  
that  some  people  are  guilty  of  perpetrating  specific  wrongful  action  does  not  absolve  
others  whose  actions  contribute  to  the  outcomes  from  bearing  responsibility.”510  The  
fact  that  I  claim  disadvantaged  governments  to  be  responsible  in  the  ways  proposed  
here   does   not   absolve   the   dominators   and   exploiters   from   their   responsibility   for  
wrongdoing.    
Instead,   I   sought   to   deconstruct   the   ‘we   versus   them’   dichotomy   that  
underlies  much  of  the  contemporary  global  justice  debate.  The  reproduction  of  such  
a   dichotomy   in   an   academic   debate   which   seeks   to   be   global   in   scope,   yet   only  
theorises  upon  the  ‘we’  as  the  acting  subject,  is  deeply  disrespectful  to  all  those  who  
occupy  the  position  of  the  ‘other.’  Most  importantly,  though,  a  discourse  of  unilateral  
responsibility  fails  to  mobilise  the  type  of  action  needed  to  put  an  end  to  the  injustice  
in   the   global   order.   “The   reproduction   of   the   distinction   between   ‘us’   and   ‘them’  
might  well  subvert  the  very  project  of  radical  cosmopolitanism.”511  By  theorising  upon  
the   responsibilities   and   duties   of   disadvantaged   governments,   I   wish   to   emphasise  
that   all   actors   –   perpetrators,   bystanders   and   also   victims   of   structural   injustice   –  
have  an  important  contribution  to  make  in  the  construction  of  a  less  unjust  world.    
In   this   same   spirit,   in   the  next   and   final   chapter  of   this   thesis,   I   turn   to   the  
question   of   what   responsibilities   citizens   of   debtor   states  may   have.   In   doing   so,   I  
wrestle  with   the   central   issue   that  most   (if   not   all)   political   theorists   that  work   on  
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issues  surrounding  sovereign  debt  concern  themselves  with  –  that  is,  the  question  of  
the   conditions   under   which   a   sovereign   debt   contract   is   binding   and   ought   to   be  
serviced  by  its  citizenry.    
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CHAPTER  8  
WHAT  CITIZENS  OWE    
Amidst   the   many   uncertainties   that   govern   debt   repayment   in   our   highly-­‐
financialised  economy,  one  background  norm  remains  largely  unchallenged:  the  idea  
that  sovereign  debt  must  be  repaid  by  the  citizenry  of  the  debtor  country.  Embodied  
in   the   legal   norm  of   Pacta   Sunt   Servanda,   this   repayment  norm  extends   to   present  
and   future   citizens   alike,   making   the   citizenry   of   the   debt   issuing   state   liable   to  
honour  the  contract  and  service  the  debt  the  state  accrued  in  their  name.    
In  this  chapter,  I  defend  two  sufficient  conditions  under  which  this  norm  can  
be  challenged.  First,   I   argue   that   citizens  cease   to  have  debt   servicing  obligations   if  
the  state  budget  as  a  whole  –  regardless  of   its  source  –   is  systematically  used   in  the  
interest  of  only  a  fraction  of  the  citizenry,  unless  they  are  the  most  disadvantaged  in  
society.  Second,  I  defend  that  whenever  the  acquisition  of  further  debt  threatens  the  
state’s   ability   to   act   in   the  public   interest,   this   offers   another  normative   ground  on  
which  to  challenge  the  repayment  norm.    
I   proceed   as   follows:   In   Section   I,   I   ask   what   makes   the   repayment   norm  
intuitively  forceful.  While  I  grant  that  the  repayment  norm  is  normatively  weighty  in  
cases  in  which  the  contracting  party  is  a  natural  person,  the  collective  agency  of  the  
state   complicates   this  picture.   In  Section   II,   I   turn   to   the  odious  debt  doctrine  as   a  
starting  point   to  defend   the   first   sufficient  condition   for  challenging   the   repayment  
norm.  Finally,  Section  III  presents  and  defends  the  second  sufficient  condition  on  the  
basis  of  which  the  citizens’  obligations  to  service  debt  can  be  challenged.      
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Repaying  Debt  That  is  Not  One’s  Own    
Why   should   sovereign   debt   be   repaid?  The  most   intuitively   plausible   and  powerful  
answer   arises   from   a   comparison   often   implicitly   made   between   debt   contracts  
accrued  by  natural  persons  and  those  accrued  by  a  sovereign  state.  We  tend  to  think  
that  individuals  who  enter  a  contract  must  fulfil  their  contractual  obligations,  except  
in  very  exceptional  circumstances.  There  are  both  deontological  and  consequentialist  
reasons  that  support  this  intuition  of  the  sanctity  of  contracts.512  We  might  think  that  
it   is   integral   to   the   autonomy   and   moral   personhood   of   individuals   to   take  
responsibility   for   their   own  actions,   and   that  keeping  one’s  promises   shows   respect  
for   other   persons.   Additionally,   we   might   believe   that   failing   to   uphold   our  
contractual  obligations  violates  a  duty  of  fair  play.  These  deontological  considerations  
seem  to  give  a  prima  facie  obligation  to  fulfil  past  promises.  Consequentialist  reasons  
further  strengthen  this  prima  facie  obligation.  Keeping  one’s  promises  allows  agents  
to   enter   mutually   beneficial   agreements   and   provides   agent   incentives   to   make  
prudent  decisions,  since  they  know  that  they  will  be  held  responsible  for  them.513    
Many   of   these   considerations   thus   rely   on   basic   considerations   of   personal  
integrity.  The  purely  deontological  considerations,   in  particular,  seem  to  rely  on  the  
conception  of   a  natural   person  who  has   an   integral,   temporally   bounded   existence.  
But  the  state  is  no  such  agent  –  the  state  is  a  moral  and  legal  person  in  its  own  right,  
an  incorporated  group.514  An  incorporated  group  does  not  merely  act  together  but  has  
standing  decision-­‐making  procedures  by  which   it   is  able  to  grasp  reasons,   form  and  
revise   its   intentions.   It   has   the   capacity   to  make   intentional   choices;   the   ability   to  
grasp   the  obligations   that  apply   to   it;   sufficient  authority  over   its  members   to  carry  
out  its  intentions;  and  it  can,  at  least  in  principle,  act  voluntary,  without  coercion  by  
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Reddy  (2007).  
513  For  a  more  extensive  justification  of  this  point,  see  Reddy  (2007).  
514  Stilz,  2011.  
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an  outside  force.515  Although  the  government  -­‐  a  person  or  group  of  persons  who  rule  
and  administer  a  political  community  –  personifies  the  state,  the  state  as  a  legal  and  
moral  person  outlives  particular  governments.    
If   one   understands   the   state   as   a   political   association   characterised   by   its  
durability  –  by  its  independence  from  a  particular  set  of  persons,  and  as  a  moral  and  
legal  person  in  its  own  right  –  the  resistance  of  some  to  revoke  the  repayment  norm  
becomes   easy   to   understand.   A   challenge   to   the   repayment   norm   would   not   only  
threaten   the  practical  viability  of  any   form  of   sovereign  borrowing  and   lending,  but  
the  very  existence  of  what  we  have  come  to  understand  states  to  be.    
The  complex,  collective  agency  of  the  state  complicates  the  picture  painted  by  
the   analogy   of   individual   debt   acquisition   cases.  When   stating   that   a   state   accrued  
debt,   what  we   are   actually   saying   is   that   finance  ministers   or   other   public   officials  
within   the   executive  branch  of   government  decided   to   either  knock  on   the  door  of  
private   banks   (private   sovereign   debt),   governments   (bilateral   sovereign   debt)   and  
other  multilateral   institutions   (public   sovereign   debt),   or   decided   to   sell   bonds   on  
private  financial  markets  (again  to  either  public  or  private  creditors).  It  is  by  virtue  of  
their  role  as  legitimate  public  officials  that  the  acts  of  these  individuals  then  become  
the  state’s  responsibility.  Debt  incurred  by  legitimate  state  officials  are  then  treated  as  
an  obligation  of  the  state.516  When  a  new  government  comes  to  power,  in  turn,  all  the  
debts   that   were   the   obligations   of   the   previous   regime   are   treated   as   the   new  
government’s   obligations.   Present   and   future   citizens   are   then   saddled   with   debt  
servicing  obligations.517  
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516   This   formulation   assumes   the   ‘fictional   conception   of   the   state’,   according   to   which   the  
state  is  distinct,  both  from  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  (Skinner,  2009,  p.  347).  A  representative  of  
the  state  is  a  person  who  takes  upon  him/herself  the  artificial  role  of  speaking  or  acting  in  the  
name  of  the  state.  
517   In   this   chapter,   I   bracket   out   questions   relating   to   inter-­‐generational   justice   in   debt-­‐
repayment.  For  excellent  discussions  on  this,  see  Gosseries  (2007)  and  Reddy  (2007).    
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What  makes   individual   and   sovereign  debt   contracts   dis-­‐analogous,   then,   is  
the  fact  that  it  is  not  one  and  the  same  agent  who  accrues  and  services  the  debt.  The  
morally   relevant   difference   between   individual   debt   contracts   and   sovereign   debt  
contracts  is  that,  whereas  in  the  former  case  the  same  agent  borrows  and  services  the  
debt,  in  the  latter  case  state  officials  at  point  Tx  accrue  debt  that  the  citizenry  in  Tx+1  
will   service.518   Put   differently,   the  morally   relevant   dis-­‐analogy   is   that,  while   in   the  
case  of  individual  debt,  the  same  agent  borrows  and  services  the  debt,  in  the  case  of  
sovereign   debt   state   officials   at   one   point   in   time   accrue   debt   that   the   citizenry,  
which  is  distinct  from  both  state  officials  and  the  state,  has  to  service  at  a  later  point.  
The  question  that  results  from  this  dis-­‐analogy  is  thus  the  following:  What  normative  
link   justifies  burdening   the  citizenry  with  debt   servicing  obligations   for  a  debt   they  
themselves  did  not  accrue?519    
Before  starting  to  answer  this  question  in  the  next  section,  let  me  respond  to  a  
possible   objection   raised   against   formulating   the   question   in   this   way.   A   possible  
objection  to  focusing  on  the  question  of  legitimate  debt  servicing  is  that  this  question  
is  only  a   sub-­‐set  of   the  more  general   interrogation  of   legitimate   taxation.  Since  one  
mechanism  through  which  states  pass  on  debt  servicing  obligations  to  citizens  is  via  
taxation,   it   can   be   argued   that   one   should   focus   on   the   more   general   question  
instead,  for  taxing-­‐to-­‐repay-­‐sovereign-­‐debt  is  only  a  special  application  of  the  general  
principle   of   legitimate   taxation.   Conversely,   if   one   still   chooses   to   begin   with   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  this,  see  Wollner  (2017).    
519   If  one  adopts  the  fictional  conception  of  the  state,  what  makes  the  case  of  sovereign  debt  
dis-­‐analogous  is  that  the  agent  who  accrues  the  debt  and  those  who  service  it  is  not  one  and  
the   same.   Were   one   to   adopt   the   ‘modern’   or   ‘reductionist   conception’   of   the   state,   by  
contrast,   the   argument   runs   slightly   differently.   According   to   the   modern   conception,   the  
state  simply  denotes  “the  individual  person,  or  the  body  of  individual  persons,  which  bears  the  
supreme   powers   in   an   independent   political   society”   (Skinner,   2009,   p.356).   The  
representatives  of  the  state  simply  are  the  state.  According  to  this  conception,  individual  and  
sovereign  debt  are  thus  analogous  in  that  it  is  one  and  the  same  agent  (the  state)  who  accrues  
and  services  the  debt.  Note,  however,  that  the  same  question  arises,  for  even  if  the  state  is  the  
primary  bearer  of  the  obligation  to  repay  debt,  the  state  can  only  service  its  debts  by  taxing  its  
citizens.  The  question  thus  becomes:  when  can  the  state  legitimately  burden  its  citizenry  with  
debt  servicing  obligations  via  the  collection  of  taxes?    
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question  of  legitimate  debt  servicing,  then  whatever  answer  is  given  to  the  narrower  
question   of   debt   servicing   also   needs   to   be   plausible   as   an   answer   to   the   broader  
question  of  legitimate  taxation.  
Although   I   agree   that   one  mechanism   through   which   the   state   burdens   its  
citizens   with   debt   servicing   obligations   is   taxation,   I   want   to   resist   the   conclusion  
that   the   question   of   legitimate   debt   servicing   is   simply   a   sub-­‐set   of   the   legitimate  
taxation   issue.   First,   other   ways   of   passing   on   debt   servicing   exist.   A   state   “raises  
revenues  to  service  its  debt  (at  least  in  part)  from  taxes  imposed  on  citizens  and  other  
subjects  taxable  by  the  government.”520  “States  have  other  ways  of  raising  revenue  or  
lowering   their   debt   burden,   e.g.,   by   selling   off   public   assets   or   by   inflating   their  
currency”.521  Second,  just  because  normative  questions  that  are  ultimately  connected  
to   taxation   arise   in   various   domains   –   relating,   for   instance,   to   jus   ad   bellum   or  
migration  management,  to  name  but  a  few  -­‐  this  does  not  make  the  narrow  questions  
that   emerge   out   of   these   domains   merely   sub-­‐sets   of   the   broader   question   of  
legitimate   taxation.   Particular   characteristics   of   the   different   domains   affect   the  
answers   given   to   the   specific   normative   questions   that   result   therefrom.522  
Nonetheless,   as  will   become  clear   as   I   proceed,   the   answer   I   provide   to   the  narrow  
question   of   legitimate   debt   servicing   is   similar   to   reasonable   answers   given   to   the  
question   of   legitimate   taxation.523   Thus,   whether   one   sees   the   question   of   debt  
servicing  as  connected,  yet  independent,  from  the  question  of  legitimate  taxation,  or  
whether  one  sees  the  former  as  merely  a  sub-­‐set  of  the  latter,  one  can  still  agree  with  
the  argument  put  forward  here.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520  Barry  and  Tomitova,  2007,  p.52,  my  emphasis.  This  is  acknowledged  even  by  those  who  see  
the  question  of  debt  servicing  as  a  sub-­‐question  of  the  one  of  legitimate  taxation.    
521  Wollner,  2017,  p.8.  
522   In   the   third   section,   I   argue   that   one   of   the   features   of   sovereign   debt   that   makes   the  
question   of   legitimate   debt   servicing   specific   is   that   high   indebtedness   of   states   may  
undermine  their  ability  to  act  in  the  public  interest.  
523  Wollner,  2017.    
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The  Use  of  Debt  in  the  Public  Interest    
We  saw  how  the  complex,  collective  agency  of  the  state  questions  the  intuitive  appeal  
of   the   repayment   norm   in   cases   in   which   the   debtor   is   a   natural   person.   In   this  
section   I   outline   and   defend   one   sufficient   condition   that   justifies   challenging   the  
repayment  norm.  I  argue  that  citizens  cease  to  have  debt  servicing  obligations  when  
the   state   uses   its   available   budget   to   systematically   act   in   the   particular   interest   of  
only  a  sub-­‐group  of  its  citizenry.  To  make  this  argument,  I  first  introduce  the  odious  
debt   doctrine,   since   it   succinctly   formulates   a   sufficient   condition   to   challenge   the  
repayment  norm.  Then   I   propose   and  defend   two  distinct   changes   to   the   sufficient  
condition,  as  formulated  by  this  odious  debt  doctrine,  and  consider  objections.    
The  odious  debt  doctrine  offers   a  promising   start   to   answer   the  question  of  
when  citizens  can,  and  when  they  cannot,  be  legitimately  burdened  with  servicing  a  
debt  accrued  in  their  name.  First  developed  after  the  Spanish  American  War  of  1898  
and  later  formalised  by  Alexander  Sack  in  1927,  the  classical  legal  doctrine  of  odious  
debt  has  proven  hugely   successful   in  challenging   the   repayment  of  debt  accrued  by  
autocratic  regimes.524  The  doctrine  consists  of  two  provisos,  the  first  of  which  focuses  
on   the   nature   of   the   regime   that   contracted   the   debt   (the   regular   government  
proviso),  and  the  second  of  which  concentrates  on  the  purpose  and  use  given  to  the  
debt  accrued  (the  public  interest  proviso).  While  disagreements  prevail  regarding  the  
definitive   interpretation   of   Sack’s   classical   doctrine,   agreement   exists   regarding   the  
normative  relevance  of  the  second  proviso.525    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524   For   an   excellent   analysis   of   how   the   enforcement   of   the   repayment   norm   changed  
throughout  time,  see  Lienau,  2014.  Lienau  discusses  how  before  WWII,  the  repayment  norm  
was  challenged  in  a  broader  set  of  cases  by  debtors  and  creditors  alike.  Since  WWII,  however,  
the  norm  has  only  been  challenged  in  cases  of  a  regime  change  (from  autocratic  to  democratic  
governments).    
525  According  to  Sack,  both  provisos  are  sufficient  conditions.  That  implies  that  “if  a  debt  was  
in  fact  incurred  to  benefit  the  people,  then  it  should  not  be  considered  odious  even  if  it  lacked  
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According   to   the  public   interest  proviso,   debts   “must  have  been   contracted,  
and  the  money  raised  through  it,  used  to  care  for  the  needs  and  in  the  interests  of  the  
State.”526  Thus,  the  answer  that  the  second  proviso  of  the  odious  debt  doctrine  would  
provide   to   the  question   that   concerns  us  here   is   the   following:  Whenever   the   state  
fails  to  contract  the  debt  and  use  the  money  raised  through  it  in  the  public  interest,  
citizens  cease  to  have  debt  servicing  obligations.    
So  far,  the  doctrine’s  second  proviso  has  been  interpreted  as  saying  something  
about   the   scope   of   authority   of   the   public   officials   accruing   the   debt.   If   the   public  
official  acted  within  the  scope  of  his  or  her  authority  when  accruing  and  spending  the  
money,  then  the  debt  is  legitimate  and  citizens  have  debt  servicing  obligations.527  By  
contrast,   if   the  public  official  exceeded  the  scope  of  his  or  her  authority,  the  debt   is  
odious  and  citizens  cannot  be  legitimately  burdened  with  debt  servicing  obligations.    
   One  of  the  strengths  of  this   interpretation  is  that   it  remains  fairly  restrictive  
in   its   assessment   of   what   constitutes   odious   debt,   keeping   the   number   of   cases   in  
which   the   repayment   norm   is   challenged   limited.   This   is   important,   since   many  
proponents  of  the  doctrine  take  its  main  strength  to  be  that   it  can  serve  as  a  public  
standard;  they  want  the  doctrine  to  be  immediately  applicable,  allowing  us  to  discern  
in  practice  what  debts  ought  to  be  repaid  and  which  ones  are  not.  At  the  same  time,  
this  narrow  interpretation  of  the  doctrine  comes  at  the  price  of  excluding  cases  from  
normative  challenge  where  the  enforcement  of  the  repayment  norm  seems  intuitively  
doubtful.   Cases   currently   triggering   the   most   debate,   such   as   those   in   the   latest  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
popular   consent.”   In   contrast,  Gosseries   shows   that  while   the   second   proviso   alone  may   be  
sufficient,  the  first  proviso  alone  is  not.  According  to  Gosseries,   it   is  the  second  proviso  that  
does  the  normative  heavy   lifting  (Gosseries,  2007).  Despite   this  disagreement  on  whether  or  
not  the  first  proviso  is  a  sufficient  condition,  scholars  working  with  the  odious  debt  doctrine  
agree   that   from   a   normative   standpoint,   the   second   proviso   is   the   most   significant   one  
(Toussaint,  2016).  It  is  this  second  proviso  that  I  focus  on  in  the  proceeding  discussion.    
526  Sack  translated  by  Gosseries,  2007,  p.101.    
527   Dimitriu   has   defended   this   argument   by   extending   the   principles   of   agency   law   in   the  
domestic  arena  to  the  international  domain  of  sovereign  lending  (2011;  2017).    
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sovereign  debt  crises   in  Europe,   for   instance,   are  excluded   from  scrutiny.  These  are  
cases   in   which,   through   austerity   measures   in   the   debtor   countries   and   through  
international  ‘solidarity  packages’  from  other  countries,  the  lower  and  middle  classes  
bailed  out  private  creditors  for  their  excesses  in  times  of  booms.  
In  what  follows,  I  propose  a  broader,  alternative  interpretation  of  the  second  
proviso  to  the  one  focusing  on  the  scope  of  the  authority  of  public  officials.  The  aim  
of   this   broader   interpretation   is   to   make   sense   of   our   intuition   that   there   is  
something  wrong  with  the  way  in  which  the  most  vulnerable  groups  of  society  have  
been   burdened   with   debt   servicing   obligations   in   cases   such   as   the   most   recent  
European  crisis.  While  this  makes  the  odious  debt  doctrine   less  readily  applicable,   I  
think  that  much  value  can  be  derived  from  understanding  why  we  intuitively  hesitate  
to   hold   citizens   responsible   for   servicing   debt   that   was   not   spent   in   their   interest.  
Rather  than  providing  a  public  standard  that   is  readily  applicable,  I   intend  to  give  a  
principled   answer   to   the   question   of   when   the   repayment   norm   ought   to   be  
challenged   and   when   citizens   can   no   longer   be   legitimately   burdened   with   debt  
servicing  obligations.528  
   To   begin   offering   this   alternative,   broader   interpretation   of   the   second  
proviso,   let  us  briefly   examine  why   states  accrue  debt.  When   the   ‘public   interest’   is  
invoked  in  the  context  of  the  acquisition  and  investment  of  sovereign  debt,  examples  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
528  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  philosophical  argument  made  here  may  not,  in  the  end,  inform  a  
public  standard.  To  do  so,  however,  other  relevant  considerations  would  have  to  be  evaluated.  
One  of  the  most  crucial  considerations  which  I  bracket  out  by  focusing  exclusively  on  the  debt  
servicing  obligations  of  the  citizenry,   for   instance,   is  the  question  of  the  legitimate  claims  of  
creditors.   Something   that   the   odious   debt   doctrine   successfully   captures   is   that,   it  matters,  
normatively,  whether  creditors  borrowed  money  in  good  or  in  bad  faith.  The  argument  runs  as  
follows:  to  the  extent  that  creditors  did  not  know,  and  could  not  possibly  have  known,  about  
the  illegitimate  purposes  to  which  a  debt  contract  was  put,  lenders  still  plausibly  hold  a  claim  
of  restitution  against  the  debtor  state  (Dimitriu,  2017,  p.91).  This  is  a  reasonable  argument  to  
make  and  I  do  consider   its   implications   in  the   last  section  of   this  paper.  Were  I   to  have  the  
ambition  of   turning   the  philosophical  answer  provided   in   this  paper   into  a  public   standard,  
however,   I  would  have  to  address   the  question  of  how  the   legitimate  claims  of   the  creditors  
are   to   be   weighed   against   the   legitimate   claims   of   the   debtor   in   a   much   more   extensive  
manner.  I  hope  to  provide  a  reasonable  answer  to  this  question  in  a  future  paper.      
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such  as  the  waging  of  a  just  war  or  the  building  of  dams  come  to  mind.  The  state  can  
be   said   to   accrue   and   use   debt   in   the   public   interest   when   it   invests   the   attained  
resources  in  common  goods.  But  how  representative  are  these  prototypical  examples,  
such  as  the  building  of  a  dam  or  the  fighting  of  a  just  war,  in  the  real  world?  For  what  
purposes  do  states  accrue  debt?  
   Debt  can  be  accrued  to  meet  any  government  expenses.  Most  commonly,  it  is  
accrued   with   the   aim   of   repaying   old   debt,   covering   a   deficit,   stimulating   the  
economy,   or   developing   new   sectors.529   In   principle,   states   could   use   other   policy  
levers   to   pursue   these   goals,   namely   fiscal   or   monetary   policy.   In   terms   of   fiscal  
policy,  they  could  increase  their  revenue  by  increasing  taxes  or  they  could  lower  their  
expenditure   via   adjustment   and   austerity   policies.   In   terms  of  monetary   policy,   the  
government   can   (via   the   central   bank,   whose   real   and   formal   independence   varies  
across   countries)   make   use   of   the   printing   press   to   stimulate   the   economy   or   pay  
their  deficit,  or  it  can  lower  interest  rates  (thereby  giving  agents  incentives  to  spend,  
rather  than  save,  and  stimulating  the  economy  via  private  credit).    
Using   each   of   these   levers   carries   a   certain   cost   for   different   groups   of   the  
population,  however.  We  can  think  about  domestic  groups  along  two  axes:  classes  or  
sectors.  Whereas   sectors  demarcate  particular  branches  of   a  national   economy   (the  
telecommunications  sectors,  the  banking  sector,  the  industrial  or  agricultural  sector,  
to   name   but   a   few),   classes   are   social   divisions   based   on   social   and/or   economic  
status.530   Who   is   affected   by   tax   hikes,   for   instance,   depends   on   the   concrete   tax  
reforms  made,  by  how  progressive  or  regressive  the  tax  system  is  in  relation  to  class,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
529  Bucheit  et  al.,  2013.  
530  In  this  chapter,  I   intentionally  adopt  a  non-­‐technical  definition  of  class  that  resembles  its  
common   usage.   For   an   excellent   discussion   of   different   ways   of   understanding   class,   see  
Wright  (2015).  Wright  establishes  a  typology  of  three  different   forms  of  understanding  class,  
namely   one   which   defines   class   in   terms   of   individual   attributes   and   definitions   (the  
stratification  approach),  a  second  which  thinks  about  class  in  terms  of  a  variety  of  opportunity  
hoarding  (the  Weberian  approach),  and  a  third  which  defines  class  in  terms  of  a  mechanism  
of  domination  and  exploitation  (the  Marxist  approach).  
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or  whether  particular  sectors  are  taxed  more  than  others  (i.e.,  the  export  sector  being  
taxed   more   or   less   heavily).   Adjustment   will   largely   affect   the   lower   and   middle  
classes,  those  who  rely  more  heavily  on  the  public  services  offered  by  the  state.531   In  
terms  of  monetary  policy,  a  devaluation  of  the  currency  might  strengthen  the  export  
sector,   although   a   very   unstable   exchange   rate   is   harmful   for   all   sectors   across   the  
board.  Devaluation  also  harms  those  sectors  relying  on  imports,  as  they  become  more  
expensive.   Finally,   lower   interest   rates   can   help   stimulate   the   economy,   replacing  
public  spending  with  private  credit,  but  the  consequences  can  be  very  risky  too,  as  all  
the  easy  money  flowing  into  the  housing  market  in  the  world’s  capitals  today  shows.    
We   gain   two  main   insights   from   looking   at   the   actual   reasons   governments  
have  to  accrue  debt,  which  translate  into  two  central  modifications  I  propose  to  make  
to   the   public   interest   proviso.   First,   we   learn   that   it   would   be   both   difficult   and  
misleading   to   separate   the   discussion   of   the   use   of   sovereign   debt   from   a   broader  
discussion   about   the   use   of   the   state’s   budget.   Money   is   fungible   and   the   debt  
accrued  by  the  state  is  only  a  portion  of  the  budget  that  the  state  has  at  its  disposal  
(the   fiscal   and   the   monetary   policy   lever   being   the   other   two).   The   fungibility   of  
money  makes   it  extremely  cumbersome  (and  maybe  practically   impossible)   to   trace  
the   use   of   the  money   raised  with   each   individual   debt   contract.  More   importantly,  
from   a   normative   stand   point,   the   source   of   the   money   seems   irrelevant.  What   is  
normatively   relevant   is   not   with   what   purpose   each   (individual)   debt   contract   is  
accrued  and  ultimately  invested,  but  whether  the  state  allocates  funding  in  the  public  
interest.    
Taking   the   fungibility   of   money   seriously   thus   requires   reformulating   the  
public   interest   proviso   in   the   following   manner:   If   the   state,   with   all   its   available  
budget,   strives   to   serve   the   public   interest,   then   the   citizenry   has   debt   servicing  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531  For  an  excellent  account  of  the  classist  character  of  adjustment  policies,  see  Blyth  (2015).  
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obligations,  regardless  of  the  use  to  which  the  (individual)  debt  contracts  have  been  
put.  Conversely,   if   a   state   is   sufficiently  unjust,   the   state   citizens  are  not  obliged   to  
repay  debts  regardless  of  the  use  of  the  borrowed  money.    
A   second   insight   we   gain   from   looking   at   the   actual   reasons   governments  
accrue   debt   is   that   invoking   a   general   notion   of   the   ‘public   interest’   is   more  
complicated   than   the   idealised   examples   (such   as   the   waging   of   a   just   war   or   the  
building  of  dams)  would  initially  suggest.  Most  decisions  made  by  the  state  (besides  
decisions   such   as   the   enforcement   of   the   law)   are   not   equally   in   the   interest   of   all  
citizens.   Behind   the   hidden   abode   of   a   very   vague   and   generic   invocation   of   the  
‘public   interest,’  we  actually  have  a  spectrum  with  roughly  three  categories.  On  one  
side  of  the  spectrum,  we  have  cases  such  as  those  to  which  the  dam  example  alludes,  
in  which   the  government   accrues   and  uses   the  debt   for   things   that   are   truly   in   the  
public  interest,  cases  where  public  interest  is  understood  as  the  ‘general  interest’  that  
stands   above   the   particular   interests   of   different   sectors   and   classes.   On   the   other  
side  of  the  spectrum,  there  are  those  cases  in  which  the  government  accrues  and  uses  
the   debt   for   particular   interests,   rather   than   the   public-­‐interest-­‐as-­‐general-­‐interest.  
Sitting   in  the  middle  are  those  cases   in  which  the  government  accrues  and  uses  the  
debt  for  things  that  are  in  the  interest  of  all  on  a  minimal  level,  but  track  the  interests  
of  some  more  than  others,  creating  clear  winners  and  losers.532  
It   is  my   contention   that  most  of   the   things   that   the   state  does   fall   into   this  
third  category.  Nearly  everything  that  the  state  does   in   its  actions  and  its  omissions  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532   Critics  who   are   particularly   sceptical   of   the   existence   of   truly   general   interest  may   think  
that  even   idealised  examples  of   common  goods  are  actually   cases   that   track   the   interests  of  
some  more   than   those   of   others.   It   can   be   argued,   for   instance,   that   even   in   the   dam   case  
there  are  clear  winners,  namely  those  sectors  of  society  that  are  more  dependent  on  water  and  
electricity.  My  overall  argument  should  still  be  convincing  for  those  who  reject  the  existence  
of  a  general  interest  as  such,  for  I  argue  that  states  must  act  in  the  interest  of  different  sectors  
and  classes  in  a  minimally  just  way.  
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inevitably  creates  winners  and  losers.533  Beyond  a  very  minimal  provision  of  a  general  
interest  (in  public  safety,  for  instance),  the  state  always  positions  itself  to  promote  the  
particular  interests  of  different  sectors  and  classes.534  This  is  true  for  decisions  made  
regarding  debt,  and  it  is  equally  true  for  decisions  concerning  the  other  policy  levers.  
The  stabilisation  of  the  currency  is  a  good  example  for  this.  On  the  face  of  it,  a  stable  
exchange  rate  is  something  that  all  sectors  benefit  from  across  the  board.  But  if  one  
looks   behind   this   thin   façade,   there   are   clear  winners   and   losers.   If   the   currency   is  
kept  at  a  competitive  rate,  say,  this  will  benefit  the  export  sector  while  harming  those  
industries   heavily   relying   on   imports.   Thus,   keeping   the   currency   competitive  may  
benefit  all,  but  will  benefit  some  more  than  others,  and  also  create  clear  losers.    
The  suggestion  that  most  of  what  the  government  does  when  accruing  debt,  
as  well  as  when  using  any  of  the  other  policy  leavers,  leads  to  the  creation  of  relative  
winners  and  losers  is  not  a  particularly  contentious  claim.  So  far,  however,  this  basic  
insight  has  not  been  accounted   for  when  specifying  the  second  proviso.  Recall   that,  
according   to   the   narrow   interpretation   of   the   second   proviso   of   the   odious   debt  
doctrine,  citizens  cease  to  have  debt  servicing  obligations   if   the  money  accrued  was  
not  used   in   the  public   interest.  What   I   suggest  by  opening   the  black  box  of   ‘public  
interest’   is   that   it   is  not   enough   to   implicitly   rely  on   a  notion  of  public-­‐interest-­‐as-­‐
general   interest   –   a   public   interest   that   stands   above   the   particular   interests   of  
different  classes  and  sectors  of  society.  Instead,  to  determine  whether  citizens  can  be  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533   For   a   mathematical   defence   of   the   argument   that   sovereign   debt   will   inevitably   benefit  
some   citizenry  more   than   others,   see   Reddy   (2007).   Reddy   shows   how   the   extent   to  which  
each  individual  citizen  benefits  from  the  resources  gained  by  accruing  the  debt,  as  well  as  the  
extent  to  which  they  will  have  to  carry  the  costs  of  debt  repayment,  differ  depending  on  the  
timing  of   individual   lives  and  variation   in  the  extent  to  which   individual  persons  experience  
increased  advantage  as  a  result  of  the  resources  gained  through  the  acquisition  of  debt.  
534   Let   me   clarify   how   I   use   the   different   understandings   of   ‘interests’.   I   use   ‘particular  
interests’   as   the   interests   of   different   groups   of   the   citizenry,   such   as   different   classes   or  
sectors.   I  use   the   term   ‘general   interest’  as   those   that  stand  above   the  particular   interests  of  
different  sectors  and  classes  and  are  truly  shared  by  all  groups  of  the  citizenry.  Finally,  as  will  
become   clearer,   the   notion   of   public   interest   I   adopt   is   not   to   be   conflated   with   general  
interest,   but   as   a   minimally,   relationally-­‐just   balance   between   the   particular   interests   of  
different  groups  of  the  citizenry.  
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legitimately  burdened  with  debt  servicing  obligations,  one  also  needs   to   look  at   the  
extent  to  which  the  state  serves  the  interests  of  particular  sectors  and  classes.    
Recognising  that  it  is  a  simplification  to  assume  that  the  state  can  always  act  
in  the  public-­‐interest-­‐as-­‐general-­‐interest,  leads  me  to  propose  the  following  standard  
to   question   the   repayment   norm:   If   the   state   systematically   acts   according   to   the  
interests   of   only   a   fraction   of   its   citizenry,   and   unless   this   class   are   those  who   are  
disadvantaged   in   the   society,   the   repayment   norm   can   be   challenged   and   citizens  
cease  to  have  debt  servicing  obligations  by  virtue  of  their  membership  of  the  state.    
The  addition   ‘unless  this  class  are  those  who  are  disadvantaged   in  society’   is  
important  here.  Without  this  clarification,   following  the   logic  of   the  revised  proviso  
would  force  us  to  conclude  that  states  that  meet  a  more  demanding  standard  of  social  
justice   –   like   the   difference   principle   –   actually   fail   to   meet   the   standard   of   the  
proviso  and  are  thus  unable  to  legitimately  burden  their  citizenry  with  debt  servicing  
obligations.  Adding   the  clause   ‘unless   this  class  are   those  who  are  disadvantaged   in  
society’  avoids  us  having  to  reach  this  implausible  conclusion.  
In  addition,  it  also  emphasises  the  importance  of  keeping  separate  that  which  
is   required   to   meet   the   minimal   standards   of   the   proviso   and   meeting   more  
demanding  social   justice  principles.  Keeping  these  two  standards  separate  is  crucial,  
since   adopting   a   very   demanding   standard   of   social   justice   (such   as   ‘everybody  
winning  equally  with  every  state  action’)  and  making  debt  repayment  dependent  on  it  
would   disregard   the   insight   just   won.   It   would   simply   be   impossible   to   meet,   for  
(nearly)   all   cases   of   state   action   or   omissions   create  winners   and   losers.  Of   course,  
this   is   not   to   say   that   it   is   undesirable   for   the   state   to   meet   more   demanding  
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principles  of  social  justice,  only  to  say  that  obligation  to  service  debts  should  not  be  
dependent  on  the  state  meeting  these  more  demanding  principles.  535  
In  sum,  I   therefore  propose  to  specify   the  second  proviso  of   the  odious  debt  
doctrine  in  the  following  way:  citizens  cease  to  have  debt  servicing  obligations  when  
the   state   uses   its   available   budget   to   systematically   act   in   the   interest   of   only   a  
particular   sub-­‐group   of   its   citizenry,   unless   this   sub-­‐group   are   those  who   are  most  
disadvantaged  in  the  society.    
Normatively  trained  scholars  may  rightly  argue  that  more  needs  to  be  said  to  
establish   where   exactly   the   boundary   lays   to   distinguish   between   cases   where   the  
promotion   of   particular   interests   is   sufficiently   balanced   to   ground   debt   servicing  
obligations  from  those  where  it  is  so  unequal  as  to  make  debt  non-­‐binding.  This  is  a  
difficult,  yet  valuable  exercise,  and  there  are  potentially  two  (compatible)  routes  to  do  
so.   First,   one   could   specify   where   the   boundary   lays   by   introducing   a   substantive  
standard.  Using  Walzer’s  distinction  between  monopoly  and  dominance  could  be  one  
strategy.  It  could  be  argued,  for  instance,  that  the  actual  pattern  of  relative  wins  and  
losses  of  the  different  policies  adopted  by  the  state  need  to  vary  over  time  in  such  a  
manner  that  there  are  no  dominant  classes  or  sectors.  By  his  definition,  a  dominant  
class   or   sector  would   be   one  which   not   only   commands   control  within   one   sphere  
(monopoly)  but  can  also  do  so  across  different  spheres  of  distribution  (dominance).536  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535  Those  who  maintain  that  the  question  of  debt  servicing  is  only  a  subset  of  the  question  of  
legitimate  taxation  would  have  reasons  to  agree  with  this  conclusion,  for  if  one  sustains  that  
the   question   of   legitimate   debt   servicing   is   a   subset   of   the   question   of   legitimate   taxation,  
whatever   standard  one  adopts   for   the  narrower  question  of  debt   servicing,   also  needs   to  be  
adopted   as   a   standard   for   the   broader   question   of   legitimate   taxing.   Adopting   a   very  
demanding  social   justice  standard  for   legitimate  debt  servicing  would  thus   force  us  to  reach  
the  implausible  conclusion  that  a  state  can  only  tax  if  it  meets  a  very  demanding  standard  of  
social   justice.   To   avoid   this   implausible   conclusion,   those   who   see   the   question   of   debt  
servicing   as   a   subset   of   the   question   of   legitimate   taxation   adopt   a   minimal   standard   to  
determine  debt  servicing  obligations,   in   line  with  what   is  argued  here.   In   the  defence  of  his  
own   theory  of   ‘legitimate   taxation,’  Wollner   argues   that   the   state  only  has   a   right   to   tax   its  
citizens   to   repay   debt   if   “it   effectively   delivers   at   least  minimal   standards   of   social   justice”  
(Wollner,  2017).    
536  Walzer,  1983,  p.10.    
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What  this  substantive  standard  rightly  emphasises  is  that  what  is  at  stake  here  is  not  
that   the  state  meets  some  sufficientarian  standard  of  distributive   justice,  but   that   it  
considers   the   particular   interests   of   all   classes   and   sectors   of   society.   Second,   one  
could   specify   where   the   boundary   lays   by   introducing   a   procedural   standard.  
According  to  such  a  procedural  standard,  a  state  could  legitimately  tax  its  citizens  to  
service  debt  to  the  extent  that  the  different  classes  and  sectors  have  a  fair  opportunity  
to  contest  the  use  to  which  resources  are  put.537  
What   these   two   potential   routes   suggest,   is   that   the   philosophical   debate  
regarding   how   to   distinguish   between   (a)   cases   where   the   state   is   sufficiently  
receptive   to   the   interests   of   different   sectors   and   classes   of   society   to   legitimately  
burden   its   citizens  with   debt   servicing   obligations,   from   (b)   those   cases  where   the  
state  is  not  receptive  to  said  interests  and  thus  cannot  legitimately  do  so,  is  far  from  
settled.  This  does  not,  however,  deprive  us  from  the  ability  to  recognise  cases  in  the  
real  world  where   the   reformulated   second   proviso   is   being   violated.      There  will   be  
convergence  of  different  standards  in  at  least  some  negative  sense:  Enough  empirical  
evidence   exists   to   suspect   that   any   plausible   standard   –   whether   substantive   or  
procedural  –  would  converge  upon  ruling  out  the  same  set  of  (empirically  significant)  
cases.  
In   recent   years,   political   economists   have   gathered   disheartening   evidence  
that   suggests   that   several   states   today   are   directly   implicated   in   defending   the  
interests  of  a   financial  elite  over  those  of  the  more  vulnerable  sectors  and  classes  of  
society.  According  to  Hacker  and  Pierson,  the  ‘escape  of  the  one  percent’  is  explained  
by  an  ‘organised  combat’  fought  by  the  wealthiest.  538  Their  main  thesis  is  that  there  is  
a   feedback   loop   in   which   the   super-­‐rich   can   use   their   capital   to   buy   themselves  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537  This  could  be  modelled  in  line  with  Michelman’s  proposal  (1967).  I  am  thankful  to  Steven  
Winter  for  this  suggestion.    
538  Hacker  and  Pierson,  2010.  
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political   influence,   which   in   turn   generates   additional   top   income   gains   for   them.  
Much   of   this   ‘organised   combat’   takes   place   outside   the   public   gaze,   where   paid  
lobbyists   use   the   money   of   the   wealthiest   to   influence   political   decision-­‐making.  
Since   backroom  deals,   rather   than   elections,   secure   policy   agendas,   voting   today   is  
devoid  of  meaning  and  becomes,  at  best,  an  “electoral  spectacle.”539  
     The   ‘Winner   Takes   All’   political   landscape   suggests   that,   in   the   radical  
unequal  world   in  which  we   live   today,   there   are   cases   in  which   the   profile   of   state  
expenditures   is   such  that   it   systematically   tracks   the   interests  of  a  particular  class  –  
the  financial  elite  –  failing  to  consider  the  interests  of  different  sectors  and  classes  of  
society.   Proving   this   to   be   the   case   in   concrete   cases   requires   a   level   of   empirical  
detail   that  would  highjack   the  discussion   that   concerns  us  here.540  The   crucial   take  
away  point  is  that  whenever  this  can  be  proven  to  be  the  case  empirically,  there  is  a  
normatively   important   reason   to   question   the   state’s   ability   to   legitimately   pass   on  
debt  servicing  obligations  to  the  citizenry  via  the  collection  of  taxes.    
The  two  key  claims  defended  in  this  section  are  thus  the  following:  First,  due  
to   the   fungibility   of   money,   the   relevant   question   to   determine   the   citizens’  
obligation   to  service  debt   is  not  how  the  money  raised  via  a  concrete  debt  contract  
was  used,  but  about  the  use  of  the  state  budget  overall.  Second,  since  the  citizenry  is  
composed   of   different   sectors   and   classes   with   distinct   interests,   to   determine   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539For  Piketty,  inequality  is  not  the  result  of  an  organised  combat,  but  the  mechanical  result  of  
forces   for   divergence   inherent   to   capitalism,   which   can   be   expressed   by   a   series   of  
‘fundamental  laws’  (most  famously,  r>g)  that  lead  the  share  of  capital  to  tend  to  rise,  all  else  
equal.   This   structural   explanation   is   often   combined   with   a   more   ideational   explanation,  
where  a  particular  set  of  ideas  are  set  to  drive  the  creation  and  instantiation  of  a  particular  set  
of   structures,  which  benefit   some  more   than  others.  Political   ideas  are  deployed   that   favour  
unfettered  markets.   Over   time,   these   ideas   produce   self-­‐perpetuating   structural   advantages  
for   the   richest   and   these  advantages  are   then   justified  by   invoking   the  very   same   ideas   that  
helped  bringing  them  about.  The  financialiszation  of  the  British  economy  is  explained  in  this  
manner.  See  Hopkin  and  Lynch  (2016).  Despite  of  the  differences  in  their  explanatory  theories,  
contemporary   political   economists   agree   in   their   interpretation   of   the   descriptive   evidence  
regarding  the  escape  of  the  one  percent  and  the  implication  of  the  state  therein.    
540  For  a  discussion  of  the  variations  to  which  the  Winner  Takes  All  logic  applies  empirically  in  
different  advanced  economies,  see  Matthijs  (2016).    
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citizenry’s   debt   servicing  obligation,   one  needs   to   know   in  whose   interest   the   state  
acted.  Taking  these  claims  into  account  results  in  the  following  reformulation  of  the  
second  proviso:  Citizens  cease  to  have  debt  servicing  obligations  if  the  state  budget  as  
a  whole,   regardless  of   its   source,   is   systematically  used   in   the  particular   interests  of  
any  sub-­‐group  of  the  citizenry  who  are  not  the  worst  off.  
  
High   Sovereign   Indebtedness   as   a   Threat   to   the   State’s   Ability   to   Act   in   the  
Public  Interest  
	  
Having  argued  for  the  broadening  of  the  odious  debt  doctrine’s  second  proviso  in  line  
with  the  two  modifications  defended  above,  I  now  argue  that  an  additional  normative  
reason   exists   to   question   the   state’s   ability   to   legitimately   burden   its   citizenry  with  
debt   servicing   obligations.   My   starting   point   is   the   insight   that   high   sovereign  
indebtedness  may  inhibit  the  state’s  ability  to  act  in  the  public  interest.  Against  this  
backdrop,  I  argue  that  whenever  the  acquisition  of  further  debt  threatens  the  state’s  
ability   to   act   in   the   public   interest,   this   becomes   grounds   to   question   the   citizens’  
obligation  to  service  that  debt.    
   Over   the  course  of   the  post-­‐war  period,   the  state   in  advanced  economies  
had   assumed   the   responsibility   of   providing   direction   to   the   economy   and   for  
managing   the   social   consequences   of   growth.541   But   –   as   we   saw   in   Chapter   2   -­‐   as  
growth   slumped   and  unemployment   grew,   fulfilling   these  obligations  became  more  
challenging,  and  the  state  was  threatened  by  the  eruption  of  a  ‘triple  crisis.’542  First,  a  
social   crisis   loomed   large   on   the  horizon,   as   the  distributional   conflicts   heightened  
over  a  pie  that  was  no  longer  expanding  at  the  same  pace.  Second,  the  state  faced  a  
fiscal   crisis,   as   the   state’s   tax   revenues   ceased   to   be   sufficient   to   cover   its  
expenditures.  Third,  a  legitimation  crisis  became  ever  more  likely,  as  the  state  feared  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541  For  an  analysis  of  this  argument  for  the  U.S.,  see  Krippner.  For  a  defence  of  this  argument  
for  Western  Europe,  see  Streeck.    
542  Krippner,  2011.  
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having   to   adopt   politically-­‐costly   austerity   measures   to   bring   expenditures   in   line  
with  its  revenues.543    
   Turning   to   finance   offered   a   temporary   way   out   of   this   triple   crisis   for  
advanced   economies   after   the   breakdown   of   the   Bretton  Woods   in   August   of   1971.  
Neither  wanting  to  put  in  place  a  more  progressive  tax  system,  nor  wanting  to  lower  
expenditure,   the   adoption  of  policies   that   allowed  both   the   state   and  consumers   to  
borrow   on   private   financial   markets   was   an   attractive   solution   for   the   state   to  
postpone  the  materialisation  of  any  one  of  these  three  crises.544  The  choice  to  turn  to  
finance   to   avoid   the   triple   crisis   instead   of   increasing   taxes   for   the   higher   income  
brackets   can   already   be   interpreted   as   a   political   positioning   in   defence   of   the  
interests   of   the   financial   elite.  Once   the   financial   elites   started   extending   credit   to  
their   own,   as   well   as   to   other,   governments,   however,   the   grip   they   had   on   states’  
policy  agenda  was  reinforced,  for  they  attained  a  new  form  of  claim  on  the  states,  one  
based  on  commercial  contractual  agreements.  
As  argued   for   in  Chapter  2,   the  turn  to   finance  came  hand-­‐in-­‐hand  with  the  
rise   of  what   Streeck   calls   a   ‘second   constituency’   of   the  modern   state.   This   second  
constituency   is   the   untaxed   financial   elite   that   became   the   state’s   creditors.545   As   a  
second   constituency,   the   financial   elite   attains   contractual   claims   that   the   debtor  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543  While  for  Marxist  scholars  the  legitimation  crisis  exposed  the  real  nature  of  the  state  as  a  
servant  to  the  interests  of  the  capitalist  class  –  a  capitalist  state  that  had  to  shield  its  role  in  
supporting   capitalist   accumulation   by   engaging   in   various   forms   of   social   spending  
(Habermas,   1973;   Offe,   1974),   non-­‐Marxists   scholars   sustained   that   the   origins   of   the  
legitimation  crisis  lay  in  the  democratic  polity  (Bell,  1976).  
544   Interestingly,   the   turn   to   finance  and   the  choice  away   from  a   ‘tax’   to  a   ‘debt   state’  was  a  
choice  made   across  partisan  divisions   and  by  political   leaders   across   the  political   spectrum.  
Hopkin  and  Lynch  (2016)  show,  for  instance,  how  financialisation  in  Britain  was  not  only  the  
outcome   of   policies   adopted   under   the   Thatcher   government,   but   continued   under   New  
Labour.   For   an   analysis   of   the   variation   in   the   extent   and   manner   in   which   advanced  
economies   turned   to   finance,   see  Matthijs   (2016)   and   Solt   (2014).   For   a   traditional   account  
explaining   the   distribution   of   income   and   political   influence   in   Europe   from   a   traditional  
‘varieties   of   capitalism’   perspective,   see   Hall   and   Soskice   (2001).   For   different   accounts  
explaining  the  variation  within  Europe  in  today’s  Winner  Takes  All  political  scenario,  see  the  
special  issue  of  Politics  &  Society  titled  “The  New  Politics  of  Inequality  in  Europe”  (2016).    
545  Streeck  (2013).  
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state   must   consider   and   whose   interests   may   stand   in   conflict   with   the   state’s  
citizenry,  whose  claims  on  public  policy  are  predicated  not  on  a  commercial  contract,  
but  on  their  membership  to  the  state  as  a  political  community.  The  dilemma  that  the  
debtor  state  may   face,   then,   is   trying   to  satisfy   these   two  different  constituencies  at  
the  same  time,  both  of  which  operate  on  the  basis  of  incompatible  logics.    
What  the  most  recent  crises  in  advanced  economies  revealed  is  that,  in  moments  
in  which  the  state  is  no  longer  able  to  satisfy  both  constituencies,  the  state  chooses  to  
prioritise  the  interests  of  the  financial  elite  as  the  state’s  domestic  and  international  
creditors   over   those   of   its   citizenry.546   This   prioritisation   is   manifested   in   policy,  
through   the   implementation   of   austerity   measures   in   the   debtor   state,   the   full  
repayment   to  creditors,  and   the  acquisition  of   further  debt   to  pay  off  old,  maturing  
loans  and  bonds.    
One  important  insight  that  this  analysis  reveals,  then,  is  that,  in  order  to  defend  
the  repayment  norm  -­‐  in  order  to  insist,  that  is,  that  sovereign  debts  must  always  be  
serviced  by  the  citizenry  of  the  debtor  state  -­‐  it  is  not  enough  to  simply  point  at  the  
sanctity   of   contracts.   Rather,   the   contractual   claim   that   the   creditors   hold  must   be  
seen   in   relation   to,   and  weighted   against,   the   claim   that   citizens  have,   by   virtue   of  
being  part  of  the  state  as  a  political  community.  The  conflict  of  interests  between  the  
first  and  the  second  constituency  of  the  state  highlights  the  importance  of  not  seeing  
the  contractual  claim  of  creditors  in  a  vacuum,  but  in  considering  the  weight  of  such  
claims   in   today’s   real   political   landscape,   namely   one   in  which   the   interests   of   the  
citizenry  may  be  opposed  to  those  of  an  international  financial  elite.    
The  concern  that  heavy  indebtedness  by  a  sovereign  state  may  be  inimical  to  the  
state’s  responsiveness  to  the  interests  of  its  citizenry  is  not  a  distinctly  contemporary  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546   Streeck   refers   to   this   prioritisation   of   the   second   over   the   first   constituency   as   the  
transition   from   the   ‘debt   state’   to   the   ‘consolidation   state’;   the   main   objective   of   the  
consolidation  state  being  to  reassure  creditors  that  they  will  be  repaid  (Streeck,  2013,  p.154).  
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contention.  Several  thinkers  of  the  early  to  mid-­‐modern  period  voiced  these  concerns  
very  explicitly.  Sieyès  was  hostile  to  the  entire  idea  of  sovereign  debt  and  favoured  a  
stronger   system   of   taxation   to   finance   public   expenditure.547   He   considered   the  
rejection   of   public   credit   fundamental   to   a   truly   responsive   constitutional  
government.   Hume,   in   turn,   famously   stated   that   “either   the   nation   must   destroy  
public  credit,  or  public  credit  will  destroy  the  nation.”548  The  concern  that  Sieyès  and  
Hume   shared   was   that   sovereign   debt   “could   make   government   officials   over-­‐
attentive  to  the  needs  and  desires  of  creditors.  (…)  This  dependence  would  render  the  
state   less   responsive   to   true   public   need   and   neglectful   of   the   greater   national  
interest.”549  
   The  arguments  of  such  diverse  scholars  as  Hume,  Sieyès  and  Streeck  highlight  
that   there  are  no  coincidental   reasons  why  highly   indebted  states  may  be  unable   to  
act   with   the   public   interest   at   heart,   for   the   acquisition   of   sovereign   debt   may  
progressively  undermine  its  ability  to  do  so.  This  is  partly  a  matter  of  distribution.  It  
concerns   the   question   of   how   much   of   the   state’s   budget   is   devoted   to   honour  
contractual   obligations   to   its   creditors,   and   how   much   is   devoted   to   meet   the  
legitimate  claims  of  its  citizenry.  The  more  indebted  the  state  is,  the  larger  will  be  the  
portion  of  the  budget  devoted  to  repaying  its  creditors,  and  the  more  difficult  it  may  
become  for  the  state  to  meet  the  legitimate  claims  of  its  citizenry.  The  central  worry  
is   not   a   distributive   one,   however,   but   speaks   to   the   state’s   responsiveness   to   the  
interests  of  its  citizenry.  The  main  concern  seems  to  be  that  the  highly  indebted  state  
will   lose   its   ability   to   act   in   the   name   of   the   citizenry   it   allegedly   represents;   the  
dependence   on   its   ‘second   constituency’   thus   threatening   the   state’s   very   raison  
d'être.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547  Sieyès,  2003.    
548  Hume  in  Hont,  2005,  p.325.    
549  Lienau,  2014,  p.47.  
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The  insight  that  high  sovereign  indebtedness  may  inhibit  the  state’s  ability  to  act  
in   the   public   interest   points   to   yet   another   normative   reason   to   challenge   the  
legitimacy  of  the  state  to  pass  on  debt  servicing  obligations  to  its  citizenry.  The  idea  is  
that  whenever  the  acquisition  of  further  debt  threatens  the  state’s  ability  to  act  in  the  
public   interest   –   as   understood   here   –   this   is   a   ground   to   question   the   citizens’  
obligation  to  service  that  debt.550    
Let  me  make  three  additional  clarifications  to  avoid  possible  objections.  First,  arguing  
that  the  acquisition  of  sovereign  debt  may  progressively  undermine  the  ability  of  the  
state   to   act   in   the   interest   of   its   citizenry   does   not   suggest   that   the   acquisition   of  
sovereign  debt  is  problematic  as  such.  This  is  where  my  argument  diverges  from  that  
of  Hume  and  Sieyès.  As  argued  in  the  introduction,  borrowing  might  be  justified  from  
a  distributive  justice  perspective  and  from  the  perspective  of  economic  productivity.  
The  problem,  recall,  resides  in  the  quantity  and  the  allocation  of  debt.  
Second,  one  important  aspect  that  needs  to  be  emphasised  from  Streeck’s  account  
is   the   class-­‐specific   nature   of   his   analysis.   Although   Streeck   talks   about  
‘constituencies,’   it   would   be   an   oversimplification   to   think   about   the   first  
constituency   as   a   homogenous   citizenry.   If   the   discussion   surrounding   ‘public  
interest’   revealed   anything   at   all,   then   it   is   that   it   is   misleading   to   assume   that   a  
robust  general  interest  of  the  state’s  ‘first  constituency’  exists  that  can  be  sacrificed  in  
the   name   of   the   state’s   ‘second   constituency’.   What   we   witness   in   the   cases   that  
Streeck   describes   is   a   prioritisation   of   the   interests   of   that   portion   of   the   financial  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550   To   be   sure,   this   is   not   a   question   of   debt   sustainability   -­‐   of   how  much   debt   a   state   can  
accrue  before  it  will  be  unable  to  service  the  debt  –  but  a  question  of  how  much  debt  the  state  
can  accrue  without  losing  its  ability  to  act  in  the  public  interest  of  its  citizenry.    
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elite   that   became   the   creditors   of   that   particular   state,   over   the   interests   of   that  
portion  of  the  state’s  citizenry  that  is  most  reliant  on  public  services.551  
Third,  the  alleged  rivalry  between  the  particular  interests  of  the  financial  elite  qua  
creditors   and   the  middle   and   lower   income   classes   of   the   debtor   state   needs   to   be  
qualified.  In  the  same  way  in  which  I  did  not  intend  to  suggest  that  there  is  no  such  
thing  as  a  general   interest,  but  simply  argued  that   in  most  cases,  whatever  the  state  
does  creates  relative  winners  and  losers,  it  would  be  an  oversimplification  to  maintain  
that  the  interests  of  the  financial  elite  and  the  debtor  state’s  middle  and  lower  income  
classes  are  always  opposed  to  one  another  in  a  zero-­‐sum  logic.  Austerity  policies,  for  
instance,   are  not   only   adopted   to  meet   the   conditions   of   the  multilateral   creditors,  
but  also  because  of  the  deeply  ingrained  belief  that  reducing  the  deficit  by  the  cutting  
of  expenses  is  necessary  to  boost  growth  in  the  long  term.  Similarly,  the  prioritisation  
of   creditor   repayment   in   moments   of   crisis   could   be   interpreted   as   an   attempt   to  
maintain  creditworthiness  and  ensure  future  access  to  credit,  something  which  may  
well  be  in  the  interest  of  the  citizenry  more  generally.    
What  I  am  suggesting,  then,  is  not  that  no  policies  exist  that  can  serve  the  general  
interest,  but   that   this   in   itself  may  not  be  enough  to   justify  burdening  citizens  with  
debt   servicing   obligations.   What   is   needed   is   that   the   state   considers   the   relative  
impact   its   policies   may   have   on   its   citizenry.   If   the   state   acts   in   a   way   that  
systematically   benefits   the   financial   elite,   relatively   speaking,   then   arguing   that  
certain   policies   are   in   the   general   interest   of   the   citizenry   as   a   whole   may   not   be  
enough  to  ground  the  citizenry’s  debt  servicing  obligations.    
In   short,   in   this   and   in   the  preceding   section,   I   proposed   and  defended   two  
sufficient   conditions   that   allow   us   to   challenge   the   repayment   norm,   one   which  
relates   to   the   use   of   the   state   budget,   the   second   to   the   state’s   ability   to   act   in   its  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551  For  an  excellent  account  of  how  and  why  adjustment  policies  are  class  specific  policies,  see  
Blyth  (2015).    
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citizenry’s  interest.  In  principle,  both  of  these  conditions  can  be  interpreted  from  an  
ex  ante  and  from  an  ex  post  perspective.     
   The   great   advantage   of   adopting   an   ex   ante   perspective   when   interpreting  
these  two  sufficient  conditions  is  that  the  legitimate  claims  of  repayment  of  creditors  
are   also   considered.   The   relevant   questions   here  would   be  whether,   at   the   time   of  
extending   the  debt   contract,   it  was   clear   or   should  have  been   clear   to   the   creditor,  
first,   that   the   debtor   state   does   not   act   in   the   public   interest,   and,   second,   that  
extending   that   debt   contract   would   undermine   the   state’s   ability   to   act   in   its  
citizenry’s   name.   If   the   answer   to   these   questions   is   negative,   creditors   have   a  
legitimate   claim   for   repayment   and   citizens   have   debt   servicing   obligations.   If   it   is  
affirmative,  creditors  do  not  have  a  legitimate  claim  on  repayment  and  citizens  do  not  
have   debt   servicing   obligations.   Adopting   an   ex   ante   perspective   to   interpret   these  
two   sufficient   conditions   to   challenge   the   repayment   norm  does  makes   it   easier   to  
translate  the  purely  philosophical  answer  provided  so  far  to  a  public  standard.       
   There  are  undoubtedly  cases  in  which  creditors  will  be  able  to  establish  this  in  
an  ex  ante  manner.  Especially  after  having   revised   the   first   sufficient  condition   in  a  
way   that   makes   the   use   of   the   state   budget,   and   not   of   the   money   raised   via   the  
acquisition   of   a   particular   debt   contract,   the   relevant   question   to   ask,   answering   it  
becomes  easier  from  an  ex  ante  perspective.  In  addition,  as  we  saw  in  the  preceding  
section,  there  are  cases  in  which  the  empirical  evidence  is  robust  enough  to  be  able  to  
know,   in   an   ex   ante   manner,   that   the   state’s   ability   to   act   in   the   interest   of   its  
citizenry   is   being   undermined   by   the   extension   of   further   debt.   Whenever   the  
empirical   evidence   suffices   to   establish   that   creditors   knew   or   should   have   known  
that  the  two  sufficient  conditions  for  the  legitimate  extension  of  debt  were  not  met,  
then  these  two  conditions  can  be  interpreted  in  an  ex  ante  perspective.       
   Nevertheless,   a   lot   of   sources   of   uncertainty   remain   and   contingent   factors  
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that  one  may  not  have  been  able   to   reasonably  predict   from  an  ex  ante  perspective  
may   impact   the   state’s   ability   to   act   in   the   public   interest.552   Specifying   when   the  
point  has  been   reached  where   the  extension  of  another  debt  contract   results   in   the  
state’s   inability   to   pursue   the   public   interest   in   an   ex   ante  manner  will   likely   be   a  
challenging  matter.  Just  how  difficult  it  can  be  to  identify  where  this  threshold  lies  is  
illustrated   with   the   analogous   debate   surrounding   debt   sustainability.   To   this   day,  
establishing  when  the  point  has  been  reached,  where  the  acquisition  of  further  debt  
will  make   the   sovereign  unable   to   service   its  maturing   contracts,   continues   to  be   a  
topic  of  heated  discussion  among  economists.  If   it   is  difficult  to  find  a  sustainability  
threshold  for  this  fairly  technical  question,  it  will  prove  even  more  difficult  to  find  an  
analogous   threshold   to   establish,   ex   ante,  when   the   state  will   be   so   indebted   as   to  
become  unable  to  respond  to  its  citizenry’s  interests.       
   In  the  light  of  these  difficulties,   I  propose  to   interpret  them  here  from  an  ex  
post  perspective.  From  an  ex  post  perspective,  all  we  need  to  know  in  order  to  be  able  
to  challenge  the  debt  servicing  obligations  of  the  citizenry  is  that  the  state  did  not  act  
according  to  the  public  interest,  as  understood  here,  and/or  that  it  does  not  have  the  
ability  to  do  so  due  to  its  high  indebtedness.      
   Adopting  this  ex  post  perspective  does  not  track  the  claims  of  creditors  in  the  
same   way   than   the   ex-­‐ante   perspective   would,   since   it   may   be   due   to   contingent  
factors  that  the  state  does  not  sufficiently  meet  these  conditions.  In  light  of  this,  it  is  
unsurprising   that   scholars  with   the   ambition  of  defending  a  public   standard   that   is  
readily  applicable  have  resisted  a  broader  interpretation  of  the  odious  debt  doctrine’s  
second  proviso  and  have  failed  to  consider  the  second  sufficient  condition  I  propose  
here,   for   it   would   prove   extremely   difficult   to   formalise   these   conditions   into   a  
doctrine  that  seeks  to  serve  as  a  public  standard.    
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countries,  or  extreme  market  developments.  
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That   it   cannot   be   formalised   into   a   legal   doctrine   does   not  mean,   however,  
that   it   is   normatively   insignificant.   Recall   that   the   ambition   of   this   chapter   is   to  
answer   the   philosophical   question   of   when   the   repayment   norm   ought   to   be  
challenged  from  the  perspective  of  the  citizenry’s  obligations.  Given  this  limited  aim,  
the  failure  of  finding  definitive  answers  to  questions,  such  as  the  threshold  question,  
does   not   undermine   the   force   of   the   argument  made   that   the   undermining   of   the  
state’s  ability  to  act  in  the  citizenry’s  interest  is  a  relevant  normative  consideration  to  
do  so.  Whenever  it  can  be  established  in  an  ex  post  manner,  first,  that  the  state  does  
not  use  its  budget  to  serve  the  public  interest  and,  second,  that  its  high  indebtedness  
erodes   its   ability   to   act   in   the   public   interest,   these   two   are   sufficient   normative  
reasons  to  challenge  the  repayment  norm  and  the  citizen’s  obligation  to  service  debt  
accrued  in  their  name.    
  
Conclusion  
One  background  rule  governs  the  practice  of  sovereign  borrowing  and  lending  –  the  
norm,  that   is,   that  “sovereign  borrowers  must  repay  regardless  of   the  circumstances  
of   the   initial  debt  contract,   the  actual  use  of   the   loan  proceeds,  or   the  exigencies  of  
any  potential  default.”553  It  is  so  entrenched  in  the  SD&CR    that  any  reduction  in  the  
claims  of  creditors  is  described  in  terms  of  ‘relief,’  ‘assistance,’  and  ‘forgiveness.’554       
In   this   chapter,   I   defended   two   sufficient   conditions   that   justify   challenging  
this   repayment  norm.  Taking   the   second  proviso  of   the  odious  debt  doctrine  as  my  
starting   point,   I   argued,   first,   that   whenever   the   state   uses   its   available   budget  
(regardless  of   its  source)  to  systematically  act   in  the  interests  of  any  sub-­‐group  who  
are   not   the   worst   off,   the   state   can   no   longer   legitimately   pass   on   debt   servicing  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553Lienau,  2014,  p.1.  
554  Barry  and  Tomitova,  2006,  p.53.  
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obligations  to  its  citizenry.  Second,  I  argued  that  whenever  the  acquisition  of  further  
debt  threatens  the  state’s  ability  to  act  in  the  public  interest,  this  becomes  grounds  to  
question  the  citizens’  obligation  to  service  that  debt.  
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CLOSING  REMARKS    
Hugo:  What  right  have  you  to  condemn  the  Regent’s  policy?    
Hoederer:  Do  you  imagine  I  condemn  him?  I’ve  no  time  to  waste.  He  did  
what  any  poor   fool  of  his  caste  would  have  done   in  his  place.  We’re  not  
fighting  men  or  a  policy,  but  against  the  class  which  produced  that  policy  
and  those  men.    
Hugo:  And  the  best  method  you  can  find  to  carry  on  this  fight  is  to  offer  
to  share  the  power  with  them?  
Hoederer:  Exactly.  Today,  it  is  the  best  method.555  
  
In  this  thesis,  I  have  tried  to  answer  two  central  questions:  First,  what  is  wrong  with  
the  way  in  which  the  SD&CR  currently  operates?  Second,  who  is  responsible  for  these  
injustices?  Rather  than  summarising  the  main  conclusions,  I  would  like  to  use  these  
brief  concluding  remarks  to  address  two  lingering  worries  that  my  readers  may  have,  
both   of   which   are   contained   in   Sartre’s   powerful   dialogue   between   his   'young  
comrade,'  Hugo,  and  the  party  secretary,  Hoederer.556    
   First,  with  my  structural  diagnosis  of  the  wrongs  of  the  regime  in  the  first  part  
of   the   thesis   and   the   individual   responsibility   attribution  of   the   second  part,   I  may  
have  made  many  enemies   and  no   friends.  Liberal   sceptics  may  not   see   the  value   in  
adopting   this   structural   viewpoint.  At   the   same   time,  Marxists  may   argue   that   it   is  
wrong   to   focus   on   the   responsibility   of   individual   agents,   for   they   may   simply   be  
doing   “what   any   poor   fool   of   his   caste   would   have   done   in   his   place.”   Perhaps   we  
ought   not   be   in   the   business   of   attributing   individual   responsibility,   for   “we’re   not  
fighting  men  or  a  policy,  but  against  the  class  which  produced  that  policy  and  those  
men.”  Why  put  so  much  effort  in  the  first  part  of  this  thesis  in  providing  a  structural  
diagnosis,   only   to   defend   an   integrated   responsibility   model   that   focuses   on  
individual  agents?    
   The  answer  that  I  have  tried  to  defend  is  that  we  simply  need  both.  We  need  a  
structural   analysis,  but  we  also  need   to  have   the  necessary   conceptual   apparatus   to  
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distribute   responsibility   to   individual   agents   in   cases   of   structural   injustice.   This  
cannot   only   be   a   shared,   forward-­‐looking   type   of   responsibility   that   we   discharge  
collectively   –   accountability   for   individual   contributions   to   structural   injustice   is  
equally   important.  Otherwise,  behind   the  vague   invocation  of   ‘structural  processes,’  
we  occlude   the   real,  often  political,  choices  made  by   the  most  powerful  private  and  
public  actors.  Contributions  to  structural  injustice,  with  their  immense  consequences  
for  the  lives  of  thousands  and  even  millions  of  people,  would  otherwise  be  rendered  
invisible.    
   Throughout  the  different  chapters  of  Part  II,  I  also  progressively  moved  away  
from   a  moral   discussion   on   the   grounds   of   which   responsibility   can   be   attributed,  
towards  a  political  understanding  of  responsibility.  I  hinted  at  three  ways  in  which  we  
can  think  about  discussions  surrounding  responsibility  becoming  explicitly  political.  
The  first  is  reserved  to  the  way  in  which  social  connection  theorists  talk  about  shared,  
forward-­‐looking   responsibilities   as   political   responsibilities   that   can   only   be  
collectively   discharged.   The   second   relates   to   the   political   responsibilities   that   role  
responsible   agents   have   by   virtue   of   the   authority   vested   in   them.   The   third   is   a  
political  way  of   theorising   about   responsibility,   because   it   shifts   the   emphasis   from  
the  question  of   the  moral  grounds  on  which  responsibility  can  be  attributed,   to   the  
question   of   where   the   pressure   points   in   the   structure   are,   that   would   allow   for  
meaningful  change  to  occur.  The  relevant  question  then  becomes:  Which  actors  face  
a  set  of  options  that  enable  them  not  simply  to  instantiate  or  transmit  the  dictates  of  
the  structure,  but  to  change  it?  The  answer  surely  must  be  that  all  actors  have  options  
at   their  disposal   that  can  contribute   to  meaningful  change   in   the  structure.  To   that  
extent,  they  should  act  accordingly.  
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   This  leads  me  to  the  second  lingering  thought  with  which  my  readers  may  be  
grappling,   and   that   is   Lenin’s   ‘burning   question’:   “What   is   to   be   done?”557   The  
objective  of  critique  may  have  seemed  a  moving  target.  Is  this  thesis  a  critique  to  the  
acquisition  of  sovereign  debt  as  such?  Is  it  criticising  the  absence  of  a  sovereign  debt  
restructuring  facility  as  the  ‘gaping  hole’  in  the  international  financial  architecture?  Is  
it   objecting   to   a   highly-­‐financialised   form   of   capitalism?   Or   is   it   a   critique   of  
capitalism  as  such?  I  believe  there  to  be  some  truth  in  each  one  of  these  questions.    
I  hope  to  have  been  clear  about  the   fact  that  my  critique   is  not  a  Sieyesian  one,  
which   denounces   all   debt   acquisition   by   sovereigns   and   proposes,   instead,   to  
uniquely  rely  on  the  fiscal  policy  leaver.  Rather,  I  defended  two  claims:  First,  I  argued  
that   sovereign   debt   is   problematic   when   too   much   debt   is   accrued   (quantitative  
aspects)   and   invested   in   a  way   that   is  neither   equitable  nor   sustainable   (qualitative  
aspect).  Crucially,  the  quantitative  question  does  not  only  relate  to  debt  sustainability  
as   a   technical-­‐economic   threshold,   but   to   a   political   threshold.   Sovereign   debt   is  
problematic  when  too  much  debt  is  accrued,  rendering  the  state  unable  to  act  in  the  
name  of  those  it  is  supposed  to  represent.  Second,  I  argued  that  the  problem  resides  
in  a  highly  asymmetrical  and  unjust  SD&CR,  which  makes  occupiers  of  positions  of  
disadvantage  vulnerable  to  domination  and  exploitation  when  debt  is  accrued  in  their  
name.  The  response  to  the  first  claim  is  that  more  attention  needs  to  be  paid  to  both  
the   qualitative   and   the   quantitative   aspects   of   sovereign   borrowing   and   lending   by  
debtor   governments.   The   response   to   the   second   claim   requires   more   radical  
changes.      
A  moderate  reform  is  the  establishment  of  a  sovereign  debt  restructuring  facility.  
Though   comparatively   moderate,   it   is   an   extremely   important   step   that   would  
alleviate  some  of  the  injustices  of  the  current  SD&CR.  It  is  deeply  worrying  that,  after  
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the   adoption   by   the   United   Nations   General   Assembly   of   basic   principles   on  
sovereign   debt   restructuring   in   September   2015,   no   substantive   policy   proposal   has  
been   made   to   date.   A   statutory   mechanism   to   restructure   debt   would   break   the  
‘creditor  cartel’  and  give  debtor  states  who  are  unable  to  pay  a  more  equal  voice  at  the  
negotiating  table.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  moreover,  it  is  a  proposal  that,  at  least  in  
principle,   should   be   able   to   garner   political   support   from   across   the   political  
spectrum.    
A  more  radical   response   to   the  second  claim   is   to  make   financial  capitalism  the  
object   of   critique.   The   historical   juncture   from   which   the   analysis   in   this   thesis  
departs  may  also  suggest  a  certain  degree  of  nostalgia  for  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  
To  be  sure,  I  take  it  to  be  both  undesirable  in  principle  and  politically  impossible  at  
this  point  in  time  to  simply  call  for  a  return  to  the  Bretton  Woods  era.  Nonetheless,  
the   Bretton  Woods   regime   did   have   important   achievements   that   ought   not   to   be  
underestimated.  It  was  a  period  of  remarkable  financial  stability  and  capital  controls  
were  extremely  effective   in   throwing  sand   in   the  wheels  of   finance.   I   take   it   to  be  a  
crucial   exercise   for   academics   and  policy  makers   to   think,   first,   about  which  of   the  
desirable  features  of  the  Bretton  Woods  regime  can  be  adapted  to  the  global  economy  
of  the  21st  century  and,  second,  about  how  to  create  the  political  conditions  that  could  
make  their  implementation  desirable.    
The  analysis  of  financialisation  presented  in  Chapter  2  may  suggest,  however,  that  
none  of  this  is  enough.  If  financialisation  is  a  bad  solution  to  the  stagnating  economy  
of   the   1970s   or,   to   use  more  Marxist   language,   to   the   inherent   crisis   tendencies   of  
capitalism,   then   another   solution   is   needed.   What   conclusion   to   draw   from   this,  
however,   is   still   an   open   question.   One   might   think   that   the   only   solution   is   the  
abolition  of   capitalism   in  all   its  historic,   specific   forms.  Or  one  might   think,   in   line  
with  radical  liberal  thinkers  such  as  Hobson  or  Schumpeter,  that  the  response  lies  in  
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the  overhaul  of  the  anachronistic  socio-­‐political  structure  that  capitalism  takes  today.  
A   radical   redistribution   may   be   an   alternative   solution   to   the   problems   posed   by  
financialisation.    
This   resonates   closely   with   the   argument  made   towards   the   end   of   Chapter   4,  
when  discussing   the  emancipatory  prospects  of  a   return   to   the  nation-­‐state,   for   the  
most   interesting   answer   to   Lenin’s   question  may  be   one   that   brings   us   back   to  my  
defence   of   individual   political   responsibility   against   the   backdrop   of   a   structural  
diagnosis:   As   citizens,   we   need   to   think   about   the   amalgam   of   options   that   are  
available  to  the  state  that  we  inhabit,  cast  our  vote,  and  mobilise  in  our  communities  
to   defend   and   promote   social-­‐democracy   over   neoliberal   orthodoxy   in   every   single  
policy   area.  While   this  may   not   be   as   radical   a   solution   as   needed,   and  may   imply  
“offer(ing)   to   share   the  power  with   them,”   it  most  definitely   is   the  best  method  we  
have  today.    
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